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China's Hawks in Command
July 1, 2012, 12:43 p.m. ET
By WILLY LAM
July 1, 2012, 12:43 p.m. ET
By WILLY LAM
The Chinese Communist Party has begun to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy over the past few years. To some extent this is to be expected as the country's economic and military clout grows substantially. But a key factor has so far been overlooked: The unprecedented influence of People's Liberation Army generals in the formulation of foreign policy.
Military officers in most countries are not allowed to speak in public about their countries' foreign or security policies. This was also true in China under former leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, as well as the first five-year term of current General Secretary Hu Jintao. Since 2010, however, PLA hawks have been making belligerent statements in the official media.
This trend grew more pronounced late last year when Rear Admiral Yang Yi urged the abandonment of Deng's diplomatic dictum to "keep a low profile and never take the lead." "It's no longer possible for China to keep a low profile," he said. "When any country infringes upon our nation's security and interests, we must stage a resolute self-defense," he said. By "resolute self defense," Admiral Yang says he means a "quick, low-cost and effective counter-attack."
Last month, Major General Han Xudong, who teaches at the PLA's National Defense University, went further. He said that it's time the country abandoned its "anti-expansionist" doctrine. In an article in the state-owned Global Times newspaper entitled "The defensive mentality has hobbled China's overseas expansion," he unabashedly called for an expansionist policy in the military, geopolitical and economic arenas.
Gen. Han indicated that while it had been traditional Chinese policy "not to seek hegemonism," this should not be construed to mean that the country should not pursue expansionist goals. "Only if we've smashed the 'non-expansionist' mental block can China speed up its transition from a regional power to a global power," he wrote.
Associated Press
The generals seem to be pushing the country toward a confrontational approach in sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, one of the most dangerous flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific Region. Their rhetoric is simple: The PLA should no longer hesitate to punish countries that dispute China's claims to myriad islets, as well as the oil and gas resources under them.
Major General Luo Yuan recently scolded "nationalistic warmongers" in the Philippines, whose naval vessels have since May been locked in a confrontation with Chinese counterparts close to the Scarborough Shoal (known as the Huangyan Islet in China). He warned, "If Manila can't rein in these kids, let's do the job for them." Referring to a possible naval battle with the Philippines, he added, "We have repeatedly exercised forbearanceand our patience has run its course. There is no more need to take caution."
The PLA and its strategists are behind the decision last month to establish Sansha City, a new municipal-level unit in Hainan province that is responsible for administering archipelagoes including the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, many of which are claimed by neighboring nations. While the idea for setting up Sansha was first mooted by the Chinese leadership in 2007, the foreign-policy establishment opposed it. A number of career diplomats argued that such a move might fan the flames of the "China threat" theory in Southeast Asian countries, not to mention the United States.
Up until last year, senior academics specializing in international relations criticized unnamed generals for meddling in foreign policy. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal in October 2010, for example, Tsinghua University Professor Chu Shulong complained that "the Chinese military is too powerful in decision-making, especially on foreign policy."
A few months later, Peking University Professor Wang Jisi laid into a host of hawkish commentators, including military personnel, for voicing "reckless statements, made with no official authorization [that] created a great deal of confusion." Such pronouncements included identifying the South China Sea as China's "core interests" and that the PLA was ready to use military means to defend challenges to China's sovereignty over these strategic waters.
Since mid-2011, however, even high-powered academics such as Messrs. Wang and Chu have not dared contradict the generals. Major General Zhang Zhaozhong recently claimed that there are "more than one million traitors" in China and elaborated that "some of our scholars are trained by the Americans." "They read American books, accepted American ideals and they are now helping the U.S. to fool the Chinese," he added in a talk widely disseminated online.
The generals gained clout partly because of the increasing conflict within the Communist Party's leadership ahead of the 18th Party Congress scheduled for this October or November. The military has always been guaranteed 20% of the seats of the powerful Central Committee, which at least in theory elects Politburo members. So the major factions rely on the generals for support in the horse-trading and skullduggery that are the trademark of every congress.
Just as important as the Politburo is the Party's organ for controlling the PLA, the Central Military Commission. The man supposed to take over as the Party's top leader, Xi Jinping, is facing resistance to his bid to also become chairman of the CMC, as Mr. Hu would like to remain chairman for at least two years. Mr. Xi has enlisted the support of several dozen "princeling generals" in the PLA, and in return for their backing he is willing to give the top brass a bigger say in foreign policy.
While the PLA has China's civilian leaders over a barrel for now, the Party may try to reassert its primacy over foreign policy after this fall's congress. But with an economic slowdown already underway, it will be difficult to put the genie of nationalism back in the bottle.
