Arms Control and Nonproliferation Treaties Futures?

[usman_1112]

Arms Control and Nonproliferation Treaties Futures?
‘Rules must be binding, violations must be punished,’
What about last 8 years of Bush Administration Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaties law were through in Bin where was rule ,will you Mr., Obama going to bring Mr., Bush to Justice,’ The threat of global nuclear war has gone down but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up this is speech by USA president in Prague keynote speech on nuclear non-proliferation " Prague’s 1989 Velvet Revolution had ‘helped to bring down a nuclear power without a shot being fired,’ Mr., Obama.What about India,Pakistan,North Korea, and Iran will u bring them back in NPT treaties or …………..

While U.S. fears of a surprise attack derive from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,Soviet fears of a surprise attack derived from the Nazi invasion of June 1941. These interlocking fears led both sides to prepare for all eventualities: preemption, launch-on warning, and retaliation. in south Asia Pakistan did same fear of nuclear attack by India Pakistan got A-bomb, North Korea fear of attack by USA got A-bomb too, now Iran is going same fear of attack by USA and Israel he is determine to has a nuclear force.

The Obama administration must break this logjam—both with the developing world
And with Russia—in order to effectively combat the nuclear threats of the 21st century.A renewed commitment on the part of the United States to reducing its nuclear arsenal, Along with a reinvigorated strategic dialogue with Russia, would bolster America’s Nonproliferation bona fides and enable it to reassume its traditional leadership role in efforts to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

USA president said in his speech , I will take the lead to work for a world in which the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be reduced and ultimately eliminated." US President Barack Obama is to convene ambitious arms reduction talks with Russia that could see both countries slash 80 percent of their nuclear weapons, the radical treaty would cut the number of nuclear warheads to 1,000 each, the deal paves the way to replace a US-Russian strategic weapons reduction programmed which expires at the end of 2009.

A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties currently bar all but underground tests with a maximum force equal to150,000 tons of TNT. The Natural Resources Defense Council states the United States conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the Soviet Union 715, the United Kingdom 45, France 210, and China 45.The last U.S. test was held in 1992; Russia claims it has not tested since 1990. In 1998, India and Pakistan announced several nuclear tests. Each declared a test moratorium; neither has signed the CTBT. North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006.

The U.N. General Assembly adopted the CTBT in 1996. As of January 23, 2009, 180 states had signed it; 148, including Russia, had ratified. Of the 44 that must ratify the treaty for it to enter into force, 41 had signed and 35 had ratified. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate. In October 1999, the Senate rejected it,48 for, 51 against, 1 present. It is on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s calendar. It would require a two-thirds Senate vote to send the treaty back to the President for disposal or to giveadvice and consent for ratification.

The Obama Administration plans to seek Senate approval of the CTBT, followed by a diplomatic effort to secure ratification by the remaining states that must ratify for the treaty to enter into force.

Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit conditions that all signatories must "pursue negotiations in good faith" towards the long-term goal of "complete disarmament". However, no nuclear state has treated that aspect of the agreement as having binding force.
Only one country—South Africa—has ever fully renounced nuclear weapons they had independently developed. A number of former Soviet republics—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—returned Soviet nuclear arms stationed in their countries to Russia after the collapse of the USSr.

The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive Nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. The United States is also a prominent actor in an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran, Pakistan, India and North Korea, includes formal treaties, export control coordination and enforcement,

U.N. resolutions and organizational controls. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) serves as the cornerstone of this regime, with all but four nations participating in it. The International Atomic Energy Agency not only monitors nuclear programs to make sure they remain peaceful, but also helps nations develop and advance those programs. Other measures, such as sanctions, interdiction efforts, and informal cooperative endeavors, also seek to slow or stop the spread of nuclear materials and weapons.

Following 28 march 2009 agreement with Russia for new talks on nuclear arms, Obama proposed a series of steps to eventually eliminate existing nuclear arsenals. halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states and ‘a lock down’ on the material used in manufacturing atomic weapons, to be completed in four year’s time, As part of his plan, Obama wants to see the creation of an international fuel bank that would allow countries to access ‘peaceful power without increasing risks of proliferation’

Regarded as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the NPT divides the world into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. The treaty considers China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States nuclear-weapon states. Every other country in the world is considered a de jure non-nuclear weapon state, even if they de facto possess nuclear weapons. Thus, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are Considered non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Those four countries are also the only countries that aren’t party to the treaty.

Nuclear-weapon states:
Won’t proliferate to non-nuclear weapon states (Art I)
Facilitate the use of peaceful nuclear technology (Art IV)
Negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament (Art VI)
Non-nuclear weapon states party:
Foreswear nuclear weapons (Art II)
Accept IAEA safeguards over peaceful nuclear activities (Art III)

Key nuclear weapons-related facilities of USA
(1)Bangor Naval Submarine Base, WA Trident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles. Houses an estimated 2,364 warheads.
(2) Barksdale AFB, LA B-52H bombers. Houses 940 warheads.
(3) Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, MO Manufactures and procures non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons. Employs ~2,900 personnel.
(4) Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base, GA Trident SBLMs and nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missiles. Houses an estimated 1,364 warheads.
(5) Kirtland AFB, NM Home of the Air Force Materiel Command’s Nuclear Weapons Center (NWC). Houses an estimated 1,914 warheads.
(6) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and refurbishment. Employs ~5,100 personnel.
(7) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM Weapons design, surveillance, assessment, and refurbishment. Employs ~5,900 personnel.
(8) Malmstrom AFB, MT Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 535 warheads.
(9) Minot AFB, ND B-52H bombers, Minuteman III ICBMS, and nuclear-capable advanced cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. Houses an estimated 1,250 warheads.
(10) Nellis AFB, NV Houses an estimated 902 warheads.
(11) Nevada Test Site, Las Vegas, NV Supports stockpile stewardship and sustains U.S. readiness to resume underground nuclear testing. Employs ~2,200 personnel.
(12) Offutt AFB, NE Home to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
(13) Pantex Plant, Amarillo, TX Range of warhead surety and safety services, along with pit storage and warhead assembly and disassembly. Employs ~3,200 personnel.
(14) Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, CA; Kauai, HI; Tonopah, NV Responsible for non-nuclear components and systems engineering. Employs ~5,100 personnel
(15) Savannah River Site, Aiken, SC Produces and manages tritium for use in nuclear weapons. Employs ~1,700 personnel.
(16) Warren AFB, CO, NE, WY Minuteman III ICBMs. Houses an estimated 170 warheads.
(17) Whiteman AFB, MO B-2 bombers. Houses an estimated 136 warheads.
(18) Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, TN Fabricates warhead parts and components from special nuclear materials. Employs ~4,000.

The United States currently has an estimated 10,000 nuclear warheads inits total stockpile of which approximately 5,400 nuclear warheads are in the active stockpile: 4,075 “operational” weapons and another 1,260 warheads kept in “reserve.” The operational stockpile consists of around 3,575 “strategic nuclear forces” and 500 “non strategic (‘tactical’) nuclear forces.” The remainder of the weapons is in storage awaiting dismantlement. Strategic nuclear forces. A nuclear warhead is generally considered “strategic” if it is delivered using a long-range strategic delivery platform as part of a deterrence mission.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles or IcBMs.
America has an estimated 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, but plans reductions to 450. The ICBMs are located at three U. S. Air Force bases in five states: Minot AFB (ND), Malmstrom AFB (MT), and Warren AFB (which overlaps corners of CO, NE, and WY). These ICBMs carry an estimated
764 nuclear warheads, most of which are 20 times more powerful than the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Ballistic Missiles Submarines or SSBNS. The United States has 14 SSBNs, two of which are currently in overhaul. These are based out of Bangor Naval Submarine Base (WA) or Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base (GA). The SSBN fleet can carry 288 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles. Each missile, in turn, can carry six nuclear warheads for a total of 1,728 operationally deployed strategic warheads on the SSBN fleet—nearly 40 percent of the operationally deployed arsenal. The explosive power of these warheads ranges from eight times to 30 times more powerful than the Hiroshima device, depending on the warhead model. More than 60 percent of SSBN patrols now occur in the Pacific, compared to just 15 percent in the 1980s. The targets for these patrols are likely China, North Korea, and Russia.

Long-range heavy Bombers. Two bombers, the B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress, are dual-hatted for nuclear and conventional missions. America has 16 B-2s and 56 B-52s on operationalstatus, and another four B-2s and 38 B-52Hs are used for training, testing,and backup missions. The B-52s are stationed at Barksdale AFB (LA) and Minot AFB (ND), and the B-2s at Whiteman AFB (MO). The bombers can carry several different types of nuclear weapons, including some with a so-called “dial-a-yield” capability that enables the user to choose from a range of explosive yields. The explosive power of the air-delivered strategic arsenal ranges from less than the explosive yield of the Hiroshima bomb to 80 times as powerful. More than 1,000 strategic warheads are operationally deployed to the bomber force.

Non-strategic “tactical” Nuclear Forces. These are nuclear weapons intended for tactical use on a military battlefield. There are no binding international legal constraints on them. America has an estimated 1,290 non-strategic weapons, of which 500 are considered “operational” and ready for deployment. The remaining 790 are considered “inactive.” An estimated 350 warheads from the active stockpile are forward deployed on the territory of several NATO allies. The non-strategic arsenal consists of sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and air-launched gravity bombs.

The NPR settled on 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed warheads, which marked a reduction of around two-thirds in the operationally deployed force. That figure was codified in a May 2002 agreement with Russia called the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT. (Some senior officials, such as then-Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley, reportedly supported even deeper reductions, perhaps by several hundred, but were deterred by the prospect of a battle with then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld). 2001 NPR did great damage to America’s nonproliferation credentials. The defense department, which had responsibility for the public relations component of the NPR, had neglected to invest any time or energy into how the NPR results might be
Received by the administration’s many critics.

Global Nuclear Stockpile from 1955- 2008
1955 USA has 3,057 warheads, Russia has 200, and Rest of world has 10.
1965 USA has 31,982; Russia has 6,129, and Rest of world 351.
1975 USA has 27,826; Russia has 19,055, and Rest of world 723.
1985 USA has 24,237; Russia has 39197, and Rest of world 1,085.
1995 USA has 12,144; Russia has 27,000, and Rest of world 1200.
2005 USA has 10,295; Russia has 17,000, and Rest of world 850.
2008-09 USA has 5,400; Russia has 14,000, and Rest of world 960.

U.S. ICBMS, 1959–2008
(1) Atlas D, Peak no. Deployed launcher type 30/soft, Dates Deployed 1959–1963 Warheads yield, 1 W49/1.4 megatons
(2) Atlas E, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 27/coffin, Dates Deployed, 1961–1964 Warheads yields, 1 W38/4.5 megatons
(3) Atlas F, 72/silo lift, Dates Deployed, 1962–1964, Warheads yields, 1 W38/4.5 megatons.
(4) Titan I, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 54/silo lift, Dates Deployed, 1962–1964
Warheads yields, 1 W38/4.5 megatons.
(5) Titan II, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 54/silo, Dates Deployed, 1963–1986
Warheads yields, 1 W53/9 metagons.
(6) Minuteman I, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 800/silo, Dates Deployed, 1962–1974, Warheads yields, 1 W59/1 megatons
(7) Minuteman II, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 450/silo, Dates Deployed, 1966–1990 Warheads yields, 1 W56/1.2 megatons

(8) Minuteman III *, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 550/silo, Dates Deployed, 1970–2008,Warheads yields, 1–3 MIrV W62/170 kilotons & W78/ 335 kilotons
(9) MX/Peacekeeper, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 50/silo, Dates Deployed, 1986–2005,Warheads yields, 10 Mirv W87/ 300 kilotons

We estimate that Russia has approximately 5,200 nuclear warheads in its operational stockpile and 8,800 in reserve or awaiting dismantlement, for a total of 14,000 nuclear weapons. U.S. plans for building missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic provoked nuclear threats from the Russian military. Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, chief of Russia’s Strategic Missile Command (SMC), repeatedly stated that such a system would be a potential target for Russian nuclear weapons.

Strategic bombers. Russia’s inventory of long-range bombers increased by one Tu-160. Another may be under construction. Unconfirmed plans were reported for a fleet of 30 Tu-160 aircraft by 2030. Putin declared in October 2007 that the Tu-95 MS will also be
modernized.

Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Russia has 11 Delta-class SSBNs of two types, Delta IV and Delta III, which are deployed in two of Russia’s four fleets. We estimate that these boats are equipped with 176 SLBMs carrying a total of 624 warheads. Russia aims to someday have six Boreyclass SSBNs, but the second one will
probably not be ready until 2010.Each Borey-class submarine will be equipped with 16 Bulava SLBMs, which are not operational but will have a range of 8,000–9,000 kilometers (5,000–5,600 miles) and are declared by Russia under START to carry six warheads.

Nonstrategic weapons. Unlike other nuclear weapon states, Russia retains a relatively large inventory of nonstrategic nuclear weapons for delivery by naval vessels and land-based maritime aircraft. We estimate that approximately 698 of 2,270 naval warheads are operational for delivery by approximately 280 submarines, major surface ships, and naval aircraft. The warheads arm cruise missiles, antisubmarine rockets, anti-air missiles, torpedoes, and depth bombs

The number of nuclearcapable ships and submarines has declined from approximately 400 in the 1990s to slightly more than 100 today. We estimate that in 2015, Russia will have a total of 2,490 strategic nuclear weapons, a 20 percent decrease from today. This comprises 844 ICBM warheads (depending on future
warhead loadings), which is a 47 percent reduction; 896 SLBM warheads, a 23 percent increase; and 878 warheads on the bomber force, a slight decrease

Russia’s nonstrategic warhead stockpile,in mid-1991, was approximately 15,000.Using this number as a baseline, , Russia would have an estimated 5,390 warheads in its nonstrategic arsenal today. Of these, we estimate that about 2,080 are operational for delivery by antiballistic missiles, air-defense missiles, tactical aircraft, or naval cruise missiles and torpedoes. 28 The remaining 3,310 weapons are in reserve or awaiting dismantlement. Of the approximately 2,000 nonstrategic warheads for delivery by aircraft, we estimate that roughly 650 are operational. This includes air-to-surface missiles and bombs for delivery by Tu-22 M3 Backfire bombers, and bombs for delivery by Su-24 Fencer fighter-bombers and possibly other tactical aircraft.

Key nuclear weapons-related facilities of USSR.
(1)Cold War name Arzamas-16, Current name -Sarov Established- 1946, Primary function(s) Weapons design and research, warhead assembly.
(2) Cold War name Sverdlovsk-44, Current name- Novouralsk, Established- 1946, Primary function(s) Uranium enrichment
(3) Cold War name Chelyabinsk-40 and later 65, Current name- Ozyorsk Established- 1947, Primary function(s) Plutonium production, component manufacturing
(4) Cold War name- Sverdlovsk-45, Current name- Lesnoy, Established-1947,Primary function(s), Uranium enrichment, warhead assembly
(5) Cold War name -Tomsk-7, Current name- Seversk, Established- 1949, Primary function(s), Uranium enrichment, component manufacturing
(6) Cold War name- Krasnoyarsk-26, Current name- Zheleznogorsk, Established- 1950, Primary function(s), Plutonium production
(7) Cold War name- Zlatoust-36, Current name- Tryokhgorny, Established-1952, Primary function(s), Warhead assembly
(8) Cold War name- Penza-19, Current name- Zarechny, Established- 1955, Primary function(s), Warhead assembly
(9) Cold War name- Krasnoyarsk-45, Current name- Zelenogorsk, Established- 1956 Primary function(s), Uranium enrichment
(10) Cold War name- Chelyabinsk-70, Current name- Snezhinsk, Established 1957, Primary function(s), Weapons design and research
Soviet/RUSSIAN ICBMS, 1960–2008

(1) R-7, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 6/soft, Dates Deployed, 1960–1967, Warheads yields, 1/3 or 5 megatons
(2) R-16, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 128/soft & 69/hard, Dates Deployed, 1961–1977, Warheads yields, 1/3, 5, or 6 megatons
(3) R-9, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 23/hard, Dates Deployed, 1963–1977, Warheads yields, 1/5 megatons
(4) R-36, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 210/silo, Dates Deployed, 1966–1979, Warheads yields, 1/20 megatons
(5) R-36, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 120/silo, Dates Deployed, 1967–1978, Warheads yields, 1/8.3 megatons
(6) SS-9 Scarp M3 , Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 18/silo, Dates Deployed, 1969–1979, Warheads yields, 1/2.3 megatons
(7) SS-9 Scarp M4, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 12/silo, Dates Deployed, 1970–1977, Warheads yields, 3 MrV/2.3 megatons
(8) SS-11 Sego M1, Peak no. Deployed launcher type, 990/silo, Dates Deployed, 1965–1979, Warheads yields, 1/1.1 megatons
(9) SS-11 Sego M2, Deployed launcher type, 248/silo, Dates Deployed, 1973–1990, Warheads yields, 1/1 megatons
(10) SS-11 Sego M2, Deployed launcher type, 220/silo, Dates Deployed, 1975–1990, Warheads yields, 3 MrV/220 kilotons
(11) SS-11 Sego M3, Deployed launcher type, 120/silo, Dates Deployed, 1975–1979, Warheads yields, 3 MrV/220 kilotons
(12) SS-13 Savage M1, Deployed launcher type, 60/silo, Dates Deployed, 1969–1979, Warheads yields, 1/430 kilotons
(13) SS-13 Savage M2, Deployed launcher type, 60/silo, Dates Deployed, 1976–1990, Warheads yields, 1/800 kilotons.
(14) SS-17 Spanker M1, Deployed launcher type, 120/silo, Dates Deployed, 1975–1983, Warheads yields, 4 MIrV/400 kilotons.
(15) SS-17 Spanker M 2, Deployed launcher type, 150/silo, Dates Deployed, 1984–1990, Warheads yields, 4 MIrV/500 kilotons.
(16) SS-18 Satan M1, Deployed launcher type, 148/silo, Dates Deployed, 1974–1982, Warheads yields, 8 MIrV/700 kilotons
(17) SS-18 Satan M2, Deployed launcher type, 10/silo, Dates Deployed, 1976–1980, Warheads yields, 10 MIrV/400 kilotons
(18) SS-18 Satan M3, Deployed launcher type, 30/silo, Dates Deployed, 1976–1985, Warheads yields, 1/20 megatons
(19) SS-18 Satan M4, Deployed launcher type, 278/silo, Dates Deployed, 1979–2005, Warheads yields, 10 MIrV/500 kilotons
(20) SS-18 Satan M5, Deployed launcher type, 30/silo, Dates Deployed, 1987–2005, Warheads yields, 6 MIrV/400 kilotons
(21) SS-18 Satan M6, Deployed launcher type, 58/silo, Dates Deployed, 1988–2008, Warheads yields ,
(22) SS-19 Stiletto M3, Deployed launcher type, 360/silo, Dates Deployed, 1979–2008, Warheads yields,
(23) SS-24 Scalpel M1, Deployed launcher type, 36/rail, Dates Deployed, 1987–2005 Warheads yields, 10 MIrV/400 kilotons.
(24) SS-24 Scalpel M2, Deployed launcher type, 56/silo, Dates Deployed, 1988–2000, Warheads yields, 10 MIrV/400 kilotons.
(25) SS-25 Sickle, Deployed launcher type, 369/silo, Dates Deployed, 1985–2008, Warheads yields, 1/800 kilotons.
(26) SS-27 Sickle, Deployed launcher type, 48/silo, Dates Deployed, 1988–2008, Warheads yields, 1/800 kilotons.
(27) SS-27A Sickle, Deployed launcher type, 6/road, Dates Deployed, 2007–2008, Warheads yields, 1/800 kilotons.
(28) SS-19 Stiletto M1, 2 , Deployed launcher , 190/silo, Dates Deployed, 1974–1982 Warheads yields, 6 MIrV/400 kilotons.

The Nixon/Ford years (1969–1977) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT I (1969–1972). This process led to the first treaties and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union that would impose constraints on strategic weapons. The ABM Treaty was one product of this process. The other main product was the Interim Agreement, in which the United States and Russia agreed to stop building new ICBM silos, exercise restraint in expanding the size of existing ones, and cap the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and SSBNs. That agreement expired in 1977.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty or ABM (1972). The ABM Treaty banned deployment of a missile defense system intended to guard the entire nation against ballistic missiles, and Prohibited a range of research and development activity that could lead to such a system.

The United States withdrew from the treaty on June 13, 2002.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty or TTBT (1974). Concluded by the Nixon administration, this early attempt at arms control prohibited nuclear tests that exceeded 150 kt (10 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb) and established a number of transparency and verification measures.. Both parties announced in 1976 their intention to observe the treaty’s yield limit pending ratification. Concerns over verification held up ratification, however, until 1987 when the two sides agreed on additional verification measures. The treaty finally entered into force in 1990.

The Carter years (1977–1981) SALT II (1972–1979). The SALT II process began months after the SALT I process ended. It produced a treaty in 1979 that would limit both sides to a total of 2,400 delivery vehicles, where each ICBM silo, submarine missile-launch tube, or bomber was considered a single delivery vehicle. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan later that year, however, President Jimmy Carter asked the Senate to put advice and consent for the treaty on hold. Although the treaty was never ratified,

The reagan/Bush years (1981–1993) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF (1987). In this treaty, the United States and Russia agreed for the first time to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapon: ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with ranges between 500–5,500 kilometers. The treaty also featured provisions mandating on-site inspections to verify compliance and established a Special Verification Commission to facilitate treaty implementation. The treaty entered into force in June 1988. Treaty membership expanded in 1991 to include Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which along with Russia had inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved. The provisions for on-site inspections expired on May 31, 2001, so verification is now conducted using surveillance satellites. The treaty is otherwise of unlimited duration.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START I (1991). Under START, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads. The treaty features elaborate counting rules for determining these limits. The parties agreed to destroy excess delivery vehicles and accept intrusive inspections to verify compliance. They also set a deadline of December 5, 2001 to comply with the treaty. All parties met that deadline.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 delayed the treaty’s entry into force because it produced four states with nuclear weapons: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In May 1992, the parties signed the Lisbon Protocol, in which all four countries (along with the United States) agreed to sign START I. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pledged to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. START I entered into force in December 1994. The treaty will expire on December 5, 2009 unless the parties agree to a five-year extension. An extension for other time periods would constitute an amendment of the treaty and therefore require re-ratification by both parties.

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, or PNIs (1991–1992). The PNI is the first and only concrete effort by the United States and Russia to jointly reduce their tactical nuclear weapons arsenals. On September 27, 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced that the United States would unilaterally end overseas deployment of ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons and destroy all weapons in this category. The PNIs resulted in the elimination of thousands of nuclear weapons, including 3,000 American weapons. Estimates of the current size of the Russian tactical arsenal vary widely, But the range is likely to be 3,000 to 6,000, down from between 12,000 to 21,700 in 1991.

The Clinton years (1993–2001) START II (1993) and START III. The core obligation in START II is to further reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 3,000 and 3,500. Another important feature of the treaty is that it would have banned multiple warheads on ICBMs. The United States ratified the treaty in January 1996 and Russia in May 2000, but Russia refused to exchange instruments of ratification unless the United States Congress approved a 1997 protocol that would extend the START II’s implementation deadline and a series of concurrently negotiated agreements that clarified and strengthened the ABM Treaty. Congress never approved these measures so START II has not entered into force.

START III was intended to serve as a follow-on agreement to START II. It envisioned further reductions and new transparency measures, but it was effectively superseded by the 2002 SORT agreement.

The Bush years (2001–2009) Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or SORT (2002). Signed by Russia and the United States in May 2002, it commits the parties to limiting their respective arsenals of operationally deployed strategic warheads to 1,700 to 2,000 by December 31, 2012, on which date SORT expires.

SORT suffers from several shortcomings. The treaty incorporates the verification
measures of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, but that agreement is set to expire in December 2009, and there is no replacement for it yet. addition, SORT does not establish any ceilings for the number of strategic warheads kept in reserve or require that excess strategic warheads be dismantled or destroyed, so when the treaty expires in 2012, either party could launch a rapid nuclear build-up using stockpiled weapons and delivery vehicles.

The Nunn, Lugar, Amendment
Congress initiated U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the Soviet Union in November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Consequently, Senators Nunn and Lugar proposed an amendment to the implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” authorized the use of $400 million in FY1992 Defense Department (DOD) funds to assist the Soviet Union, and its
“successor entities” with efforts to “1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and other weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and 3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.

CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization ($ millions)
In its early years, the Department of Defense divided the CTR program into three distinct project areas—chain of custody, destruction and dismantlement, and demilitarization 1992, to2009 $7285.10 and Authorization $7336.05

Part 2ND about other key nuclear stock holder china, Pakistan, India, will published soon Usman karim based in Lahore Pakistan lmno25@hotmail.com