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SOURCE: DNA INDIA
At the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at Ufa on July 9, India raised the issue of Beijing refusing to allow United Nations action against Pakistan for freeing Mumbai terror attack mastermind Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. China defended its position saying that it had taken its position on objective grounds. This was an example of how China despite friendly protestations refuses to take into account India’s concerns.
This unyielding stance along with the friendly overtures has now become part of China’s diplomatic mask when dealing with India. It was seen in the ceremonial extragavanza that Xi had staged on the occasion of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China in May. But behind it all was the underlying Chinese policy to contain India. Beijing was, of course, willing to increase bilateral economic relations with India, but there was no satisfactory move towards resolving the border dispute. India has been responding resolutely to Chinese intrusions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while working towards improved economic relations with China.
China’s aggressive stance towards India could be seen when its State-owned television station displayed an Indian map without Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir during Modi’s visit. In an apt response, Modi told the Chinese authorities to resist from expressing or displaying anything which was bound to needlessly exacerbate Sino-Indian relations.
The fact is that Xi’s visit following Modi’s triumphant electoral victory in May, 2014, indicated that China had realised that an era of weak coalition governments in India was over, and that a cohesive government would be less tolerant of Chinese blandishments than before. Underscoring Chinese earnestness for investments in India, a delegation of 135 Chinese CEOs accompanied Xi to India. Over $20 billion in Chinese investments in India over the next five years was announced and Indian companies were promised greater market access to China. Apart from subsequent benefits to India, it would abate India’s monumental trade deficit of $40 billion with China.
In the Chinese barometer of power politics, the strength of a country is a crucial determinant of its stature. The strength is further heightened if that country happens to be in China’s neighbourhood. The prolonged and contested Sino-Indian geographical border is a paramount factor determining China’s relationship with India. India occupies more space in Chinese strategic and security calculations than any other country in Asia.
Additionally, India’s sprawling landmass, population, and national strength qualify it as worthy of more attention than other countries within China’s geographical proximity.
After the tragic border war in 1962, India and China severed diplomatic relations and their relationship was marked by hostility and mistrust. The last three decades have witnessed gradual improvement in exchanges between the two Asian neighbours. But tacit antagonism has been the overriding mood in the bilateral relations.
To keep up sustained pressure on India, China has enlisted the support of Pakistan for the past five decades and repeatedly shored up Islamabad with financial aid, weapons, and transfer of nuclear technology.
Amid such feints and Byzantine intrigues of regional diplomacy, Modi and his advisors have set out to chart a navigable path for Indian diplomacy to safeguard India’s interests. The feather in Modi’s cap from the China visit has come by way of securing an agreement of $22 billion in bilateral commercial Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the two countries, commitment to strive to reduce India’s trade deficit with China, emphasis for peace on the Sino-Indian border, and facilitating the visits of Chinese tourists to India to contribute towards compatibility between the Indian and Chinese cultures and as a source of generating revenue for the country’s exchequer.
The author analyses international affairs
At the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at Ufa on July 9, India raised the issue of Beijing refusing to allow United Nations action against Pakistan for freeing Mumbai terror attack mastermind Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. China defended its position saying that it had taken its position on objective grounds. This was an example of how China despite friendly protestations refuses to take into account India’s concerns.
This unyielding stance along with the friendly overtures has now become part of China’s diplomatic mask when dealing with India. It was seen in the ceremonial extragavanza that Xi had staged on the occasion of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China in May. But behind it all was the underlying Chinese policy to contain India. Beijing was, of course, willing to increase bilateral economic relations with India, but there was no satisfactory move towards resolving the border dispute. India has been responding resolutely to Chinese intrusions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), while working towards improved economic relations with China.
China’s aggressive stance towards India could be seen when its State-owned television station displayed an Indian map without Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir during Modi’s visit. In an apt response, Modi told the Chinese authorities to resist from expressing or displaying anything which was bound to needlessly exacerbate Sino-Indian relations.
The fact is that Xi’s visit following Modi’s triumphant electoral victory in May, 2014, indicated that China had realised that an era of weak coalition governments in India was over, and that a cohesive government would be less tolerant of Chinese blandishments than before. Underscoring Chinese earnestness for investments in India, a delegation of 135 Chinese CEOs accompanied Xi to India. Over $20 billion in Chinese investments in India over the next five years was announced and Indian companies were promised greater market access to China. Apart from subsequent benefits to India, it would abate India’s monumental trade deficit of $40 billion with China.
In the Chinese barometer of power politics, the strength of a country is a crucial determinant of its stature. The strength is further heightened if that country happens to be in China’s neighbourhood. The prolonged and contested Sino-Indian geographical border is a paramount factor determining China’s relationship with India. India occupies more space in Chinese strategic and security calculations than any other country in Asia.
Additionally, India’s sprawling landmass, population, and national strength qualify it as worthy of more attention than other countries within China’s geographical proximity.
After the tragic border war in 1962, India and China severed diplomatic relations and their relationship was marked by hostility and mistrust. The last three decades have witnessed gradual improvement in exchanges between the two Asian neighbours. But tacit antagonism has been the overriding mood in the bilateral relations.
To keep up sustained pressure on India, China has enlisted the support of Pakistan for the past five decades and repeatedly shored up Islamabad with financial aid, weapons, and transfer of nuclear technology.
Amid such feints and Byzantine intrigues of regional diplomacy, Modi and his advisors have set out to chart a navigable path for Indian diplomacy to safeguard India’s interests. The feather in Modi’s cap from the China visit has come by way of securing an agreement of $22 billion in bilateral commercial Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between the two countries, commitment to strive to reduce India’s trade deficit with China, emphasis for peace on the Sino-Indian border, and facilitating the visits of Chinese tourists to India to contribute towards compatibility between the Indian and Chinese cultures and as a source of generating revenue for the country’s exchequer.
The author analyses international affairs
