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China-in-Pakistan to hinder Indias growth and power - Opinion - DNA
Harsh V Pant | Friday, October 8, 2010"]Harsh V Pant | Friday, October 8, 2010
As tensions mount in East Asia between China and Japan and Beijing makes it clear that it intends to defy international opinion to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan, something seems to be changing in New Delhi too.
Our sage-like prime minister who has previously described China as Indias greatest neighbour has now been suggesting that Beijing could be tempted to use Indias soft underbelly, Kashmir, and Pakistan, to keep India in low-level equilibrium.
Our ultra-cautious defence minister has admitted that there has been an increasing assertiveness on the part of China. After trying to push significant divergences with China under the carpet for years, Indian decision-makers are being forced to acknowledge that relationship with China is becoming increasingly contentious. The challenge now is to understand China and its motivations clearly.
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Divisions within China about the future course of its foreign policy are starker than before. It is now being suggested that much like young Japanese officers in the 1930s, young Chinese military officers are increasingly taking charge of strategy with the result that rapid military growth is shaping broader foreign policy objectives. Civil-military relations are under stress with the PLA asserting its pride more forcefully and demanding respect from other states. A country needs respect, and a military also needs respect, wrote a major-general recently in the PLAs paper.
It is also possible that Chinas aggression is a symbol of its weaknesses, a result of its sense of internal vulnerabilities. The clampdown on media and internal dissent is stronger than ever before. Troubled regions of Tibet and Xinjiang are being tightly controlled. And in that context the very success of India poses a challenge.
While the Chinese Communist Party can continue to self-righteously claim that the western model of political and economic governance is not an ideal one, it is more difficult to counter the Indian model which offers a different pattern of development, and in a democratic framework. In that sense, its a battle of ideas between China and India as much as anything else.
Though China overtook Japan as the worlds second-largest economy as far back as 2001 in purchasing power parity terms, it was last month that China bypassed Japan in terms of nominal GDP measured in current exchange rate terms. By 2020 China is expected to be the largest economic partner of every single country in the Asia-Pacific. Measured against this standard, Chinese policy makers, by and large, dont consider Japan and India as competitors.
India is not very important in Chinas foreign policy calculus and there is a general perception that India can be easily pushed around. The chaos of Indian democracy is seen as reason for Indias vacillating foreign policy. New Delhis actions have strengthened that impression. The Chinese believe that a strong reaction to Indian foreign policy overtures would be enough to
deter New Delhi from countering Chinas moves.
It is not clear if China has well-defined external policy objectives, though her means, both economic and military, to pursue them, are greater now than at any time in the recent past. Pakistan, of course, has always been a crucial foreign policy asset for China but with Indias rise and US-India rapprochement, its role in Chinas grand strategy is bound to grow.
There is no need for India to counter China by matching weapon for weapon or bluster for bluster. India will have to look inwards to prepare for the China challenge. After all, China has not prevented India from pursing economic reforms and decisive governance, developing its infrastructure and border areas, and from intelligently investing in military capabilities. If India could deal with the China challenge in 1987, when there was a real border standoff between the two, there should be less need for alarm today when India is a much stronger nation, economically and militarily.
A resurgent India of 2010 needs new reference points to manage its complex relationship with the superpower-in-waiting China. A start can be made by making the Henderson-Brooks Commission report public so that an honest debate can commence on China and the challenge it poses.
India will also have to work more purposefully with other powers, most notably the US, in countering China. After the initial hoopla about a G2, Chinas relationship with the US has also soured. The recent Chinese bluster on the issue of South China Sea too provides an opening for New Delhi to cultivate security ties with countries in East Asia. Given the legitimate interests that all regional states have in such an undertaking, cooperation in this realm will be easier to achieve.
Chinas Global Times had warned last year that India needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China. India should raise the stakes high enough so that instead of New Delhi, its Beijing that is forced to consider seriously the consequences of a potential confrontation.
Harsh V Pant | Friday, October 8, 2010"]Harsh V Pant | Friday, October 8, 2010
As tensions mount in East Asia between China and Japan and Beijing makes it clear that it intends to defy international opinion to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan, something seems to be changing in New Delhi too.
Our sage-like prime minister who has previously described China as Indias greatest neighbour has now been suggesting that Beijing could be tempted to use Indias soft underbelly, Kashmir, and Pakistan, to keep India in low-level equilibrium.
Our ultra-cautious defence minister has admitted that there has been an increasing assertiveness on the part of China. After trying to push significant divergences with China under the carpet for years, Indian decision-makers are being forced to acknowledge that relationship with China is becoming increasingly contentious. The challenge now is to understand China and its motivations clearly.
Article continues below the advertisement...
Divisions within China about the future course of its foreign policy are starker than before. It is now being suggested that much like young Japanese officers in the 1930s, young Chinese military officers are increasingly taking charge of strategy with the result that rapid military growth is shaping broader foreign policy objectives. Civil-military relations are under stress with the PLA asserting its pride more forcefully and demanding respect from other states. A country needs respect, and a military also needs respect, wrote a major-general recently in the PLAs paper.
It is also possible that Chinas aggression is a symbol of its weaknesses, a result of its sense of internal vulnerabilities. The clampdown on media and internal dissent is stronger than ever before. Troubled regions of Tibet and Xinjiang are being tightly controlled. And in that context the very success of India poses a challenge.
While the Chinese Communist Party can continue to self-righteously claim that the western model of political and economic governance is not an ideal one, it is more difficult to counter the Indian model which offers a different pattern of development, and in a democratic framework. In that sense, its a battle of ideas between China and India as much as anything else.
Though China overtook Japan as the worlds second-largest economy as far back as 2001 in purchasing power parity terms, it was last month that China bypassed Japan in terms of nominal GDP measured in current exchange rate terms. By 2020 China is expected to be the largest economic partner of every single country in the Asia-Pacific. Measured against this standard, Chinese policy makers, by and large, dont consider Japan and India as competitors.
India is not very important in Chinas foreign policy calculus and there is a general perception that India can be easily pushed around. The chaos of Indian democracy is seen as reason for Indias vacillating foreign policy. New Delhis actions have strengthened that impression. The Chinese believe that a strong reaction to Indian foreign policy overtures would be enough to
deter New Delhi from countering Chinas moves.
It is not clear if China has well-defined external policy objectives, though her means, both economic and military, to pursue them, are greater now than at any time in the recent past. Pakistan, of course, has always been a crucial foreign policy asset for China but with Indias rise and US-India rapprochement, its role in Chinas grand strategy is bound to grow.
There is no need for India to counter China by matching weapon for weapon or bluster for bluster. India will have to look inwards to prepare for the China challenge. After all, China has not prevented India from pursing economic reforms and decisive governance, developing its infrastructure and border areas, and from intelligently investing in military capabilities. If India could deal with the China challenge in 1987, when there was a real border standoff between the two, there should be less need for alarm today when India is a much stronger nation, economically and militarily.
A resurgent India of 2010 needs new reference points to manage its complex relationship with the superpower-in-waiting China. A start can be made by making the Henderson-Brooks Commission report public so that an honest debate can commence on China and the challenge it poses.
India will also have to work more purposefully with other powers, most notably the US, in countering China. After the initial hoopla about a G2, Chinas relationship with the US has also soured. The recent Chinese bluster on the issue of South China Sea too provides an opening for New Delhi to cultivate security ties with countries in East Asia. Given the legitimate interests that all regional states have in such an undertaking, cooperation in this realm will be easier to achieve.
Chinas Global Times had warned last year that India needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China. India should raise the stakes high enough so that instead of New Delhi, its Beijing that is forced to consider seriously the consequences of a potential confrontation.