following article i read/pasted from indian express
Coercion? God forbid, if something happens...
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Posted: Dec 17, 2008 at 0108 hrs IST
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New Delhi: In 2001, when India mobilised troops on its western border after the attack on Parliament, the biggest worry at Air Headquarters was numbers. With lack of replacements depleting the fighter squadron strength, Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, who had just taken charge, was concerned that the fighter numbers were probably not adequate. All he wanted was to keep the existing fleet going.
Seven years down the line, as India again talks about coercive diplomacy after the Mumbai Terror attacks, the situation has worsened, especially in the IAF which is grappling with delays in procurement, bureaucratic wrangles and bad planning.
Where is this talk about coercion when you cannot defend? When your defences are weak, what are you going to coerce with? asks Krishnaswamy.
The former Air Chief has reason to be angry.
Consider this: the squadron strength of the IAF is at an all time low with only 32 fighter units operational. The only new acquisition since 2001 has been three squadrons of the Su-30 MKI. All other programmes, including a deal to purchase 126 fighters and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, will take at least five years to fructify before new aircraft enter service.
While it has been argued that with the induction of multi-role fighters, numbers can be cut down by replacing older generation aircraft with technologically superior fighters, the IAF maintains there can be no replacement for sheer force levels.
The depleting number of aircraft cannot be made up merely with better technology. Numbers in war are important. The counter to falling aircraft strength is adding more airplanes, says former Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi.
Analysts say modern fighters can carry out a number of different missions but in a full blown conflict, sheer numbers count and the rapidly depleting force level is affecting the capability of the IAF to carry out wide scale operations in the event of war.
Given that the LCA project is running behind schedule, India has no option but to acquire more aircraft from other sources. The operational capability of the air force would till then continue to suffer, says Tyagi.
Whats more worrying, even the reliability of the numbers that the IAF possesses is questionable. More than a third of IAFs operational strength consists of obsolete MiG-21 aircraft. These aircraft are so ancient, says Krishnaswamy, that it is a miracle how they are maintained.
Other frontline aircraft, including the Mirage-2000, are due for upgradation. The Mirage, which proved its mettle during the Kargil war by delivering precision guided bombs on enemy positions, is in urgent need of modernisation but the process has been stuck in bureaucratic wrangles. While negotiations with France have been on for more than two years, the deal has been in the final phase of consultations for close to six months. Insiders say an agreeable price has not been reached yet.
... contd.
Coercion? God forbid, if something happens...
Font Size Manu Pubby
Posted: Dec 17, 2008 at 0108 hrs IST
Print Email Feedback Discuss
Related Stories:
New Delhi: In 2001, when India mobilised troops on its western border after the attack on Parliament, the biggest worry at Air Headquarters was numbers. With lack of replacements depleting the fighter squadron strength, Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy, who had just taken charge, was concerned that the fighter numbers were probably not adequate. All he wanted was to keep the existing fleet going.
Seven years down the line, as India again talks about coercive diplomacy after the Mumbai Terror attacks, the situation has worsened, especially in the IAF which is grappling with delays in procurement, bureaucratic wrangles and bad planning.
Where is this talk about coercion when you cannot defend? When your defences are weak, what are you going to coerce with? asks Krishnaswamy.
The former Air Chief has reason to be angry.
Consider this: the squadron strength of the IAF is at an all time low with only 32 fighter units operational. The only new acquisition since 2001 has been three squadrons of the Su-30 MKI. All other programmes, including a deal to purchase 126 fighters and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, will take at least five years to fructify before new aircraft enter service.
While it has been argued that with the induction of multi-role fighters, numbers can be cut down by replacing older generation aircraft with technologically superior fighters, the IAF maintains there can be no replacement for sheer force levels.
The depleting number of aircraft cannot be made up merely with better technology. Numbers in war are important. The counter to falling aircraft strength is adding more airplanes, says former Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi.
Analysts say modern fighters can carry out a number of different missions but in a full blown conflict, sheer numbers count and the rapidly depleting force level is affecting the capability of the IAF to carry out wide scale operations in the event of war.
Given that the LCA project is running behind schedule, India has no option but to acquire more aircraft from other sources. The operational capability of the air force would till then continue to suffer, says Tyagi.
Whats more worrying, even the reliability of the numbers that the IAF possesses is questionable. More than a third of IAFs operational strength consists of obsolete MiG-21 aircraft. These aircraft are so ancient, says Krishnaswamy, that it is a miracle how they are maintained.
Other frontline aircraft, including the Mirage-2000, are due for upgradation. The Mirage, which proved its mettle during the Kargil war by delivering precision guided bombs on enemy positions, is in urgent need of modernisation but the process has been stuck in bureaucratic wrangles. While negotiations with France have been on for more than two years, the deal has been in the final phase of consultations for close to six months. Insiders say an agreeable price has not been reached yet.
... contd.
