In the 1970s, Israel began to modify existing UAVs and develop new designs. One of the most ingenious Israeli uses of UAVs came during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, when a “swarm” of Northrop Chukar unmanned craft was sent toward the Golan Heights. The Syrian military was tricked into thinking a massive air attack was under way against its potent surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, and launched dozens of SAMs against the incoming aircraft, substantially depleting their air defenses. In subsequent years, Israel took the global lead in certain types of UAVs, particularly in the 1980s with the development of lighter, smaller unmanned aircraft like the RQ-2 Pioneer (pictured). Along with its sibling, the IAI RQ-5 Hunter, the Pioneer flew extensively in the 1991 Gulf War.
Read more:
http://www.airspacemag.com/photos/a-brief-history-of-unmanned-aircraft-174072843/#ixzz3RNvIo7tm
In 1971, Ryan sold a number of Lightning Bugs to Israel, which fueled that nation’s interest in UAV development.
The Navy acquired the Pioneer UAV (see Figure 25) system from Israel in 1986. The Israelis first developed an interest in using UAVs for reconnaissance in the mid-1960s. They visited with people from Ryan Aeronautical in 1967 and 1969, but no purchases came from these early visits. After Egypt shot down two Israeli F-4 Phantom reconnaissance jets, the Israeli Air Force began to look seriously for a reconnaissance UAV. They met with representatives from Ryan again in the spring of 1970 in Israel. A short time later, Israel agreed to buy a dozen of Ryan’s model 124 target drones, modified to be nearly identical to the 147SD. After taking delivery in the middle of 1971, they used these UAVs to patrol the Suez Canal zone, sometimes even daring to send them over Cairo for photo reconnaissance. During the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force used the Ryan model and another reconnaissance drone, known as the Chucker, for intelligence missions over both Syria and Egypt.47
In 1978, Israel tested its first domestically produced UAV: the Mastiff Mk I. The Mastiff was part of a new generation of what were called mini-UAVs, although compared with some of the UAVs in service today as part of the Long War, the Mastiff was hardly “mini.” It measured 8 feet 6 inches long, with a wingspan of 13 feet 9 inches, around half the size of the Ryan’s 147. A new model, the Mk II entered service in 1980, as did Scout, another domestically built mini-UAV. The Mastiff Mk II and the Scout possessed a somewhat limited range, but they could provide intelligence from Lebanon and southern parts of Syria. Before the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Israelis sent some decoy UAVs coupled with RF-4Es aircraft to map the deployment of Syrian SA-6 anti-aircraft missile batteries. Although never confirmed by the Israelis, they likely recorded fire control and electronic counter-measure data during these flights. As part of Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, the Israelis deployed two decoy UAVs, named Samson and Delilah, to trick the Syrians into activating their radar. Once the Syrians responded, the Israelis used the intelligence gathered before the war to destroy 17 of the 19 SA-6 batteries in Lebanon. The following day the Israelis eliminated the final two batteries.
After the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beruit, Lebanon, October 1983, officers from the Navy had the opportunity to observe the Israelis use of UAVs for artillery fire adjustment. Their recommendation of a similar system led the Navy to acquire a Mastiff for testing. A group of Marines who flew remote control planes as a hobby formed the basis of the 1st RPV Platoon. They performed tests onboard the USS
Tarawa in 1985, and in 1986 the Navy purchased Israel’s newest UAV, the Pioneer. After taking delivery, the Navy discovered some adjustments were required to give the Pioneer the capability of taking off and landing from a ship. Research and development of these modifications cost an addition $50 million and caused much frustration within Congress, which believed the Pioneer to be operationally ready upon delivery. Once modified, the Pioneers served with the Navy until 2002, including operations in Operation
DESERT STORM and SHIELD. The Marine Corps continued to use Pioneers throughout the Long War
When the Navy decided to decommission two of its four battleships, the USS
Iowa and the USS
New Jersey, the JPO realized that any maritime UAV would likely require a smaller vehicle than the one intended for the Army and the Marines. Although it continued to seek interoperable components, the JPO began looking for alternate vehicles. The JPO granted contracts for prototype development in September 1989 to McDonnell Douglas Missile Systems and Israeli Aircraft Industries. The contracts gave each company 18 months to deliver a system for evaluation and testing by the JPO. During the first technical evaluation testing of McDonnell Douglas’s Sky Owl and Israeli Aircraft Industries “Hunter” systems, neither proved ready to move forward. After a few modifications, in 1992 the JPO picked the Hunter system.
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/op37.pdf
Time Line of UAVs
NOVA | Spies That Fly | Time Line of UAVs | PBS
Like the BQM/SSM, the BGM-34A was developed because of hostilities. Israel was concerned about Soviet-made anti-aircraft artillery emplacements along the Suez Canal. In 1971, Teledyne-Ryan Aeronautical (TRA) developed a UCAV that could deliver air-to-surface munitions.1 TRA again used the Lightning Bug as the basic frame and then used pieces from other UAVs to develop the final BGM-34A product. In less than a year, TRA had developed a UCAV that was used to fire a powered, guided air-to-surface missile against a simulated target. American military thinkers had the idea of using these UCAVs on the first wave to soften a target then to finish off the target with manned aircraft. The Israelis agreed and used the BGM-34A against Egyptian missile sites and armored vehicles in the October 1973 Yom Kippur War and again in 1982 against Syrian missile emplacements in the Bekaa Valley.13 These Israeli UCAVs certainly saved the lives of Israeli pilots. Americans never used this UCAV in Vietnam because it could not perform better than manned technology.
Israeli successes in 1973 and 1982 led the United States to finally procure a new UAV of its own, primarily to conduct battle damage assessment for the U.S. Navy. This Israeli Aircraft Industries UAV, Pioneer, has been used by U.S. forces since the late 1980s. Pioneer was procured starting in 1985 as an interim UAV capability to provide IMINT for tactical commanders on land and at sea. Pioneer skipped the traditional U.S. development phase of the acquisition process, and nine systems, each with eight air vehicles, were procured beginning in 1986, at an estimated cost of $87.7 million. Similar to Aquila, Pioneer is a small propeller-driven aircraft. The Pioneer encountered unanticipated problems almost immediately after delivery. Recoveries aboard ship and electromagnetic interference from other ship systems were serious problems that led to a significant number of crashes. The Pioneer system also suffered from numerous other shortcomings. The Navy undertook a $50-million million research and development effort to bring the nine Pioneer systems up to a level it described as a "minimum essential capability."33
However, the Pioneer flew 300+ combat reconnaissance missions during Persian Gulf operations in 1990–1991. The system received extensive acclaim for outstanding performance in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps commanders lauded the Pioneer for its effectiveness. During the Persian Gulf War, all the UAV units at various times had individuals or groups attempt to signal the Pioneer, indicating their willingness to surrender. The most famous incident occurred when the USS
Missouri (BB-63), using its Pioneer to aim its accurate 16-inch gunfire, devastated the defenses of Faylaka Island off the coast near Kuwait City. Shortly thereafter, while still over the horizon and invisible to the defenders, the USS
Wisconsin (BB-64) sent its Pioneer over Faylaka Island at low altitude. When the Pioneer came over the island, the defenders recognized that they were about to be targeted, so using handkerchiefs, undershirts, and bedsheets, they signaled their desire to surrender.1, 34 Since the Persian Gulf War, Pioneer has flown operationally in Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia, and, of course, it has become one of the primary weapons of choice in the Second Persian Gulf War and the Global War on Terror.
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
Another outlandish UAV system designed for reconnaissance operations over China was the project called Lone Eagle, later renamed Compass Arrow.
...
Compass Arrow project manager Schwanhausser remembers that the Israeli military attaché,
Maj. Gen. Elihu Zeira, had visited the Ryan plant and later, as the chief of Israeli intelligence, made “desperate attempts” to get the shelved vehicles just prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.79 According to Compass Arrow engineer John Dale, President Nixon did not want the drones transferred to Israel and personally ordered that they be destroyed to end the issue.80 Whatever the reason for Compass Arrow’s demise, it was born as, and died as, a political weapon system.
After the failure of high altitude, long endurance UAVs like the Air Force’s Compass Cope in the mid-1970s, DARPA in the late 1970s began a project called “Teal Rain” investigating high altitude engine performance. Based on that work, they commissioned Israeli inventor and iconoclast Abraham Karem to design a less ambitious project than Compass Cope, but one with medium altitude (15,000-25,000 feet), long loiter capability.168 Still concerned about the cruise missile threat, the Navy took over partial sponsorship of the $40 million program as it showed promise for the same mission its ill-fated “over the horizon” (OTH) UAV was slated to fill—long range Harpoon target acquisition.169 DARPA’s aircraft came to be called Amber.
Amber was a product of Karem’s fertile but eccentric mind. He was, in some ways, keeping in the tradition of UAV designers, who tend to inhabit the fringes of the aerospace engineering world. Karem’s prickly personality made it exceedingly difficult to work with him.170 He designed Amber with a unique inverted “V” tail, a pusher propeller, and a long, thin, high-lift wing— it was an odd-looking bird. Amber was designed to be rocket-launched out of a torpedo tube as well as conventionally launched from a runway.171 Karem reportedly produced a weaponized version as well as one for standard reconnaissance work. By 1986 Karem conducted successful flight tests, and by late 1987 the Navy decided to transition to operational trials.172 On June 7, 1988, Amber demonstrated flight duration approaching 40 hours at altitudes exceeding 25,000 feet.173 After several internal Navy failures to achieve a ship-launched endurance UAV, it appeared DARPA had achieved a workable prototype.
Amber got lost in the transition to the Congressionally mandated centralized UAV management system, however. The legislation that established the UAV Joint Program Office (JPO) and froze all UAV funds stemmed from what was perceived as a proliferation of singleservice UAV projects, the failure of the Army’s Aquila program, and Congressional frustration over the loss of an F-111 crew in the Libyan air strike conducted in April 1986.174 As with other ongoing UAV programs such as the Navy’s Pioneer, the budget freeze hamstrung Amber at a crucial moment, and it became clear that the Navy was not interested in Amber and that the new UAV management system would focus on battlefield reconnaissance. Amber was canceled after having demonstrated successful canister and runway launch and endurance of some 40 hours at 25,000 feet.
The use of UAVs as decoys was later adopted by the Israeli Air Force, which employed US-made BQM-74 Chukar target drones as decoys for the first time in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, this time as part of a deliberate, phased attack plan designed to suppress missile defenses. The drones (looking like an attacking formation) prompted Egyptian missile radars to emit. Radarhoming
missiles right behind the drones slammed into the radar sites, blinding them for the manned aircraft strike that dropped deadly ordnance on the missile sites. Israel repeated the trick in the 1982 Bekaa Valley strike using a variety of indigenously produced decoys. (In a deliberate reprise of those Israeli tactics, the US Air Force launched 40 Chukar target drones into Baghdad on the first two days of the Gulf War in 1991.216 Whether as sacrificial data-gatherers or as a means of confusing enemy defenses, drones showed infinite courage in their role as protectors of US military pilots.
Eventually, the Tactical Endurance UAV made its way through this management structure
by getting its budget directly from Congress instead of through the services.
In April 1994, the Tactical Endurance UAV was lumped under OSD’s new quick-reaction ACTD program that was designed to bypass the normal acquisition process. After a competition, the system chosen for Tier II was
the Predator, a derivative of Israeli designer Abraham Karem’s Amber project and a much improved version of the CIA’s Tier I Gnat 750.438
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA525674
Indeed, let's not lie to people
