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US-ROK-Japanese Trilateral Security Coo | The Asan Forum
A US Perspective
Michael Auslin, American Enterprise Institute
Kyodo ⓒREUTERS
A Japanese Perspective | The Asan Forum
February 11,2016 National Commentaries
A Japanese Perspective
Yamaguchi Noboru*, National Defense Academy of Japan
Toru Hanai ⓒREUTERS
A South Korea Perspective | The Asan Forum
February 12,2016 National Commentaries
A South Korea Perspective
Choi Kang*, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Kim Kyung-Hoon ⓒREUTERS
A US Perspective
Michael Auslin, American Enterprise Institute
"US-ROK-Japanese Trilateral Security Cooperation"
When President Barack Obama announced his much-touted “rebalance” to Asia in a speech in Australia in November 2011, his administration believed that its new stance toward the Asia-Pacific policy would be his foreign policy legacy. Having ended, so they hoped, America’s military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, their emphasis on enhancing US relations with the world’s most dynamic region seemed to announce a new post-9/11 era. As Obama prepares to leave office in just under a year, his “pivot” to Asia has been both overshadowed by global crises and proven ineffective in shaping the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific. The rise of ISIS, the devastation of the Syrian civil war, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and intervention in Syria, and questions about the Iranian nuclear pact have seemed to overwhelm the administration, leading observers to claim that the world Obama bequeaths to his successor is far more unstable than the one he inherited in 2009. This commentary looks at what a new administration might do, while concentrating on triangular US-ROK-Japanese relations in parallel with the other postings.
What was hoped to be a successful set of initiatives in Asia has been sidelined by a worsening of the regional security environment. Beijing has shifted the security equilibrium in the South China Sea through over 3,000 acres of land-reclamation on reefs and atolls, building new islands and establishing bases with runways, port facilities, and administrative structures. In January, Chinese civilian flights began landing on the isolated islands. In response, the Obama administration publicly warned China to stop its building activities and sent both US planes and ships near the waters on which Beijing now claims 12-mile territorial limits. As for North Korea, Pyongyang began 2016 by conducting its fourth nuclear test, rattling the world by claiming it was a hydrogen explosion. After seven years of “strategic patience,” the Obama administration has made no headway in either denuclearizing or containing North Korea. US allies in the Asia-Pacific make known their concern over increasing instability in the region, and question Washington’s long-term commitment to maintaining security. Japan is one of the leaders in pressing for more forceful US commitments, while South Korea is reemphasizing the alliance and taking a fresh look at trilateral security ties with Japan, looking to more US leadership.
The next US president will, thus, have to maintain the US presence in Asia while dealing with a plethora of foreign challenges. Doing so will require a clear policy and an enhanced working relationship with regional partners. In particular, Washington should commit to working with Japan and South Korea as the core of a community of liberal interests that upholds norms and rules, and provides encouragement to other nations to cooperate in strengthening Asia’s open, rules-based system. The time is particularly ripe for such an approach, given the recent rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo. After an extended period in which the ROK-Japan working relationship barely functioned, President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo have made important moves to reinvigorate ties. Most notably, Abe offered a landmark official apology in December 2015 for the World War II-era “comfort women,” and for the first time pledged Japanese government funds for support of the surviving victims. Given that these two leaders both will be in office for the next two years (Abe’s departure date being uncertain, but unlikely to be soon), a refusal to begin moving beyond the past and start working together would have meant a significant failure of foreign policy on both sides, seriously limiting US options.
The importance of forging a tight working relationship between Seoul and Tokyo cannot be overstated. As East Asia’s leading democracies and largest free economies, the two serve as models of liberal governance in a region that still struggles between authoritarianism and democracy. Just as importantly, as the two key American allies in East Asia, their lack of close coordination of security policy has limited the degree to which Washington can plan for a comprehensive approach to risk management in East Asia. With the goal of preserving order in the region, there are three policy priorities that the next US administration should pursue in East Asia: containing North Korea, strengthening maritime security in the Yellow and East China Seas, and promoting democracy. Each of these should be undertaken as part of a renewed trilateral initiative among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, thereby building on the venerable “hub-and-spokes” model of US alliances in Asia.
The first priority should be a new policy towards the Korean Peninsula. The Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” has essentially meant a pause of over a half-decade in any new US initiatives. After the failure of the Bush administration to prevent North Korea from achieving nuclear capability, US policy has been stuck in the mode of seeking denuclearization, without any realistic chance of achieving it. Obama’s sole attempt at deal-making with Pyongyang, the “leap day agreement” in February 2012, was broken by the North within weeks of its signing.
The next president should declare North Korea a nuclear power and develop a containment policy that makes clear that any aggression by North Korea will result in graduated responses. For too long, Pyongyang has escaped any real punishment for its provocations. Meaningful financial sanctions targeted at the Kim family and regime leaders should be implemented by the United States and its partners. With the recent thaw in relations between Seoul and Tokyo, Washington should push for an expanded trilateral approach to security coordination; greater information sharing and crisis planning will allow for a more integrated strategy. While it will be difficult, the next administration should also push for ROK-Japan-US crisis exercises and defense training related to Korean Peninsula contingencies. Working to have Japan join South Korea and the United States in maritime and air exercises will enhance crisis response, while South Korea should be brought more fully into the robust Japan-US missile defense program. Ultimately, defense procurement planning should be discussed among the three partners, aiming at developing more coordinated ballistic missile defense and information-gathering capabilities.
These moves present the North with a unified front, but also deepen the working relationship between Seoul and Tokyo. The next president must be committed, moreover, to putting political capital behind a strengthened trilateral relationship, and making the case to the leadership and publics of both South Korea and Japan why closer cooperation is vital to the maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula.
A second priority for the next administration is to enhance maritime security initiatives in the East China and Yellow seas. While much recent attention has been paid to the South China Sea, including China’s land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands chain, the waters of Northeast Asia are not free from tension. Japan and China continue to tangle over the Senkaku (Daioyu) Islands in the East China Sea, while in December 2015, the South Korean navy fired warning shots at a Chinese maritime patrol vessel that crossed the Northern Limit Line between North and South Korea. As early as 2010, Beijing warned Seoul and Washington not to undertake military exercises in the Yellow Sea, arguing that its exclusive economic zone would be transgressed.
The danger in Northeast Asia is that the rules of maritime behavior are being undermined by increasing competition and competing sovereignty claims over disputed islands, just as in the South China Sea. While South Korea and Japan have their own territorial dispute over the Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo in Korean, Takeshima in Japanese), there is little danger of the two coming to blows over them. The same cannot be said, however, for either the Senkakus or maritime borders in the Yellow Sea. As China’s navy and maritime patrol force have modernized and increased their ability to operate throughout the region, Beijing has become more willing to use them to uphold claims and put pressure on smaller naval forces. The same goes for its expanding air forces, which now patrol the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) that Beijing abruptly declared in the East China Sea in November 2013. Given that China’s ADIZ overlaps with parts of both Japan and South Korea’s respective air defense zones, an incident over the skies of the East China Sea remains a distinct possibility.
The next US administration should aim at ensuring that clear rules of behavior continue to hold in Northeast Asia’s seas and skies. The goal is not to provoke a confrontation with China, but instead to make sure that no nation feels coerced by China into changing its behavior (as both Japanese and Korean civilian airlines did when they agreed to abide by China’s ADIZ rules). One way to achieve this is by closer coordination at the trilateral level on regional freedom of navigation and overflight operations. While it is a stretch to think that the ROK Navy would get involved in joint exercises near the Senkakus, at least while the Dokdo issue lingers, broader freedom of navigation operations in the region’s waters are a possibility, as would be joint overflight activities. These could be used for working on trilateral air traffic control exercises for military flights and also with air-sea rescue exercises. The goal, as with Korean Peninsula cooperation, is twofold: to increase working ties between the ROK and Japanese militaries, and to send a message that the region’s democratic states will work together to ensure that no nation feels free to disrupt the open structure of regional trade and transportation, and that maritime claims need to be settled by negotiations, not force.
A third policy for the next administration is to work with both South Korea and Japan on jointly strengthening democracy, human rights, and civil society in the Asia-Pacific. Both countries are powerful models of the benefits of rule of law, freedom of the press, women’s rights, universal education, and free elections. Each has followed a slightly different path, and each continues to wrestle with the boundaries between the state and civil society, but they have traveled farther down the democratic path than most of their neighbors.
Asia is in particular need of liberal voices. Some states are backsliding, like Thailand and Malaysia, and need to be reminded that, while democracy is often a messy and inefficient process, it is also the system that brings about the most development and social stability over the long-run. Other countries, like Myanmar, have just begun their democratic experience, and will benefit from the learned experience of more established democratic states like South Korea and Japan. The two can also serve as counterexamples to authoritarian systems like those in China and the Mekong Valley nations.
Under the Obama administration, human rights and democracy promotion have taken a back seat to other priorities, such as attempting to forge a closer relationship with China. It is time to return to them as tools in a broader strategy that seek to increase the liberal community of interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The more democracies a region has, the more likely it is to be stable and have cooperative policies across borders. No one is calling for an EU-type structure in Asia, but the lack of cooperation among democracies may be a contributing factor to growing regional instability. The three nations should host democracy conferences, grass roots gatherings, legislative exchanges, and the like, in order to strengthen civil society bonds in Asia. Democratic states, in particular, should be engaged in an on-going discussion of women’s rights, press freedoms, legal systems, and educational modernization. The expertise (and limitations) of both South Korea and Japan can be a major part of helping promote liberal values.
These are just three ideas for the next US administration to pursue. Whatever choice is made, there should be a two-fold goal behind Asia policy in January 2017. The first is to create a stronger ROK-Japan relationship, stressing the importance of Asia’s two most advanced democracies working together. The second is to leverage the strengths and interests of Tokyo and Seoul into a more functional trilateral arrangement with Washington, so as to promote stability in the region. This includes a reinvigorated North Korea policy, a commitment to upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, and the promotion of liberal values. In doing so, the next American president will work with his or her South Korean and Japanese counterparts to reduce risk in Asia and help ensure the spread of peace and prosperity.
A Japanese Perspective | The Asan Forum
February 11,2016 National Commentaries
A Japanese Perspective
Yamaguchi Noboru*, National Defense Academy of Japan
"US-ROK-Japanese Trilateral Security Cooperation"
In the mid-1990s, when Japan and the United States redefined their alliance and revised the “Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between the United States and Japan” to match the new set of international security challenges that arose after the end of the Cold War, trilateral security relations among the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan were substantially improved with particular focus on the three countries’ efforts to deal with the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs as well as its conventional military provocations. In recent years, however, these trilateral relations have been stagnant mainly because ROK-Japanese relations have been tense due to the reemergence of problems, including the territorial dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Island, the “comfort women” issue, and other history-related issues. These issues enflamed nationalist sentiments within the two countries and heightened antagonistic feelings against each other. As North Korea has become more and more provocative demonstrated by its recent nuclear and missile tests, the situation in the region is highly tense and requires much closer cooperation among the three countries along with robust ROK-US and Japan-US alliances. China’s rise too requires the three countries to have closer, deeper dialogue to coordinate their respective policies to steer China towards cooperative, if competitive, and constructive relations with the rest of the world. The recent development in the bilateral relationship between the ROK and Japan is a promising start with the first ever summit meeting between Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Park Geun-hye in November 2015 and the following foreign ministry dialogue to settle bilateral problems including the “comfort women” issue. This political leadership toward a better relationship should be followed by various efforts, as proposed below.
Proposed Efforts Aimed at Triangularity
First, the two countries should start acknowledging their mutual dependence in various fields including national security as well as cultural and economic areas. In particular, Japan, including its public, should deeply understand and explicitly appreciate the fact that the ROK-US alliance has protected its western flank for more than half a century-a period exceptional in Japan’s history. Japanese strategic thinkers have always been concerned about the western flank because most of the battles between Japan and China (at times with their allies) since the seventh century have been fought on or through the Korean Peninsula. During the Battle of Baekgan (or Hakusukinoe in Japanese) in 663, Japan suffered total defeat in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula against the alliance of the Tang Dynasty of China and the Siila Kingdom of Korea. After that, the Yamato Court feared an invasion from Tang or Siila and started to establish the first ever defense system in the western part of Japan with frontier guards (sakimori), signal fire systems, and permanent fortifications. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan tried to secure its western flank at the expense of Korean sovereignty and national pride, which eventually led to its complete and decisive defeat in 1945. Since then, particularly after the ROK-US alliance successfully repelled North Korea’s aggression, Japan has enjoyed a perfectly secured western flank thanks to both the Korean and US militaries.
In addition, Korea and Japan should have a shared understanding that the ROK-US and Japan-US alliances are inseparable and interdependent for the security of both the ROK and Japan. As for the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-US alliance, on the one hand, directly deals with any contingencies on the peninsula that might easily spill over to Japan, and the Japan-US alliance, on the other, provides Korean and American troops with security in their backyard and logistical support as demonstrated in the 1950s. In fact, there was a time in the mid-1990s when Japan and ROK strongly promoted security cooperation due to the increasing necessity in dealing with the heightened tension over North Korea’s nuclear programs. Public diplomacy between the two countries during that period helped people deepen mutual understanding through track 2 dialogues. For example, the February 1999 issue of This is Yomiuri carried an article on a simulation over maritime crisis management focusing on cooperation between the ROK Navy and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (SDF) in case of contingencies caused by North Korea.1 According to the article, academics, ex-government officials, and ex-military officers of the two countries had extremely deep and forward-looking discussions on naval cooperation to deal with threats posed by North Korea. A book entitled US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building towards a “Virtual Alliance”published in 1999 is another example.2
Second, the three countries should utilize the two alliances and trilateral cooperation as international public goods in regional and global contexts. Related to the previous point, the three countries share a common understanding of the importance of US political commitment to and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region for peace and stability in the region as well as the international community as a whole. Since sustainable stationing of US forces in Korea and Japan is essential to the US forward deployment posture, the Korean and Japanese governments have to make their best efforts to smoothly host US service members. For Japan, the plan for the realignment of US forces in Japan, including the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, should be implemented as soon as possible. In the meantime, the three countries’ armed forces are becoming more and more active in non-traditional military operations abroad, such as UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Among a number of examples, assistance to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 is noteworthy. While US marines demonstrated their high readiness with their prompt deployment followed by the SDF’s entry, Korean soldiers stayed in the affected area for a longer time to reconstruct the local community.3 The three countries should coordinate while cooperating with others for such international missions whenever it is possible and effective.
Third, the ROK, Japan and the United States should deepen security cooperation over the issues related to North Korean threats. In this context, it is crucially important for the three to thoroughly address differences in their threat perceptions based on geographical distance from North Korea as such differences may result in divergent policy priorities. The ROK, with its geographic proximity to North Korea, may give priority to maintaining the stability of the peninsula by avoiding armed conflict and preventing domestic chaos within North Korea. Japan puts a priority on dealing with North Korea’s long-range missiles and nuclear weapons through international efforts to prevent it from developing and deploying such missiles as well as pursuing its nuclear programs. Japan also places great weight on its own efforts to protect its population through ballistic missile defense programs. The United States along with the rest of the world seems to be pursuing a policy to prevent North Korea from further proliferating its nuclear weapons and missiles. In the long run, the three may strike a balance along with others in combining all of these goals, but they should be well aware of the differences in their short-term policy priorities. The bottom line is that different goals must be pursued in a manner that does not neglect others. For example, Japan may work hard to reduce the threat from North Korea’s missiles, that should not be pursued at the expense of other goals such as stability on the peninsula. In any case, no one should compromise with North Korea on its obligation to abandon its nuclear ambitions in return for gains on other policy goals.
Fourth, nuanced differences in China policies toward the three countries-particularly those between Korea and Japan-should be thoroughly addressed. In June 2015, on the fiftieth anniversary of ROK-Japan normalization, the Institute for International Policy Studies and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs released a ROK-Japan joint report, “Envisioning the Next Fifty Years of Japan-Korea Ties (IIPS/SFIA Joint Report).”4 In regards to China, the report notes that it is difficult for the two countries “to fully recognize the nuanced differences of the security interests arising from different geostrategic locations,” and since the ROK is close to China, it “has practical reasons to maintain its cooperative relationship with China, particularly for realizing the unification of the Korean Peninsula.5” The report also pointed out, “Japan should be cognizant of Korea’s geopolitical position as a divided nation that shares borders with China as an immediate neighbor,” while “Japan enjoys relatively safer geopolitical ground” as “an island country detached from the continent.”6
Lastly, the three countries should deepen and widen trilateral dialogue on what has been described as “extended deterrence” of the United States. After the end of the Cold War, this term came to have wider meaning than extended nuclear deterrence or the nuclear umbrella with more emphasis on conventional forces and other available means to avoid and mitigate military or paramilitary conflicts. Fred McGoldrick argues, “what is critical is the ROK’s confidence in the credibility of its overall relationship with the United States and the continued ability of the United States to convince the South Koreans that it has no intention of abandoning them and that the United States will provide credible non-nuclear deterrence guarantees.”7 This perfectly applies to the Japan-US alliance too. Frank and professional discussions on the credibility of US extended deterrence and alliances, as a whole, should be conducted among the three countries at both official and track 2 levels.
Conclusion
The IIPS/SFIA Joint Report quoted above proposed six concrete policies that can be applied to trilateral security cooperation. The following list is a modified version of the report’s proposals on the trilateral context recommending that the three countries should:
1) promote public diplomacy to enhance mutual understanding and to reduce twisted perceptions and misunderstanding;
2) promote track 2 and professional exchanges to share common security interests and strategic perspectives;
3) institutionalize ROK-Japan security ties in addition to already firm ROK-US and Japan-US alliances through grassroots personnel exchanges among military professionals;
4) promote trilateral cooperation towards the unification of the peninsula under ROK’s initiative while forging common understanding on the basic conditions for unification;
5) activate trilateral policy coordination and information sharing on North Korea and China; and
6) promote ROK-Japan, ROK-Japan-US military cooperation in international activities, including UN PKO, global peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations.8
On the above list, the first points seem to have the foremost importance. This commentary has touched upon track 2 efforts to promote ROK-Japan and ROK-Japan-US security cooperation. The author himself participated in a number of such informal occasions held in the mid- to late 1990s through which personal relations were formed with academics, military officers, and government officials who were still young but becoming more and more influential in Korea and the United States.9 Such personal relations have been extremely useful in the following years including when Japan had difficult relations with the ROK or with the United States as well as in good times. As already twenty years have passed, the three countries should not wait any longer to restart such efforts to build personal bonds in the next generation.
1.Shinobu Miyachi, “日韓共同シミュレ?ション：海の防衛協力” (This is Yomiuri) (February 1999): 274-283.
2.Ralph Cossa, ed., US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Towards “Virtual Alliance,” (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1999).
3.Lessons learned from the response to the disaster caused by Typhoon Haiyan were shared during the workshop held by Peace Winds America in Tokyo on January 22-23, 2014,http://peacewindsamerica.org/readiness/civil-military-initiative/january-disaster-preparedness-workshop/.
4.The author participated in the preparations for this report, expressed views similar to those in this article, and further articulated policy proposals for the two countries. “Envisioning the Next Fifty Years of Japan-Korea Ties (IIPS/SFIA Joint Report),” Institute for International Policy Studies, June 22, 2015, http://www.iips.org/publications/2015/06/22000000.html.
5.Ibid
6.Ibid
7.Fred Mcgoldrick, “Nuclear Nonproliferation,” in Scott Snyder, ed., The U.S.-South Korea Alliance(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012).
8.“IIPS/SFIA Joint Report.”
9.For example, Professor Rhee Sang-Woo of the New Asia Research Institute and Ambassador Okazaki Hisahiko hosted a series of meetings of young security experts from Korea and Japan titled the K-J Shuttle in which a number of promising specialists, government officials, and military officers from the two countries became acquainted and formed bonds of friendship.
A South Korea Perspective | The Asan Forum
February 12,2016 National Commentaries
A South Korea Perspective
Choi Kang*, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
"US-ROK-Japanese Trilateral Security Cooperation"
Despite the practical necessity of trilateral security cooperation among the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan, conditioned by changes in the security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula, the Park administration has maintained a kind of lukewarm or cautious attitude toward it. Several factors have contributed to South Korea’s position on it. They can be categorized into two groups: Korea-Japan relations and China factors. However, the agreement on the “comfort women” on December 28, 2015, the fourth nuclear test of North Korea on January 6, 2016,1 and disappointing Chinese behavior after the test have provided a new, maybe the most favorable, atmosphere for the realization of trilateral security cooperation. The ROK should consider this cooperation option very seriously.
Factors Favorable for Trilateral Security Cooperation
From the beginning of the Park administration, the Korea-Japan relationship continuously deteriorated. Almost nothing could be done between the two countries until the “comfort women” issue was resolved. In the eyes of most South Koreans, Prime Minister Abe and his administration were seen as some kind of historical revisionists. There were four, principal unresolved and recurring issues between the ROK and Japan: Dokdo Island, history textbooks, the Yasukuni Shrine, and “comfort women.”2 Among them, President Park placed the utmost importance on the resolution of “comfort women” issue in South Korea’s relations with Japan. Despite all concerns and criticism, she maintained this tough position as a total of 12 director-general level meetings took place. The prospects for a resolution were not that good.
Against general expectations on both sides, the ROK and Japan suddenly reached an agreement on the “comfort women” issue at the end of 2015. While there is criticism against it,3 the Park administration appears to be quite firm in sticking with it. The agreement is a very meaningful and important turning point in South Korean-Japanese relations since it has created the background for talking about, agreeing on, and addressing long overdue issues of cooperation between the two countries, including security issues. Furthermore, this can be translated into trilateral ROK-US-Japan security cooperation.
The second factor that might contribute to the realization of trilateral security cooperation is North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and, more importantly, the Chinese reaction to it. Whatever the reasons for it, the test has once again proved that North Korea is determined to keep and advance its nuclear capabilities under any circumstance. It is posing an increasing threat to South Korea and Japan, directly and immediately, which means that they have more common concerns and that they should recognize the need to find ways to have more reliable and effective deterrent measures against the ever-increasing nuclear and missile threats. Since South Korea and Japan rely on US extended deterrence for their own security, they are interlinked, one way or another. It can be said that North Korea’s fourth test has made it natural and necessary for South Korea to revisit the trilateral security cooperation as a way to enhance the credibility of the US extended deterrence vis-?-vis South Korea.
In addition, Chinese reactions following North Korea’s nuclear test have made South Korea reconsider its hopes for China’s cooperation in solving the North Korean nuclear problem, which it has underscored in its diplomacy for solving the problem over the years. Chinese reactions after this test have been particularly disappointing. Foreign Minister Wang Yi merely reiterated China’s traditional three principles: denuclearization, peace and stability, and negotiations. In the eyes of most South Koreans, China appears to be primarily concerned with regime stability in North Korea, prioritizing that over denuclearization, and China is not much concerned with South Korea’s own security interests. Now Park’s China policy is the target of criticism from both progressives and conservatives for the failure in securing long-expected Chinese cooperation when North Korean put this to a test and for the overall misunderstanding of China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula.
In recognition of this misjudgment, the South Korean government must now review and adjust its China policy. For economic reasons as well as North Korean issues, the South Korean government has been very cautious not to provoke China. This has been seen in its reluctance to advance trilateral security cooperation and on the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) issue, but the future may be different.4 The South Korean government could and should do whatever is necessary to safeguard its national security interests.
The Path to Trilateral Security Cooperation
The general situation and mood are now much more positive for trilateral security cooperation, but there are several points to be considered in realizing it. First of all, trilateral security cooperation should be pushed by South Korea. If it is pushed by the United States and Japan, it would be met with strong resistance since China believes such cooperation is a formula to contain China by forming a tight virtual, maybe even a formal, alliance between the United States and its allies. In addition, such cooperation being pushed by the United States and/or Japan could be met with strong domestic resistance in South Korea, especially from those who argue that trilateral security cooperation would bring the Cold War structure or confrontation back to the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and would serve the interests of the United States and Japan, not those of South Korea. Secondly, some are likely to argue that under the trilateral security cooperation framework, South Korea will have little room to pursue its own policy initiatives toward North Korea. Korean Peninsula issues will become secondary, entrapped in a larger regional context; “fear of entrapment” may arise. To avoid or minimize Chinese and domestic resistance towards this cooperation, South Korea should take a leading role or at least exercise convening power in realizing the trilateral security cooperation. The timing and atmosphere are now just right, but the window of opportunity may soon close again, and it is unpredictable when it might reopen.
Trilateral security cooperation should be mainly focused on North Korean issues and unification. The important issues to be discussed and resolved by all three parties range from the nuclear issue to human rights. Instead of focusing on one or two burning issues such as the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement (ACSA), and missile defense, the three parties should start with talks over a blueprint and road map (or action plan) for unification and then the regional strategic architecture conducive to achieving it, if possible. South Korea is suspicious of Japan’s position on Korean unification. Many believe Japan wants the continuation of a divided Korea. At the same time, Japan may be suspicious of a future unified Korea’s orientation, suspecting that it would draw much closer to China. After all, recently many Japanese and even some Americans have argued that South Korea has tilted toward China.
Unless we have trust and confidence in each other, trilateral security cooperation will lack a strategic rationale and could be stalled again and again. That is why talks over the blueprint and action plan are necessary; they will contribute to the enhancement of mutual trust and confidence in each other’s intentions. In other words, the cognitive foundation of trilateral security cooperation can be established if there is a common vision for the future of Korean Peninsula, making it easier to solve more technical issues of cooperation. For this purpose, it is necessary to revive the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) and come up with a common approach toward North Korean issues and unification. Not only a linear path but also a non-linear path (i.e., instability and contingencies) must be on the agenda. To facilitate government efforts and to secure the understanding and support of the public, it would be helpful to have expert group meetings, but they must not be totally independent from the government work. Rather, they must be linked with government work indirectly. For that, it may be desirable to introduce the Trilateral experts and eminent persons (EEP) formula.
While we focus primarily on the Korean Peninsula, we must investigate ways to go beyond this geographical scope for trilateral security cooperation. Whenever the three countries try to define the regional range of trilateral security cooperation, they are usually faced with foreign (mostly Chinese) resistance and domestic resistance in Korea. It is neither necessary nor desirable for the three to clearly define the missions of trilateral security cooperation in a geographical context. Rather, we can concentrate on functional, issue-based cooperation among the three countries. There are many important non-traditional human security issues that affect peace and stability at all levels: cyber security, pandemics and public health, nuclear safety and security (plus safeguards), humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), anti-piracy (and the security of source lines of code (SLOC)), search and rescue (S&R) operations, anti-terrorism, cooperation against drugs and human trafficking, the fight against organized crime, and etc. These are all related to the global and regional commons. If trilateral security cooperation were geared toward the provision of public goods to the international community, it would be easier to overcome foreign and domestic resistance. This would also enhance mutual understanding among those are involved. The three could help developing countries in nation building. Working together on official development assistance (ODA) programs would enhance the efficacy of those programs by making them mutually complementary and avoiding duplication.
In addition to the functional issue-based approach, it is necessary to think of ways to preserve and advance a rule-based international order. The three countries share the same values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and a market economy. Joint efforts in defining, protecting, and adjusting the rules and norms, as well as the process for the realization of those values, must be sought. Whenever and wherever challenges to the existing rule-based international order take place, as a country that has benefited from the rule-based, liberal international order, South Korea, not only along with the United States and Japan but also with other like-minded countries, should be forthcoming in protecting it. The reason why this is important is that it is about South Korea’s identity and integrity as a democratic country and a responsible member of the international community. Furthermore, this would enable South Korea to build a network of cooperation well beyond Northeast Asia and contribute to the realization of its desire to be at the center of world politics. Trilateral security cooperation centered on a rule-based international order is a vehicle, or catalyst, for attaining such goals.
Conclusion
Trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States and Japan is an overdue objective. The resolution of the “comfort women” issue and the fourth nuclear test of North Korea have opened a window of opportunity for its realization, but the window of opportunity may not remain open for long. Thus, South Korea should not waste time. Rather it should seize this rare opportunity as fast as it can. Of course, there will be costs South Korea would have to bear, but the benefits would be much greater.
1.North Korea claimed it was a hydrogen, not an atomic, bomb test, but outside experts have assessed that this is not true. The bomb test may have been a boosted fission kind, which contains some element of hydrogen.
2.There are other issues, such as forced labor, the voting rights of Koreans living in Japan, hate speech, and the trade imbalance, but these four were identified as the core issues to be resolved by President Roh Moo-hyun.
3.The ROK side demanded four things: recognition of the Japanese government’s involvement in recruiting and running the comfort women system, self-reflection, an apology, and compensation. All four elements seem to be included in the agreement. But many NGOs such as Jungdaehyeop (Association for the Comfort Women Issue) criticized the fact that the agreement does not clearly recognize the Japanese state’s responsibility. Another criticism is that the agreement includes the removal of the “girl of peace statue,” which is currently located in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.
4.Park has already hinted at the possibility of a different approach in her press conference on January 13. On the THAAD issue, she said that, depending on the situation and the national interest, this issue would be approached anew.
