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Armored Carousels' & 'Tank Trousers': Russia's Modern Tank Tactics

Signalian

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In an era of localized conflicts without clear front lines, jihad-mobiles equipped with anti-tank guns and IEDs, the idea of large tank armies facing off along vast fronts has become a thing of the past. Rossiya Segodnya journalist Andrei Stanavov takes an exclusive look at how modern warfare has changed Russian thinking on the use of armor.

To get better acquainted with Russia's tank doctrine, Stanavov visited the Pogonovo test range in Russia's Voronezh Region to observe tactical exercises by the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army, armed with T-72s of various modifications. The units' tanks include the T-72B3, an upgraded T-72 with a new main gun, digital fire control system, more powerful engine and advanced dynamic protection kit.

For training purposes, the older T-72s are often sufficient. "The main advantage of the T-72 family is the tanks' exceptional reliability and trouble-free operation even in the most difficult operating conditions – in heat, extreme cold, and high humidity. If the tank breaks, it can be repaired directly in the field," Stanavov wrote.

Tank Carousel

"This maneuver is called the 'tank carousel', " tank company commander Captain Roman Schegolev told the journalist amid the tanks' movements.

"It allows us to fire over an unlimited time period. There can be three, six, nine or more machines. They move uninterrupted in a circular motion, one pummeling the enemy, the other moving to the rear and reloading, the third preparing to enter firing position, and so on. Non-stop shooting; just make sure to feed the shells," the officer explained.

"In contrast to the Americans' Abrams, our tanks have one important advantage – an automatic loader, which significantly increases the rate of fire," Schegolev added.



"The carousel could be compared to the rotating drum of a revolver," Stanavov explained. "Only instead of cartridges there are tanks, and instead of bullets – powerful 125-mm shells. The scheme is used when it is unknown what kind of armament the enemy has at his disposal – tanks, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or grenade launchers."

1066048751.jpg

© SPUTNIK / ANDREY STANAVOV
Т-72B1 firing at the Pogonovo test range.


Intense, sustained blanketing fire of between 8-10 rounds per minute eventually forces the enemy to respond, revealing their concealed positions, Schegolev noted.

"Imagine tanks shooting for ten, twenty, thirty minutes at a time without a break," the officer said. "On the other side they will break down and open return fire, revealing their armament. Then our disguised sniper tanks with specially trained crews step into action. They quickly and efficiently strike the identified targets."

Syrian School

Localized conflicts, including the war in Syria, demonstrate that the classical tank warfare idea of positional defense and offensives are irrelevant in conditions of irregular warfare, Stanavov noted. "In Syria, militants don't bother with planning strategic offensives and drawing arrows on operational maps, but rather adhere to the mobile tactics of guerilla warfare – guessing the strength of government positions, rushing in on high-speed jihad-mobiles, making precise strikes and quickly disappearing."


In Syria, the journalist explained, the tank carousel has been a particularly effective tactic during the Syrian Army's operations in the country's geographic conditions of earthen and sand parapets. Here, tanks can move along the parapet and, when they reach an opening, shoot, quickly concealing themselves back behind the embankment. So long as they remain in constant motion, it becomes almost impossible to aim at or hit them. Furthermore, to deceive the enemy, the commander can choose which opening to fire from at random, giving the impression there are more tanks deployed than in reality. Openings can be created using engineering equipment, and if necessary, by the crew itself.

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© SPUTNIK / MIKHAIL VOSKRESENSKIY
The crew of a T-72 tank of the 10th Division, 2nd Corps of the Syrian Arab Army are on combat alert off Katana, Damascus Province
"The scheme works even with a small amount of tanks," Schegolev said. A single tank platoon can achieve an intensity of fire so high that the enemy will think there is at least a battalion attacking it."

Tank Trousers

Another tactic explained by Schegolev is the idea of 'tank trousers', which involves tanks alternating fire between two trenches, without staying in one position for more than a few seconds. The tank enters the trench, fires, kicks into reverse and moves to the next. Enemy anti-tank weapons don't have time to react.

Along with the carousel, tanks can operate in pairs, crosswise, or according to seemingly completely random patterns. "These operations are rather complicated, and require a high level of crew training, Senior Lieutenant Vladislav Seliverstov said. "We are constantly training, with at least two shooting drills and one driving one each week."

MBT Howitzers

In addition to move and shoot maneuvers, the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army trains to hone their skills in firing from a closed firing position – a tactic invented during the Great Patriotic War. "With the advent of new long-range tank guns and stabile in-flight ammunition, this tactic has acquired particular urgency," Stanavov explained. It allows for plunging fire by tanks, effectively turning them into a sort of howitzer.

"Our shells are very stable in flight, so this technique allows us to inflict maximum damage on the enemy at a very long range," Senior Lieutenant Seliverstov explained. "The enemy does not actually see the tanks, which means he cannot suppress them with traditional means – recoilless guns, ATGMS and grenade launchers. Only long-range artillery and aviation, which need time to deploy, will do any good. But time is not something the enemy will get; the tanks come in, shoot and leave."

1066046459.jpg

© SPUTNIK / ANDREY STANAVOV
Т-72B1 maneuvering at the Pogonovo test range.
Russian tankmen have honed the skill of their plunging fire considerably; at a distance of 8 kilometers, high explosive shells hit within 15-20 meters of their target. Accuracy is further improved by modern equipment present on the T-72B3s, including the Sosna-U sight, digital ballistics computer, sensors for wind and temperature conditions and an automatic target tracking system which takes account of the movement of the target and the tank itself. At night, guidance devices operate using the main sight's thermal imagining system. "The thermal imager is so powerful that one winter I saw a hare in it from a distance of 2 kilometers," Seliverstov noted.

Crew Makes All the Difference

According to Schegolev, the most important principle in Russian tank crew training is forming a tight-knit unit which understands one another at an intuitive level. "We immediately look at who works with whom and how. If we see that the gunner and tank commander have found a common language, we put them in one crew and test their firing. The difference between a tight-knit team and a green, unfamiliar one is like heaven and earth," he stressed.



"In any case, no matter how modern and well-equipped a tank may be, it remains only a tool, whose combat effectiveness depends on the skill and cohesion of its crew…If in one crew's hands the tank is just a comfortable target for an enemy, in another's it can be an elusive, deadly machine," Stanavov concluded.

1066046425.jpg

© SPUTNIK / ANDREY STANAVOV
Tank crew at the Pogonovo test range.


https://sputniknews.com/military/201807041066049372-russian-armor-tactics/
 

Very interesting tactics that can be used in the semi-conventional war being fought in Syria.

There surely must be some application to this to conventional warfare as well.

I believe that large scale, combined arms operations are very possible between India and Pakistan, South of Lahore to the desert. IED type strategies can also work in a defense-at-depth situation India attempts to cut Pakistan in half.

In Punjab, because of rivers and canals, and a very congested battlefield with strong defenses, these strategies described in this article - like trouser, carousels and tank-as-artillery can be effective as well.

Yet, a major class of armor, at scale, supported by tons of infantry and artillery and possibly air support, is still very likely and could prove to be decisive. This is why tank warfare, no matter how it changes with the trend, will be a major factor in a future Indo-Pak war.

The South Africans had an interesting take on how to utilize tanks, the kind of tanks that suit their terrain and conditions, and the kind of tanks that are sufficient for their opponents. They built their own unique military strategy. @denel can perhaps attest to this. Russia, as shown in this article, has innovated its use of its traditional equipment, and found new strategies and practices that suit it in Syria.

Both South Africa and Russia designed, built and utilized their own tanks, for the specific tactics and strategies it looked to pursue in its environment. However, neither Pakistan nor India have done this, their tanks are borrowed and their strategies are borrowed.

What's more, one of the key elements of tank warfare has been production - both quality and rate of production - but unfortunately neither of these countries can produce their tanks at any meaningful rate and efficiency.

These fundamental mistakes stand in the room like giant white elephants when we discuss armor and maneuver warfare in the subcontinent. And if you talk to the average officer, you'd be dismayed how little they appreciate warfare strategies or tactics. These are mostly people who pass exams at war colleges mechanically, often by rote learning. They don't really live in any of these fantastic worlds of maneuver and flanking and blitzkreig.

Often they just know these names and throw them around, but that's the limit. The British created these armies as institutions to serve a specific role. That role did not involve great intellectual thought and strategic management. Until fundamental organizational change takes place, this will continue to be the case.
 
Very interesting tactics that can be used in the semi-conventional war being fought in Syria.

There surely must be some application to this to conventional warfare as well.

I believe that large scale, combined arms operations are very possible between India and Pakistan, South of Lahore to the desert. IED type strategies can also work in a defense-at-depth situation India attempts to cut Pakistan in half.

In Punjab, because of rivers and canals, and a very congested battlefield with strong defenses, these strategies described in this article - like trouser, carousels and tank-as-artillery can be effective as well.

Yet, a major class of armor, at scale, supported by tons of infantry and artillery and possibly air support, is still very likely and could prove to be decisive. This is why tank warfare, no matter how it changes with the trend, will be a major factor in a future Indo-Pak war.

The South Africans had an interesting take on how to utilize tanks, the kind of tanks that suit their terrain and conditions, and the kind of tanks that are sufficient for their opponents. They built their own unique military strategy. @denel can perhaps attest to this. Russia, as shown in this article, has innovated its use of its traditional equipment, and found new strategies and practices that suit it in Syria.

Both South Africa and Russia designed, built and utilized their own tanks, for the specific tactics and strategies it looked to pursue in its environment. However, neither Pakistan nor India have done this, their tanks are borrowed and their strategies are borrowed.

What's more, one of the key elements of tank warfare has been production - both quality and rate of production - but unfortunately neither of these countries can produce their tanks at any meaningful rate and efficiency.

These fundamental mistakes stand in the room like giant white elephants when we discuss armor and maneuver warfare in the subcontinent. And if you talk to the average officer, you'd be dismayed how little they appreciate warfare strategies or tactics. These are mostly people who pass exams at war colleges mechanically, often by rote learning. They don't really live in any of these fantastic worlds of maneuver and flanking and blitzkreig.

Often they just know these names and throw them around, but that's the limit. The British created these armies as institutions to serve a specific role. That role did not involve great intellectual thought and strategic management. Until fundamental organizational change takes place, this will continue to be the case.
Correct, our doctrine is based on blitzkreig and the role of tanks has complete been discarded based on the ultra-long range we need to operate and our terrain. Hence all the local IFVs/mineproofs vehicles are the primary basis for all our work. When I look at Pak's eastern flank it is very very similar especially the Thar desert to operating in the deep Kalahari; Kalahari is unforgiving with inhospitable 1m size rocks which can decimate any tank tracks no matter how good. Hence Buffel/casspir/Ratels/Rooikats range supreme. Ratels were turned into tank killers with anti-tank missiles; the versatility of Ratels was unprecedented and saw so many versions to support various uses.
We are always told to operate in a pack of 10-12 vehicles and avoid clustering. In our operations in angola, under no circumstances were we to hold a position, take over and move forward; it will be looked after by the unit that would be following behind. Similarly each group operates in a secure radio comm unit using freq hoppers.
 
Correct, our doctrine is based on blitzkreig and the role of tanks has complete been discarded based on the ultra-long range we need to operate and our terrain. Hence all the local IFVs/mineproofs vehicles are the primary basis for all our work. When I look at Pak's eastern flank it is very very similar especially the Thar desert to operating in the deep Kalahari; Kalahari is unforgiving with inhospitable 1m size rocks which can decimate any tank tracks no matter how good. Hence Buffel/casspir/Ratels/Rooikats range supreme. Ratels were turned into tank killers with anti-tank missiles; the versatility of Ratels was unprecedented and saw so many versions to support various uses.
We are always told to operate in a pack of 10-12 vehicles and avoid clustering. In our operations in angola, under no circumstances were we to hold a position, take over and move forward; it will be looked after by the unit that would be following behind. Similarly each group operates in a secure radio comm unit using freq hoppers.

Excellent post! thank you for the insight. The Rooikat was the closest of them to a tank, and in many ways, was SA's tank.
 
Excellent post! thank you for the insight. The Rooikat was the closest of them to a tank, and in many ways, was SA's tank.
actually Ratels did the bulk of the fighting in the bush and hit the T-55/T-62s with their 76mm cannons. They drew most of the blood with hardly any losses. Reason, the ability to out manouver tanks with sheer speed in the bush.
 
signalian, thats an exercise simulation under controlled variables , ( you can invade kashmir in 3 days in an exercise )

1. as i said earlier in another thread, the ATGM team ( as observed in syria ) usually makes first contact and inflicts max damage in the first few salvos.

2. tank cannon range vs atgm gunner range ? longer arm ?

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/men...g-syrian-rebel-use-anti-tank-guided-missiles/

^^ this chapter is a very reliable and thorough assessment of rebel ATGM use in syria, complete armored assaults were stopped by rebel teams armed with ATGMs, it was only after russian air strrikes and extensive drone cover were the rebels defeated .

cost of one ATGM round vs cost of one tank ? economics of war ?


look, i have nothing personal against the tank , yet sans eyes in the sky and air cover, i doubt it will make a mark in any future conflict.
 
signalian, thats an exercise simulation under controlled variables , ( you can invade kashmir in 3 days in an exercise )

1. as i said earlier in another thread, the ATGM team ( as observed in syria ) usually makes first contact and inflicts max damage in the first few salvos.

2. tank cannon range vs atgm gunner range ? longer arm ?

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/men...g-syrian-rebel-use-anti-tank-guided-missiles/

^^ this chapter is a very reliable and thorough assessment of rebel ATGM use in syria, complete armored assaults were stopped by rebel teams armed with ATGMs, it was only after russian air strrikes and extensive drone cover were the rebels defeated .

cost of one ATGM round vs cost of one tank ? economics of war ?


look, i have nothing personal against the tank , yet sans eyes in the sky and air cover, i doubt it will make a mark in any future conflict.
Eventually the Government deployed own ATGM teams to counter attack enemy ATGM teams. This is what i have been saying throughout my posts, infantry is deployed to counter enemy ATGM teams. Thus PA doctrine of using APC's and dismounting infantry to join armored forces (MBT) when attacking enemy positions.
 
Eventually the Government deployed own ATGM teams to counter attack enemy ATGM teams. This is what i have been saying throughout my posts, infantry is deployed to counter enemy ATGM teams. Thus PA doctrine of using APC's and dismounting infantry to join armored forces (MBT) when attacking enemy positions.

amen...

and this is where is we go back to pre -1916 somme .

the tank role for break through and assault is now dented . and mounted infantry is needed to 'baby sit' the armored cogs against ATGMs

no silver spoon in life my friend :/
 
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