Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War

[sudhir007]

Airpower at 18,000

Foreword

In the spring of 1999, the world slowly became aware of Pakistan’s foray into the Kargil-Dras sector of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir, a provocation that would incite the limited war now known as the “Kargil conflict.” This clash represented a watershed in Indo-Pakistani security relations because it demonstrated that even the presence of nuclear weapons might not dampen the competition that has persisted historically between the region’s largest states. But the conflict distinguished itself in other ways as well, especially in the scale and type of military operations.

Although past struggles for advantage along the disputed borders outside of declared wars invariably involved small infantry elements on both sides, the Kargil conflict was unique both in the number of major Indian land formations committed to the struggle and New Delhi’s decision to employ airpower. The role of airpower, however, was tinged with controversy from the very beginning. Both during and immediately after the conflict, it was not clear whether the Indian Air Force (IAF) leadership of the time advocated the commitment of Indian airpower and under what conditions, how the IAF actually performed at the operational level and with what effects, and whether the employment of airpower was satisfactorily coordinated with the Indian Army at either the strategic or the tactical levels of war. Whether airpower proved to be the decisive linchpin that hastened the successful conclusion of the conflict was also uncertain—but all these questions provided grist for considerable disputation in the aftermath of the war.

What the Kargil conflict demonstrated, however, was that airpower was relevant and could be potentially very effective even in the utterly demanding context of mountain warfare at high altitudes. At a time when India is compelled to think seriously about the security challenges posed by China’s continuing military modernization—especially as it affects India’s ability to protect its equities along the formidable Himalayan borderlands—a critical assessment of the IAF’s contributions to the Kargil conflict is essential and in fact long overdue. Various partial analyses have appeared already; they are indispensable because they address several specific dimensions of IAF operations ranging from the early debates about strategy and the political impact of employing airpower to overcoming the various difficulties that the IAF had to surmount in quick order if its instruments of combat were to make a useful contribution to the success of India’s national aims. The combat capabilities brought to bear in the airspace above the mountain battlefields, obviously, constituted only the visible tip of the spear; a vast and often invisible system of organization and support involving everything from managing intratheater airlift to redeploying combat squadrons to planning and coordinating operations to improvising technical fixes amidst the pressure of combat were all implicated in airpower’s contribution to the Kargil War.

This story has never been told before in depth or with comprehensiveness and balance—yet it deserves telling both because it sheds light on an important episode in Indian military history and because its lessons have implications for managing the more demanding threats that India is confronted with in the Himalayas. This monograph by Benjamin Lambeth advances both aims admirably. It represents a serious scholarly effort to understand how the IAF actually performed at Kargil and is exemplary for the meticulousness of its research, the political detachment of its analysis, and its insights which could come only from one of America’s premier analysts of airpower, who also happens to have accumulated extensive flight experience in more than three dozen different types of combat aircraft worldwide since 1976. Lambeth’s oeuvre—manifested during a distinguished career of over forty years (most of it at RAND)—has always been wideranging: in addition to his many writings on airpower and air warfare, it has included seminal studies on Soviet military thought; nuclear deterrence, strategy and operations; geopolitics in the superpower competition; and the evolution of military technology and its impact on warfighting.

Given his diverse interests and his formal academic training at Georgetown and Harvard, it is not surprising that Lambeth’s study ranges across multiple levels of analysis, from the geopolitical to the tactical. This broad approach permits him to cover airpower’s contribution to the conflict in extraordinary detail. It relies not simply on the published record but also on detailed interviews with the IAF’s leadership and its combat cadres as well as on extensive communications with a host of participants from the other services involved in the war, all brought together in a seamless and coherent analytical narrative. As the result, the report is simultaneously a chronicle of what the IAF actually did and a fair evaluation of both its achievements and its shortcomings. National security analysts in the United States and in India, as well as policymakers in both countries, would do well to read the monograph carefully because of its judgments about IAF capabilities and the paths implicitly suggested for future U.S.-Indian defense (and in particular airpower) cooperation.

The South Asia program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is privileged to publish Lambeth’s report. I am especially grateful to the Indian Council for Cultural Relations for supporting the Endowment’s ongoing research on Indian security.

there is more then 70 page for full reading please go for link

 

[Capt.Popeye]

AIRPOWER AT 18,000 ft; The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War by Benjamin S.Lambeth (pub. by the Carnegie Endowment, 2012) certainly does throw some light on the proceedings at Kargil in 1999 just as much as it is likely to generate some heat and re-ignite great discussions on the fracas that took place there more than a decade ago.
To start with; neither the architects of the plan that set Kargil off, nor the putative victims of that plan did ever conceive that Airpower could have had any role to play there. But events on those mountain peaks ‘snow-balled’ so to speak; and Air-power was used (at least on one side). That is what Benjamin Lambeth has sought to study.

Kargil re-visited.

Just to recap the context of Lambeth’s study; Pakistan made an ingress across the LOC (Line of Control) into the Indian side of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the mountainous area of Kargil. When this incursion came to light in India (and later Internationally) Pakistan made the case that this was an incursion planned and executed by Mujaheddin (insurgents ostensibly engaged in seeking independence for J & K from India) though soon enough this operation was exposed as a plan of a few officers at the highest level of the Pakistani Army’s Establishment and the Mujaheddin angle was simply a masquerade!

Prelude to Kargil.

Brig. Shaukat Kadir a retired officer of the PA (in “An Analysis of Kargil” –RUSI Journal) explains the prelude to the operation thus:
“ Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad somewhere towards mid November 1998, then commanding 10 Corps sought an appointment with the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Pervez Musharaf, through the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt Gen Aziz. When he went to see him, he was accompanied by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Frontier Constabulary of the Northern Areas (FCNA), Major General (now Lt Gen) Javed Hassan.
They sought permission to execute a plan, which had been made earlier, as military plans often are, and shelved. The plan essentially visualized occupying terrain in the Dras-Kargil sector, which the Indians were known to vacate every winter, and reoccupy at the advent of summer. The rationale was that it would provide a fillip to the Kashmiri freedom movement. The plan was approved in principle, with instructions to commence preparations, but confine the knowledge of this plan to the four people present, for the time being.”
“While preparations for executing the plan began in November/ December 1999, the subject was casually broached with the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, some time in December, presenting the same argument that the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into these territories, left unoccupied by the Indians during winters. It would also repay them for their incursion into Siachin.
In fact, it would hurt them more. Nawaz Sharif, being the kind of person he is, accepted the statement at face value. Nor did the military leadership, as it is supposed to, present a complete analysis of the scale of the operation or its possible outcome, with a political aim, and how the military operation would achieve the political aim.”
“Thus far, the rest of the army was unaware of the operation, as indeed were the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) and the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS).”
“Personally, I do not think that the operation was intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it grew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied heights, and finally were overlooking the valley. In the process, they had ended up occupying an area of about 130 square kilometers over a front of over 100 kilometers and depth ranging between 7 to 15 kilometers. They were occupying 132 posts of various sizes6. Whereas, the total number occupying these posts, never exceeded 1000 all ranks, but four times this number provided the logistical backup to undertake the operation. While the occupants were essentially soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), there were some local Mujahideen assisting as labour to carry logistical requirements.”

As that account shows, the Mujaheddin connection to the Kargil Op. was tenuous and only to the extent of being used as “beasts of burden” in the logistical train.

Shaukat Kadir continues: “It was at this stage, in March 1999, that the leadership of the army was apprised of the operation and the Military Operations (MO) Directorate in GHQ was tasked to evolve a strategic operational plan, which would have a military aim to fulfill a political objective.
Given the fact that they were evolving a plan to justify an operation already underway,
the response was no less than brilliant. Given the total ratio of forces of India and Pakistan, which was about 2 ¼ : 1, the MO concluded that the initial Indian reaction would be to rush in more troops to ***, further eroding their offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, they concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so it would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan.”

The rest of the GHQ staff was co-opted much later (by Shaukat Kadir’s account) to give a post-facto Strategic “flesh” to the Tactical “ skeleton”- which happened to be a Military Operation already underway! And it was named as Operation Badr (from Ghazwa-e-Badr).

The information above is substantiated by Hassan Abbas in his book- “Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism” wherein he says: “So much so that even the very able DGMO, Lieutenant General Tauqir Zia, was initiated into the secret after the gang of four had already taken the irrevocable decision of going ahead with the operation”. Hassan Abbas had served in the administrations of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1994-1995) and Gen. Parvez Musharraf (1999-2000).

More from Shaukat Kadir; “While the political aim spelt out was, “To seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir”, the military aim leading up to the political aim was, “To create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness”. The operational plan visualized the Indian’s amassing troops at the LOC to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas. By July, the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian lines of communication, at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. Thus creating an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and pose an additional threat, this would force India to the negotiating table. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, the initial execution, tactically brilliant.The only flaw was that it had not catered for the “environment“.

In the underlined part; Brig.Kadir is being generous to the original architects as well as the GHQ, PA (which worked on the ‘post-facto’ Strategic Operational Plan) to a fault; as will be demonstrated later.

This plan (sic) was part of a presentation that was made to the PM and other Service Chiefs in April 1999.

In Brig.Kadir’s words:
“Soon thereafter, the first formal briefing of the entire operation was made for the benefit of the Prime Minister (of Pakistan) in April, in the presence of the other services. Since the CNS was on a visit abroad, the navy’s reaction was voiced cautiously, but the CAS was openly critical and skeptical of the conclusion that India would not opt for an all-out war.He also voiced the view that in the event of war; the air force would not be able to provide the support that the army might be seeking.”

Thus Brig. Kadir explains the setting of the scene for Kargil. Since Kadir has mentioned the PAF CAS’ view; it will be relevant to mention the views of a PAF insider: that of then Director Air Operations, later Air Cmde. (R) Kaiser Tufail.

Air Cmde.Kaiser Tufail writes about that time in his blog “Aeronaut”. While he writes clearly that the PA (specifically 4 officers) seemed to working on some Operational Plan, nowhere was that Plan discussed with the PAF. Only some information was sought from the PAF (in March 1999) about: “fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc”. That was it.

Later on 12th May, a PAF team was sent 10 Corps HQ to attend a Briefing on what was termed as the ‘Kashmir Contingency’.
That seems to be the extent of PAF involvement in drawing up the plans for Kargil.

Kaiser Tufail describes that briefing thus: “Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the ‘latest situation in Kashmir’ at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a ‘protective manoeuvre’, he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. “Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of ‘providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir’ was never mentioned.)

When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. “I have Stingers on every peak,” he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud’s reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link’s vulnerability to our offensive elements.”

The PA’s (or at least, the Plan’s proponents’) view on the lack of need for PAF involvement or association with the Operation is summarised in the underlined part above.

While, the questions posed by the PAF team’s Air Cmdes. Nawaz and Tufail clearly apprehended (and even actually predicted) the possible use of IAF air-power and IA’s Artillery power in response to Operation Badr (Kargil Ops).

Also read the fallacy of Lt.Gen. Mehmud’s assertion when he replied to Air Cmde. Tufail: “ that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link’s vulnerability to our offensive elements.”

This assertion by Mehmud was eventually proved to be hollow when the Indian Army moved up Artillery Guns (of which 130 guns alone were the Bofors FH-77 155 mm Howitzers) and MBRLs into the very same Dras-Kargil Sector in large numbers and unleashed an unrelenting Artillery Barrage on the ridges, peaks and valleys across; eventually expending approx. 250,000 rounds. On one day alone, 9000 shells were lobbed at Tiger Hill!
Seemingly, in the words of one Indian Army officer: “the (Indian) infantry started taking Bofors (howitzer) as their section weapon.”

On the other hand; it was the Pakistani Army GHQ that was unable to move up any sizeable reinforcements since it could not deplete formations engaged on the Indo-Pak borders elsewhere, as it had no control or any clue on the future direction that the conflict would take (as was proved later).

Plus GHQ, PA had already stymied itself (“shot itself in the foot”, so to speak) by peddling the story that it was not involved in Kargil, thus confining itself to launching an Operation; and then being forced to stand by, “twiddling its thumbs”!

An instance of how poorly the architects had thought through the Operation Badr Plan.

In the account of the briefing held at 10 Corps, the key to the importance of Operation Badr is let out in the recount of Lt.Gen. Mehmud’s statement:
“Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold”.
The intention of the operation seems to have been to choke off the Indian supply line to Siachen which originated out of Kargil. Apart from interdicting the main supply route to Ladakh (NH 1A).

Then Kaiser Tufail sums up the PAF’s view as follows:
“Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army’s planning, though we were given to believe that it was a ‘limited tactical action’ in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with.”

It can thus be said that the PAF seemed to be more prescient and sanguine as to how the ‘planned operation’ was likely to turn out in its consequences.

This intention of the PA to keep PAF out of the loop, seems to be an echo of an earlier Operation Gibraltar launched by PA in 1965; where the PAF was similarly treated- a fact attested to by many including AM (R) Nur Khan as well as ACM (R) M. Anwar Shamim in his book “Cutting edge PAF”.
It is another matter that after Operation Gibraltar collapsed and Operation Grand Slam ground to a halt in 1965, the PAF was still able to pull the PA’s ‘chestnuts out of the fire’.

In Kargil, the PAF just had no chance to do so.



The Architects of Kargil

It will be relevant in some measure to reproduce Brig.Kadir’s (subjective as it might be) ‘pen-picture’ of the 4 architects of Kargil:
“Gen Pervez Musharaf (then COAS): A sharp and intelligent, artillery officer, who has
commanded infantry formations from brigade upwards, and held a large variety of staff and instructional appointments. A bold commander, who takes pride in being decisive, quick to take decisions (a fact he took pains to highlight after his takeover, but cannot be accused of it in political matters) and, therefore, a good commander of troops and keen to assume responsibility.

Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (then GOC, 10 Corps): Again an artillery officer, with a wide variety of experience. He is sharp and intelligent, with a touch of arrogance that kept growing till it became overwhelming towards the end of his career, and a strong sense of right and wrong. A strong, forceful, decisive and highly ambitious individual, who was secular, but “discovered” the force of Islam late in life. Consequently he tends to see everything in life is starkly either, black or white. On those occasions, as dangerous as any other “who believes himself to be incapable of going wrong”.

Lt Gen Muhammed Aziz (then CGS): More than anyone else, he has been painted the villain, and the “fundo”, which he is not. Deeply religious, but very balanced, he is born Kashmiri, and has served in some of the most rugged reaches of it, at various stages of his career. Strongly patriotic and deeply committed to the cause of Kashmir, but not to the extent that it might jeopardize Pakistan. He is intelligent, sharp, very balanced, progressive and dynamic.

Major General Javed Hassan (then GOC, FCNA): A highly intelligent and well-read officer, who is more an academician than a commander, and bears that reputation. He was the only one, with a point to prove.”

Another view (which may also be subjective) of the 4 architects of the “Kargil Plan” appears in Hassan Abbas’ book quoted earlier, but it is telling nonetheless:
“The third and final operational plan for Kargil was put forward by its inspirational father, Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz Khan, chief of the general staff (CGS). Himself a Kashmiri, he was fully committed to the cause of Kashmiri freedom, and not the sort of man who held any commitment lightly. He is very religious and not known to be a hypocrite.

The tactical parents of the Kargil plan were two. The first was Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, the commander of 10th Corps, in whose area of operations the objective lay. He was a comparatively weaker personality than Aziz, with a romance about history. It is believed that he was convinced by the conviction of Aziz, which, combined with his own historical dream, made him a hostage to the Kargil idea.

The second parent of the plan was Major General Javed Hassan, commander of the Pakistani troops in the Northern Areas (Force Command Northern Areas, FCNA) who would actually have to carry out the operation. He had one of the best minds in the army and even more ambition. He gave his unstinting support to the operation, less through any sense of conviction and more because of the promise that such a position held of bringing him into General Pervez Musharraf’s charmed inner circle.

(Gen.)Musharraf was taken in by the enthusiasm of two of his closest generals, and being eternally levitated by an irrepressible streak of unreal optimism, he became the strongest advocate of the operation. The absolute secrecy that was one of the preconditions of the success of the operation, to secure it against any possibility of leaks, also made it proof against any possibility of a second opinion, and thus against any collusion with a sense of reality.”

The above view of Hassan Abbas regarding the absolute secrecy and lack of any critical appraisal of the Plan is supported by Kaiser Tufail’s assessment of Kargil:
“In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its own operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures”.

It will be pertinent to note that Gen.Parvez Musharraf as a Brig. had served in Siachen and had authored as well as led an unsuccessful Plan. In September 1987, while he led the Special Services Group in Khiplo near Siachen, he planned to take back Quaid Peak at Bilafond Pass in which he badly failed. Hence the supposition (in some quarters) that Kargil was a reaction to Siachen.

Another account of a high level briefing for the Pakistani PM explains:
“Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif summoned General Pervez Musharraf in a high level meeting on Wednesday the 2nd June during which many secrets of the Kargil Operation plan came into light. Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, Secretary Defense Lt. Gen. (retired) Iftikhar Ali Khan, Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Mehmood Ahmed, the then Naval and Air chiefs and Director-General ISI were also present in the meeting.
On this occasion, Secretary Defense Lt. Gen. Iftikhar Ali said: “On the strength of my military training, studies and experience, I can only say that there could only be two results of this military operation: full scale war or an insulting and crushing defeat. It is my national obligation to inform you about the future dangers.”
(Urdu Digest, August 99 edition page 37).

Pakistani Forces used at Kargil

The forces earmarked for OPERATION BADR were: 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th battalions of the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI). Also included were Mujaheddin (in the role as mentioned earlier) and members of Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG) since Officers from 1 and 3 Special Services Group were also killed. Along with elements from the Chitral and Bajaur Scouts. It is estimated that about 5,000 troops were involved, while the troops actually occupying the vacant Indian posts were approx. 1800.. Since officers from several other regiments were also identified – 24 Sind, 13 Azad Kashmir, 1 and 63 Frontier Force, 60 Baluch – it might be tempting to assume other battalions were involved. More likely that these officers probably were on deputation to the NLI.
These forces were provided with fire-support by at least 18 batteries of PA Artillery.

Operation Badr- a summation

In summation, Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions was based on exploitation of the large gaps that existed in the defences in the sector both on Indian and Pak side of the Line of Control (LOC). The terrain is extremely rugged with very few tracks leading from the main roads towards the LOC. During winters the area gets very heavy snowfall making movement almost impossible. Zoji La, the only mountain pass connecting the Kargil area to the Kashmir Valley, normally opens by the end of May or beginning of June. Thus, moving of reinforcements by surface means from Srinagar would not have been possible till then. Pakistan Army calculated that even if the intrusions were discovered in early May, as they were, the Indian Army's reaction would be slow and limited, thereby allowing them to consolidate the intrusions more effectively. However, Zoji La was opened for the induction of troops in early May itself. The incursions, if effective; would enable Pakistani troops to secure a number of dominating heights from where the Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1A could be interdicted at a number of places. The intrusions would also draw in and tie down Indian Army reserves. These intrusions would, further, give Pakistan control over substantial tracts of strategic land area across the LOC, thereby, enabling Islamabad to negotiate from a position of strength. The intrusions would irrevocably alter the status of the LOC, since the LOC is the de-facto border between the two states in the disputed area of Jammu & Kashmir.

In the light of all the above, the ‘Idea’ behind Kargil’s “Operation Badr” was brilliant in its conception and audacious in its intent. The problem however was that it did not encompass much more than that ‘kernel of an idea’ so that it could be grown in to a ‘ripe fruit of a well-thought out and thought-through Plan’ of action.
An ‘Idea’, however great it may be; cannot be a synonym for a ‘Plan’ nor can it be passed off as a Plan. To don the mantle of a Plan, thought and reasoning has to be added around the ‘Idea’. All possible possibilities and contingencies have to be thought of and thought through to give a Plan any reasonable chance of success. It is vital to weigh the pros and cons of a military offensive in terms of understanding the possible ramifications and enemy reactions before embarking on a military Operation. All that can be considered to be “environment” (the expression used by Brig.Kadir).

For instance, the plan paid little attention to the “environment”. The “environment” included (but was not limited to) the possibility that the response from India could even be escalatory in nature, which in the event; it actually was!

That was something that the planners of Operation Badr had not considered with any seriousness and finally as demonstrated by subsequent events; were simply even unable to cope with!
Did the planners smugly believe that such a response was not even likely? It seems so.
Contingencies had little (if any) part of their attention while drawing up the plan.

And Brig. Kadir could just blandly say, as he did: “While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan was faultless, the initial execution, tactically brilliant. The only flaw was that it had not catered for the “environment”.

How “good” is a Plan that has eventual failure intrinsically built into it?

It is amazing that the 4 architects of the plan (who had been instructors in various Military Institutions in their respective service careers) had overlooked such finer points.

What compounded the flaws in Op.Badr was that it seems not even to have been explained in any detail to the Political Leadership in Pakistan. Because the consequences of any Military action directed towards a neighbouring country must have a diplomatic ‘fall-out’ which of necessity would have to be dealt with by the Political Leadership. In this instance, the Political Leadership (and consequently the Pakistani Diplomatic Establishment) were grossly unprepared.
About how the Diplomatic Establishment of Pakistan was kept in the dark about Kargil; Ambassador Zafar Hilaly (Pakistani FO) had this to say in “Comment-Military Dictation on Foreign Policy”:
“Kargil, of course, was yet another disaster over which the military consulted no one, not even its own, what to speak of the FO. And, instead of being court-martialled for his folly, Musharraf was given a long lease of life in office followed by an honourable send-off.”

Though there has been a great deal of acrimony about this matter; whether this (the explanation) was done or not – has been a continuing squabble between the two main ‘Honchos’ on the Pakistani side, viz. PM Nawaz Sharif and COAS Parvez Musharraf since then up to the present time.
Whatever may be the truth, the fact is that once the plan was set rolling and the dismal results came in eventually (and somewhat inevitably) there was a huge disconnect between the Political leadership and the Military leadership about the campaign and its conclusion, and in the end; both Political and Military leadership in Pakistan were simply reduced to a state of dysfunction- something that just added to the chances of a disastrous conclusion of the plan!

Indian reaction to Operation Badr

On the Indian side, the Indian Army was taken completely unawares. Having gone through the “then-routine” act of vacating the posts and pickets on the Kargil ridges during winter, it had even scaled down the patrols that were sent out (citing bad weather). The patrols that did take place failed to detect the intrusions till some local shepherds reported the matter. Even Air Surveillance Sorties took place very intermittently without any results. The initial sighting by the shepherds jogged all concerned in to some state of vigilance. Then it took some time to positively identify the intruders. It has been said that this “stand-down” condition was engendered by the spirit of bonhomie that was visible between the political leaderships of India and Pakistan after the famous “Dosti-Bus” trip undertaken by the Indian PM to Lahore in February 1999. But that was all political moves which should have scarcely been allowed to percolate into the routine peace-time Indian military operations. Additionally, regular IA units had been bled to set-up Rashtriya Rifles (RR) Units in the Vale of Kashmir. Clearly, counter-insurgency tasks in the Kashmir Valley were taking greater importance in the scheme of things.

Probing patrols launched by the IA’s Kargil Brigade (121 Bde.) finally confirmed the intrusions on 5th May and the full scale of the incursions was validated by Cheetah Helicopter surveillance over Dras on 8th May.

The Military action at Kargil has otherwise been recounted many times and in such great detail; that it will be inappropriate to repeat that here. But for some issues.

The first is the stated disagreements between the COAS, IA and the CAS, IAF on the use of air-assets. This disagreement was re-echoed numerous times and on various fora; that it even led to some re-ignition of the debate on “IAF support to the IA” that came to the fore in 1962 after the Indo-China conflict.

The IAF view was based on the fact that initially HQ, 15 Corps through HQ, Northern Command of the IA asked the IAF only for Attack Helicopters or Armed Helicopters to be employed in support of IA troops on the ground who were tasked to evict the intruders. The IAF’s response was that the operating heights of 14,000~ 18,000 ft. was outside the operational ceiling of the IAF’s Mi-25/Mi-35 Attack Helicopters. The IAF was also reluctant to operate the Mi-17 Helicopters in an armed role because it considered them to be vulnerable to enemy ground fire though they could otherwise operate at those altitudes. Thus only fixed wing assets could be considered for operations. More importantly, the IAF believed that employment of Air-Assets in any meaningful measure could only be an escalatory measure in the conflict which needed approval of the political leadership considering the effects of such escalation in the conflict. Some time passed before the COSC was able to present some unanimity to the CCS of the Govt. of India; seeking the necessary approval. The GoI accorded the necessary approval on May 25th 1999, with a critical rider that “the IAF could in no condition be allowed to cross the LOC”.

This injunction was to severely over-hang the subsequent operations in Kargil and drastically impact the tone and tenor of the IAF’s air operations.
While this injunction of the GoI was militarily untenable (and flawed), it had a beneficial fall-out on the Diplomatic manouevrings that inevitably attach to such matters.This was eventually exploited to the fullest.

Initially the IA and IAF disagreed strongly on the nature and extent of air assets to be used in the military response. However once the necessary consensus was created in the COSC, inter-services co-operation kicked in completely and even the IN went on alert on 20th May, then later initiated Operation Talwar to commence aggressive patrolling off the Pakistan coast which could (if required to) interdict the SLOC and blockade Pakistani ports; that would have had very serious repercussions on the Pakistani Economy and War Effort.

In short, the Indian reaction followed the sequence of:
Disconcerting Discovery-> Disbelief-> Confusion-> Coherent and Concerted Action-> Conclusive End!
Thus IAF air operations (Operation Safed Sagar) commenced at 0630 hrs on 26th May.

Air Operations on both sides during the Conflict.

Be that as it may, armed Mi-17 helicopters commenced operations in support of ground troops. On 29th May, a IAF Mi-17 helicopter was downed by a shoulder fired SAM as forebode by the IAF earlier, that put an end to rotary winged operations till at least the helicopters were retro-fitted with suitable counter measures. But Mi-17s were subsequently not used in any offensive role and served only in Supply and CASEVAC etc. However, AAC light helicopters (Chetaks and Cheetah) of the IA were used extensively as FAC apart from CASEVAC and Supply throughout the conflict.
Earlier on 28th May, the IAF suffered two air casualties in quick succession; first a MiG-27 which had an engine flame-out after ingesting rocket exhaust gas through the engine’s air inlets after attacking an enemy supply dump. The Mig-27 was flying at an altitude well above which the rockets had been cleared to be fired. The pilot ejected successfully and became a POW in the hands of the PA, being returned to India later.

A MiG-21 that was flying top cover for the attacking aircraft, that came down to investigate the location of the downed pilot was hit by a SAM. This pilot also successfully ejected, but was brutally murdered by the enemy troops who apprehended him after landing on the ground.

It must also be recorded that a slow lumbering Canberra PR-57 reconnaissance aircraft had been hit by a Chinese made Anza SAM in one engine on May 21st; but the aircraft was successfully recovered to base.
These were the only air casualties that occurred but they forced the IAF to rethink their operational procedures for the rest of the action. Subsequently, not a single IAF aircraft was downed or sustained battle damage; though more than 100 SAMs were launched.

On the Pakistani side, there was no air-action save possibly re-supply by air. But that was well behind the Pakistani side of the LOC and thus remained invulnerable because of the injunction that the IAF could not cross the LOC. In any case since the PA and Govt. of Pakistan had been insisting that the intruders were Mujaheddin (aka Non State Actors) there was nothing that the PAF could do in their active support.

As Kaiser Tufail avers: “From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF’s intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.”

So the PAF was trapped into a massive bind. It was damned if it did and equally damned if it did’nt! Certainly not an enviable situation for a professional Air Force to be in. But that was the “beauty” of the Plan that set off Operation Badr!

In the mean-while the scope of the IAF air operations increased exponentially after they went through a short lull and reworked their operating methods. Now the intruders were facing a relentless air-attack while their own Air Force was nowhere to be seen in their support. Though in all fairness, when the PAF was beseeched by their PA comrades for air-support; it had set up a system of CAPs by their fighters in the air-space over POJK in the hope that some IAF aircraft may be lured over the LOC and engaged in combat. However this would have exposed the PAF aircraft to the hazards of BVR combat for which the PAF then had no capability, while the IAF had BVR capable aircraft. The results of such engagement could have been disastrous. Also the most capable aircraft in the PAF inventory, the F-16 was severely hit by the US imposed embargo after Pakistan’s Chagai Hills nuclear tests. After some period of flying these jets out of Skardu initially and later out of Minhas and Sargodha (since Skardu was vulnerable to IAF attack), the PAF was faced with the realisation after one week of flying random CAPs with the F-16s; that the limited War Reserves were being consumed and in Air Cmde.Kaiser Tufail’s words: “that the activity had to be ‘rationalised’, a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether.”

Kaiser Tufail goes on to explain the conclusion of whatever air ops that were undertaken by by PAF thus:: “It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.”

The statement of Kaiser Tufail is supported by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh “Pakistan deployed SAMs and air defence weaponry in the bridgehead across the LoC on the Indian side. The PAF mounted patrols on an ongoing basis, but prudently preferred discretion… and did not attempt to challenge the IAF.”

Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal adds “though some (IAF) pilots spotted PAF fighter aircraft including F-16s, the PAF studiously avoided raising the ante.”

So that was the end of any serious PAF combat-capable air activity.

Tellingly Kaiser Tufail continues: “In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to ‘equal the match’. Might it strike to some that PAF’s restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?”

This again points to the inherent incompleteness and inadequacy of the “so-called Plan” that Operation Badr was based on. Also the plan had not even adequately factored in the actual state of assets and reserves available to the PAF (simply because it blithely assumed that there was no need for Air-Power!).

Or as mentioned earlier, the plan just assumed no possibility of any escalation.

Whether the planners had also accounted for the state of other Pakistani reserves is also a question. For example, the POL reserves available or even the financial reserves of the GoP. It is now well known that the GoP was then involved in hectic negotiations with International Financial Institutions for a much-needed financial infusion; which came under threat because of the conflict. Just as the precarious state of POL reserves in Pakistan got highlighted when the IN started aggressive patrolling in the Arabian Sea as part of the Indian response. In case of further escalation, the IN could have choked off the SLOC.

Another example of the inattention to “environment” by the planners as mentioned earlier. So much for that “brilliant Plan”!!


Problems encountered in use of Air Assets and their alleviation.

The thin air at those altitudes posed serious threat to the accuracy of munitions as well as degraded the performance of the aircraft platforms themselves. Most of all, the aircraft had to be operated outside the operating envelope of the portable SAMs peppering the Pakistani positions on the ridges. All of these had to be catered for apart from the prohibition by Govt. of India on crossing the LOC!

First of all, the IAF set limits on weapons release altitude that placed most aircraft at 30,000 feet (9,140 m) to avoid the threat from Pakistani SAMs. In the meantime it equipped all its fighters involved in the operations with flares.

In the mean-while, the IAF (as Lambeth says in his monograph) was evolving: “IAF’s pilots quickly understood what the Israelis had learned at great cost during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery downed nearly a third of the Israeli Air Force’s fighter inventory (102 aircraft) before the three-week war finally ended in victory for Israel.”

“Demonstrating its adaptability, the IAF moved with dispatch to equip all of its participating fighters with flares in order to provide an active countermeasure against any enemy infrared-guided missiles.”
“In all, enemy forces fired more than 100 surface-to-air missiles at IAF aircraft throughout the conflict. After the service’s first three days of combat operations, however, not a single one of its aircraft was downed or sustained battle damage.”

Of course there were other problems that the IAF had to work around before it hoped to make any meaningful contribution to the combat.

The injunction of the GoI (while allowing use of Air Power) on disallowing crossing the LOC affected the IAF’s ability to engage fixed targets as well. Many Pakistani supply sites were located across the LOC in the Northern Areas and were therefore off-limits to begin with. Apart from that, the increased turning radius caused by the high altitude atmosphere also placed many targets within the Kargil Area off-limits, because the LOC could not be crossed while manoeuvreing. Of course there is a view that while this prohibition severely constrained the IAF in its operations, it forced the IAF to re-look at its procedures. Further innovative real-time innovation by the IAF occurred when MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard navigation suites resorted to the use of stopwatches and commercial hand-held GPS receivers clamped down in their cockpits for conducting night interdiction bombing and introducing some measure of precision. This measure was thought of by a junior IAF pilot.
Of course the one un-repairable consequence of the GoI’s injunction was that the IAF was forced to operate in the West~East Direction when it should have been operating South~North ideally.

Another unusual technique developed by the IAF for use in the campaign involved selecting weapon impact points so as to create landslides and avalanches that covered intruder’s supply lines. This was one use of the dumb bombs which otherwise would have had limited utility.

One serious handicap in the IAF air operations was the inability to discern the strung-out “penny-packet” disposition of the enemy hidden in to the folds of the rugged terrain. As some pilots have said of Kargil (as well as in Afghanistan)- “the target view was postage stamp sized”.

To overcome this, (to quote Lambeth): “Finally, to note just one of many additional examples that could be cited, the IAF pioneered during its Kargil campaign what has since come to be called nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through its use of electro-optical band infrared imaging targeting pods for conducting high-resolution aerial reconnaissance of the battle-space”.

Apart from that, a junior IAF pilot took along a hand-held video-camera to provide “real-time monitoring” of the air strikes. This practice soon gained acceptance and proved to be of great utility.

Thus the spirit of innovative ‘out of the box’ thinking; commonly known as “Jugaad” in the Sub-Continent paid dividends.

Lambeth explains in some detail about the evolving IAF counter-measures:
“Rapidly adapting to these constraints, on May 30, just four days after the start of Operation Safed Sagar, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis decided to take action to help correct the problem of inaccuracy. He chose to commit IAF Mirage 2000H fighters capable of delivering laser-guided bombs to ground attack operations in the Kargil sector. "the fighters first had to be configured to deliver the bombs, so Air Headquarters launched an accelerated effort to do so at Air Force Station Gwalior, where the Mirage 2000Hs were principally based. India’s Aircraft System Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore was well along in a developmental program to integrate Israeli-made Litening electro-optical targeting pods onto the Mirage 2000H and Jaguar fighters. To support the accelerated effort at Gwalior, ASTE began a full-court press to prepare selected Mirage 2000Hs from 7 Squadron to be fitted with Litening pods for use over Kargil. At the same time, ASTE helped modify the Mirage 2000H’s centerline weapons station to carry 1,000-pound U.S.-made Paveway II laser-guided bombs instead of the IAF’s French-produced Matra precision munitions, which were prohibitively expensive. Concurrently, the IAF’s elite Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment (TACDE) located at Air Force Station Jamnagar took the lead in developing and validating best tactics, techniques, and procedures for delivering the Paveway II. By June 12, the upgraded Mirage 2000Hs were ready to commence precision strike operations in anger for the first time in IAF history.”

Phil Camp explains in greater detail about the use of the Mirage 2000 aircraft in Kargil; “The Mirage 2000 aircraft itself had always been regarded as an air defence fighter with a limited ground attack capability. Consequently it lacked certain resources such as bombs, hardpoint pylons, tooling, testers and ground crew experienced in such matters. A big push was instigated at Gwalior to get the platform prepared. By the 12th June, the IAF Personnel had ironed out most of the faults.

A typical bombing mission would involve 4 Mirages from 7 Squadron loaded with dumb bombs leaving a base in Punjab together with a two seat Mirage loaded with a LGB and Laser Designating pod. This 5 ship would rendezvous with 3 aircraft of 1 Squadron carrying Beyond Visual Range Weapons (Super 530D), operating out of another base. This rendezvous point would change on a mission to mission basis and once joined up, one escort aircraft would return. Once over Jammu and Kashmir they would be joined by Mig29’s giving top cover. These only had 20-minute duration in the area and would usually be supplemented by another pair. Over the target the Mirages with the dumb bombs would visually acquire the target and drop their bombs. The two seater, which would be filming the whole affair from behind, would only use the LGB if required to do so. Only 9 LGB’s were dropped during the whole war, 8 by the Mirage fleet and one by a Jaguar. Normal procedure employed during the dumb bomb attacks was for the aircraft to commence a dive at about 30,000 feet and designate the target at 15 kms distance. At 8 kms distance anything from 6 to 12 bombs would be despatched towards the target. Procedure for a LGB attack would differ in that the target would be acquired at 20 kms distance, designation would occur at 15 kms with release of the weapon at 8.5 kms. The LGB would travel towards the target and the Mirage would turn away still illuminating the target and at point of impact it would be 6 kms away.”

This was the most innovative and abiding change that the operations at Kargil wrought in the IAF.

Another point of interest in the discussion on the use of air-power in Kargil, was the use of ELINT aircraft of the IN to locate and map AD radars across the border.

Benefits of the use of Air Power.
Benjamin Lambeth speaks of the benefits of the IAF operations:
“Four days later, on June 17, another important breakthrough in the joint campaign was
achieved when a formation of 7 Squadron Mirage 2000Hs struck and destroyed the enemy’s main administrative and logistics encampment at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik sector by means of accurately placed 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs delivered in high-angle dive attacks using the aircraft’s computer-assisted weapons-aiming capability. For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting. The AOC-in-C of Western Air Command at the time, Air Marshal Patney, affirmed later that the essentially total destruction by the IAF of the NLI’s rudimentary but absolutely life-sustaining infrastructure at Muntho Dhalo “paralyzed the enemy war effort, as it was their major supply depot. The air support provided by the IAF almost instantly boosted the morale of India’s beleaguered ground troops and facilitated an early recapture of their outposts at Muntho Dhalo and Tiger Hill.”

For example, retired Major General G. D. Bakshi characterized the IAF’s innovative use of airpower as “one of the excellent features of the Kargil operations,” adding that “the complete domination of the sky by the IAF over the area of intrusion … served to demoralize the [NLI] troopers” and, “in combination with artillery, served to mass effects and generate an element of shock and awe.”

However Marcus P.Acosta in his 2003 study, “HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE” for the Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey Calif. does not concur with all the inferences drawn about the efficacy of Air Power in Kargil.

As Acosta states:“Several factors prevented the IAF from providing timely and reliable close support to ground maneuver. Restrictions imposed following early aircraft losses added to the detrimental effects of the high altitude atmosphere. CAS missions became hindrances to ground maneuver on several occasions, and delayed ground operations with inaccurate strikes. The IAF adapted by targeting Pakistani supply lines and isolating their forward positions. Mirage aircraft reduced NLI positions on Tiger Hill, destroying the enemy’s battalion headquarters. The service contributed to the campaign, yet its ability to provide CAS in the high altitude environment proved to be a shortcoming.”

“Air power could not deliver consistent and reliable firepower to support ground maneuver. Laser-guided munitions (LGM) improved accuracy, yet the heightened risk and atmospheric effects prevented the IAF from providing the volume of fire necessary to suppress Pakistani positions. Would these conclusions be relevant in future high altitude warfare?”

Acosta goes on to say that JDAMs were a better proposition than even LGBs (notwithstanding the fact that LGBs contributed to vastly improved results in Kargil).

As he says “The JDAM is a guidance tail kit that converts unguided free-fall bombs into all-weather precision-guided munitions (PGM). A Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance control unit and inertial navigation system (INS) in the tail section allows the JDAM to navigate to its target after release. It therefore offers a significant advantage over laser-guided munitions (LGM), because clouds, dust and smoke do not affect the JDAM’s trajectory as it flies toward the GPS coordinates entered by the aircrew. All-weather characteristics appear to make the JDAM an ideal weapon for the high altitude environment, where unpredictable changes in precipitation and cloud cover are the norm.”

Actually Acosta is of the view that Artillery may provide a relatively better result than air-power in a Kargil like operation. This ‘Point of View’ is certainly well merited.
In Acosta’s words: “Combat in the mountains of Kargil and Afghanistan demonstrates that the nature of warfare at high altitude has not significantly changed, even with the emergence of precision munitions. Mountain warfare is the domain of light infantry. Artillery remains a necessary element of maneuver warfare. Air power alone cannot deliver sufficient firepower to support ground maneuver in the high mountains. The suppressive fire afforded by artillery is more valuable than the precision of aerial munitions on the high altitude battlefield. Advanced precision munitions, such as the JDAM, are effective against unprotected fixed targets in any environment. But in a fluid battle in the rugged terrain of the high mountains, the firepower necessary to support methodical and difficult ground maneuver cannot be provided by close air support alone.”

Of course, Acosta does not deride the importance of air-power otherwise. In fact; he states that a surge of air assets to critical areas, can sometimes overcome the limitations of CAS at high altitude.

In Acosta’s assessment, air-power has to be complementary to the use of artillery (as well as all available means of fire-power) towards the successful prosecution of operations like Kargil. This could well be the most valid conclusion that may be arrived at.As Air Cmde. A.Subramanian IAF, writes in “Kargil Revisited: Air Operations in a High Altitude Conflict”: “In a conflict like the Kargil War, air power, if anything, was the prime catalyst for ‘de-escalation’ as it demonstrated intent, and intent is one of the most credible instruments of deterrence.”

Air Cmde.Subramanian also makes the point that “Innovative and never-used-before tactics had to be employed and that is why the utilisation of air power merits attention as part of a study of air power employment in ‘unconventional warfare’, because the Kargil War was truly unconventional in many ways from an air power perspective, both strategically and tactically”.

Another view thrown up by the Kargil air ops was- The deterrent effect of air power has been enhanced by this fact, as the prospect of decisive air action is now a proven possibility in even a LIC (low intensity conflict) situation. This hitherto, was not considered to be the case.

These views above are certainly worthy of further discussion and debate!

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