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Bangladesh's foreign policy towards US, China, and India inside-out (pt.1)
Putting Bangladesh’s foreign policy under the microscope. This is the first part of a two-part op-ed
Reuters
Anu Anwar
March 4, 2023 2:13 AM
Let us take a historic lens to analyze how Bangladesh's relations with the US, China, and India have evolved since Bangladesh's emergence as an independent country in 1971.
Although more than 50 years have passed, this historical lens is important because even in contemporary geo-politics, how Bangladesh interacts in the US-China-India strategic triangle is primarily shaped by the way in which the country was established.
First, India
India-Bangladesh relations are deeply rooted in Bangladesh's independence struggle. India's assistance in the Bangladesh Liberation War was instrumental. Of course, it was also India's “self-help act” given the threat it encountered from Pakistan being located on India's east and western flank.
The liberation of Bangladesh resolved India's number one security threat.
Nevertheless, India's assistance accelerated Bangladesh's independence. However, India's policy towards Bangladesh shifted significantly soon after independence. Whereas India's support for the Bangladesh Liberation War was generous and unconditional -- India's policy in the subsequent years was driven primarily by three main objectives.
First, India's policy aims to keep Bangladesh in its sphere of influence. Second, limiting Bangladesh's foreign and defense policy choices. Third, controlling Bangladesh's political and social life in a way that advanced India's regional interest.
India uses a mix of incentive and coercive tactics to compel Bangladesh to accept its demands, whether it is a transit route or helping Delhi uproot the separatist movement in its northeast. Bangladesh is a big market for Indian products and culture. Bangladesh is also the fourth largest remittance source for India.
On the other hand, even after decades of negotiation, India has yet to sign the Teesta water-sharing pact or stop the killing of Bangladeshi citizens by Indian border guards.
Historically, Bangladesh's incumbent political party, Awami League, is more inclined towards Delhi. Evidence suggests Dhaka has been more forthcoming in adapting a Delhi-friendly policy when AL is in power.
Although the government was able to make some long-standing deals -- such as the India-Bangladesh land boundary agreement in 2015 -- the prevailing view in Bangladesh is that the AL is giving in to India too much and has failed to stand up to Delhi when it must.
AL views India's support as crucial for the government's continuation. A number of ministers and party leaders made such public statements on various occasions. The common perception is that to appease India, Dhaka has signed unfavourable deals.
The latest example of it is an energy deal with the Adani group where Washington Post and other news reports suggest Dhaka caved into India's pressure to pay more than it should have.
In turn, Delhi continues to support the current government. After the last two controversial elections, the US-led Western coalition is now pressuring the government to hold a free, fair election. Indian officials, seemingly contradicting the West, have publicly stated that they have full confidence in the current government.
Second, Bangladesh's relations with China
At the height of the Cold War in the 70s, thanks to China's ties with Pakistan, Beijing neither supported Bangladesh's independence struggle nor extended its assistance in the subsequent years. China-Bangladesh relations remained largely strained for a long period of time due to this historic animosity but also China's own inward-looking policy.
China-Bangladesh bilateral relations started taking off only after Deng Xiaoping's “reform and opening up” policy in the early 90s. But the relationship has been limited to low politics, such as trade and investment.
It was only in the early years of this century, as Bangladesh was facing a number of security challenges along its border, such as the escalation on the Bangladesh-Myanmar and Bangladesh-India border, that Dhaka started to perceive Beijing as a remote strategic cushion for its entanglement in the borderland.
China-Bangladesh relations take a new height in light of China's Belt and Road Initiative. After BRI, Bangladesh saw renewed interest from Beijing, leading both countries to upgrade the bilateral relations to a strategic partnership.
In the current bilateral relations, I would argue that the defense cooperation between two armed forces has played an instrumental role, due to both countries' converging threat perception with respect to India.
However, the pandemic and the repercussions of China-funded projects in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and elsewhere in Asia have served as cautionary tales for Dhaka. Bangladesh now appears to be more cautious in taking Chinese loans.
Anu Anwar is a fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, and a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Bangladesh's foreign policy towards US, China, and India inside-out (pt.1)
Putting Bangladesh’s foreign policy under the microscope. This is the first part of a two-part op-ed
