After Bush
THE most striking spectacle of America's election season has been the sight of crowds of up to 20,000 cheering Barack Obama. Mr Obama never has any trouble summoning up applause, but he gets his most heartfelt response when he turns to foreign policy. He reminds his supporters that he opposed the Iraq war from the start. He insists that America should be focusing on al-Qaeda rather than Iraq. And he pledges that he will begin to withdraw American troops from Iraq as soon as he becomes president.
Hillary Clinton, his rival in the nail-biting fight for the Democratic nomination, lacks Mr Obama's silver tongue, and is handicapped by having voted to authorise the invasion of Iraq in 2002. But she, too, can work the crowd into a frenzy when she talks about foreign policy. She promises that she will begin to withdraw American troops from Iraq within 60 days of becoming president, and accuses George Bush of pursuing one of the most disastrous foreign policies in American history.
To John McCain, the Republican nominee, this is all dangerous nonsense. Mr McCain argues that withdrawing from Iraq would spell disaster for the Middle East and humiliation for America. He reckons that America needs to stay in Iraq, in some guise, for a hundred yearsand accuses Mr Obama of peddling the empty hope of a holiday from history.
When it comes to foreign policy, there really are two Americas. The divisions are at their sharpest over Iraq, but they extend much further. Should America put the war on terrorism at the heart of its foreign policy or treat it as just one concern among many? Should America bomb Iran or allow Iran to get the bomb? Should it negotiate with its enemies or wait for them to mend their ways?
From hero to zero
These deep divisions are the legacy of a man whose name will not appear on the ballot in November. Mr Bush came to power promising anything but a bold foreign policy. He styled himself as a new kind of conservativea uniter rather than a dividerand surrounded himself with foreign-policy heavyweights.
Dick Cheney was a hard-headed realist who had opposed toppling Saddam Hussein when he was defence secretary during the first Gulf war (asking how long would we have had to stay in Baghdad?). Colin Powell was known for his caution about using forceeither go in big or don't go in at alland for his enthusiasm for working with allies. Condoleezza Rice was a dyed-in-the-wool realist who had famously observed that the 82nd Airborne's job description did not include escorting kids to school.
During his campaign Mr Bush pledged himself to pursuing a humble foreign policy, an American foreign policy that reflects American character. The modesty of true strength. The humility of real greatness. He contrasted his approach with the Clinton administration's arrogance which had undermined American alliances, alienated friends and emboldened our adversaries.
Inevitably, all this changed on September 11th 2001. That tragedy initially united America in common grief and in a common determination to root out al-Qaeda. But Mr Bush's policies eventually replaced what he called the warm courage of national unity with bitter division.
Good and evil
Mr Bush responded to the terrorist attacks with striking boldness, based on his conviction, formed within hours of the attacks, that America was engaged in a war on terror. America would make no distinction between terrorists and the people who harboured them. It would remain on the offensive, working with friends if possible and alone if necessary. And it would tackle the root causes of terrorismthe Faustian bargain between Middle Eastern autocracies and radical Islam. The former frat boy saw himself as bringing firm resolve and clear vision and a deep faith to a global struggle between good and evil.
Mr Bush combined his visionary approach to foreign policy with a hard-edged style of governing. He embraced the Washington partisanship that he had denounced as a candidate, pushing through a wish-list of conservative measures, most notably tax cuts. But he also did something that was new in foreign policy: he turned the war on terror into an instrument of partisan advantage with the aim of building an enduring Republican majority.
At first this dual strategy of assertiveness abroad and bare knuckles at home worked well. The invasion of Afghanistan was a triumph. Less than 18 months later the American army took Baghdad in a mere three weeks. In the 2002 mid-term elections the Republican Party increased its majority in the House and captured the Senate. Two years later Mr Bush won re-election with more votes than any previous presidential candidate.
Yet the price was heavy. Whereas September 11th had brought America together, his decisions to invade Iraq and to turn the war on terror into a partisan issue relentlessly divided the country. Democratic opposition to the war gathered strength with the insurgency in Iraq and exploded into fury as it became clear that Saddam Hussein's regime had neither weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nor close ties to al-Qaeda.
The opposition to the war eventually spread beyond the Democratic Party. And public unhappiness about the Iraq debacle has turned into much broader unease about American foreign policy. Mr Bush's foreign policy has turned its author into one of the most polarising presidents in American history. At home he is about as popular as Richard Nixon at the depths of the Watergate scandal (see chart 1); abroad he is seen as a war-mongering buffoon.
His policy has also left an astonishingly difficult legacy for Mr Bush's successor. Some 160,000 American troops are struggling to contain an insurgency in Iraq at the cost of $300m a day, not to mention thousands of American and tens of thousands of Iraqi lives. Things are better than they were, thanks to the surge of extra American troops last year, but Iraq remains a shattered nation, beset by terrorism, a civil war and a failed apparatus of state.
The rest of Mr Bush's axis of evil is still in place. North Korea has a nuclear bomb. Iran is still bent on acquiring nuclear capabilities and is expanding its regional influence. Hamas and Hizbullah are thriving. The Taliban is reviving in Afghanistan. Following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and an election that brought a resounding vote of no confidence in the president, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan remains strife-ridden. Al-Qaeda is still a coiled cobra.
On the face of it the presidential election will give America the best chance it has had to resolve its internal disagreements about American foreign policy. The two versions on offer could hardly present a clearer choice. But the task will be much more difficult than it appears. A Democratic president will have to weigh huge domestic pressures to bring the troops home against the danger of creating regional chaos in Iraq. Withdrawing troops too suddenly could bring catastrophe in the region and political humiliation at home. Jimmy Carter's failure in Iran destroyed his presidency and helped to sideline the Democrats as a political force for a decade. Does a future Democratic president want to risk a similar debacle?
Mr McCain will face a reality test of his own. He is nothing if not stubborn; nobody survives five-and-a-half years as a prisoner-of-war in Vietnam without a steely will. He has happily picked fights with all and sundry, including his own party. For example, he was one of the leading critics of the Bush administration on torture. He also cares deeply and personally about national security. He risked political suicide by supporting the surge when his party looked as if it was willing to soften on the Iraq war.
But even a man who proudly describes himself as a son of a bitch cannot buck public opinion. The American public has turned sharply against military assertiveness, so Mr McCain's hawkish instincts on foreign policy are hurting his chances of winning the White House. And even if he can pull it off, he will have a tough time of it: both houses of Congress will almost certainly have bigger Democratic majorities.
This is not to say that things will stay much the same when Mr Bush leaves. American foreign policy has already changed in important ways during the second Bush administration. The president has abandoned some of the hubris and bellicosity of his first term and put more effort into reaching out to allies and working with multilateral institutions, as well as giving more attention to the Palestinian problem. The next occupant of the White House, of whatever political stripe, will push American policy still further in that directionperhaps adding some grand gestures such as closing down the military prison at Guantánamo Bay or embracing global warming as a priority.
Beyond the war on terror
Most importantly, the next president will want to broaden American foreign policy from its preoccupation with the war on terror. The Olympic games in Beijing this summer will remind Americans of China's growing economic might, at a time when America is nervous about its own economic performance and faces powerful protectionist pressures at home. Russia's growing authoritarianism and assertiveness is also bound to pose a big strategic problem.
Even so, the issues that dominated the Bush presidency will not go away. Defeating radical Islam will remain a mainspring of American policy. Al-Qaeda still seems determined to inflict massive casualties on America's civilian population. It is still powerful and continues to pursue biological and even nuclear weapons. The president's first job is to protect the American people from attack, so al-Qaeda will remain an overriding worry.
A Democratic president might bring a change of strategy to the war on terror, with less martial rhetoric and a shift of focus from Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr Obama is saying that America should be fighting terrorism (but in Iraq it has chosen the wrong battlefield). He has expressed his willingness to go after high-value al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan without the permission of Pakistan's government, something that Mr Bush refused to do. The Bush administration itself is already toning down its rhetoric and trying harder to work with local elites and use non-military tools. There would be more of this under a Democratic president.
Whoever wins, America's foreign policy will continue to be bedevilled by three problems that Mr Bush has had to contend with. The first is partisanship at home. America will remain deeply divided about how to deal with radical Islam. Conservatives believe that this is the defining struggle of the age, whereas liberals see it as a hysterical response that will only add to the problem.
A Democratic president could find such partisanship particularly difficult to manage. The president will come under enormous pressure to bring America's troops home (see chart 2). He or she will also be expected to pursue a more conciliatory policy in the wider Middle East. But what happens if these twin goals prove difficult to reconcile? The president might be attacked from the left for selling out and from the right for not going far enough.
The second problem is that America disagrees with the rest of the world over dealing with the Middle East and radical Islam. Even under a Democratic president America will take a harder line than Europe on al-Qaeda, Iran, Pakistan and Palestinian militants. And even in a sunnier diplomatic climate Europe will be reluctant to do more in Iraq or Afghanistan. Europe's elites are not rallying to America's side as they did during the cold war.
The third difficulty is that America is simply not devoting enough resources to dealing with the war on terror. The army is severely overstretched. The Department of Homeland Security is a mess. The intelligence agencies have failed to adjust to the new threat from terrorism. America's schools and universities are not churning out nearly enough Arab-speakers.
Some commentators regard the war with extreme Islamism as the natural successor to the cold warworld war four, in the phrase of Norman Podhoretz, a prominent neoconservative. But Americans are far more polarised over foreign policy than they were in the days of the cold war, and many are not prepared to devote large resources to dealing with the terrorist threat. The grand certainties of the Bush doctrine are being replaced not by a new consensus but by growing confusion about what to do about terrorism and how to weigh that threat against the other strategic problems America is facing.
Hillary Clinton, his rival in the nail-biting fight for the Democratic nomination, lacks Mr Obama's silver tongue, and is handicapped by having voted to authorise the invasion of Iraq in 2002. But she, too, can work the crowd into a frenzy when she talks about foreign policy. She promises that she will begin to withdraw American troops from Iraq within 60 days of becoming president, and accuses George Bush of pursuing one of the most disastrous foreign policies in American history.
To John McCain, the Republican nominee, this is all dangerous nonsense. Mr McCain argues that withdrawing from Iraq would spell disaster for the Middle East and humiliation for America. He reckons that America needs to stay in Iraq, in some guise, for a hundred yearsand accuses Mr Obama of peddling the empty hope of a holiday from history.
When it comes to foreign policy, there really are two Americas. The divisions are at their sharpest over Iraq, but they extend much further. Should America put the war on terrorism at the heart of its foreign policy or treat it as just one concern among many? Should America bomb Iran or allow Iran to get the bomb? Should it negotiate with its enemies or wait for them to mend their ways?
From hero to zero
These deep divisions are the legacy of a man whose name will not appear on the ballot in November. Mr Bush came to power promising anything but a bold foreign policy. He styled himself as a new kind of conservativea uniter rather than a dividerand surrounded himself with foreign-policy heavyweights.
Dick Cheney was a hard-headed realist who had opposed toppling Saddam Hussein when he was defence secretary during the first Gulf war (asking how long would we have had to stay in Baghdad?). Colin Powell was known for his caution about using forceeither go in big or don't go in at alland for his enthusiasm for working with allies. Condoleezza Rice was a dyed-in-the-wool realist who had famously observed that the 82nd Airborne's job description did not include escorting kids to school.
During his campaign Mr Bush pledged himself to pursuing a humble foreign policy, an American foreign policy that reflects American character. The modesty of true strength. The humility of real greatness. He contrasted his approach with the Clinton administration's arrogance which had undermined American alliances, alienated friends and emboldened our adversaries.
Inevitably, all this changed on September 11th 2001. That tragedy initially united America in common grief and in a common determination to root out al-Qaeda. But Mr Bush's policies eventually replaced what he called the warm courage of national unity with bitter division.
Good and evil
Mr Bush responded to the terrorist attacks with striking boldness, based on his conviction, formed within hours of the attacks, that America was engaged in a war on terror. America would make no distinction between terrorists and the people who harboured them. It would remain on the offensive, working with friends if possible and alone if necessary. And it would tackle the root causes of terrorismthe Faustian bargain between Middle Eastern autocracies and radical Islam. The former frat boy saw himself as bringing firm resolve and clear vision and a deep faith to a global struggle between good and evil.
Mr Bush combined his visionary approach to foreign policy with a hard-edged style of governing. He embraced the Washington partisanship that he had denounced as a candidate, pushing through a wish-list of conservative measures, most notably tax cuts. But he also did something that was new in foreign policy: he turned the war on terror into an instrument of partisan advantage with the aim of building an enduring Republican majority.
At first this dual strategy of assertiveness abroad and bare knuckles at home worked well. The invasion of Afghanistan was a triumph. Less than 18 months later the American army took Baghdad in a mere three weeks. In the 2002 mid-term elections the Republican Party increased its majority in the House and captured the Senate. Two years later Mr Bush won re-election with more votes than any previous presidential candidate.
Yet the price was heavy. Whereas September 11th had brought America together, his decisions to invade Iraq and to turn the war on terror into a partisan issue relentlessly divided the country. Democratic opposition to the war gathered strength with the insurgency in Iraq and exploded into fury as it became clear that Saddam Hussein's regime had neither weapons of mass destruction (WMD) nor close ties to al-Qaeda.
The opposition to the war eventually spread beyond the Democratic Party. And public unhappiness about the Iraq debacle has turned into much broader unease about American foreign policy. Mr Bush's foreign policy has turned its author into one of the most polarising presidents in American history. At home he is about as popular as Richard Nixon at the depths of the Watergate scandal (see chart 1); abroad he is seen as a war-mongering buffoon.
The rest of Mr Bush's axis of evil is still in place. North Korea has a nuclear bomb. Iran is still bent on acquiring nuclear capabilities and is expanding its regional influence. Hamas and Hizbullah are thriving. The Taliban is reviving in Afghanistan. Following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and an election that brought a resounding vote of no confidence in the president, Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan remains strife-ridden. Al-Qaeda is still a coiled cobra.
On the face of it the presidential election will give America the best chance it has had to resolve its internal disagreements about American foreign policy. The two versions on offer could hardly present a clearer choice. But the task will be much more difficult than it appears. A Democratic president will have to weigh huge domestic pressures to bring the troops home against the danger of creating regional chaos in Iraq. Withdrawing troops too suddenly could bring catastrophe in the region and political humiliation at home. Jimmy Carter's failure in Iran destroyed his presidency and helped to sideline the Democrats as a political force for a decade. Does a future Democratic president want to risk a similar debacle?
Mr McCain will face a reality test of his own. He is nothing if not stubborn; nobody survives five-and-a-half years as a prisoner-of-war in Vietnam without a steely will. He has happily picked fights with all and sundry, including his own party. For example, he was one of the leading critics of the Bush administration on torture. He also cares deeply and personally about national security. He risked political suicide by supporting the surge when his party looked as if it was willing to soften on the Iraq war.
But even a man who proudly describes himself as a son of a bitch cannot buck public opinion. The American public has turned sharply against military assertiveness, so Mr McCain's hawkish instincts on foreign policy are hurting his chances of winning the White House. And even if he can pull it off, he will have a tough time of it: both houses of Congress will almost certainly have bigger Democratic majorities.
This is not to say that things will stay much the same when Mr Bush leaves. American foreign policy has already changed in important ways during the second Bush administration. The president has abandoned some of the hubris and bellicosity of his first term and put more effort into reaching out to allies and working with multilateral institutions, as well as giving more attention to the Palestinian problem. The next occupant of the White House, of whatever political stripe, will push American policy still further in that directionperhaps adding some grand gestures such as closing down the military prison at Guantánamo Bay or embracing global warming as a priority.
Beyond the war on terror
Most importantly, the next president will want to broaden American foreign policy from its preoccupation with the war on terror. The Olympic games in Beijing this summer will remind Americans of China's growing economic might, at a time when America is nervous about its own economic performance and faces powerful protectionist pressures at home. Russia's growing authoritarianism and assertiveness is also bound to pose a big strategic problem.
Even so, the issues that dominated the Bush presidency will not go away. Defeating radical Islam will remain a mainspring of American policy. Al-Qaeda still seems determined to inflict massive casualties on America's civilian population. It is still powerful and continues to pursue biological and even nuclear weapons. The president's first job is to protect the American people from attack, so al-Qaeda will remain an overriding worry.
A Democratic president might bring a change of strategy to the war on terror, with less martial rhetoric and a shift of focus from Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr Obama is saying that America should be fighting terrorism (but in Iraq it has chosen the wrong battlefield). He has expressed his willingness to go after high-value al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan without the permission of Pakistan's government, something that Mr Bush refused to do. The Bush administration itself is already toning down its rhetoric and trying harder to work with local elites and use non-military tools. There would be more of this under a Democratic president.
Whoever wins, America's foreign policy will continue to be bedevilled by three problems that Mr Bush has had to contend with. The first is partisanship at home. America will remain deeply divided about how to deal with radical Islam. Conservatives believe that this is the defining struggle of the age, whereas liberals see it as a hysterical response that will only add to the problem.
A Democratic president could find such partisanship particularly difficult to manage. The president will come under enormous pressure to bring America's troops home (see chart 2). He or she will also be expected to pursue a more conciliatory policy in the wider Middle East. But what happens if these twin goals prove difficult to reconcile? The president might be attacked from the left for selling out and from the right for not going far enough.
The third difficulty is that America is simply not devoting enough resources to dealing with the war on terror. The army is severely overstretched. The Department of Homeland Security is a mess. The intelligence agencies have failed to adjust to the new threat from terrorism. America's schools and universities are not churning out nearly enough Arab-speakers.
Some commentators regard the war with extreme Islamism as the natural successor to the cold warworld war four, in the phrase of Norman Podhoretz, a prominent neoconservative. But Americans are far more polarised over foreign policy than they were in the days of the cold war, and many are not prepared to devote large resources to dealing with the terrorist threat. The grand certainties of the Bush doctrine are being replaced not by a new consensus but by growing confusion about what to do about terrorism and how to weigh that threat against the other strategic problems America is facing.
