VikingRaider
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( A great analysis from fatherland of BAL spoiled brats)
But the fact is that Bangladesh is at the cusp of a political shift that it has not witnessed since 2009. Hidden in this old-school, high-tension politics between two known rivals and a politicised military are unexpected signals that indicate deeper tumult.
One, public frustration with the ruling Awami League (AL) is wide and deep enough that the fear of a crackdown is dissipating. Two, the economic situation is so bad that even Hasina’s main allies are reconsidering options as sources of electoral finance shrink. Three, neither Hasina nor the BNP have answers to fix the economy or meet public expectations.
The current focus on violence around the forthcoming BNP mass rally in Dhaka overlooks the fact that the latter has held a series of rallies across the country to surprisingly huge public turnouts. That this occurred despite government attempts to limit movement by forcing public transport closures — even in traditional AL strongholds such as Khulna and Faridpur — offers reason to pause. How can the BNP, considered politically dead till recently, mobilise mass support? Because, to its own surprise, it is emerging as a broker of disparate grievances against a government disconnected from the people.
After all, Bangladesh’s macroeconomic improvements, considerably important and celebrated the world over, don’t automatically translate into redistribution of wealth and institutional integrity. It was always the litany of microeconomic problems and daily political coercion meted out by a corrupt party and state officials that were Hasina’s Achilles’ Heel. This is why people took long boat rides or walked for hours in the face of government-imposed bus and train closures to reach the Khulna rally, which could retrospectively mark a turning point.
If these events have emboldened the opposition, they have generated sharp outbursts from Hasina, promising more police crackdowns and media intimidation. This is what makes the forthcoming Dhaka-rally dangerous: Hasina risks losing both ways. If she uses force to break the protests, she’ll push more people in the opposition’s direction. But if she doesn’t interrupt these protests, it could diminish Hasina’s strongperson image and further the opposition’s political momentum. It’s a classic trap, and the questions for Hasina and her allies are: Can face be saved without alienating people further? If not, should the government become more aggressive?
The answers lie in Bangladesh’s political economy. The dual shock of the pandemic followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dislocated Dhaka’s macroeconomic growth story. Predicated on a model of compromised institutions, basic welfare spending, and coercing opponents and media into silence, this macroeconomic story would’ve knelt under its own contradictions sooner or later. But the enormity and timing of these external shocks are proving to be force multipliers for Hasina’s opponents. The financial shrinkage is not yet an external debt crisis, but the austerity measures will only worsen the cost-of-living situation. Plus, a banking sector crunch is dwindling Hasina’s internal patronage networks critical for political survival.
A sign of stress in this regard is the series of multibillion-dollar loans to the S Alam Group by the Islami Bank, the Social Islami Bank, and the First Security Islami Bank. Why would Hasina’s key financier, who has ownership stakes in many Bangladeshi banks, take humongous loans to allegedly buy hotels and malls in Singapore when the economy is facing an acute crisis? This move ties Bangladesh’s financial future to a single firm, and could potentially trigger a Sri Lanka-type collapse. Under investigation, this case indicates different possibilities, none of which are promising. If the S Alam group did this with Hasina’s permission, then this could be an “exit loan” that lights a long political fuse that could implode the economy, but not under Hasina’s. But if this occurred without Hasina’s approval, then she has a Brutus in the mix.
It raises the question: What does the BNP have to offer if — and it’s a big if — it does somehow come to power? This is where the story becomes grimmer. The BNP’s revival is being driven by widespread anti-Hasina sentiment, not because it has a larger vision for governance. The unexpected success of its rallies has united the party behind its polarising exiled leader, Tarique Rahman, with public sympathies for an ailing Khaleda Zia still intact. Few of the BNP’s promises of steering clear of Chinese finance, mending ties with India, distancing from Islamist radicals, or ushering democratic and institutional integrity will survive on impact with a troubled economy and a restless populace.
The primal, time-tested political logic that is then likely to guide the BNP is to secure its bases and ensure that it remains in power. Even if it adopts a forgiving approach towards Hasina, the party is unlikely to invest in institutional transparency or democratic strengthening, given the accruing costs of failure. In the medium term, it could even take an Islamic populist turn and tilt towards Beijing to offset the political risks of economic turbulence. This has happened before, and Hasina likely understands this best. If the BNP is committed to ousting her tomorrow, Hasina could be more focused on wrecking the day after tomorrow, in the hope of regaining leverage today.
It is the structural inevitability of history repeating itself that makes the current moment loaded with risk. There is a dire need for calibrated behind-the-scenes intervention by regional powers, especially India, to ideally prevent or, at minimum, contain the aftermath of the brewing storm in Bangladesh. If current approaches are not working — New Delhi does have channels with Hasina’s opponents — then different strategies might be needed. The last thing the Subcontinent needs is a serious disruption in the livelihoods and hopes of Bangladeshis. For, that will only add to India’s geopolitical woes in its east where endemic violence and Chinese ingress continues to stymie New Delhi’s geoeconomic aspirations.
The writer teaches at SOAS University of London and is the author of My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal
indianexpress.com
Bangladesh on razor’s edge: Why India must wake up to the looming economic crisis and political instability to its east
So routine are protests and violence in Bangladesh that treating the ongoing crackdown against Sheikh Hasina’s opponents as anything but election-generated noise could seem a stretch. From the latest deaths of opposition activists in police firing, and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) demanding a “caretaker” administration that could ensure electoral transparency, to an angry Hasina vowing to never let “arson terrorists” come to power — this is quintessential Bangladeshi politics. Even Western criticism, visible in a recent ambassadorial joint statement asking for free, fair, and peaceful elections, and Indian and Chinese silences, are not novel.But the fact is that Bangladesh is at the cusp of a political shift that it has not witnessed since 2009. Hidden in this old-school, high-tension politics between two known rivals and a politicised military are unexpected signals that indicate deeper tumult.
One, public frustration with the ruling Awami League (AL) is wide and deep enough that the fear of a crackdown is dissipating. Two, the economic situation is so bad that even Hasina’s main allies are reconsidering options as sources of electoral finance shrink. Three, neither Hasina nor the BNP have answers to fix the economy or meet public expectations.
The current focus on violence around the forthcoming BNP mass rally in Dhaka overlooks the fact that the latter has held a series of rallies across the country to surprisingly huge public turnouts. That this occurred despite government attempts to limit movement by forcing public transport closures — even in traditional AL strongholds such as Khulna and Faridpur — offers reason to pause. How can the BNP, considered politically dead till recently, mobilise mass support? Because, to its own surprise, it is emerging as a broker of disparate grievances against a government disconnected from the people.
After all, Bangladesh’s macroeconomic improvements, considerably important and celebrated the world over, don’t automatically translate into redistribution of wealth and institutional integrity. It was always the litany of microeconomic problems and daily political coercion meted out by a corrupt party and state officials that were Hasina’s Achilles’ Heel. This is why people took long boat rides or walked for hours in the face of government-imposed bus and train closures to reach the Khulna rally, which could retrospectively mark a turning point.
If these events have emboldened the opposition, they have generated sharp outbursts from Hasina, promising more police crackdowns and media intimidation. This is what makes the forthcoming Dhaka-rally dangerous: Hasina risks losing both ways. If she uses force to break the protests, she’ll push more people in the opposition’s direction. But if she doesn’t interrupt these protests, it could diminish Hasina’s strongperson image and further the opposition’s political momentum. It’s a classic trap, and the questions for Hasina and her allies are: Can face be saved without alienating people further? If not, should the government become more aggressive?
The answers lie in Bangladesh’s political economy. The dual shock of the pandemic followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dislocated Dhaka’s macroeconomic growth story. Predicated on a model of compromised institutions, basic welfare spending, and coercing opponents and media into silence, this macroeconomic story would’ve knelt under its own contradictions sooner or later. But the enormity and timing of these external shocks are proving to be force multipliers for Hasina’s opponents. The financial shrinkage is not yet an external debt crisis, but the austerity measures will only worsen the cost-of-living situation. Plus, a banking sector crunch is dwindling Hasina’s internal patronage networks critical for political survival.
A sign of stress in this regard is the series of multibillion-dollar loans to the S Alam Group by the Islami Bank, the Social Islami Bank, and the First Security Islami Bank. Why would Hasina’s key financier, who has ownership stakes in many Bangladeshi banks, take humongous loans to allegedly buy hotels and malls in Singapore when the economy is facing an acute crisis? This move ties Bangladesh’s financial future to a single firm, and could potentially trigger a Sri Lanka-type collapse. Under investigation, this case indicates different possibilities, none of which are promising. If the S Alam group did this with Hasina’s permission, then this could be an “exit loan” that lights a long political fuse that could implode the economy, but not under Hasina’s. But if this occurred without Hasina’s approval, then she has a Brutus in the mix.
It raises the question: What does the BNP have to offer if — and it’s a big if — it does somehow come to power? This is where the story becomes grimmer. The BNP’s revival is being driven by widespread anti-Hasina sentiment, not because it has a larger vision for governance. The unexpected success of its rallies has united the party behind its polarising exiled leader, Tarique Rahman, with public sympathies for an ailing Khaleda Zia still intact. Few of the BNP’s promises of steering clear of Chinese finance, mending ties with India, distancing from Islamist radicals, or ushering democratic and institutional integrity will survive on impact with a troubled economy and a restless populace.
The primal, time-tested political logic that is then likely to guide the BNP is to secure its bases and ensure that it remains in power. Even if it adopts a forgiving approach towards Hasina, the party is unlikely to invest in institutional transparency or democratic strengthening, given the accruing costs of failure. In the medium term, it could even take an Islamic populist turn and tilt towards Beijing to offset the political risks of economic turbulence. This has happened before, and Hasina likely understands this best. If the BNP is committed to ousting her tomorrow, Hasina could be more focused on wrecking the day after tomorrow, in the hope of regaining leverage today.
It is the structural inevitability of history repeating itself that makes the current moment loaded with risk. There is a dire need for calibrated behind-the-scenes intervention by regional powers, especially India, to ideally prevent or, at minimum, contain the aftermath of the brewing storm in Bangladesh. If current approaches are not working — New Delhi does have channels with Hasina’s opponents — then different strategies might be needed. The last thing the Subcontinent needs is a serious disruption in the livelihoods and hopes of Bangladeshis. For, that will only add to India’s geopolitical woes in its east where endemic violence and Chinese ingress continues to stymie New Delhi’s geoeconomic aspirations.
The writer teaches at SOAS University of London and is the author of My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal
source -
Bangladesh on razor’s edge: Why India must wake up to the looming economic crisis and political instability to its east
For the first time since 2009, Sheikh Hasina is on the back foot and a Sri Lanka-level macro-economic breakdown is a possibility. There is a dire need for calibrated behind-the-scenes intervention by regional powers, especially India
indianexpress.com
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