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Briefing: Teeth of the dragon
Author:Robert Hewson - Air-Launched Weapons Editor, London
Last posted:2011-01-17
Content
Air combat weapons
Future missiles
Short-range AAMs
Air-to-surface weapons
More new missiles
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE FD-60/PL-11
CHINA'S RUSSIAN WEAPONS
China is setting its sights on expanding its air-to-air and air-to-surface weapon inventory. Robert Hewson reports
The fascinating emergence of China's J-XX next-generation combat aircraft demonstrator in late 2010 has refocused attention on the pace of military aerospace development in the People's Republic. The carefully stage-managed revelation of the large and unconventional 'new Chengdu machine 2001', or J-20, as many are calling it, seems to confirm that China has grand industrial ambitions and attention-getting operational requirements.
Whether the '2001 programme' will fulfil any of those aims remains to be seen. At this early stage there is still more than a hint of amateur dramatics surrounding the aircraft and the speed with which this secret project has been exposed to the outside world. All early assessments of its capabilities should be restrained, but the 2001 programme is nevertheless the fourth or fifth new combat aircraft development project in China - as many as those from the rest of the world combined.
Even before the arrival of the J-XX, China was heavily engaged with the Chengdu J-10 multirole fighter and what could be a significantly enhanced successor in the shape of the J-10B. At Shenyang the J-11B has emerged as an 'indigenised' Su-27 with combat capabilities that far exceed China's original Sukhoi Su-27SK and baseline J-11 aircraft. Similar development work may be transforming a two-seat J-11 into the J-11BS strike attack platform, which could be China's answer to the Su-30MKK. These projects are joined by the J-15 carrier-based fighter programme, derived from the Su-33. There are even more concepts for fifth-generation (what China calls its fourth-generation) aircraft taking shape at Shenyang that we have not yet seen.
To this list of aircraft programmes should be added the Xi'an JH-7A and the latest H-6 bomber variants. With little of the fanfare that has surrounded the J-10, for example, these two well-proven types are now among the most significant combat assets in the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The H-6 has been transformed from a 1950s anachronism to a cruise missile shooter and stand-off maritime attack platform. Meanwhile, the JH-7A has become the PLAAF's most capable delivery system for precision-guided munitions - with the ability to carry Kh-31 (AS-17 'Krypton') very high-speed air-to-surface missiles - plus a growing electronic attack capability.
An essential component of China's expanding air power ambitions are the weapons needed by its combat aircraft force. To that end, China is pursuing a range of new weapons developments that, in terms of individual programmes, outnumber the aircraft projects by a ratio of 3:1. These include improved air-to-air missiles (AAMs), air-to-surface missiles for use against a multiplicity of targets and families of guided bombs. There is also an associated but distinct sphere of small weapons development driven by China's increasing number of armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programmes.
Air combat weapons
China's primary indigenous beyond-visual-range (BVR) AAM is the SD-10 (and enhanced SD-10A). It is a product of the Luoyang Electro-Optical Technology Development Center (LOEC), which provides a core element of the air weapons capability within the giant Aviation Industries Corporation of China (AVIC) industrial bloc. The SD-10 was the first radar-guided AAM to be developed at LOEC, which was already well established as China's centre of excellence for infrared (IR)-guided air-to-air weapons.
After a relatively low level of achievement in previous medium-range AAM development efforts, the SD-10 emerged quite quickly during the last decade as China's first state-of-the-art BVR weapon. China clearly recognised that it lacked the ability to produce essential components for the kind of air-to-air weapons that would be needed by its new generation of Chengdu J-10 and Shenyang J-11 fighters that entered service in the early 2000s. In the mid-1990s, as the J-10 and J-11 designs were finalised, so too was a high-priority air-to-air weapon programme to equip these indigenous fighters with an indigenous missile.
It should be noted that SD-10 is the export label for this missile. The designation PL-12 has been applied to the equivalent weapon in PLAAF service. LOEC has repeatedly said that the PL-12 designation is speculative and incorrect, while declining to identify the missile further. The PL-12 designation is in widespread use in all Chinese sources and is generally accepted to refer to a missile that has superior performance to the export-standard SD-10. When the PLAAF displayed the SD-10 as part of its landmark presence at the 2010 Airshow China, it labelled the missile only as SD-10.
The first photographs of the SD-10 appeared in 2001 and by 2002 its existence had been acknowledged by Chinese industry officials. The missile probably entered service on early-model J-10s around 2004-05 but was not photographed on operational aircraft until late 2006. Data on the missile has emerged largely through marketing efforts by CATIC (China Aviation Technology Import-Export Corporation). The SD-10 is part of the baseline weapon fit for Pakistan's JF-17 Thunder lightweight fighters (jointly developed with AVIC) and it is noteworthy that China has allowed one of its most modern weapons to be exported so early in its operational career.
The SD-10 is roughly comparable with the US-developed Raytheon AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). Both missiles follow a similar design and mode of operation.
The SD-10 is an active-radar-guided AAM that uses an inertial navigation system during mid-course flight before switching to its own onboard seeker for the terminal phase. Updated target information can be datalinked to the airborne missile by the launch aircraft. It is powered by a dual-thrust solid rocket motor and has a maximum range of about 70 km in a head-on engagement.
Although the SD-10 looks very similar to the AIM-120, it is longer, heavier and fatter. These dimensions - particularly the wider body diameter, which points to a longer-burning rocket motor - suggest that the SD-10 is on a par with, or capable even of outperforming, existing AMRAAM variants, at least in kinematic terms. The SD-10 has not been tested or proven in the same way the AIM-120 family has - over thousands of intense industry and military trials in the US and elsewhere, to say nothing of the AIM-120's combat experience.
In November 2010 a startling claim was made for the Chinese missile. Officials from LOEC said that the SD-10 was designed from its inception to function with a dual-mode seeker operating in distinct active and passive radar homing modes. If this is accurate, then the SD-10 is a considerably more capable weapon than hitherto believed. In fact, it would be the first AAM to enter service with this acknowledged capability.
In lengthy discussions during the 2010 Airshow China event, LOEC described the operating modes of the SD-10 in detail. The missile has an active radar seeker capability, which has been public knowledge since the first details of the SD-10 were officially released. What remained unspoken was the missile's claimed ability to home in on radar or electronic warfare emissions from the target aircraft, without support from the launch aircraft or use of the missile's own active seeker modes.
A LOEC official stated that the passive mode was operational and proven, although not intended to be the missile's primary targeting mode - and he cited the risks to friendly aircraft when relying on passive guidance mode alone. It is not clear if the SD-10's seeker can continuously alternate between active and passive modes in flight, or if it makes a less-sophisticated 'one-time' switch.
In Russia the AGAT Design Bureau has developed several dual-mode seekers (active-passive and active-semi-active) that it only began to publicly discuss in 2009. AGAT's active-passive design operates by switching back and forth between its two modes over the entire engagement cycle. A central, circular active array on the missile's gimballed seeker head is surrounded by a ring of seven smaller passive detectors. AGAT claims that, in passive mode, the seeker can detect a fighter aircraft's emitting fire control radar at distances of up to 200 km. This significantly outreaches the active seeker, which has a maximum lock-on range of about 20 km.
Senior AGAT officials have remained vague when asked who paid for their latest seeker development programmes, noting only that there is no Russian application and no Russian state support for them.
During the 1990s China also gained access to the 9B-1032 passive seeker developed by Avtomatika for the Vympel R-27P (AA-10 'Alamo-E') AAM. A melding of these two design inputs might explain how China arrived at its SD-10 seeker design. According to a LOEC official, the dual-mode capability was designed into the SD-10 from the beginning of the programme.
As is often the case, China's claim that the SD-10 is a wholly indigenous product are wide of the mark. The missile was developed with considerable Russian design input and uses basic hardware acquired from a number of specialist Russian (and probably Ukrainian) companies. There appears to have been a deliberate and well-executed effort to acquire specific items, such as the active seeker, control and actuation systems and inertial navigation systems. China purchased batches of items from various suppliers with the intention of establishing a local production capability based on the knowledge thus acquired.
From the beginning of this acquisition project in 1993-94 that aim was achieved - more or less - over the next eight to 10 years. Certainly the SD-10 has entered front-line PLAAF ser-vice and the initial weapon has been followed by the improved SD-10A. However, according to Chinese company officials the SD-10A has not introduced any greatly improved performance. Instead it has addressed cost and reliability issues with the original missile.
Speaking in July 2010, one Russian missile systems designer, who acknowledged the supply of active-radar seeker hardware for the original SD-10 development project in the 1990s, said: "We worked with China for a while but now they think they know it all. However, it's entirely possible that they are still buying some components from Russia. The impression they give is that they are trying to do all the components themselves, but I don't know about that."
In November 2010 a LOEC official hinted that co-operation with outside sources was still ongoing when he noted: "We [LOEC] have the capability to make the seeker ourselves, but obviously we want it to be the best it possibly can be." He confirmed that the missile still relied on some (unidentified) components that were sourced outside China, commenting that the SD-10 was "like a mobile phone" in that respect.
LOEC maintains that only two versions of the missile have been developed to date: the original SD-10 and the current SD-10A. The SD-10A incorporates some small airframe design changes; it is roughly 10 cm longer and 19 kg heavier than the SD-10 according to company figures. LOEC also suggests that the SD-10A's range has been increased, although perhaps only slightly, from 70 km to what it now says is "more than 70 km". Despite this, the most important improvements were to the missile's reliability and affordability.
According to LOEC the SD-10A remains more costly than the company would like. This may be a reflection of the high failure rate of some subcomponents, which the company says it is working hard to remedy. Improvements to both of these aspects produced the SD-10A, said LOEC.
Future missiles
Much speculation surrounds future development of the SD-10 and China's efforts to field a next-generation, extended-range AAM. For several years speculative advanced missile designs have appeared via Chinese internet sources. Different illustrations of the same handful of supposed designs have remained in circulation and in late 2010 the rumour mill got a renewed boost with the publication of a detailed chart purporting to show the official developmental timeline of three new missile types.
The timeline depicts a series of enhanced SD-10/PL-12 variants, including a so-called PL-12B (perhaps analogous to the SD-10A, it has a claimed development period of 2006-08), PL-12C (seemingly optimised for internal carriage, with a claimed development period of 2006-10) and PL-12D (a ramjet-powered variant, with a claimed development period of 2006-10). Beyond the PL-12D is a larger weapon dubbed the PL-21: a purpose-built ramjet-powered AAM. The PL-21 is credited with a development period of 2006-12.
The chart also shows several short-range missile variants, although only one of these is a potentially new project: China's supposed next-generation IR-guided dogfight missile, which is now referred to by several local sources as the PL-10. It is an evolution of an earlier concept for an advanced short-range missile, previously identified as PL-ASR. The supposed programme development dates for this missile are 2006-10.
There is no evidence whatsoever that any of these weapons exist. While the chart illustrates what would clearly be a logical - and therefore quite likely - development path, the bold vision it depicts is not backed up by any concrete facts. It is true that similar-looking illustrations have appeared in several sources over the years, suggesting that some underlying truth is sustaining them. The missile timeline chart's veracity is also supported, to some degree, by the inclusion of several officially acknowledged AAM developments, such as the evolution of the PL-5C to the PL-5D and the PL-8A to the PL-8B.
However, the slow progression of these now-outdated short-range AAMs underlines how China's AAM developers have yet to demonstrate real 'leap-ahead' progress. The supposed new PL-12 and PL-21 series remain chimeras and their existence has been flatly denied in conversations with LOEC; the centre dismissed them as "inventions of enthusiasts but not products of our company".
Asked about what future extended-range AAM developments were under way, one official said that most of the work done so far remained theoretical. He noted that debate continues in China regarding the benefits of ramjets versus rocket booster propulsion systems. In this respect China's designers seem to be echoing the thoughts of their Russian counterparts, who have also been less keen to fully embrace ramjets on grounds of cost and complexity.
More significantly, it was stated that China lacks experience in small ramjet engines of the kind needed for AAMs and that this was a brake on progress as much as any philosophical reason.
There was also a telling admission that China is not rushing to develop a ramjet-powered AAM because the United States has not done so. It was acknowledged that US designs have heavily influenced the routes China has chosen to follow with its own AAM designs and was candidly told: "We are smart because we usually follow others."
Conversations in 2010 about 'the new Chengdu machine 2001' brought widespread acknowledgement of the aircraft and the programme behind it well before its surprise appearance at the end of the year. Although 2001's existence was recognised with many knowing smiles, the need for a new set of weapons to equip it was not expressed. Several weapons industry officials noted that China's current generation of weapons would be adequate and that deployment of the aircraft was still so far away that it was not directly pushing any new developments.
Short-range AAMs
The slow pace of development in China's air-to-air weapons is most obvious in the short-range missile field. The PLAAF's deployed weapons include a number of missiles with their roots in the 1980s or earlier. There is no sign yet that China is close to fielding an agile dogfight missile to rival now-standard Western weapons like the IRIS-T, AIM-9X or ASRAAM. China's Russian-sourced fighter aircraft are armed with the R-73 (AA-11 'Archer') and the pilots of these aircraft are equipped with the same helmet-mounted sights as their Russian counterparts. The R-73 is an ageing, but still effective, weapon that outperforms the rest of the PLAAF's short-range missile inventory of PL-5, PL-8 and PL-9 weapons.
Described as a 'second-generation' AAM, the PL-5 was a straightforward copy of the AIM-9G Sidewinder design with a similar level of performance. Its history dates back to the 1960s, having been modernised across several versions before arriving at its current PL-5D/E form, which is perhaps equivalent to the AIM-9L.
A step-up in performance came with the PL-8, copied directly from Python 3 missiles supplied to China in the 1980s. The PL-8 outclassed the PL-5 by virtue of its more powerful, longer-burning motor and better seeker. As the PL-8B, this missile was upgraded with a new two-colour seeker for improved countermeasures resistance.
The PL-8 led directly to the PL-9, which should stand as China's most modern short-range AAM, even though it is not much more than a reconfigured PL-8. The PL-9 was first seen in the late 1980s but it is not clear that it has entered PLAAF service. J-10 fighter aircraft are usually armed with PL-8s. The PL-9 is claimed to be compatible with all current Chinese fighters and it has been exported, most recently to Nigeria, to equip Chengdu F-7NIs. Beyond its uncertain operational status, the PL-9 is still not an advanced, agile design and is clearly outclassed by its peers in the rest of the world.
Evidence that China is working on improved short-range weapons dates back to at least 2004, when photos of a thrust-vectoring system under test were displayed for the first time. So, too, were components for a 128 x128 InSb staring IR seeker (plus seeker dome materials). Since then there has been little more than sketchy talk of developmental tests coupled with the so-called PL-ASR/PL-10 and its rumoured progress.
The PL-10 appears to be an agile, short-range, dogfight weapon with thrust-vectored controls (TVC). Its wingless, tail-controlled design uses narrow strakes along the main body to generate lift. The first illustrations of the PL-ASR (as it was referred to at the time) bore a striking similarity to Denel's A-Darter missile. In later conversations with Denel it was admitted that China had sought assistance on AAM programmes, but these contacts were rebuffed and there was no link between the two countries. It is perhaps significant that the PL-10 design depicted in the 2010 missile chart has a new configuration that looks a lot less like the A-Darter (and a lot more like the IRIS-T).
Air-to-surface weapons
The high priority China has given to developing a new class (new to China, at least) of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) has seen Chinese industry replicate the achievements of its Western counterparts in one third of the time. Over the course of about 10 years (compared to at least 30), China has produced a series of laser-guided - then GPS/INS-guided and now dual-mode (laser/GPS) - PGMs with ever-increasing efficiency. There has also been a parallel emphasis on stand-off weapon development and electro-optical (EO) guidance technology for land attack and anti-ship weapons. These weapons are equipping China's tactical fighter and bomber forces and are now spreading into the realm of UAVs. Yet another set of developers is working on new helicopter weapons for aircraft like the Z-10 and WZ-9G.
New information on almost all of these different areas emerged during November 2010's Airshow China event, with a particular emphasis on small PGMs and larger stand-off weapons.
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) is active in both fields through its FT (Fei Teng, meaning 'to soar') series of PGMs. Current versions include the baseline 500 kg class FT-1 and 250 kg class FT-3 INS/GPS-guided bombs. When fitted with range-extension kits these two weapons become the FT-2 and FT-6 respectively. The pop-out wings give both bombs a gliding range of up to 90 km. According to CASC, these weapons can be used against "hostile political targets, military headquarters, [industrial] plants, harbours, power plants, transformer substations, communication centres and ground forces".
The FT-5 is described by CASC as "a small-diameter bomb" and it stands apart from the other FT weapons by virtue of its smaller size and revised airframe configuration (CASC does not appear to have an FT-4). The FT-5 weighs between 55 kg and 75 kg, according to CASC.
At Airshow China, CASC made reference to "an additional seeking system that greatly improves its delivery precision", allowing the weapon to "precisely attack small point targets" with CEP (circular error probability) accuracy of around 5 m. The INS/GPS-guided FT weapons are accurate to between 10 m and 20 m CEP.
The new guidance system for the FT-5 is almost certainly a semi-active laser (SAL) seeker, allowing precise terminal guidance by the launch aircraft or forces on the ground. CASC is integrating the FT-5 on its CH-3 medium-range long-endurance UAV. Drop tests with unguided weapons began in 2009 and a CASC official stated that guided tests would be completed in 2011.
it was also claimed that this armed CH-3 configuration was being sold to Pakistan, with 20 air vehicles to be acquired.
A similar SAL-equipped enhanced guidance fit has been developed by LOEC for two new variants of its LS-6 guided weapon family. The 50 kg LS-6(50) and 100 kg LS-6(100) use some of the basic GPS/INS guidance components of the much larger LS-6(250) and LS-6(500) but with a redesigned airframe and a new laser seeker for enhanced precision.
The two previously unseen 'small-diameter' LS-6s have a specially developed tubular warhead fitted with a tail kit housing the bombs' GPS/INS guidance systems and actuated control surfaces. Four long-span, short-chord wing surfaces are strapped onto the bomb body to provide extra lift for gliding range. Each weapon is tipped with a circular SAL seeker. LOEC says that an IR seeker is a future guidance option.
Development of the small-diameter LS-6s does not seem to be as advanced as for the CASC FT-5. LOEC says that it has clients for the weapons but that drop testing has not yet begun. LOEC placed less emphasis on UAV operations with its small weapons, noting they were best suited to expanding the warload of aircraft like the J-10 and JH-7. A LOEC official noted that the LS-6(50) and LS-6(100) were also well-suited to internal carriage. The official added that this was not yet a design feature on any current Chinese combat aircraft but would emerge on China's coming fifth-generation fighter.
More new missiles
A new derivative of CASC's well-proven C-802 design takes the missile beyond its primary anti-ship role and firmly into the land attack arena. Designated CM-802AKG, it is based on the C-802A but is fitted with an imaging IR seeker (replacing the original radar seeker), plus a datalink. A new blast/fragmentation warhead, better matched to infrastructure targets, has also been added. The missile weighs about 700 kg and has an effective range in the 200 km to 280 km bracket. A CASC promotional video shows animation of a CM-802AKG launched by a JH-7A to destroy a building complex.
At the other end of the size scale, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) showed the previously unknown TB-1 multipurpose airborne PGM. Closely resembling a QW-18 or QW-19 man-portable air defence system-type weapon (which CASIC also produces), the lightweight TB-1 can be used in air-to-surface or air-to-air roles. It uses SAL guidance, requiring the launch aircraft to maintain a laser designator lock on the target for the missile's entire duration of flight. An armour-piercing shaped-charge blast/fragmentation warhead is fitted. The TB-1 was shown alongside a neat twin-tube launcher, clearly designed for helicopter or UAV carriage.
CASIC also provided outline details of yet another previously unknown PGM type, the YZ-200 series of guided bombs. According to the company, there are nine types of YZ-200 spanning the 50 kg, 125 kg and 250 kg weight classes. It is assumed that each weapon can be fitted with a choice of seekers and perhaps a rocket booster and/or wing kit.
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE FD-60/PL-11.
China's 'other BVR AAM' is a missile that has gone by even more names than the SD-10/PL-12. At first glance it pre-dates the SD-10 and is a less capable weapon. It should be quitting Chinese service as the SD-10 replaces it. Instead, this missile is being integrated onto new platforms and is carried alongside the SD-10 on front-line fighters, including the J-10.
This missile began life as a copy of the AIM-7 Sparrow semi-active radar homing missile. Early-model AIM-7s were replicated in China in a programme dating back to the 1970s, with little reported success. The designation PL-10 was associated with these 'first pass' missiles, although that same label is now being applied to a possible new short-range AAM.
In the 1980s, with significant input from Alenia, a second replication effort was launched using the Italian company's Aspide design to produce a missile designated PL-11. Alenia delivered several batches of Aspides to China with the intention of establishing a complete production line there. Italian co-operation with China lasted for a period of about three years until 1989, but was suspended completely in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Independently, China continued to work on the PL-11 and there were several reports during the 1990s that the missile had been adapted to an active radar seeker design known as AMR-1. The fate of this project is unclear, but when the SD-10 became an acknowledged programme it was assumed no further effort would be devoted to the less-capable PL-11.
Instead the PL-11 began to appear on front-line J-10 and J-10A aircraft and, in 2004, the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation announced it would be exporting the missile as the FD-60. Nothing more was heard of these plans or the new export designation until the PLAAF displayed the PL-11 at Airshow China 2010, using the FD-60 name. The PL-11/FD-60 continues to be deployed on current PLAAF fighters, including the J-10, J-11B and late-model J-8 interceptors.
CHINA'S RUSSIAN WEAPONS
Alongside its own multifaceted weapons development, China has acquired a significant array of armaments from Russian suppliers.
As the PLAAF made the transition from the single-role Su-27SK/J-11 air superiority fighter to the Su-30MKK heavyweight strike fighter, it adopted an increasingly sophisticated weapons set.
Along with standard Russian AAMs, like the R-27 (AA-10 'Alamo') and R-73 (AA-11 'Archer'), China took delivery of a large number of the RVV-AE (AA-12 'Adder') active-radar AAMs. Indeed, it was largely Chinese orders (along with some from India) that sustained the production lines for these missiles in Russia and Ukraine.
The Su-30MKK and Su-30MK2 brought new precision strike weapons to China, including the Region 1500 kg-class FAB-1500 guided bomb family and Raduga Kh-59M EO-guided stand-off weapon. To meet a specific Chinese requirement for a long-range anti-ship weapon, Raduga developed the Kh-59MK: a radar-guided, turbojet-powered weapon with a range of up to 285 km. The Kh-59MK is thought to be a unique Chinese asset.
China has also been quick to adopt the Kh-31 (AS-17 'Krypton') high-speed anti-ship and defence suppression weapon. A production capability for this missile appears to have been established in China under the designation YJ-91.
Significantly, this missile became the first Russian weapon to be integrated with a Chinese platform: the JH-7A attack aircraft.
IHSJ
Author:Robert Hewson - Air-Launched Weapons Editor, London
Last posted:2011-01-17
Content
Air combat weapons
Future missiles
Short-range AAMs
Air-to-surface weapons
More new missiles
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE FD-60/PL-11
CHINA'S RUSSIAN WEAPONS
China is setting its sights on expanding its air-to-air and air-to-surface weapon inventory. Robert Hewson reports
The fascinating emergence of China's J-XX next-generation combat aircraft demonstrator in late 2010 has refocused attention on the pace of military aerospace development in the People's Republic. The carefully stage-managed revelation of the large and unconventional 'new Chengdu machine 2001', or J-20, as many are calling it, seems to confirm that China has grand industrial ambitions and attention-getting operational requirements.
Whether the '2001 programme' will fulfil any of those aims remains to be seen. At this early stage there is still more than a hint of amateur dramatics surrounding the aircraft and the speed with which this secret project has been exposed to the outside world. All early assessments of its capabilities should be restrained, but the 2001 programme is nevertheless the fourth or fifth new combat aircraft development project in China - as many as those from the rest of the world combined.
Even before the arrival of the J-XX, China was heavily engaged with the Chengdu J-10 multirole fighter and what could be a significantly enhanced successor in the shape of the J-10B. At Shenyang the J-11B has emerged as an 'indigenised' Su-27 with combat capabilities that far exceed China's original Sukhoi Su-27SK and baseline J-11 aircraft. Similar development work may be transforming a two-seat J-11 into the J-11BS strike attack platform, which could be China's answer to the Su-30MKK. These projects are joined by the J-15 carrier-based fighter programme, derived from the Su-33. There are even more concepts for fifth-generation (what China calls its fourth-generation) aircraft taking shape at Shenyang that we have not yet seen.
To this list of aircraft programmes should be added the Xi'an JH-7A and the latest H-6 bomber variants. With little of the fanfare that has surrounded the J-10, for example, these two well-proven types are now among the most significant combat assets in the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). The H-6 has been transformed from a 1950s anachronism to a cruise missile shooter and stand-off maritime attack platform. Meanwhile, the JH-7A has become the PLAAF's most capable delivery system for precision-guided munitions - with the ability to carry Kh-31 (AS-17 'Krypton') very high-speed air-to-surface missiles - plus a growing electronic attack capability.
An essential component of China's expanding air power ambitions are the weapons needed by its combat aircraft force. To that end, China is pursuing a range of new weapons developments that, in terms of individual programmes, outnumber the aircraft projects by a ratio of 3:1. These include improved air-to-air missiles (AAMs), air-to-surface missiles for use against a multiplicity of targets and families of guided bombs. There is also an associated but distinct sphere of small weapons development driven by China's increasing number of armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programmes.
Air combat weapons
China's primary indigenous beyond-visual-range (BVR) AAM is the SD-10 (and enhanced SD-10A). It is a product of the Luoyang Electro-Optical Technology Development Center (LOEC), which provides a core element of the air weapons capability within the giant Aviation Industries Corporation of China (AVIC) industrial bloc. The SD-10 was the first radar-guided AAM to be developed at LOEC, which was already well established as China's centre of excellence for infrared (IR)-guided air-to-air weapons.
After a relatively low level of achievement in previous medium-range AAM development efforts, the SD-10 emerged quite quickly during the last decade as China's first state-of-the-art BVR weapon. China clearly recognised that it lacked the ability to produce essential components for the kind of air-to-air weapons that would be needed by its new generation of Chengdu J-10 and Shenyang J-11 fighters that entered service in the early 2000s. In the mid-1990s, as the J-10 and J-11 designs were finalised, so too was a high-priority air-to-air weapon programme to equip these indigenous fighters with an indigenous missile.
It should be noted that SD-10 is the export label for this missile. The designation PL-12 has been applied to the equivalent weapon in PLAAF service. LOEC has repeatedly said that the PL-12 designation is speculative and incorrect, while declining to identify the missile further. The PL-12 designation is in widespread use in all Chinese sources and is generally accepted to refer to a missile that has superior performance to the export-standard SD-10. When the PLAAF displayed the SD-10 as part of its landmark presence at the 2010 Airshow China, it labelled the missile only as SD-10.
The first photographs of the SD-10 appeared in 2001 and by 2002 its existence had been acknowledged by Chinese industry officials. The missile probably entered service on early-model J-10s around 2004-05 but was not photographed on operational aircraft until late 2006. Data on the missile has emerged largely through marketing efforts by CATIC (China Aviation Technology Import-Export Corporation). The SD-10 is part of the baseline weapon fit for Pakistan's JF-17 Thunder lightweight fighters (jointly developed with AVIC) and it is noteworthy that China has allowed one of its most modern weapons to be exported so early in its operational career.
The SD-10 is roughly comparable with the US-developed Raytheon AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). Both missiles follow a similar design and mode of operation.
The SD-10 is an active-radar-guided AAM that uses an inertial navigation system during mid-course flight before switching to its own onboard seeker for the terminal phase. Updated target information can be datalinked to the airborne missile by the launch aircraft. It is powered by a dual-thrust solid rocket motor and has a maximum range of about 70 km in a head-on engagement.
Although the SD-10 looks very similar to the AIM-120, it is longer, heavier and fatter. These dimensions - particularly the wider body diameter, which points to a longer-burning rocket motor - suggest that the SD-10 is on a par with, or capable even of outperforming, existing AMRAAM variants, at least in kinematic terms. The SD-10 has not been tested or proven in the same way the AIM-120 family has - over thousands of intense industry and military trials in the US and elsewhere, to say nothing of the AIM-120's combat experience.
In November 2010 a startling claim was made for the Chinese missile. Officials from LOEC said that the SD-10 was designed from its inception to function with a dual-mode seeker operating in distinct active and passive radar homing modes. If this is accurate, then the SD-10 is a considerably more capable weapon than hitherto believed. In fact, it would be the first AAM to enter service with this acknowledged capability.
In lengthy discussions during the 2010 Airshow China event, LOEC described the operating modes of the SD-10 in detail. The missile has an active radar seeker capability, which has been public knowledge since the first details of the SD-10 were officially released. What remained unspoken was the missile's claimed ability to home in on radar or electronic warfare emissions from the target aircraft, without support from the launch aircraft or use of the missile's own active seeker modes.
A LOEC official stated that the passive mode was operational and proven, although not intended to be the missile's primary targeting mode - and he cited the risks to friendly aircraft when relying on passive guidance mode alone. It is not clear if the SD-10's seeker can continuously alternate between active and passive modes in flight, or if it makes a less-sophisticated 'one-time' switch.
In Russia the AGAT Design Bureau has developed several dual-mode seekers (active-passive and active-semi-active) that it only began to publicly discuss in 2009. AGAT's active-passive design operates by switching back and forth between its two modes over the entire engagement cycle. A central, circular active array on the missile's gimballed seeker head is surrounded by a ring of seven smaller passive detectors. AGAT claims that, in passive mode, the seeker can detect a fighter aircraft's emitting fire control radar at distances of up to 200 km. This significantly outreaches the active seeker, which has a maximum lock-on range of about 20 km.
Senior AGAT officials have remained vague when asked who paid for their latest seeker development programmes, noting only that there is no Russian application and no Russian state support for them.
During the 1990s China also gained access to the 9B-1032 passive seeker developed by Avtomatika for the Vympel R-27P (AA-10 'Alamo-E') AAM. A melding of these two design inputs might explain how China arrived at its SD-10 seeker design. According to a LOEC official, the dual-mode capability was designed into the SD-10 from the beginning of the programme.
As is often the case, China's claim that the SD-10 is a wholly indigenous product are wide of the mark. The missile was developed with considerable Russian design input and uses basic hardware acquired from a number of specialist Russian (and probably Ukrainian) companies. There appears to have been a deliberate and well-executed effort to acquire specific items, such as the active seeker, control and actuation systems and inertial navigation systems. China purchased batches of items from various suppliers with the intention of establishing a local production capability based on the knowledge thus acquired.
From the beginning of this acquisition project in 1993-94 that aim was achieved - more or less - over the next eight to 10 years. Certainly the SD-10 has entered front-line PLAAF ser-vice and the initial weapon has been followed by the improved SD-10A. However, according to Chinese company officials the SD-10A has not introduced any greatly improved performance. Instead it has addressed cost and reliability issues with the original missile.
Speaking in July 2010, one Russian missile systems designer, who acknowledged the supply of active-radar seeker hardware for the original SD-10 development project in the 1990s, said: "We worked with China for a while but now they think they know it all. However, it's entirely possible that they are still buying some components from Russia. The impression they give is that they are trying to do all the components themselves, but I don't know about that."
In November 2010 a LOEC official hinted that co-operation with outside sources was still ongoing when he noted: "We [LOEC] have the capability to make the seeker ourselves, but obviously we want it to be the best it possibly can be." He confirmed that the missile still relied on some (unidentified) components that were sourced outside China, commenting that the SD-10 was "like a mobile phone" in that respect.
LOEC maintains that only two versions of the missile have been developed to date: the original SD-10 and the current SD-10A. The SD-10A incorporates some small airframe design changes; it is roughly 10 cm longer and 19 kg heavier than the SD-10 according to company figures. LOEC also suggests that the SD-10A's range has been increased, although perhaps only slightly, from 70 km to what it now says is "more than 70 km". Despite this, the most important improvements were to the missile's reliability and affordability.
According to LOEC the SD-10A remains more costly than the company would like. This may be a reflection of the high failure rate of some subcomponents, which the company says it is working hard to remedy. Improvements to both of these aspects produced the SD-10A, said LOEC.
Future missiles
Much speculation surrounds future development of the SD-10 and China's efforts to field a next-generation, extended-range AAM. For several years speculative advanced missile designs have appeared via Chinese internet sources. Different illustrations of the same handful of supposed designs have remained in circulation and in late 2010 the rumour mill got a renewed boost with the publication of a detailed chart purporting to show the official developmental timeline of three new missile types.
The timeline depicts a series of enhanced SD-10/PL-12 variants, including a so-called PL-12B (perhaps analogous to the SD-10A, it has a claimed development period of 2006-08), PL-12C (seemingly optimised for internal carriage, with a claimed development period of 2006-10) and PL-12D (a ramjet-powered variant, with a claimed development period of 2006-10). Beyond the PL-12D is a larger weapon dubbed the PL-21: a purpose-built ramjet-powered AAM. The PL-21 is credited with a development period of 2006-12.
The chart also shows several short-range missile variants, although only one of these is a potentially new project: China's supposed next-generation IR-guided dogfight missile, which is now referred to by several local sources as the PL-10. It is an evolution of an earlier concept for an advanced short-range missile, previously identified as PL-ASR. The supposed programme development dates for this missile are 2006-10.
There is no evidence whatsoever that any of these weapons exist. While the chart illustrates what would clearly be a logical - and therefore quite likely - development path, the bold vision it depicts is not backed up by any concrete facts. It is true that similar-looking illustrations have appeared in several sources over the years, suggesting that some underlying truth is sustaining them. The missile timeline chart's veracity is also supported, to some degree, by the inclusion of several officially acknowledged AAM developments, such as the evolution of the PL-5C to the PL-5D and the PL-8A to the PL-8B.
However, the slow progression of these now-outdated short-range AAMs underlines how China's AAM developers have yet to demonstrate real 'leap-ahead' progress. The supposed new PL-12 and PL-21 series remain chimeras and their existence has been flatly denied in conversations with LOEC; the centre dismissed them as "inventions of enthusiasts but not products of our company".
Asked about what future extended-range AAM developments were under way, one official said that most of the work done so far remained theoretical. He noted that debate continues in China regarding the benefits of ramjets versus rocket booster propulsion systems. In this respect China's designers seem to be echoing the thoughts of their Russian counterparts, who have also been less keen to fully embrace ramjets on grounds of cost and complexity.
More significantly, it was stated that China lacks experience in small ramjet engines of the kind needed for AAMs and that this was a brake on progress as much as any philosophical reason.
There was also a telling admission that China is not rushing to develop a ramjet-powered AAM because the United States has not done so. It was acknowledged that US designs have heavily influenced the routes China has chosen to follow with its own AAM designs and was candidly told: "We are smart because we usually follow others."
Conversations in 2010 about 'the new Chengdu machine 2001' brought widespread acknowledgement of the aircraft and the programme behind it well before its surprise appearance at the end of the year. Although 2001's existence was recognised with many knowing smiles, the need for a new set of weapons to equip it was not expressed. Several weapons industry officials noted that China's current generation of weapons would be adequate and that deployment of the aircraft was still so far away that it was not directly pushing any new developments.
Short-range AAMs
The slow pace of development in China's air-to-air weapons is most obvious in the short-range missile field. The PLAAF's deployed weapons include a number of missiles with their roots in the 1980s or earlier. There is no sign yet that China is close to fielding an agile dogfight missile to rival now-standard Western weapons like the IRIS-T, AIM-9X or ASRAAM. China's Russian-sourced fighter aircraft are armed with the R-73 (AA-11 'Archer') and the pilots of these aircraft are equipped with the same helmet-mounted sights as their Russian counterparts. The R-73 is an ageing, but still effective, weapon that outperforms the rest of the PLAAF's short-range missile inventory of PL-5, PL-8 and PL-9 weapons.
Described as a 'second-generation' AAM, the PL-5 was a straightforward copy of the AIM-9G Sidewinder design with a similar level of performance. Its history dates back to the 1960s, having been modernised across several versions before arriving at its current PL-5D/E form, which is perhaps equivalent to the AIM-9L.
A step-up in performance came with the PL-8, copied directly from Python 3 missiles supplied to China in the 1980s. The PL-8 outclassed the PL-5 by virtue of its more powerful, longer-burning motor and better seeker. As the PL-8B, this missile was upgraded with a new two-colour seeker for improved countermeasures resistance.
The PL-8 led directly to the PL-9, which should stand as China's most modern short-range AAM, even though it is not much more than a reconfigured PL-8. The PL-9 was first seen in the late 1980s but it is not clear that it has entered PLAAF service. J-10 fighter aircraft are usually armed with PL-8s. The PL-9 is claimed to be compatible with all current Chinese fighters and it has been exported, most recently to Nigeria, to equip Chengdu F-7NIs. Beyond its uncertain operational status, the PL-9 is still not an advanced, agile design and is clearly outclassed by its peers in the rest of the world.
Evidence that China is working on improved short-range weapons dates back to at least 2004, when photos of a thrust-vectoring system under test were displayed for the first time. So, too, were components for a 128 x128 InSb staring IR seeker (plus seeker dome materials). Since then there has been little more than sketchy talk of developmental tests coupled with the so-called PL-ASR/PL-10 and its rumoured progress.
The PL-10 appears to be an agile, short-range, dogfight weapon with thrust-vectored controls (TVC). Its wingless, tail-controlled design uses narrow strakes along the main body to generate lift. The first illustrations of the PL-ASR (as it was referred to at the time) bore a striking similarity to Denel's A-Darter missile. In later conversations with Denel it was admitted that China had sought assistance on AAM programmes, but these contacts were rebuffed and there was no link between the two countries. It is perhaps significant that the PL-10 design depicted in the 2010 missile chart has a new configuration that looks a lot less like the A-Darter (and a lot more like the IRIS-T).
Air-to-surface weapons
The high priority China has given to developing a new class (new to China, at least) of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) has seen Chinese industry replicate the achievements of its Western counterparts in one third of the time. Over the course of about 10 years (compared to at least 30), China has produced a series of laser-guided - then GPS/INS-guided and now dual-mode (laser/GPS) - PGMs with ever-increasing efficiency. There has also been a parallel emphasis on stand-off weapon development and electro-optical (EO) guidance technology for land attack and anti-ship weapons. These weapons are equipping China's tactical fighter and bomber forces and are now spreading into the realm of UAVs. Yet another set of developers is working on new helicopter weapons for aircraft like the Z-10 and WZ-9G.
New information on almost all of these different areas emerged during November 2010's Airshow China event, with a particular emphasis on small PGMs and larger stand-off weapons.
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) is active in both fields through its FT (Fei Teng, meaning 'to soar') series of PGMs. Current versions include the baseline 500 kg class FT-1 and 250 kg class FT-3 INS/GPS-guided bombs. When fitted with range-extension kits these two weapons become the FT-2 and FT-6 respectively. The pop-out wings give both bombs a gliding range of up to 90 km. According to CASC, these weapons can be used against "hostile political targets, military headquarters, [industrial] plants, harbours, power plants, transformer substations, communication centres and ground forces".
The FT-5 is described by CASC as "a small-diameter bomb" and it stands apart from the other FT weapons by virtue of its smaller size and revised airframe configuration (CASC does not appear to have an FT-4). The FT-5 weighs between 55 kg and 75 kg, according to CASC.
At Airshow China, CASC made reference to "an additional seeking system that greatly improves its delivery precision", allowing the weapon to "precisely attack small point targets" with CEP (circular error probability) accuracy of around 5 m. The INS/GPS-guided FT weapons are accurate to between 10 m and 20 m CEP.
The new guidance system for the FT-5 is almost certainly a semi-active laser (SAL) seeker, allowing precise terminal guidance by the launch aircraft or forces on the ground. CASC is integrating the FT-5 on its CH-3 medium-range long-endurance UAV. Drop tests with unguided weapons began in 2009 and a CASC official stated that guided tests would be completed in 2011.
it was also claimed that this armed CH-3 configuration was being sold to Pakistan, with 20 air vehicles to be acquired.
A similar SAL-equipped enhanced guidance fit has been developed by LOEC for two new variants of its LS-6 guided weapon family. The 50 kg LS-6(50) and 100 kg LS-6(100) use some of the basic GPS/INS guidance components of the much larger LS-6(250) and LS-6(500) but with a redesigned airframe and a new laser seeker for enhanced precision.
The two previously unseen 'small-diameter' LS-6s have a specially developed tubular warhead fitted with a tail kit housing the bombs' GPS/INS guidance systems and actuated control surfaces. Four long-span, short-chord wing surfaces are strapped onto the bomb body to provide extra lift for gliding range. Each weapon is tipped with a circular SAL seeker. LOEC says that an IR seeker is a future guidance option.
Development of the small-diameter LS-6s does not seem to be as advanced as for the CASC FT-5. LOEC says that it has clients for the weapons but that drop testing has not yet begun. LOEC placed less emphasis on UAV operations with its small weapons, noting they were best suited to expanding the warload of aircraft like the J-10 and JH-7. A LOEC official noted that the LS-6(50) and LS-6(100) were also well-suited to internal carriage. The official added that this was not yet a design feature on any current Chinese combat aircraft but would emerge on China's coming fifth-generation fighter.
More new missiles
A new derivative of CASC's well-proven C-802 design takes the missile beyond its primary anti-ship role and firmly into the land attack arena. Designated CM-802AKG, it is based on the C-802A but is fitted with an imaging IR seeker (replacing the original radar seeker), plus a datalink. A new blast/fragmentation warhead, better matched to infrastructure targets, has also been added. The missile weighs about 700 kg and has an effective range in the 200 km to 280 km bracket. A CASC promotional video shows animation of a CM-802AKG launched by a JH-7A to destroy a building complex.
At the other end of the size scale, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) showed the previously unknown TB-1 multipurpose airborne PGM. Closely resembling a QW-18 or QW-19 man-portable air defence system-type weapon (which CASIC also produces), the lightweight TB-1 can be used in air-to-surface or air-to-air roles. It uses SAL guidance, requiring the launch aircraft to maintain a laser designator lock on the target for the missile's entire duration of flight. An armour-piercing shaped-charge blast/fragmentation warhead is fitted. The TB-1 was shown alongside a neat twin-tube launcher, clearly designed for helicopter or UAV carriage.
CASIC also provided outline details of yet another previously unknown PGM type, the YZ-200 series of guided bombs. According to the company, there are nine types of YZ-200 spanning the 50 kg, 125 kg and 250 kg weight classes. It is assumed that each weapon can be fitted with a choice of seekers and perhaps a rocket booster and/or wing kit.
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE FD-60/PL-11.
China's 'other BVR AAM' is a missile that has gone by even more names than the SD-10/PL-12. At first glance it pre-dates the SD-10 and is a less capable weapon. It should be quitting Chinese service as the SD-10 replaces it. Instead, this missile is being integrated onto new platforms and is carried alongside the SD-10 on front-line fighters, including the J-10.
This missile began life as a copy of the AIM-7 Sparrow semi-active radar homing missile. Early-model AIM-7s were replicated in China in a programme dating back to the 1970s, with little reported success. The designation PL-10 was associated with these 'first pass' missiles, although that same label is now being applied to a possible new short-range AAM.
In the 1980s, with significant input from Alenia, a second replication effort was launched using the Italian company's Aspide design to produce a missile designated PL-11. Alenia delivered several batches of Aspides to China with the intention of establishing a complete production line there. Italian co-operation with China lasted for a period of about three years until 1989, but was suspended completely in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre.
Independently, China continued to work on the PL-11 and there were several reports during the 1990s that the missile had been adapted to an active radar seeker design known as AMR-1. The fate of this project is unclear, but when the SD-10 became an acknowledged programme it was assumed no further effort would be devoted to the less-capable PL-11.
Instead the PL-11 began to appear on front-line J-10 and J-10A aircraft and, in 2004, the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation announced it would be exporting the missile as the FD-60. Nothing more was heard of these plans or the new export designation until the PLAAF displayed the PL-11 at Airshow China 2010, using the FD-60 name. The PL-11/FD-60 continues to be deployed on current PLAAF fighters, including the J-10, J-11B and late-model J-8 interceptors.
CHINA'S RUSSIAN WEAPONS
Alongside its own multifaceted weapons development, China has acquired a significant array of armaments from Russian suppliers.
As the PLAAF made the transition from the single-role Su-27SK/J-11 air superiority fighter to the Su-30MKK heavyweight strike fighter, it adopted an increasingly sophisticated weapons set.
Along with standard Russian AAMs, like the R-27 (AA-10 'Alamo') and R-73 (AA-11 'Archer'), China took delivery of a large number of the RVV-AE (AA-12 'Adder') active-radar AAMs. Indeed, it was largely Chinese orders (along with some from India) that sustained the production lines for these missiles in Russia and Ukraine.
The Su-30MKK and Su-30MK2 brought new precision strike weapons to China, including the Region 1500 kg-class FAB-1500 guided bomb family and Raduga Kh-59M EO-guided stand-off weapon. To meet a specific Chinese requirement for a long-range anti-ship weapon, Raduga developed the Kh-59MK: a radar-guided, turbojet-powered weapon with a range of up to 285 km. The Kh-59MK is thought to be a unique Chinese asset.
China has also been quick to adopt the Kh-31 (AS-17 'Krypton') high-speed anti-ship and defence suppression weapon. A production capability for this missile appears to have been established in China under the designation YJ-91.
Significantly, this missile became the first Russian weapon to be integrated with a Chinese platform: the JH-7A attack aircraft.
IHSJ
