Air Warriors of the PAF in 1965

[fatman17]

Air-Marshal; Malik Nur Khan. HJ, HSJ


C-in-C of PAF during the 1965 War.


As one of the most outstanding military commanders since World War II, Air Marshal Malik Nur Khan has had the unusual distinction of interspersing highly successful careers in both service and civil fields.

Following family tradition - his father fought as a much-decorated Indian Army cavalryman in World War I - Nur Khan entered the Royal Indian Military College at Dehra Dun in the mid-1930s at the age of 11 with the expectation of qualifying for Sand Hurst or its equivalent in India. Before he was 17, however, his enthusiasm for aviation resulted in him starting to learn to fly at his family's expense during vacations at the Lahore Flying Club, and he achieved his pilot's A-license on Tiger Moth biplanes as soon as he reached his 17th birthday. Significantly, he disappeared during his first solo to fly over his family house at Lahore, which resulted in him being briefly grounded by his anguished instructor, and his reputation for devilry in the air accompanied him throughout his eventful flying career.

The youthful pilot's plans to graduate to the RAF College Cranwell for a service flying career were thwarted by the outbreak of World War II, but his persistence resulted in him being accepted by the Indian Air Force for aircrew training some weeks before his 18th birthday- then the official age limit - in January 1941. After initial ground training at Lahore, Nur Khan began flying with RAF instructors on Indian Air Force Tiger Moths at Hyderabad (Begum bet), moving on to Ambala to complete his wings course before the end of 1941 on the more powerful Hawker Hart and Audax biplanes. He was the only student on his course to achieve 'above average' assessments from the RAF in armament, gunnery and bombing.

Among the student pilots on the same course as Nur Khan was a former RAF navigator, P. C. Lal, who became involved in an escapade, while flying in the back seat of an Audax, when the trainee from Ambala attempted to fly beneath some telephone wires crossing a ravine during some unauthorized low flying. Somehow, the sturdy Audax staggered back to base trailing bunches of wire from the top wing, but although Lal jumped out of the rear cockpit and pulled them off after Nur Khan had landed on the far side of the airfield, they had cut into the main spar causing damage which could not be concealed.

Nur Khan received a red endorsement in his logbook and was re-coursed, but P. C. Lal went on to become his squadron commander at a later stage, and held a senior staff post with the Indian Air Force during the 1965 war with Pakistan. He subsequently became C-in-C of the IAF in 1970.

Nur Khan's first operational posting was to No 3 Squadron of the original IAF at Peshawar, still flying Audaxes and Harts, against the perennial Fakir of Ipi and his dissident tribesmen in the North-West Frontier Region. Once again, he achieved the highest armament scores of all the squadron's pilots, and repeated this success in 1942 when converting to Vultee Vengeance dive-bombers at Peshawar, after an instructor's course on Harvards at Ambala. Nur Khan spent about six months bombing bridges used by the Japanese in Burma, operating from Assam with the Vengeance, which he recalls as 'a terrible aircraft', before returning to Peshawar to convert to Hurricane fighters.
After flying Hurricanes operationally against the Japanese in Burma in 1944, he was posted to Bangalore, in southern India, for a Spitfire course as a preliminary to joining the only Indian Air Force squadron earmarked to join the occupation forces in Japan. When he did get to Japan, however, in 1945, it was to fill a staff job as Squadron Leader Operations at Air HQ in Iwakuni.

On his return to Delhi in August 1947 he found India in the throes of partition, and he joined the exodus of the Muslim population via a hazardous train journey, through murderous religious riots, to Lahore. He transferred to the Royal Pakistan Air Force on its formation, becoming station commander at Chaklala, before being posted to London in 1948 as his new country’s first Air Adviser. In this capacity, he was responsible for evaluating the suitability of new British equipment for Pakistan's emergent air force, and recommended selection of the Hawker Fury piston engined fighter to re-equip the PAF's combat squadrons, the sturdy Bristol Freighter, in preference to the Vickers Valetta, as a Douglas C-47 transport replacement.

Further staff jobs followed his return to Pakistan, including commandant of the PAF Academy at Risalpur, and at Air HQ where as a group captain he eventually became Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations). In this capacity, he was involved in plans for the Americanization of the PAF, which at that time still had an RAF C-in-C. He was instrumental in overcoming his British chief’s preference for the Republic F -84 Thunder-jet strike-fighter offered by the US by demanding, against the threat of his resignation, the higher-performance and more versatile North American F-86F Sabre. This was to have far reaching effects in the 1965 war.

In the mid-1950s, Nur Khan also completed a course at the RAF Staff College, Andover, where one of his fellow-students was Ezer Weizman, later to become an outstanding C-in-C of the Israeli Air Force, at the time of the 1967 war in the Middle East, and more recently Defense Minister. In his autobiography On Eagles' Wings Ezer Weizman said of Nur Khan: 'He was a formidable fellow, and I was glad that he was Pakistani and not Egyptian.'

As station commander at Mauripur, Nur Khan had the responsibility of supervising the PAF's conversion to Sabres, the first high-performance jet fighter to arrive in Pakistan, and under his usual dashing leadership, his squadrons soon demonstrated their confidence and skill with their new equipment by performing the first 16-aircraft loop in tight formation.

When Air Marshal Asghar Khan became the PAF's first Pakistani C-in-C in 1957, Nur Khan was responsible for the organization of the new Operations Group, of which he then took command, at its Peshawar HQ, and remained there until seconded by the Pakistan Government as managing director of the national airline, PIA, in 1959. His success in establishing PIA on a firm and profitable financial basis in the ensuing six years is now a fact of airline history, and is all the more remarkable in view of his hitherto exclusively military background.

Characteristically, following notification of his pending transfer back to the PAF as Commander-in -Chief early in 1965, Nur Khan arranged to take a conversion course on Pakistan's most advanced jet fighters, and despite not having flown for about six years, had a quick check-out at Sargodha, on the Lockheed T-33, before converting to the Mach 2 Lockheed F-104A Star-fighter via the two-seat F-104B. He also flew a Sabre and soon got his hand back in to such effect that he achieved the near-impossible feat of scoring 100 per cent in air-to-ground gunnery. This was the first time this had been done in the P AF, but to show that it was no fluke, the C-in-C repeated this feat at a later date in both marks of Sabre then used by the PAF. He subsequently achieved the same quite remarkable achievement in the MiG- 19 when the first of these massive twin-jet fighters arrived from China.

This was leading from the cockpit with a vengeance, but in setting new standards for his pilots to emulate, Nur Khan, who was appointed Air Marshal during the 1965 war with India, established the foundations of aggressive tactics, and raised morale of the PAF accordingly. This substantial achievement was not without its risk, however. Maintaining his tradition of flying every combat type in PAF service, the C-in-C later pulled too hard in a high-altitude turn during his first flight in the delta-wing Mirage, and found himself in a spin - not the best of maneuvers in a tailless aircraft. Despite repeated urgings from Wg Cdr Alam, who was flying chase, for him to eject, Nur Khan succeeded in recovering control about 5-6,000ft from the ground, thereby saving the PAF an expensive loss. On another air-to-ground sortie, his habit of diving as close as possible to the target for maximum accuracy resulted in him picking up a ricocheting rocket splinter which damaged an engine in the (fortunately) twin -jet MiG- 19 which he was flying at the time.

Nur Khan's key part in the 1965 operations emerges in the narrative which follows, and there seems little doubt that without his leadership, Pakistan may well have failed to survive. The P AF was the only arm of the Pakistan defense forces which was prepared for imminent war at that time, and in the prevailing political paralysis which gripped the government and cabinet of Field Marshal Ayub Khan at the beginning of September, Nur Khan made effective use of the completely free hand he had been given to prevent an Indian breakthrough.

His conduct of the air war was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that he had taken over command of the PAF, after a long absence from military aviation, on 23 July 1965, only a few weeks before the outbreak of hostilities on 1 September. Immediately after the war, he instituted a series of major reorganization al moves to rectify some of the deficiencies which had become apparent, together with a massive re-equipment program for new combat aircraft from France and China, to overcome the arms veto imposed by the US on both sides in the 1965 conflict.

This resulted in his being instrumental in obtaining 90 Orenda engine ex-Luftwaffe Sabres via Iran, in addition to 75 MiG-19SF or F-6 fighter-bombers from China, in 1966, and arranging the purchase of an initial batch of 35 high -performance Mirage IIIs and 5s from France. Not content with virtually trebling the strength of the PAF to around 280 combat aircraft, Nur Khan also set out to rectify the proven deficiencies in airfields and radar installations by initiating the construction of six new major bases, at Mianwali, Murid, Hafizabad, lacobabad, Badin and Shorkot (Rafiqui), and equipping a substantial number of new early-warning sites.

Nur Khan consolidated this reorganization before his retirement as C-in-C of the PAF in 1969. He then held senior administrative posts in the government for a short time, including Deputy Martial Law Administrator and then Governor of West Pakistan, under President Yahya Khan, before resigning through political disagreements. Although opposed to the views of Yahya Khan, Nur Khan has always avoided political appointments, and it was on this basis that he eventually yielded to repeated requests from the Pakistani Government to resume control of Pakistan International Airlines in November 1973.

His success in not only keeping PIA out of Pakistan's turbulent political arena, but also returning it to a sound commercial basis, is indicated by the remarkable growth achieved during the five years of his recent control. In a period of general airline recession, he increased PIA's revenue passenger/km by a factor of three; its freight tons/km by a factor of 7.5; and capacity in seat/km by 2.5. When Nur Khan took over PIA again in 1973, its operating surplus for 73/ 74 was only RsO.18 million. The 1978 figure is somewhere round the Rs262 million – or about US$26 million.

'Fortune favors the brave' could well be the Khan family motto. Having survived innumerable flying hazards unscathed, Nur Khan had his closest brush with death towards the end of 1977 when, in characteristic fashion, he attempted, single-handedly, to overpower an armed hijacker who was holding a PIA F-27 Friendship, its crew and passengers as hostages on the ground at Karachi Airport. After reasoning with the hijacker for several hours, Nur Khan attempted to snatch his gun in the close confines of the F-27's cabin. In the ensuing struggle, he was shot in the side at point-blank range by the gunman, the bullet lodging a centimeter or so from his spine. By that time, however he was on top of the hijacker, who was then overpowered by the crew of the F-27. Happily, Nur Khan recovered rapidly from his dangerous wound, and had the distinction of adding the Hilal-e Shujat - Pakistan's highest civil award - to the Hilal-e Jurat, or Distinguished Service Order, which had been awarded after the 1965 war. Air Marshal Nur Khan is the only Pakistani citizen to have been awarded both these decorations.

courtesy John Fricker - author of Battle For Pakistan.

 

[SQ8]

I believe a look on the Bomber crews is needed more, we all know a fair bit on the fighter sq.
But it was these men that kept the enemy sleepless and cratered runways.

 

[fatman17]

I believe a look on the Bomber crews is needed more, we all know a fair bit on the fighter sq.
But it was these men that kept the enemy sleepless and cratered runways.

its coming friend!

 

[fatman17]

Thirty Seconds over Sargodha


Wg. Cdr. (now Group Captain) Mohammad Mahmood Alam is a scrap of a man who appears almost lost in the none-too-roomy cockpit of a Sabre. Yet during the 1965 conflict with India, this Pakistani squadron commander, established a combat record which has few equals in the history of jet warfare.

Many pilots have scored several air victories in one sortie, and have exceeded or equaled Alam’s claims of shooting down up to five enemy aircraft of superior performance within a few minutes. But few are likely to be able to match his record of destroying at least three opponents – Hawker Hunters of the IAF – within the space of somewhere around 30 seconds.

Admittedly confirmation of Alam’s claims has been difficult to obtain despite close range observation of this encounter by several PAF pilots, and some gun camera evidence. Nearest of these observers was his wingman, Flg. Off. Masood Akhtar who, protecting his leaders tail, clung like a leech throughout the encounter. Another section of PAF Sabre’s, led by Flt Lt Bhatti was attempting to engage the Hunters but Alam (at that time a Sqn. Ldr.) got there first. Flying top cover in an F-104A Star fighter was Sqn. Ldr. Arif Iqbal who, with intense frustration, watched the brief combat with admiration.

On this basis, Alam was originally credited with five IAF Hunters destroyed, although the wreckage of only two could be found in Pakistani territory, within two or three km’s of Sangla Hill railway station – the bodies of the pilots, one Hindu and one Sikh – were reportedly burnt beyond recognition. The area of the main engagement, however, 30 miles east of Sargodha, was only 55 nautical miles inside Pakistani territory – some seven or eight minutes at jet speeds. Only the Indian government is in a position to know its actual losses on the second day of its war with Pakistan. But the evident superiority achieved at that time by the PAF in its initial combats was a powerful factor in heightening both morale and fighting efficiency in a force which was heavily outnumbered by its opposition.

When at the end of August 65, the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, threatened to blow into full scale hostilities, the PAF equipped with American aircraft supplied through the Mutual Aid Program, was confronted by a well-trained adversary, operating large numbers of mainly British combat aircraft. The PAF order of battle comprised 92 F-86F Sabre’s in service, plus eight undergoing repair and overhaul at maintenance units; 12 Lockheed F-104 Star fighters, of which two were un-armed F-104B two-seat trainers; 25 Martin B-57 jet bombers, including several fitted out for reconnaissance tasks and 12 Lockheed T-33 jet trainers, adapted for ground attack and aerial reconnaissance. These 141 combat aircraft were deployed in nine squadrons at only three widely scattered operational airfields in West Pakistan, and were supported by about 30 assorted trainers, transports and helicopters.

Corresponding IAF strength at the time was estimated to be at least 775 aircraft in 29 squadrons in the course of building up to a planned combat strength of some 45 squadrons. More than 500 of the IAF aircraft were first line jet types; disposed in 27 fighter and 3 bomber squadrons, each with 16 aircraft on establishment. They included the first 10 Mach 2 MiG-21’s, 118 British supplied Hunter 56’s, 80 Indian built Gnats, 80 Dassault Mystere’s, 56 Dassault Ouragan’s, 132 obsolescent Vampires, 53 Canberra B(I) 58 bombers and seven PR- 57 reconnaissance aircraft.

Thus, in combat aircraft, the PAF was outnumbered nearly four to one and if the IAF support element of 191 transports and 48 helicopters were included against the corresponding total for Pakistan, the ratio became closer to five to one. Even then the comparison was between the numbers of aircraft estimated to be in actual service with the IAF, against the overall totals in the PAF inventory.

For example, although India received its first six MiG-21s from the Soviet Union as early as February 1963, followed by a further six by the end of 1964 and another 18 in 1965, only 10 of the initial 12 were estimated by the PAF to be operational at Chandigarh by the end of August 1965. But this Mach 2 force exactly matched Pakistan's total of 10 F-104As at Sargodha.
Similarly, the PAF's 100 F-86F Sabre’s were balanced against the 118 Hunters operated by the IAF, although there were some doubts in Pakistan that the older North American fighter would be able to cope effectively with the more powerful and more heavily armed combat aircraft of British origin. Most of the PAF Sabre’s had been modified to F-86F-40-NA standards, although there were still a few F-86F-35s in Pakistani service. Main difference between the two versions was that the -35 Sabre had the so-called 'hard' wing, without leading-edge slats, whereas the -40 had both slats and wing-tip extensions for improved maneuverability and high altitude performance. There were also minor differences in such details as the elevator actuator and rear fuselage sections. The uprating of the Sabre’s to the latter standard was to prove a significant factor in future combat with the formidable Hunter.

Against this preponderance of Indian air power, the PAF could offer only a high standard of leadership throughout all its echelons, a determination springing from the realization that nothing less than national survival was at stake, and a sound background of training and experience.

From the technical point of view, the PAF had perhaps only one trump card to play against the IAF - the Sidewinder infra-red homing air-to-air missile. Less than 25% of the Sabre force, in fact only 22 aircraft - was equipped to carry Sidewinders, but in the heat of combat, the IAF would have to assume that every F-86F it encountered was so equipped.

One of the main effects of the Sidewinder so far as the PAF was concerned was its ability to remedy in part the deficiencies in speed and climb which the Sabre suffered by comparison with the Hunter. With their superior performance, the IAF Hunters could normally expect to disengage from combat at will, but the two-mile reach of the Sidewinder tended to minimize the profitability of this maneuver. If the Hunters stayed they had to fight on the F-86F's terms and thus permit the Sabre’s to make use of their unrivalled low-speed maneuverability.

This, then, was the situation on 7 September 1965 - the second day of the Indo-Pakistan war - when 32-year old Mohammed Alam was commanding No 11 Squadron, flying a dozen or so Sabre’s from the main PAF operational base of Sargodha, in the Punjab. With virtually all of its fighter strength concentrated on this one first-line airfield, the PAF was fully alert to the dangers of IAF air attack - especially as it was the Pakistani pilots who had opened the airfield offensive at dusk on the previous day with strikes against the opposing Indian air bases.

Night brought the Canberra bombers from both sides in harassing attacks against each other's airfields. From its own successes on the previous day, however, the PAF was under no illusions that the main danger was from fighter strikes in daylight. This was why the half-light before dawn on the morning of 7 September found Sqn. Ldr. Alam and some of his pilots already strapped in the cockpits of their Sabre’s, at readiness at the end of the runway, waiting for the signal to scramble as soon as warning of approaching IAF aircraft was received through the Pakistani radar and observer network.

With low-flying jets, however, any warning at all is a luxury at a front-line airfield. Although Sargodha already had its initial protective fighter patrol airborne, the first intimation of the arrival of the IAF was the sight of six Mystere IV A fighter-bombers pulling up out of the sunrise from their tree-top approach to deliver their attack at about 05.30hrs. Their navigation was good, and the great airbase - packed with aircraft, fuel bowsers and other rewarding targets - lay sprawled beneath them. While many of the PAF fighters were spread around in camouflaged dispersals, others were lined up, through military necessity, on the Operational Readiness Platform (ORP) at the end of the runway. Sargodha was well defended with light ack-ack, but it had only three fighters airborne and the Mystere’s, enjoying virtually complete surprise, had the Pakistani base at their mercy.

Strapped helplessly in their aircraft on the ground, the PAF Sabre and Star fighter pilots watched the Mystere’s pull up to about 1,000-1,500ft, still maintaining tight and unwieldy echelon formation, and spray the empty tarmac area at random with their weapons. First they fired their under-wing rockets, although several simply jettisoned the pods with the rockets still in them. Some of these battered pods are still on display at the PAF Museum at Peshawar. Then they opened up with their twin 30mm cannon, but virtually without taking aim during their single high-speed pass. They exited towards the southwest leaving Sargodha unscathed. They themselves, however, were less fortunate. One was shot down as it flashed past by the anti-aircraft defenses, while a further two fell to the 20mm Vulcan cannon of the patrolling Star-fighter.

Immediately after this first IAF daylight attack, Sqd. Ldr. Alam and his No 2, Fig. Off. Masood Akhtar, were scrambled with two other F-86s and an F-104 for an airfield patrol at about 15,000ft. Within about five minutes they were directed by ground control towards an incoming Indian raid, but after flying eastwards for 10-15 miles, they were told to turn back because IAF fighters were overhead Sargodha. This was then about 06.10hrs.

Flying top cover for the F-86’s in the F-104, Sqn. Ldr. Arif Iqbal did not get a chance to join the combat, although he watched it from beginning to end. He recalls:

'I was orbiting base at about 15,000ft when I saw four Hunters right over the runway, heading south-west. I don't know whether they had already delivered their attack but I called "contact". Fit. Lt. Bhatti was orbiting about 10 miles or so south-west of base, and Alam was about five miles further south. I dived towards the IAF aircraft maintaining visual contact, by which time they had passed through Bhatti's and Alam's sections, who also established contact. Bhatti had to break off because of a fuel tank hang-up, but Sqn. Ldr. Alam and his wingman continued chasing the Hunters. These were flying at about 480 knots, still with their drop tanks on.

'The first I saw of the actual combat from my position behind the Sabre’s was when a ball of flame went into the ground. This, I realized, must have been a fifth Hunter.

After Alam had then shot down the first of two Hunters on the right, a break was given by the Indians. I heard some of their conversation on the RT, although we were on UHF and they were on VHF - I believe it's a matter of harmonic frequencies - and I heard one of them say,

"Lead, No 3 has been shot down." Sqn. Ldr. Alam was then a bit excited as he had his mike button pressed, and he was telling his wing man to stay clear but to stick with him. Even after that, the IAF aircraft made no effort to jettison their tanks, which would have enabled them to have accelerated away from the Sabre’s, or to execute a break. When they did start to turn, Sqn. Ldr. Alam had already shot down his third aircraft, and he almost overtook the remaining pair. His fourth victim was attacked from what looked like a range of not more than about 800ft or so, and the last one was probably even closer.'

Alam's account of the action is more graphic:
'As we were vectored back towards Sargodha, Akhtar called, "Contact - four Hunters", and I saw the IAF aircraft diving to attack our airfield. So I jettisoned my drops [most jet fighters carry additional fuel in external under-wing tanks which can be quickly released before going into action] to dive through our own ack-ack after them. But in the meantime I saw two more Hunters about 1,000ft to my rear, so I forgot the four in front and pulled up to go after the pair behind. The Hunters broke off their attempted attack on Sargodha, and the rear pair turned into me. I was flying much faster than they were at this stage - I must have been doing about 500knots - so I pulled up to avoid overshooting them and then reversed to close in as they flew back towards India.

'I took the last man and dived behind him, getting very low in the process. The Hunter can out-run the Sabre, it's only about 50 knots faster, but has a much better acceleration, so it can pull away very rapidly. Since I was diving, I was going still faster, and as he was out of" gun range, I fired the first of my two GAR-8 Sidewinder (air- to-air missiles at him. [The Sidewinder homes on the heat radiations from the target aircraft's jet engine but is sometimes affected by ground returns if fired in a dive at low altitudes. I In this case, we were too low and I saw the missile hit the ground short of its target.

'This area east of Sargodha, however, has lots of high tension wires, some of them as high as 100-150ft, and when I saw the two Hunters pull up to avoid one of these cables, I fired my second Sidewinder. The missile streaked ahead of me, but I didn't see it strike. The next thing I remember was that I was overshooting one of the Hunters and when I looked behind, the cockpit canopy was missing and there was no pilot in the aircraft. He had obviously pulled up and ejected and then I saw him coming down by parachute. This pilot [Sqn. Ldr. Onkar Nath Kakar, commander of an IAF Hunter squadron] was later taken prisoner.
'I had lost sight of the other five Hunters, but I pressed on thinking maybe they would slow down. There were, of course, still only two Sabre’s pitted against the remaining five IAF aircraft. I had lots of fuel so I was prepared to fly 50-60 miles to catch up with them. We had just crossed the Chenab river when my wingman called out, "Contact - Hunters 1o’clock," and I picked them up at the same time - five Hunters in absolutely immaculate battle formation. They were flying at about 100-200ft, at around 480 knots and when I was in gun-fire range they saw me. They all broke in one direction, climbing and turning steeply to the left, which put them in loose line astern. This, of course, was their big mistake. If you are bounced, which means a close range approach by an enemy fighter to within less than about 3,000ft, the drill is to call a break. This is a panic maneuver to the limits of the aircraft's performance, which splits the formation and both gets you out of the way of an attack and frees you to position yourself behind your opponent.

But in the absence of one of the IAF sections initiating a break in the other direction to sandwich our attack, they all simply stayed in front of us.

'It all happened very fast. We were all turning very tightly - in excess of 5g or just about on the limits of the Sabre's very accurate A-4 radar ranging gun sight. And I think before we had completed more than about 270 degrees of the turn, at around 12 degrees per second, all four Hunters had been shot down.

In each case, I got the pipper of my sight around the canopy of the Hunter for virtually a full deflection shot. Almost all our shooting throughout the war was at very high angles off – seldom less than about 30 degrees. Unlike some of the Korean combat films I had seen, nobody in our war was shot down flying straight and level.'

Accurate shooting is difficult enough at the best of times fighter travelling not far off the speed of sound. The problems of flying with such precision while In a turn of such crushing force that every part of you weighs more than five times its normal amount may be imagined. And yet throughout the short 1965 war, in which he claimed nine enemy aircraft destroyed in only three encounters, never had to fire more than twice at an opponent.

He continues;
I developed a technique of firing very short bursts – around half a second or less. The first burst was almost a sight-er, but with a fairly large bullet pattern from six machine guns, it almost invariably punctured the fuel tanks that they streamed kerosene.
During the battle on 7 September, as we went round in the turn, I could just see, in the light of the rising sun, the plumes of fuel gushing from the tanks after my hits. Another half-second burst was then sufficient to set fire to the fuel, and, as the Hunter became a ball of flame, I would shift my aim forward to the next aircraft. The Sabre carries about 1,800 rounds of ammunition for its six 0.5in guns, which can therefore fire for about 15 seconds. In air combat, this is a lifetime. Every fourth or fifth round is an armor piercing bullet, and the rest are HEI - high-explosive incendiary. I am certain after this combat that I brought back more than half of my ammunition, although we didn’t have time to waste counting rounds.

My fifth victim of this sortie started spewing smoke and then rolled on to his back at about 1,000ft. I thought he was going to do a barrel roll, which at low altitude is a very dangerous maneuver for the opponent if the man in front knows what he's doing. I went almost on my back and then I realized I might not be able to stay with him so I took off bank and pushed the nose down. The next time I fired was at very close range - about 600ft or so – and his aircraft virtually blew up in front of me. None of ejected, and all of them were killed. ,*

*[post-war Indian reports list two IAF Hunter pilots as missing in action over Pakistan on 7 September – Sqn.Ldr. SB Bhagwat and Flt.Lt. JS Btar. In addition the names of at least a further five Hunter pilots, all but one of whom were killed, are listed as being shot down in air combat on unknown dates]

How could a formation of jet fighters flown by senior and experienced pilots (three were squadron leaders and the other three flight lieutenants) allow themselves to be shot down by aircraft of inferior performance which they outnumbered some three to one?

Wg. Cdr. Alam comments;
Hunter pilots won’t believe it. I have flown Hunters myself in England and they are very maneuverable aircraft, but I think the F-86 is better.

'Actually, the Sabre has a fantastic turning performance. Although the normal stalling speed with flap is around 92 knots, you can fly it round in a steep turn down to as little as 80 knots or less in a descending scissors maneuver. Between 100 and 120 knots is quite a normal speed range to rack the Sabre round in combat. If you applied aileron at that speed in a Hunter you would flick out the other way. The F-86F is almost faultless on the controls, but it's a pity it doesn't have a bit more thrust. Provided that you see your opponent in time, you can never be outturned or outfought in a Sabre.

'I think, also, that the 0.5in Browning machine-gun is the best possible weapon against fighters for close combat. But if the Hunters hadn't all broken in the same direction, I could have been in trouble. As it was, they left themselves no initiative for turning the tables. The sixth and last Hunter disappeared from view, but we later heard that the pilot had ejected, he said because of engine trouble'.

Not everyone shares Wg. Cdr. Alam's views concerning the relative merits of the Sabre versus the Hunter. Even in the PAF, where many pilots have flown Hunters with the RAF, opinions are divided, but there is a strong element in favor of the British aircraft, which, after all, flew for the first time four years later than the Sabre. Wg. Cdr. Alam is prepared to defend his beloved Sabre with supporting technicalities, which he quotes with authority:

'In a turn the Hunter slows down more quickly than the F-86 for the same application of g. For one thing, it has a much higher aspect ratio - the span of the wings in relation to their chord - and induced drag increases in inverse proportion to the square of the velocity. In other words, the lower the speed, the higher the induced drag.'

He readily acknowledges the far better thrust/weight ratio of the Hunter, which has 10,000lb of thrust from its Rolls-Royce Avon 203 engine for a clean aircraft weight of 19,000lb, compared with 6,0001b output from the General Electric J47 turbojet of the 15,000lb F-86F Sabre, without external stores. In his opinion, however, this is more than offset in combat by the higher induced drag of the Hunter. He continues:

'This means that the Hunter loses speed faster than the Sabre in a turn because of its bigger drag rise, which the extra thrust cannot counter. So in the turn I steadily closed up on the Hunters, which quickly decelerated from about 450 down to around 240 knots, and would have had to have pulled about 7g to get away from me. As it was they just slid back into my sights, one by one.'

In the final reckoning, could it be the man in the cockpit that counts more than the aircraft?

'Certainly flying skill matters a great deal. When I went to war I had about 1,400 hours on the F-86 which is a lot of experience and, with another pilot, I held the record for the highest gunnery scores in the PAF, with an average around 70 per cent. And I would definitely say this, that PAF air combat standards are as good as any in the world. Many of our pilots go on exchange postings to England and elsewhere, and come back proudly claiming that in air combat practice they have matched their skill with the best. I don't know whether by nature we Pakistanis are more aggressive, but we lay a lot of stress on aerobatics, gunnery, and air combat itself.'

These are some of the principal reasons for the establishment of air" supremacy by the Pakistan Air Force, from almost the very beginning of hostilities, although something more than mere superiority in flying proficiency had to be present to offset the overwhelming numerical advantage held by the Indian forces. For an indication of this additional element, which was unquestionably the key to the entire Pakistani posture in the critical events of 1965, Wg. Cdr. Alam articulately expresses the national view point:

'We were fighting with a passion founded on faith. That concept of nationhood that you have in the West has perhaps not yet dawned upon us. We fought as Muslims against a people who were trying to destroy our way of life… We went through great 'anxieties, great fear often. But we knew one thing, that faith in one's destiny, faith in a cause - all this sustains a man, and faith sustained us.'

Here, then, was the main motivation of the Pakistani people, who do not hold their official status of an Islamic Republic in light regard. As Wg. Cdr. Alam put it:

'We may not be first-rate Muslims, but this I know, that we, have a faith in God extending through everyone in Pakistan, and a belief that He takes care of us. To feel that my life is in the hands of God, and that any risks that I undertake are for a good purpose, leaves me nothing to fear. Before the war officially started three or four of us were briefed for a raid against the Indian airfield at Adampur, on which we were told by our intelligence that there were 48 aircraft. We didn't grumble, but we all knew it was going to be a one-way mission - and for some of us, like the late Sqn. Ldr. Rafiqui, it was. I called one of my pilots and wrote a short letter for him to give to my mother - I'm not married - if I didn't come back. But once I knew that it had to be done, it had to be done.

When we came back we felt that there was a power greater than us taking care of these things.'

Wg. Cdr. Alam's faith was reinforced by several incidents during the 1965 war. On 4 September, for example, when leading a low-level recce mission against the IAF airfield at Jammu, and when passing the outskirts of the Indian town, the canopy of his Sabre was suddenly shattered by ground fire while he was skimming just above the trees at around 420 knots. He remembers:

'One moment I felt so secure and the next it was almost as if the world had come to an end. When the canopy goes, you get a lot of dust sucked up from the bottom of the cockpit, and this goes on for as long as 10 or 15 seconds. I was half-blinded, and the next thing that occurred to me was, God! Before the war has even started I'll be taken prisoner. I turned the shortest way towards Pakistan, but just then I saw smoke ahead from a regiment of Indian artillery - 16 guns firing towards Chamb and holding up our crossing of the river. I couldn't speak to my wingman because of the noise of the slipstream through the cockpit, so I pulled up and made signs that I was going to attack. I made two passes and kept firing on the Indian artillery until my own guns jammed through overheating.

'I climbed up to about I,000ft, and suddenly I lost all fear. It was a feeling of almost mystical experience, and I thought, "If I'm attacked by enemy aircraft while my guns are jammed, I'll simply ram my aircraft into my opponent." But I got back safely, and I never felt like that again throughout the war.

'After the combat with the six Hunters, my main feeling was of a sudden anti-climax. All that excitement ... and then it all seemed too much. I certainly didn't feel the elation I expected from my avid reading of all the classic books on air combat from World War II when a junior officer. There was no passion in the killing itself; while I was shooting I was firing at an airplane rather than a man. We shot with cold blood ness but not with the intent of killing a human being.

In the wreckage of one of the Indian Hunters was found the pilot's wallet, and this man come from my home town - Calcutta. In the wallet were pictures of his wife and children and for a while 1 felt sad. I don't know if killing can ever be morally completely justified, but I killed in defense of my country and not as an individual. When I landed back at Sargodha, I was tremendously grateful to my God, that's one thing I remember.’

For Pakistan, this was the mood of the 1965 war. Fighting without hate, but with a fierce determination that took little account of the odds, based on a religious and unifying fervor.


courtesy John Fricker - author of Battle For Pakistan.

 

[fatman17]

Operation Desert Hawk


South of Karachi, and of the tributaries forming the mouth of the mighty Indus, a desolate area of mud, swamp and salt flats stretches eastwards for almost 200 miles into India. For much of the year, the Great Rann of Kutch as this wasteland is called is submerged by monsoon flooding, and the international boundary between India and Pakistan in this inhabitable area has never been defined. Even in the days of the British raj , the demarcation of the provincial boundaries of this sandy tract between Sind and the former princely state of Kutch bhoj was undetermined. At the time of partition, however, India laid claim to the northern part of the Rann of Kutch, which came under the administrative control of Sind, in West Pakistan. The disputed area comprised about 3,500 sq.miles situated roughly north of the 24th parallel, and from 1947 onwards was policed by Pakistan from a post at Chad Bet. But for India it remained a temptation which was resisted only until February 65, when military forces with air support overran the Pakistani post and village and occupied the northern part of the Rann of Kutch to establish a de-facto frontier.

In view of the apparent worthlessness of the terrain, Pakistan contented itself with a strong protest to the Indian government concerning this action. The Indian occupation of the Rann of Kutch took on a different aspect, however, following exploration of the area, with soviet assistance around Vigjokot, Karim shahi and khavda in February 65. This led to reports of confirming the likelihood of oil in the region, which may possibly have been one of the main reasons for Indian attempts, within the next few weeks, at the complete occupation of the Rann of Kutch.

On the face of it, there can seldom have been a more unprepossessing area over which to fight, but an Indian military buildup (exercise arrow-head) in march at chad bet was matched by Pakistan along the de-facto border. On 6 April, 65, 8 infantry division HQ received the following directive from Pak-Army. ’Failing satisfactory response (to the Pakistani demand for an Indian withdrawal from the Rann of Kutch) all necessary measures to be taken to deny Indian offensive activities, and to assert our claim, including occupation of few such positions in the disputed territory as would place our forces in a favorable position to negotiate the closure of the newly established Indian posts. If Indians react unfavorably to our defensive action enumerated above, our forces to take necessary counter – measures, including action in the disputed territory in de facto control of India …’

Almost inevitably, this confrontation between about three Indian infantry brigades and No’s 6 and 51 brigades of 8 Pak Army Division erupted into a shooting war early in April around the Pakistani post of Ding, at the western end of the Rann of Kutch, with continued skirmishes resulting in minor casualties on both sides. There was a brief lull after Pakistan had made proposals for a peaceful settlement of the issue on 9 April, but no official answer to this move was received until 24 April, when it was formally rejected. In the meantime, India was able to regroup its forces to reoccupy several posts which had changed hands in the area, although one of two successful raids were made by Pak Army units.

Operations reached their peak on 26 April, 1965. Elements of the 8th Div. ordered up earlier by the Pakistani Army C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa, under the codename Operation Desert Hawk, were then reinforced by a squadron of tanks for an attack on the Indian occupied post of Biar Bet. Located almost midway between Ding and Chad Bet, this was overrun and captured by Pakistan forces after a fierce battle ending at 06.30hrs the following morning. 8 Div. lost one ammunition truck among its vehicles, and claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on the retreating enemy.

Further hostilities were stopped by diplomatic intervention from the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, resulting in an unofficial cease-fire on 27 April. This came into formal effect by 1 July, but the Rann of Kutch affair was all over barring some sporadic shooting by the end of April 1965.

If necessary, the Indian ground forces in the Kutch area could have called upon considerable air support for their operations. Several strike and reconnaissance squadrons were immediately available from such IAF bases in the vicinity as Jamnagar, where there was one Vampire fighter-recce squadron, a detachment of Gnats and one fighter-bomber squadron with Vampires and Ouragans. These were reinforced by a Canberra bomber squadron transferred from Agra on 19 April. At Poona, there was also one Canberra, one maritime reconnaissance and two Vampire squadrons, with a radar early warning installation at Dwarka; a GCI unit at Bombay; and three bomber guidance units at Dwarka, Bhuj and Utterlai.

As it happened, however, air operations were conspicuously absent from the Kutch campaign, through rather curious circumstances. When hostilities began over the border dispute early in April, the PAF immediately began to prepare for action. At the same time, the Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, contacted his opposite number in India, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, with the idea of coming to an understanding over the use of aircraft in the disputed area, and perhaps limiting the scope of conflict.

Such a move in the interests of peace was perhaps only possible between two senior officers who had earlier served together as comrades in the same pre-partition Indian Air Force squadron. Although no firm guarantees in this respect were received from India, this high-level liaison was undoubtedly a major factor contributing to the absence of air operations in the Rann of Kutch dispute. The situation was precisely summarized by the PAF C-in-C in a signal to the Army Commander and GOC 8 Div. on 17 April:

'Regarding air operations over Rann of Kutch. Discussed the matter further with Air Marshal Arjan Singh and have been unable (repeat) unable to reach an agreement regarding operation of aircraft over this area. No (repeat) no agreement therefore exists between the two air forces. Have gauged from my talks with Arjan Singh that Indian armed aircraft, however, unlikely to operate in the area.'

As one Pakistani official was quoted at the time as saying about the discussions between the Cs-in-C: 'Killing each other's troops in a salt flat without a blade of grass for cover struck them both as none too sporting.'

Escalation apart, the PAF was equally anxious to avoid air support operations for more tactical reasons.

Conscious always of being outnumbered by about five to one by the IAF, which also had nominally superior aircraft, the PAF had always accepted the air defence of Pakistan as its primary objective. As a small force it had also assumed that its defensive commitments and need for minimal attrition would leave it insufficient resources for close support missions, and the army staff was constantly reminded by the PAF that its operational planning should assume a complete absence of air cover. This philosophy was implicit in other signals to 8 Div. during the Rann of Kutch campaign, such as this one sent in 12 April:

'Air support will be provided only if enemy air attacks targets in our territory. Oblique photographs [by RT-33As of No 20 Squadron will only be done from within own territory, subject to modification if enemy air becomes over-active in own territory.'

There is also additional evidence indicating that despite the lack of formal agreement with India concerning the use of military aircraft in the Kutch dispute, there was a tacit assumption - at least on the Pakistan side – that air power would not be involved. In another Desert Hawk signal, on 15 April, PakArmy observed:

'Our forward elements reported Indian light aircraft flew over area Kanjarkot (just south of Ding), hence agreement between C-in-C PAF and C-in-C IAF reported (vide our signal G-1037) violated. In view of above have authorised own L-19s may also cross de facto boundary if required, observing due precautions against ground fire.'

Several points from this signal require comment. In the first place, there was an assumption of agreement between the two air force Cs-in-C which was directly contradicted in the later signal of 17 April. Only Army light aircraft used for reconnaissance and perhaps artillery spotting were involved, however, without apparent risk of escalation.

Like the PAF, the Pakistan Army had benefited considerably from the earlier US Mutual Aid Program. Among a great deal of other equipment, including M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks and M-24 and M-41 light armoured vehicles, the Pakistan Army had received enough aircraft for a complete air wing, comprising nearly 100 Cessna L-19E (O-IE) observation light planes, plus a few Beech L-23 light twins for liaison and a number of Bell H-13 helicorters. Army light aircraft were exempt from the rigorously observed restriction which prevented the PAF from flying closer than 30 miles to the Indian border, except, of course, at such places as Lahore.

It was in a Pakistan Army Cessna L-19 that the Commander-in-Chief Designate of the PAF, Air Vice Marshal M. Nur Khan, took it upon himself to fly over the Kutch battle area on 28 April, the day after the unofficial cease-fire, for a personal assessment of the situation. Although A VM Nur Khan was then still running Pakistan International Airlines, he made it his duty to investigate supply problems being experienced by the forward troops in the desolation of the Rann of Kutch, where the PAF had previously shown little or no interest, and subsequently arranged for logistic support to be provided by some of his C-J30 Hercules transports.

Although the PAF sought to avoid adding air combat to the Rann of Kutch hostilities, suitable preparations were made to meet possible Indian activity. As the nearest base to the area, Mauripur, just outside Karachi, was placed on alert status from 15 April 1965 onwards. At the same time, the fighter airfield at Sargodha, facing the large IAF bases at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara, moved to a similar state of readiness. The PAF B-57s and Sabres were ordered to their wartime dispersals, and operations rooms at the two bases, as well as the Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC) at Air HQ were placed on 24-hour watches. Also alerted, and moved to their war locations, were No’s 229 and 234 Squadrons, as the mobile components of the Sector Operations Centre (SOC) at Badin, in the south of West Pakistan.

Badin was the site of one of the two high-powered FPS-20 static early-warning and control radars supplied to Pakistan by the US as part of the Mutual Aid Program.

With the second installation at Sakesar, further north in West Pakistan, and serving the main advanced base at Sargodha, the PAF could scan an arc of just over 200 miles to detect' incoming aircraft and vector its own fighters for an interception. There were also older and obsolescent radars at Thatta and Rahwali, plus even more ancient Type 13, 14 and i5 equipment with a range of 100 miles in East Pakistan. In the west, however, low level coverage was complicated by the mountains in some areas, and there were many gaps in the defense belts. It was not until immediately after the 1965 war with India, in fact, that a few low-level type 501 B radar sets were obtained from the Army, to remedy some of the deficiencies in the PAF early-warning network. But supplementing the more sophisticated air defence equipment right from the beginning was a network of Mobile Observer units, over radii of 30, 60 and 100 miles, linked by telephone or radio to the operations centers.

When operations began in earnest, these ground observers proved to be a major factor in ensuring adequate warning of nearly all intruding Indian aircraft.

So far as its own countermeasures against the IAF radar defense system were concerned, the PAF had been far from idle. Well before the start of hostilities, the Pakistanis had established radio listening posts for their electronic intelligence organization, and airborne ECM and surveillance devices were constantly in use both before and during the 1965 war. The two specially equipped Martin RB-57Bs and two RB-57Fs employed by the PAF on these electronic intelligence (ELINT) duties, had pinned down the main performance limitations as well as the locations of the principal Indian radar installations at Ambala and Amritsar before a shot had been fired. And in the subsequent strikes against the main Indian surveillance radar at Amritsar, controlling and protecting the IAF squadrons in the Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara complex, the ELINT aircraft of the PAF continued to play a major role.

As it happened, there were no air operations of any significance during the Rann of Kutch dispute, but as a result of Desert Hawk, the PAF was poised for instant action. Armed combat air patrols and reconnaissance sorties by F-86Fs from Mauripur, reinforced by two F-I04A Star fighters, on detachment from Sargodha, initiated from 17 April onwards, were kept well behind the disputed frontier, to avoid provocation, although it seems that the IAF was less careful in this respect.

On 24 April, for example, after early warning from Badin, a section of two Sabres was scrambled from Mauripur to intercept a single aircraft which was heading deep into Pakistan air space. By the time the Sabres had made visual contact, with some difficulty in the poor visibility characteristic of the Punjab, Delhi and Rajasthan areas at that time of the year because of dust in suspension and haze, the intruder was 50 miles inside Pakistan territory, apparently heading for Karachi. Visual confirmation that the target was an Ouragan fighter-bomber bearing the green, white and saffron roundels of the IAF and flying at about 2,000ft above the ground, resulted from a warning pass made by the PAF Sabres. Before they could position themselves for an attack, however, the Ouragan lowered undercarriage and flaps in surrender, and made a forced landing near the village of Jangshahi. Apart from wiping off its wheels, the Ouragan received little damage on landing, and the pilot, Fit. Lt. Rana Sikka of No 51 Auxiliary Squadron, Jamnagar, was soon captured unhurt, after attempting to pass himself off as a member of the PAF. Although the Ouragan was fully armed, it seems that its pilot had strayed across the border by mistake, and he was returned to India in August. The damaged Ouragan is now among the main exhibits in the PAF Museum.

Two other air space infringements by IAF aircraft took place before the cease-fire. Both could have resulted in a serious escalation of the air war but for restraint on the part of the Pakistanis. On one occasion, an IAF reconnaissance Canberra crossed the border north-east of Sargodha, and was trailed visually for more than 10 minutes by an F-104A Starfighter, flown by the late Fig.Off. Mushtaq. In the absence of orders for the destruction of the enemy, however, it was allowed to return to India unscathed. After another aircraft had dived on Pakistani troops behind the battle line, and had drawn some ground fire, two Martin B-57s were scrambled from Mauripur at the request of the Divisional HQ, for immediate reprisals. When it was discovered that the IAF aircraft had not actually attacked the Pakistani troops, however, the B-57s were recalled before they had reached the battle area.

Although air operations therefore played little part in the Rann of Kutch dispute, this was of considerable significance to the PAF in rehearsing its transfer to a war footing and in underlining some of the deficiencies in its planning and organisation. Army support procedures, for example, were overhauled as a result of the Desert Hawk commitment for the Mauripur aircraft to fly at least six simulated tactical ground attack missions per day. At that time, there was no Joint Operations Centre (JOC) to process Army requests for air support to the PAF, but to improve such liaison, a group captain was attached to GHQ, and a squadron leader to HQ 8 Div. The effectiveness of this liaison may be judged from a signal sent by the Army GOC, Gen Mohammed Musa, on 6 July 1965, to the C-in-C PAF, Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan:

'Now that the emergency has receded, convey very high appreciation of all ranks of Pak Army and of my own for the whole-hearted cooperation of officers and ORs of PAF. Their professional efficiency, high morale, dedication to duty and personal conduct very, very inspiring. '

If nothing else, Desert Hawk revealed an essential need for a specific commitment for Army support in PAF war planning. This was accordingly reviewed even before the official cease-fire came into effect in the Rann of Kutch area on 1 July 1965. Additional urgency to the task of reassessing Pakistan's defense aims was added by the ominous comment from Indian Prime Minister Shastri on the Kutch affair to the effect that, 'Next time, we'll choose our own time and place to fight.'

It was therefore hardly surprising that while most PAF units reverted to peacetime procedures before the end of July 1965, thus officially ending Desert Hawk, the air staff were increasingly preoccupied with thoughts of war.

A reassessment of PAF policy at this time was additionally appropriate in view of the pending change in command. After eight momentous years as Commander in-Chief, during which he has seen the PAF grow out of all proportion to its origins, Air Marshal Asghar Khan was due to retire in July 1965 and exchange jobs with his successor, Air Vice Marshal M. Nur Khan, then managing director of Pakistan International Airlines.


courtesy John Fricker - author of Battle For Pakistan.

 

[fatman17]

Message from The Chief of the Air Staff Pakistan Air Force


September 07, 2012

The Defence Day of Pakistan rekindles the memories of valiant heroes and martyrs of '65 war in our hearts. It is a day when the nation pays rich tribute to our Shuhada and Ghazis who remained steadfast while facing the challenge of defeating an adversary that enjoyed overwhelming numerical advantage.

The events of September 1965, serve as a reminder that our historic success was made possible because the nation and the armed forces rose to the occasion as an epitome of a united and disciplined entity. These events of September '65 saw the practical manifestation of the principles of Unity, Faith and Discipline given to us by the Father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. There is no doubt that our daring armed forces along with the courageous people of Pakistan defeated an aggressor, which was numerically three times superior. The Pakistan Air Force on this day created a saga of national pride and proved that no enemy can undermine its spirit to fight an aggressor under heavy odds. We salute the brave sons of the soil who embraced Shahadat, or returned with pride as Ghazis.

My Dear Countrymen! Presently, the menace of terrorism is disrupting our peace and harmony. While we honour the heroes of '65 War and commemorate supreme sacrifices of the nation, once again we need to dedicate ourselves to protect our country against the perils of terrorism. Pakistan Air Force as an organisation and its personnel as individuals, have committed themselves for this cause and have pledged to continue with utmost efforts until terrorism in all its manifestations is uprooted from the soil of our homeland.

The spirit of September 1965, demands us to draw strength from our Faith in Almighty Allah and prove ourselves worthy of the greatness that our predecessors have so adroitly achieved in the past. I assure you that Pakistan Air Force as the front line of defence is fully prepared to defend the aerial frontiers of our sacred motherland. May Allah Almighty grant us the strength and vision to withstand all the challenges and discharge our duties to the best of our abilities! Ameen.

Pakistan Zindabad!

Pakistan Air Force Paindabad!

 

[fatman17]

The PAF Prepares for War.




If Air Marshal Asghar Khan had built the foundations of Pakistan’s air power, Air Vice Marshal M Nur Khan was the ideal choice to consolidate it. Then in his early 40’s and slight of stature, his compelling personality was the personification of leadership. Immediately prior to his appointment as C-in-C, he had spent six years transforming PIA from a struggling minor carrier into an airline recognized internationally for its technical standards, service and profitability. With the additional responsibilities of Chief Administrator of Civilian Aviation and Tourism, Nur Khan had gained wide commercial experience which gave him an unusual breadth in military circles. He was no less qualified for his service responsibilities, however, since he had originally graduated from the Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun, and had seen operational service as a fighter and dive bomber pilot, with the RIAF in south-east Asia during WWII.

Like his predecessor, Asghar Khan, AVM Nur Khan believed in leading from the cockpit. Despite having been away from practical flying for several years while administering PIA, Nur Khan began flying the very sophisticated Starfighters of No. 9 Squadron within a few days of taking over command of the PAF on 23 July, 1965. He went on to work up his air-to-ground gunnery in both the Starfighter and the Sabre until he was setting his pilots the near impossible example of 100% scores , with every round hitting the target.

As a born fighter pilot, Nur Khan combined a natural aggressiveness in his flying with a shrewd appreciation of tactical and logistical problems from behind the desk at Air HQ. His forthright opinion of the gentlemen’s agreement between the PAF and the IAF to stay out of the air during the Rann of Kutch was that it was nonsense. He failed to see why the troops of the Pak Army should fight and die while losing territory, with the PAF standing idly by. He opposed the agreement from the beginning on the additional grounds of its effects on morale and his attitude was undoubtedly an additional major factor in reshaping PAF policy towards increased Army support. He soon discovered that Pak Army and PAF were thinking of defense problems in mutually exclusive terms, with little regard for cooperation or feeling of interdependence! But in setting out to improve this situation, it is clear that he was endorsing a policy for improved army support which had already been embodied in the revised PAF War Plans which had been issued in June 1965, after the unofficial ceasefire.

This however failed to improve Indo-Pakistan relations. Immediately after the ceasefire, Pakistan planned a major operation for the liberation of Indian occupied Kashmir by infiltrating freedom fighters. This infiltration plan was based on assurance from the then foreign minister, ZA Bhutto that a conflict arising out of a guerilla war in Kashmir would remain confined to the disputed area, and would not lead to a general war between India and Pakistan. AVM Nur Khan was convinced that it would lead to an Indian attack across the international border, and immediately set about revising the PAF war plans for the impending conflict.

On assuming command of the PAF, AVM Nur Khan received no briefing on the proposed army operations in Kashmir. On hearing rumors of pending troop movements, however he immediately arranged to meet General Malik, the GOC in Kashmir, who had been entrusted with the conduct of the infiltration plan. The C-in-C flew to Rawalpindi in a Cessna T-37, and then on to Murree by army helicopter to reopen Army /Air force liaison.

From discussions of the proposed infiltration plan by about 8,000 guerillas and regular army troops, it was obvious that little participation by the PAF had been envisioned. AVM Nur Khan immediately offered his Lockheed C-130 transports for resupply roles, however as he realised that the task was beyond the capabilities of light Army aircraft and helicopters, that the General had in mind. On his return to Air HQ, the C-in-C ordered the Transport Squadron commander to undertake the necessary trials preparatory to performing this difficult operation in the mountains of Kashmir. Since detection of the re-supply flights by the Indians would have invited immediate counter action against PAF bases, the C-in-C also stipulated that these logistic support sorties would have to be undertaken under the cover of darkness.

Having acquainted himself with the Army's plans Nur Khan had to consider how the PAF could be made to play a more effective role in the impending conflict - which he warned Gen Musa he regarded as inevitable once the Pakistani guerilla force crossed the cease-fire line in Kashmir.
The existing war plans of the PAF were based on the 1962 assessment of Indian war aims, on which the PAF had originally been relying, and listed possible IAF priorities as:

a Rapid neutralisation of the PAF

b Disruption of vital lines of communication

c Destruction of Pakistani war-making potential.

Main IAF targets were accordingly assessed as:

1 Sargodha air base and its radar station at Sakesar

2 Mauripur air base, Karachi, and its radar station at Badin

3 Dacca air base, in East Pakistan, and its mobile radar unit

4 The civil airports at Karachi and Rawalpindi (Chaklala)

5 Industrial targets such as the port of Karachi, oil installations in the south, Wah ordnance factory Attock oil facilities in Rawalpindi and bulk petrol storage in Peshawar.

Because of the disparity in its size compared with the IAF, the PAF could not afford to be taken by surprise, and the plan envisaged that it would have to be maintained at as high a state of operational readiness as resources would permit. It was also assumed that it would not have the initiative for a first strike, and that its primary task would be the air defence of Pakistan. AM Asghar Khan had maintained his insistence that no air effort would be available for army support, and the most that he could offer the troops could be to try and keep the IAF off their backs.
Apart from the allocation of a portion of the PAF F-86F Sabre force for immediate support of PakArmy, the War Readiness Plan, as modified by 29 June 1965, was not greatly changed from that of 1962. The committee appointed by AM Asghar Khan to revise the War Plan were given a number of possible political contingencies to work on, but their findings were mainly based on the presumptions that hostilities would result from the long-standing dispute over Kashmir, and the main battle for Pakistan would thus be fought in the area of the former West Punjab; and that an all-out war with India was considered unlikely. There was little dispute that the main objective for the PAF would be to neutralise selected vital elements of the IAF by striking them on their airfields, thereby reducing the margin of numerical superiority held by India, ensuring the survival of the PAF and preventing the attainment of air superiority by India and of effective interference by the IAF in the land battle.

To review and recast the plans, Nur Khan constituted a committee of senior officers led by Grp Capt F. S. Hussain to consider and make recommendations on:

'How, while maintaining the security of the air bases, to gain local air superiority over the main Army area of operations with a view to influencing the land battle by providing the maximum support to the Pakistan Army while preventing the IAF from supporting the Indian Army.'

The main points that the committee had to consider and make recommendations on were:

a Assuming the area between Kashmir and the Sutlej River as the most probable location of the main land battle, to plan to gain local air superiority

b To recommend methods of neutralising the IAF's numerical superiority

c To plan to effect the maximum economy of effort in defence of the air bases.

d To plan for the availability of support to the Army in its main operational area

e To plan for the maximum harassment of the enemy without dissipating the effectiveness of the first line aircraft and personnel of the PAF

f To recommend methods of surprising and deceiving the enemy

g To ensure that the logistical plan adequately supported the operational plans.

The C-in-C and the operational planners of the PAF had three main problem areas in drawing up the plans to achieve their desired aims in a confrontation with the IAF. The first was the wide disparity between the strength of the PAF and the IAF, as discussed earlier.

The second problem facing the PAF in both its defensive and offensive plans was the complication of a severe shortage of front-line operational airfields. In the relatively narrow strip of West Pakistan, these comprised only Peshawar and Sargodha, in the north (the transport and training fields at Chaklala and Risalpur were not suitable for more than occasional use by combat jets), and Mauripur in the south.

Only longer-range types such as the B-57s could make effective use of the rear airfield of Samungli, Quetta, and in East Pakistan, a single base was available at Dacca (Tezgaon). The lack of suitable bases prevented wide-scale dispersal of the PAF aircraft, with a corresponding simplification of the IAF's strike problems, and also denied Pakistan much of the flexibility essential for effective operation.

In contrast, the IAF had a wide choice of more than two dozen combat bases deployed in depth around the frontiers between West and East Pakistan, on which some 75% of Indian air power was located. More than 50% of these airfields offered a low-level strike threat to Pakistan, and the complex made up of Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara, under the control of Amritsar radar, formed the base of a triangle whose apex centred on the vulnerable city of Lahore, just 16 miles from the frontier with India.

This complex was therefore considered the primary target for the PAF in West Pakistan, although the strike plan had to extend to IAF bases and radar stations as far north as Srinagar, in Kashmir; Ambala, in Central India; and Jamnagar, in the south. From East Pakistan, the most vital strike target for the PAF was the IAF base at Kalaikunda, in West Bengal, although the area was ringed by other Indian airfields at Baghdogra, Barrackpore and Hasimara.

The third problem was that the whole of the PAF air defence and fighter guidance system depended on the Sakesar early warning and central radar in the north and a similar facility at Badin in the South. The PAF had no alternative or fall-back equipment available if these radars were damaged or destroyed.

After the deliberations of the committee A VM Nur Khan made the following decisions:

a To concentrate the PAF in the area Sargodha/Peshawar, leaving one squadron for the air defence of Karachi

b The air superiority battle to be fought as the defence of Sargodha air base thereby effecting the maximum economy of force; safeguarding the main base and Sakesar Radar; and dominating to a large extent the main battle area of the Army

c To attack Indian air bases as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostilities and to destroy the maximum number of the IAF aircraft on the ground. This, it was hoped, would also induce the IAF to retaliate against Sargodha where the F-104 Starfighter and the Sidewinder-armed Sabre could be used in combination to destroy the attacking IAF aircraft

d To attack the IAF bases with airborne commandos to destroy aircraft, aircrew and airfield facilities on the main IAF air bases on the night ofD-day/D+ 1

e To double the existing number of missions per aircraft per day to reduce the disparity in the relative strengths of the PAF and the IAF

f To fly combat air patrols consisting of one F-104 Starfighter, armed with the Sidewinder air-to-air missile, and two F-86 Sabres, also armed with the Sidewinder. (This combination utilised the superior performance of the F-104 Starfighter to provide top cover to almost all the F-86 Sabres on combat air patrol with the ten available F-104s)

g On hostilities becoming imminent, air defence measures to be fully operational to safeguard against pre-emptive or surprise attack

h At least one squadron to be available for close support to the Army

i Harassment of the enemy's air bases to be carried out by single bomber raids repeated a number of times every night to keep the enemy's air bases under constant air attack alerts

k Training and other non-operational aircraft to be used, at night, to attack road and rail communications and troop concentrations, to harass the enemy's ground forces.

These decisions of A VM Nur Khan indicate that he sought primarily to cripple the IAF, if possible, on the ground with every means available to him. If this did not prove practical, he then planned to fight in an area which was vital to the PAF and to the Pakistan Army and where he could concentrate his maximum strength. His concern for air support for the Army, which hitherto had not featured at all prominently in PAF planning, and his implementation of the means to provide such support revealed a deep understanding of the influence that air power has had on land combat since the Spanish Civil War.

With the operational concept and the vital decisions made, the operational staff officers proceeded to work out the details. Two vexing problems required careful consideration. One was the division of resources between the requirements of air defence, offensive air strikes and the support of the Army.

The other was the question of the timing of the air strike on the IAF bases.

Given superiority in numbers, an airborne strike force can begin attacking enemy airfields at dawn and continue throughout the day to inflict the maximum possible damage. But the PAF assessed its numerical strength as insufficient to ensure that its initial strike would be massive enough to 'prevent immediate and effective retaliation. Dusk - or more accurately, 15 minutes before sunset - was therefore selected as the optimum time-over-target (TOT) for airfield strikes at the end of the first day of hostilities.

This would minimise the danger of an immediate counter-attack and enable harassing pressure by B-57s from Mauripur to be maintained during the night. It would also give the air defence system plenty of time to prepare to meet reprisal attacks on the following morning, and the strike force to be ready for follow up attacks planned for a TOT of 15 minutes before sunrise. Because sunset was much earlier in East Pakistan the strikes against Kalaikunda were planned for dawn on the following day, to avoid preceding those in West Pakistan and thus alerting the Indian defences.

From that point, further planning was a question of detail. Since the Sabre was then the only fighter-bomber in PAF service, the mission profiles had to be tailored to the characteristics of the F-86F. The PAF plan assumed 12 aircraft, allocated to each target, in three sections of four at five-minute intervals, using underwing rockets as well as the standard internal armament of six 0.5in machine-guns, for ground strafing. Further examination, however, indicated the necessity of carrying external fuel tanks to give an adquate combat allowance over the required ranges, and permit two attacks per aircraft, since the most forward PAF strike airfield of Sargodha was nearly 130 miles behind the frontier with India. This meant dispensing with the use of rockets, although in any case these weapons were considerably less accurate than the Sabre's machine-guns.

One final point to be decided was whether the strike force should cross the Indian frontier simultaneously on the way to their various targets, or aim for a common TOT (time-over-target). Since Indian defensive measures would almost certainly be initiated by the act of border penetration, the PAF plan decided in favour of the simultaneous frontier crossing and the acceptance of differing TOTs.

This question of timing was to have significant effects on the events to come



Courtesy; John Fricker - Battle for Pakistan

 

[fatman17]

Alarms & Excursions.


There was still no formal state of war between Pakistan and India , nor had ground operations spread beyond the vicinity of the CFL in Kashmir, when Pak Army forces resumed their thrust towards Akhnoor, the gateway to Srinagar via Jaurian. On 3rd September 1965, PAF air operations started at 0530 hrs. with a dawn takeoff of two Sabres and an F-104 from Sargodha for an armed reconnaissance over Akhnoor. The other main bases at Mauripur and Peshawar had also been alerted before first light, following a request from 7Div. Pak Army, for air cover to protect further crossings by its vehicles of the Tawi River.

One of the main jobs for the Peshawar patrol was to keep an eye on the PAF at Srinagar, which was the base most likely to be used to mount a low level strike against their own airfield. Only one Canberra and a single transport aircraft were observed on this occasion, however, the Peshawar patrol also reported 10-12 Indian tanks at Baramullah.

Another CAP scrambled from Sargodha about an hour or so after the first, included two sidewinder armed Sabres flown by Flt.Lt. (later Sqn.Ldr) Yusuf Ali Khan, Flg.Off. Butt as his No.2, accompanied by the usual F-104 to patrol Chamb. After they had been flying over their designated area for some time, the Sabres were warned by the Sakesar GCI of the proximity of UKJ’s (unknown jets) at 36,000ft, and promptly requested a vector to intercept despite being outnumbered by two to one. No contact was made with these bogies, but four IAF Gnats were seen climbing towards the Sabres from the opposite direction. Flt.Lt. Yusuf Khan recalls;

‘I called over the RT to my No.2 to punch tanks* and pulled my Sabre in a climbing turn to close with the Gnats. One of my wingman’s tanks hung up, however, and as he tried to sort out his problem in the cockpit, he lost contact with me so I told him to exit. Meanwhile I was getting missile tone, which indicated that the sidewinder was locked on to a target, but just as I was going to launch my GAR-8, I felt a series of thuds on my aircraft. Looking back I saw two Gnats behind me, and as one overshot, I broke hard into him and he turned away.

Flt. Lt. Khan’s Sabre was not responding properly to the controls, which was hardly surprising, since his tail unit had been hit by three 30mm high explosive cannon shells from one of the Gnats. Nevertheless he continued the engagement descending to 1,500ft. Or less above the ground in the process and claimed that he could still out turn the Gnat, despite the severe damage suffered by his Sabre. Fortunately for him, help was on hand. While his No.2 was in process of rejoining him in his single handed combat with six Gnats, the first four being reinforced by two more, Flt.Lt. Khan saw the Star fighter flown by Flg.Off. Abbas, who had been the third member of his CAP, dive supersonically from 35,000ft. through the milling mass of aircraft. The F-104A had been vectored on to the engagement by Sakesar after a futile pursuit of another hostile track, and its appearance in the course of several high speed passes was enough to cause two or three of the Gnats to break off. The remaining Gnat continued dog fighting with the two Sabres until almost sandwiched between them, when it dived to ground level and escaped. Undaunted to the end, Flt.Lt. Khan attempted to dive after his adversary, but found that he was unable to reach more than about 350 knots, and that at anything more than 92% engine rpm, vibration became excessive. All he then had to do was to nurse his crippled aircraft more than 100 miles back to base, with marginal fuel , and having lost his radio and emergency IFF (identification, friend or foe) equipment. He sent his No.2 on ahead and eventually returned to Sargodha, where he found that his left main wheel was not indicating down and locked, and that he had no brake pressure, Fit Lt Khan continues:

'I made a pass over the field and waggled my wings to indicate a precautionary landing. As I had no brakes, I ran into the airfield crash barrier at the end of the runway, but there was no further damage. There was already enough, however. Most of the upper parts of the fin and rudder were damaged, as was the left elevator. Another shell had entered the fuselage behind the air brakes and passed completely through leaving a 5in diameter hole just aft of the engine turbine rotor.'

One of the most extraordinary hits on Fit Lt Khan's Sabre was the passage of a 30mm shell right up the tailpipe of one of his Sidewinder missiles, passing through the rocket motor and finally exploding about half-way along the 9ft 2in length of the GAR-8. The front portion of the missile, containing the warhead and sensitive infra-red homing equipment, was blown off (and recovered later) but the explosion of the 30mm shell put several thousand splinters through the wing, and accounted for the failure of the undercarriage hydraulic system.

Despite its severe damage, this Sabre was repaired and returned to operational service by the indefatigable industry of the PAF engineers at Sargodha, led by Sqn Ldr M. Wahidullah, in charge of the Repair and Salvage Unit, and Sqn Ldr I. A. Kazi, commanding the Aircraft Engineering Squadron. In conjunction with FIt Lt Khan, the PAF maintenance personnel confounded the claim by All-India Radio of the destruction of a PAF Sabre, for which Sqn Ldr Trevor Keelor of the IAF was awarded the Vir Chakra.

But there was an even more ironic sequel to this combat, which was professed to have boosted the morale of the IAF. Another F-104, flown by Fit Lt Hakimullah, which had been vectored to the scene of the fighting by Sakesar, but had arrived just too late, came across one of the Gnats returning to its base after the engagement.

Hakimullah's Starfighter had been flying at Mach 1.4 for the interception, and he had asked Sakesar to let him know when he was within about five miles of the combat area, in order to have sufficient time to decelerate. It was just about then that he came across the IAF Gnat, whose pilot thought he had escaped one F-104, only to be confronted by another.

As the Gnat was then flying at about 5-6,000ft over the disused PAF airfield of Pasrur, not far from the Indian border south of Sialkot, its pilot promptly lowered his under carriage in surrender, and landed the aircraft intact, with the assistance of its tail parachute. Flt. Lt Hakimullah continued circling overhead for some 20 minutes or so, until the Gnat and its pilot were captured by Pakistani troops. After interrogation, it was established that the pilot, Sqn Ldr Brij Pal Singh Sikand, who was CO of an IAF Gnat squadron, had taken off from Halwara, where he had arrived only the previous evening from Ambala. After re-fuelling at Pathankot, his formation of six Gnats was assigned that morning to provide close support for Indian Army troops in the Bhimber area. This, of course, had been frustrated by the determined action of the outnumbered PAF pilots, after which the IAF Gnat pilot claimed that he had lost his radio and compass, and that his two 30mm cannon had jammed. The Indian prisoner, who was dismissed from the IAF while in captivity, also bet the PAF pilot assigned to fly the Gnat away from Pasrur three bottles of beer that he would not be able to start the aircraft, let alone get it airborne. What the Indian pilot did not know, however, was that Sqn Ldr S. A Hatmi of the PAF had flown Gnat Trainers extensively with the RAF, and the differences from the HAL-built fighter version were sufficiently minor to present him few problems.

When the Gnat flew into Sargodha three days after landing at Pasrur, with an escort of six Sabres, it was greeted with acclamation, and its few secrets were soon laid bare, although a tactical evaluation was not possible until after the end of hostilities. It was recognized as an effective little aircraft, although with limited range and an inferior turning circle to the Sabre. As for it’s much boosted reputation as 'Sabre-Slayer', it seems that in this respect, the Indians appear to have been victims of their own propaganda.

Certainly the Gnat was not regarded by the PAF with less respect than the Hunter, nor is the PAF convinced that it lost more than one or two Sabres to Gnats, throughout the entire period of hostilities with India.

Meanwhile Gnat No IE 1083 is still hangared at Sargodha as a treasured memento to the PAF's moral superiority over the IAF. And when its guns were tested immediately after its capture, they worked perfectly...

When this eventful day (3 September) ended, the PAF had flown 24 CAP missions, comprising 19 from Sargodha and five from Peshawar, with no further contact despite several attempts at intervention over the battle area by the IAF. Although the Indians had avoided further combat, the C-in-C felt that a reassessment of PAF fighter tactics was desirable after these initial experiences, and therefore went with some of his senior staff officers from Air HQ to Sargodha that evening for a conference, After a discussion with the station commander, Grp Capt (now Air Cdre) M. Zafar Masud and some of the more experienced squadron pilots, the C-in-C decided that, in future, CAPSs would be doubled in strength to meet the challenge of larger IAF formations. Furthermore, it was planned that while the four Sabres of a CAP flew at around 25-30,000ft, where they would be picked up by the enemy, the two accompanying F-104s taking off 10 minutes later would stay at low level to avoid detection by Indian radar, ready to zoom up whenever combat was joined.

In practice, these tactics were to prove less than completely successful, but they did go some way towards meeting the PAF requirement to seek combat with the numerical odds a little more favorable than before, The theory was that the F-86s should withdraw after the IAF was committed to combat, leaving the field clear for the F-104s. CAPs to this pattern began on 4 September, when the Pak Army push into Indian-held Kashmir had reached the outskirts of Jaurian, but the only thing missing to test the theory was IAF cooperation in accepting combat. In effect, the F-86s acted as bait to entice the IAF into engagement, but at this stage there was virtually no reaction from the ISO or so aircraft based at the three forward airfields in the northern sector, just behind the Indian border. Nor, at this time, were PAF fighter pilots permitted to pursue intruding IAF aircraft back across the international border into Indian Territory

One of the advantages of this period of phony war to the PAF was that it provided a breathing space to sort out a command structure capable of coping with the pressure of the revised operational requirements. There was some division of responsibility between the HQ staff at Rawalpindi, and those remaining at Air HQ Peshawar because of insufficient accommodation. The border line of responsibility between the ACAS Operations and the AOC Air Defense was also not as clearly defined as it might have been, but this issue was resolved by the C-in-C's decision to transfer the PAF air defense staff element to the GCT control center at Sakesar. There, the skill and experience of Air Cdre Masroor Hussain could be applied to a direct assessment of the air situation as presented by the Sakesar radar, for immediate on-the spot decisions on tactics and defense deployment.

For the C-in-C, another major worry was the vulnerability of the two main PAF static early-warning and control radar installations at Sakesar and Badin, in the north and south of West Pakistan. Both were necessarily situated close to the Indian border, and, with their equipment housed in enormous plastic domes visible for 30-40 miles, were incapable of concealment. They were an obvious target for the IAF, and the loss of either would have been a very serious matter indeed since no replacements were available. Their main defense was dependent on only single batteries, each with 16 anti-aircraft guns, but these were virtually powerless against low-level surprise attacks, as events were to prove, despite some reinforcement and protection by CAPs. In fact, in prewar PAF planning exercises it was assumed that operations would have to be conducted without the aid of the two fixed radars, although these did manage to stay in service most of the time.

In addition to 34 air defense missions flown by the PAF on 4 September, all but four of which were from Sargodha, more ground attack missions were flown against Indian army targets in the vicinity of Jaurian and Akhnoor. In one low-level sortie in the Jammu area, Sqn Ldr Alam, accompanied by Fit Lt Jilani, had his cockpit canopy shattered by ground fire but nevertheless continued strafing enemy artillery before nursing his damaged Sabre safely back to Sargodha. Another strike mission, however, led by Sqn Ldr Arshad, CO of No 15 Squadron, with four F-104s flying as top cover, during the afternoon was less fortunate and incurred the first loss to be suffered by the PAF during the period of hostilities.

Two sections, each of four Sabres armed with rockets, followed by a further four carrying Napalm, came across a large convoy of Indian vehicles on the road from Akhnoor to Jaurian, and claimed 26 trucks destroyed. By the time the third flight arrived under the command of Sqn Ldr M. D. Ahmed, no worthwhile targets were left, and while searching for alternatives, these Sabres came under heavy AA fire from guns around the Akhnoor Bridge at Jaurian. They nevertheless attacked what appeared to be a large field HQ south of Jammu.

There was no sign of any air opposition, but while exiting at low level, the last man of the third section, Fig Off Nasir Mahmood Butt, received hits on his aircraft and was forced to eject, landing safely near some Pakistani troops. Since no IAF aircraft had been seen, the loss of the Sabre was initially attributed to Pak Army AA fire, but after the war it was learned that Fit Lt Virendra Singh Pathania had been credited with the destruction of a PAF Sabre in the same area and at an approximately similar time. A second Sabre was also claimed on the same day by India, but no other loss is indicated in PAF records.

The problem of aircraft identification by ground troops manning individual AA weapons was to prove tragically acute in the forthcoming operations, compounded as it was by the fact that both sides were using not only aircraft of closely similar appearance, in the case of the Sabre and the Hunter, but also of a common type in the Canberra. Little blame could be attached to the Pak Army forces, since they had been told for so long that any aircraft seen overhead would inevitably be hostile, but of all the tragedies of war, that of being struck down by your friends is surely among the most poignant.
It was during these operations on 4 September that IAF MiG-21s were reported to be active for the first time, identified by the speed of their tracks through Sakesar GCT. No contact was made, nor in fact sought, by the returning Sabres which the MiGs flew across and behind but from range and endurance factors, it was concluded that they were operating from the IAF base at Pathankot.

The IAF is thought to have launched 24-30 fighters in waves during the day, to interfere with the land battle around Jaurian, but these were effectively prevented from attacking the Pak Army forces by 12-16 PAF aircraft on CAPs.

Other PAF activity on 4 September included two successful photo recce sorties on behalf of Pak Army by Lockheed RT-33As of No 20 Squadron. The latter were also from Sargodha, under the command of Sqn Ldr M. M. Ahmed. Although as converted trainers the RT-33s were relatively slow, obsolescent and vulnerable, they managed to average two sorties per day throughout most of September, in which 60 missions were completed totalling 73 flying hours. One mission on 4 September was flown unescorted over the Tithwal area to obtain a photographic mosaic, while the second, with top cover by two Sabres, was for a similar task over Akhnoor.

On later occasions, the unarmed RT-33s made deep penetrations into Indian territory without fighter escort, but were unsuccessful in the vital task of photographing enemy airfields because they had to turn back to avoid interception by IAF fighters. F-86s and F-104s were used for the visual reconnaissance of heavily-defended targets but, as will be seen, there were also some ingenious adaptations of the Starfighter to obtain vital photographic coverage. An IAF photographic reconnaissance aircraft was also active on 4 September, but in contrast with the PAF activities had no compunction in violating the international border and flying over Pakistan territory to survey the Jhelum-Gujrat area. It was pursued but not fired upon.

Against UN appeals that day from U Thant and the Security Council for Pakistan and India to 'take forthwith all steps for an immediate ceasefire', the contrasting attitudes of the two countries were set out at an evening press conference by A VM Nur Khan. He pointed out that according to the policy of the Pakistan Government, the PAF had not yet violated Indian air space. This, of course, was on the assumption that Pakistan did not recognize the validity of the cease-fire line in Kashmir, over which the PAF had certainly made a large number of ground attack sorties. The C-in-C added:

'As against that India has been enjoying the advantage of choosing her own time and place of air engagements, but that may not be possible for her for long. The PAF has been exercising great restraint by not taking advantage of its right of pursuit of the raiders into Indian Territory (i.e. across the international border proper). In all our combats so far our pilots are outnumbered two to three times. Yet we have not done badly, shooting up four Vampires and forcing down a Gnat intact. However, superiority in numbers does not decide the outcome of air battles; better training, morale, and above all fighting spirit, in fact, are the deciding factors.'

With the capture of Jaurian by Pak Army forces on the morning of 5 September, and the continuation of their advance to a bridgehead only four miles or so short of Akhnoor, events were clearly moving towards a climax.

Despite all the advantages of vastly outnumbering the Pakistan forces and of fighting from prepared positions with formidable fortifications, the Indian troops under Gen Chaudhuri had been unable to check the Pak Army thrust, and had suffered very heavy losses in the process.

The fall of Jaurian was accompanied by the loss of a complete field regiment of artillery to the Pak Army -which was later to put the captured Indian guns to good use - as well as a large number of prisoners, 15 undamaged AMX tanks and scores of vehicles.
In Pakistan, there was little doubt at this time that, politically, India could not possibly accept the loss of any more territory in Kashmir, where an area of about 300 square miles had been overrun by Pak Army forces, who had also taken Chhamb, Dewa, Sukrana and laurian.

Since the army was evidently incapable of checking the Pakistan offensive, the probability of a widening of hostilities to other fronts was becoming overwhelming.

This conviction was further strengthened by several mysterious messages broadcast over the AU-India Radio. That evening, for example, there was an announcement that, 'there will be heavy rain in the Delhi area for the next 48 hours!' Air Cdre Saeedullah Khan, then temporary Director of operations, recalls that a check with the PAF meteorological staff revealed that there was no possibility whatsoever of any rain near Delhi, so the message was interpreted to have a different and more sinister significance.
All indications, in fact, pointed to an imminent attack across the international border by Indian forces, but so far as the PAF was concerned, the C-in-C and HQ staff was satisfied that nothing more remained to be done to complete its readiness for action. Apart from the earlier completion of operational deployment plans, the PAF support organizations had been geared for war since the Rann of Kutch operations. Maintenance had been established on the basis of war conditions, using round the clock shifts for work on the widely dispersed aircraft.

At Peshawar, these were housed in sandbagged pens put together in 10-15 days by university students who had eagerly volunteered for the job, One of the biggest fears of the PAF, with its limited number of airfields, mostly fairly close to India, was of being knocked out on the ground by a surprise low-level attack, so all the bases were at the highest possible state of alert.
Sargodha, in particular, was extremely vulnerable, both in being the nearest PAF airfield to the main Indian air base complex, and in being crammed to overcrowding with fighter squadrons. Even before hostilities had started, the Sargodha station commander Grp Capt Masud had been told by President Ayub Khan, 'Young man, I hope you realize that if your base goes down, we'll be in a jam so far as air operations are concerned.' If anything, this was an understatement. The emergency strip at Risalwala was the only conceivable stand-by if Sargodha had been knocked out. But Risalwala had no pre-planned dispersal, and its main function was only as a base for the emergency recovery of aircraft. Risalpur was earmarked as an emergency and re-fuelling base for the PAF B-57s and C-130s, but had no fighter handling facilities.

Curiously enough, while Pakistan was poised on the brink of war on 5 September, the air situation was relatively quiet with only 16 F-86 and F-104 sorties flown during the day. All except four were from Sargodha, and included ground attacks against heavy AA opposition by a quartet of Sabres near Akhnoor. No losses were incurred by the PAF, although one F-86F was slightly damaged by Indian flak. In the course of an attempted interception of an enemy aircraft tracked by radar over Lahore, an F-104 from Sargodha delivered a resounding supersonic double bang over the Amritsar area.

This was solemnly reported by the Indian Defence Minster to Congress in the following terms: 'Pakistani aircraft [have] intruded across the border at Wagah, near Amritsar, and fired rockets at an Indian air force unit.' In a subsequent account of Indo-Pakistan hostilities, the official Indian Defence Ministry description of this incident was as the first PAF attack on the AA battery at Amritsar, which of course was the site of the main IAF early-warning and GCI radar in this crucial area. This 'attack', it was claimed, was 'driven off' by the single AA battery. Amritsar was subsequently to experience many more realistic and damaging visits from the PAF in the course of the ensuing war.



Courtesy; John Fricker - Battle for Pakistan

 

[fatman17]

War over the Punjab




Even without the benefit of long range reconnaissance, denied to Pakistan because of its refusal to violate the international border, the Indian army offensive towards Lahore, which began at 0300 hrs. on 6 September 1965, should have come as no surprise. It was no more, in fact than the long expected conclusion to a situation that had steadily escalated ever since the Rann of Kutch affair. In addition to the long thrust along the Grand Trunk Road towards Lahore, the capital of West Pakistan, launched without a warning or an ultimatum, the border was crossed by lighter forces in two subsidiary attacks to the south towards Kasur from Khem Karan, and to capture the vital crossing over the Ravi River to the north-east at Jassar. The latter was soon to prove a feint to draw out the forces defending the Sialkot area, which two days later was to face the main Indian armored onslaught, but initially India achieved total surprise.

By an odd coincidence, the main thrust by two Indian infantry brigades supported by corps artillery and armour took place at Wagah, the scene of the alleged ‘rocket battle’ on the previous day. Equally curious was the fact that the first Pakistani unit to confront the invaders was a PAF detachment near the border. Since this unit was not equipped to fight tanks, the NCO in charge ordered a withdrawal, and reported the encounter to his station commander at Lahore. Without realizing that this was a full scale attack, the Lahore station commander ordered the PAF detachment back to its post, but also informed the C-in-C, AVM Nur Khan, however, quickly appraised the situation and informed President Ayub Khan with the words ‘this means war’.

There seems little doubt that India planned to advance the 15 miles or so to Lahore within 12 hours of launching the attack, and that the capture of this major city – the capital of West Pakistan – that day was to be a prelude to a lightening drive to cut the country in half and topple its government. Support for this theory comes from several incidents apart from Indian newspaper claims. It was later learned that foreign newspaper correspondents in New Delhi had been officially informed to stand by for an important announcement at 1600 hrs. on 6 September. This statement never came, but it was almost certainly to announce the capture of Lahore, which was thought by Indian army intelligence to have been undefended.

Further confirmation came with the embarrassingly premature publication by the Statesman in New Delhi the next day of a special supplement commemorating the glorious victory of the Indian army in seizing Lahore. That same evening, having been sent the news in advance, even the BBC credited the fall of Lahore to the Indian army, and showed on TV a newsreel supplied by India of a Lahore bus captured at Wagha. It is also widely believed in Pakistan that Gen Chaudhuri had issued invitations to his senior staff officers to attend a victory cocktail party in the Lahore Gymkhana on the evening of 6 September.

Indian official sources have since denied that there was any intention of capturing Lahore or Sialkot, although it is difficult to envisage what other purpose the thrusts towards these cities could have had. The Indian Defense Ministry was subsequently content to describe the purpose of the attacks as ‘marching into the Lahore sector to forestall an attack in the Punjab’- and as a move which, ‘will certainly split West Pakistan militarily’ – lateral lines of road and rail communications will be cut. So far as Pakistan was concerned, it was soon clear that what was involved was nothing less than a fight for survival – the military forces reacted accordingly, undaunted by the fact that only 28 Pak Army infantry battalions faced 121 similar Indian units on the Kasur-Lahore-Sialkot fronts and in Kashmir.

If Pak Army forces had launched operation grand slam into Kashmir without coordinated air support, the Indians were equally and unbelievably remiss on 6 September. There appeared to be little or no liaison between the Indian air and ground elements, and the sporadic attacks made by the IAF against targets in Pakistan during the day seemed completely uncoordinated with the major effort being made by the Army. As the ACAS Ops Air Cdre Rahim Khan later said:

'The first news which came that day early in the morning was that Indian fighter planes, mostly in pairs, were strafing targets at random without any fixed purpose or aim. There was a report of a train being strafed, a bridge being rocketed and so on. At first, the thought that came to our minds was that some of the IAF units had probably run berserk. But minutes later, when the Joint Operations Centre informed us that the Indian troops had crossed the international border at two or three points, the picture became somewhat clearer.'

It was about 0530hrs on 6 September that full realization of the scale of the Indian onslaught was appreciated in Pakistan, by which time the usual early morning CAPs were airborne to cover the standard VPs (vulnerable points). Among the PAF patrols, which went out at dawn and dusk, were two Starfighters from Sargodha led by Fit Lt Aftab Alam Khan and his wing man, Fit Lt Amjad Khan, who from 30,000ft over Chhamb were vectored by Sakesar GCI towards the scene of a strafing attack by the IAF against a train at Ghakhar Station near Rahwali airfield, Wazirabad. Since it was not yet full daylight, the F-104s let down against orders from Sakesar to stay at 10,000ft, to about 1,000ft, and their pilots eventually made contact with four IAF Mysteres. These were busily engaged in bomb and rocket attacks against a stationary passenger train, under the impression that it was carrying ammunition, and on the mobile control and reporting radar equipment of No 230 Squadron at Rahwali.

Although his No 2 had been forced to return to base through radio failure, Fit Lt Aftab Alam dived his F-104 in full afterburner supersonically through the Mystere formation which promptly scattered. The Indian aircraft then began to make their escape by exiting at about 50ft above the ground, registering considerable alarm in the process over the RT, but they were or course no match for the Starfighter. At close to 600 knots, and virtually treetop height, Fit Lt Aftab Alam selected the nearest Mystere, and began his Sidewinder release drill as the range closed to 4-5,000ft. When the missile tone came in, he squeezed the trigger, and seven-tenths of a second later the deadly Sidewinder was on its way.

This slight delay seemed much longer in combat, and Fit Lt Aftab Alam looked out towards his wing tip to see if anything was happening. At that moment, the rocket motor fired with a flash which temporarily blinded him, so he instinctively pulled up clear of the ground. This took him to about 5,000ft where he lost contact with the Mysteres, and he could not observe the result of his missile attack. From RT monitoring, and visual observation from Chandas radar, Sakesar was able to tell him that one Mystere had been shot down and one damaged. After he returned to base, he was telephoned from Rahwali with the news that the wreckage of one aircraft had been found, so that his victory was confirmed. FIt Lt Aftab Alam's main reaction was astonishment that a shooting war had started at all, but he also achieved one of the world's first air victories by a Mach 2 combat aircraft.

Despite the encouraging results achieved by his outnumbered force during initial contact with the IAF, AVM Nur Khan admits to feeling 'considerable apprehension' at the magnitude of the task facing the PAF when, with his senior staff officers he attended a joint Chiefs of Staff meeting presided over by President Ayub Khan at 08.30hrs on 6 September. The President and Cabinet he recalls, were 'shattered' at the rapid escalation of hostilities, which to them was completely unexpected. The main point which emerged at this 1/2-hour meeting, so far as the PAF was concerned, was that AVM Nur Khan was given complete authority to conduct air operations as he thought fit. He informed the President that one of the earliest priorities would be to implement the long-standing plan to strike at the main IAF airfields opposite the battle areas, but also assured Pakistan Army that at least part of the PAF fighter force would be earmarked for close support operations, in addition to its main commitments.. for air defence.

Even before this meeting, which immediately preceded the Presidential announcement that a state of war existed between Pakistan and India, the PAF had begun harassing the Indian ground forces, adding to the fierce resistance they were encountering from a special Pakistan Army strike battalion on the Wagah-Lahore road. After the first section of four Sabres which had taken off at about 08.00hrs from Sargodha returned without contact with the enemy, either on the ground or in the air, six F-86Fs already airborne from Peshawar, each with eight 5-in rockets beneath their wings and scheduled for the Chhamb sector, were diverted to the Lahore front by the ACAS Ops, Air Cdre Rahim Khan.

These Sabres were from No 19 Squadron, based at Peshawar, and were being led by their squadron commander, Sqn Ldr (now Wg Cdr) S. S. Haider, universally referred to as 'Nosey' because of his magnificently patrician proboscis. 'Nosey's' pilots had been spoiling for a fight since the latter part of August, when they began flying CAPs over Kashmir, averaging three missions per day. On one occasion, on 27 August, they had made contact with four Hunters in the Akhnoor area, and had headed hopefully towards them, but the Indian aircraft turned back into their own territory and could not therefore be pursued. All that the Sabre section then saw was Indian AA fire from a heavily defended bridge near Akhnoor, blazing away frenziedly at nothing in particular.

By 1 September, 'Nosey's' pilots were feeling very frustrated at the lack of action, and their mood was not improved by the arrival in 'their' area of the two Sargodha Sabres which shot down the four IAF Vampires. Having heard that the Sargodha squadrons had subsequently started ground attack operations while his own unit was still restricted to unopposed CA Ps, 'Nosey' begged the C-in-C when he visited Peshawar on 4 September for some action. He was authorised to load up six of his 20 Sabres with Napalm, rockets and bombs, but although they were alerted for possible missions on three occasions it was not until 6 September that ground attack missions started.

In addition to eight armour-piercing 5-in rockets, each Sabre was fully armed with 1,800 rounds of ammunition for its six 0.5-in machine-guns as the six aircraft led by 'Nosey' took off from Peshawar at about 09.00hrs.

Flying along the Lahore-Amritsar road at about 1,000ft, the Sabre pilots saw tank tracks in Pakistan territory, and dived down to about 50ft to identify the armour. From their saffron roundels, the tanks were obviously Indian and unperturbed by sporadic AA fire from Atari village and from the target area, 'Nosey' methodically set about organising a text-book attack. He sent his No 5 and 6 Sabres up to 7,000ft as top cover (later reinforced by a F-I04) while the remaining four aircraft pulled up to 4-5,000ft for the standard rocket attack sequence.

In the first of about five runs which each Sabre made over the vehicle concentration, 'Nosey' sighted carefully and released four of his rockets in pairs, and saw his tank target explode into flames. As he pulled up for the next run, he saw another indian tank lift visibly off the ground as the rockets from his No 3 slammed into it. During their 15 minutes or so over the target area, most of the Sabre pilots managed to shoot up two tanks each with their rockets and a Pakistan Army observer estimated that at least 10 armoured vehicles had been destroyed by the end of the attack. Only seven were claimed by the PAF, however, plus another 20 vehicles which were machine gunned after all the rockets had been expended. It was later learned that this Indian army brigade was forming up to launch an attack across the BRB canal towards Lahore. The PAF attack achieved a vital delay which enabled PakArmy forces to move into position to block any further Indian advance.

With fuel margins perilously low, the Sabres then landed at Sargodha to top up their tanks before returning to Peshawar. After the de-briefing it was clear that this determined and carefully delivered attack had achieved a major effect on the critical situation confronting the troops of 10 Div PakArmy, facing the advancing Indian forces near the Batapur bridge. Pakistani engineers were desperately trying to demolish this bridge at the time, to slow down the Indian advance. The enemy tanks, identified as Shermans were considered by the Sabre pilots as excellent targets, with their large flat tops and open tracks, but 'Nosey' felt that Napalm (jellied petroleum) fire bombs could have done more damage. He made this recommendation to the C-in-C and the ACAS Ops shortly afterwards, and the Sargodha ground attack squadrons were promptly instructed to include Napalm among their next loads.

While the PAF was beginning its efforts to stem the Indian attack, to such good effect that the Lahore offensive had ground to a halt by about midday on 6 September, AVM Nur Khan followed up the Presidential declaration of war with an Order of the Day to his Air Force:

'Since 1 September when the PAF was called upon to go into action against the IAF in Kashmir, we have carried out all our operational commitments in a highly successful manner. This has been possible because of the magnificent way everyone in the PAF reacted to the emergency. We are now faced with a total war and are required to perform our supreme task. I am confident that we will prove equal to the cballenge and all airmen and officers, particularly the aircrew, will discharge their responsibilities with even greater devotion, dedication and determination ensuring our ultimate victory. I wish you all success and good hunting.'

Incredibly, the Indian offensive struggled on without any form of air support, and the IAF did not challenge the repeated ground attack sorties flown without loss by the PAF throughout the day up to 15.45hrs. Eleven sorties were completed from Sargodha in support of the PakArmy on the Lahore front, plus a further four in the vicinity of Jassar Bridge, striking at Indian army vehicles, troops and artillery.

The PAF was also very sensitive towards possible IAF strikes against its bases, which accounted for the 22 F-86 and 15 F-104 CAP sorties flown from Sargodha and six each from Peshawar and Mauripur on 6 September.

When the C-in-C returned from the President's office at about 1000hrs, he was again asked by the ACAS Ops, Air Cdre Rahim Khan, whether action should be taken to implement the long-established War Plan No 6 of June 1965 to neutralise selected vital elements of the IAF by strikes against their airfields. This time the answer was affirmative. The C-in-C had decided to attack the main IAF bases just before dusk, as originally planned, although not without considerable misgivings .. Looking back, AVM Nur Khan recollects the mid-morning of 6 September as the most critical and tense period of the war from his personal viewpoint, when he experienced to the full all the ultimate loneliness of command.

Militarily, the advantages of getting in the first strike were unarguable so far as the vastly outnumbered PAF was concerned, but there could be no doubt as to the effect of such a blow on the escalation of operations as a whole. The sort of questions the C-in-C had to ask himself were:

Could the PAF withstand the inevitable IAF retaliation? Could it take the risk of losing its priceless radar eyes if the vulnerable installation at Sakesar were to be put out of action? Would it not be wiser to adopt the IAF tactics of playing safe and restrict air operations so as at least to retain the PAF as a force in being?

In weighing up the situation, the C-in-C had to assume that the IAF was just as prepared to meet airfield strikes as the PAF, but was far better equipped to absorb fairly high casualties in the first few days of operations.

Although about 50% of the PAF pilots were extremely experienced, the remainder could not be counted upon except as untested youngsters, and Pakistan had no reserves whatsoever of either men or machines. Even with an aircraft loss ratio as favourable as four to one, the PAF would never be able to recover from heavy initial casualties. It would certainly be unable to provide PakArmy with the support it required. If it were to be knocked out, Pakistan would be at the mercy of the overwhelmingly more numerous units of the Indian army and air force. Even obsolete aircraft like the Vampire could then be brought back into service in support of the final land battle that might well spell the end of Pakistan.

The risks of commitment to the airfield strike plan were grave, but the consequences of inaction were potentially still more hazardous. AVM Nur Khan received no guidance from the Government for his agonized assessment of the most crucial question of the air war, but his inclination to go ahead with the strike plan was reinforced by the support he received for the proposal from his staff.

There was, in any case, little time for prolonged deliberation. With the decision taken at 11.00hrs, and the necessary time allocated to conveying the combat orders in cipher, it was not until about 13.00hrs on 6 September that the mission signals had been received by all the units concerned.

As amended by the needs of the moment, the PAF airfield strike plan was as follows:

Take-of- Base………. Commitment……….. Target
Sargodha……………… 8 F-86Fs……………….. Adampur
Sargodha……………… 8 F-86Fs……………….. Halwara
Sargodha…………….. 4 T-33s…………………. Ferozpur Radar
Sargodha…………….. 6 F-86Fs………………..Amritsar Radar
……………………………..1 RB-S7 ELiNT
Peshawar……………… 8 F-86Fs……………… Pathankot, Srinagar
Mauripur……………… 8 F-86Fs………………. Jamnagar
Mauripur…………….. 4 T-33s………………… Porbunder Radar
Mauripur…………….. 12 B-S7s……………… Jamnagar

For so complex an operation, requiring a very high degree of coordination and precise timing to achieve a simultaneous time-on-target (TOT) of 17.05hrs, a great deal of preliminary organisation was necessary despite the basic pre-planning. Another essential requirement was adequate aircraft availability, but the demands of PakArmy for air support on 6 September, plus the need for a major air defence commitment militated against both these conditions. During the early hours of 6 September, up to about midday, the Sargodha Sabres alone had flown about 40 sorties, and several of those returning from ground attack missions were temporarily out of action because of minor damage and unserviceability.

For its airfield strike commitment alone, the Sargodha wing required the preparation of 20 Sabres, including four reserves. Twelve F-86Fs from No 18 Squadron, led by Sqn Ldr 'Butch' Ahmed, plus six T-33s from Mauripur were therefore allocated to augment the Sargodha force, having previously been earmarked to attack Adampur from Risalawala. The Mauripur element had been standing by to move to Sargodha since mid-morning on the 6th but its pilots did not receive the take-off signal until about 12.50hrs, and the first eight were not airborne until 13.20hrs. The main reason for the delay was to avoid exposing too many aircraft on the already overcrowded airfield at Sargodha for too long to possible IAF attack - then considered as extremely likely.
Their supporting C-130, carrying ground crews and equipment, did not synchronise its movements with the fighter element, with the result that it was not possible even to refuel the Sabres after their arrival at Sargodha before 16.30hrs - only 35 minutes before the scheduled TOT.

To add to the serious problems being encountered at Sargodha, four of the Mauripur Sabres arrived with major defects requiring rectification. The maintenance personnel at Sargodha were already more than fully extended with refuelling and arming up the strike aircraft, replenishing their oxygen supplies and so on, and even their devoted and tireless efforts could not meet the minimal time scale confronting them. It was not until about 16.00hrs that the last Sabre landed back at Sargodha from the close support missions, and it became obvious that nowhere near the required number of aircraft would be ready in time.

At about 16.15hrs, the Sargodha station commander, Grp Capt M. Z. Masud telephoned the C-in-C at Theatre to inform him that only four F-86s were availabJe for each of three targets - Adampur, Halwara and Amritsar Radar - and suggested that the whole airfield strike operation be postponed by 24 hours. There had been no sign of the IAF that day, and the delay would give Sargodha the necessary time to prepare all the aircraft required. Furthermore, he felt that the Sargodha pilots, all of whom had already experienced a very full day, should be the ones to undertake these strikes as they had virtually lived with the enemy airfield targets for some time.

These arguments were carefully considered by the C-in-C but, in the end, the danger of the IAF being left the initiative to strike the first blow against the PAF on the ground was considered to outweigh the fact that only a fraction of the Pakistani force originally envisaged would be available for the initial attack against the Indian airfields. There was the additional factor that the Peshawar force was fully prepared and ready to go against its Pathankot primary target, and the 8-57 squadrons were standing by to follow up the fighter strikes during the night. Grp Capt Masud was therefore ordered to proceed as planned, irrespective of the numbers of aircraft available.

Even after this directive, Grp Capt Masud felt compelled to make one final telephone call to the ACAS Ops, at Air HQ, only a few minutes before 17.00hrs, when it was found that the maximum force Sargodha could produce was only eight Sabres. The station commander suggested that as this was only 50% of the required number, all eight aircraft should be despatched against a single target, instead of being split between both Adampur and Helwara. This would have represented a more viable force, in Grp Capt Masud's view, against the heavy air opposition expected around the IAF air base complexes.

Once again, however, the Sargodha station commander was overruled, with ACAS Ops' decision endorsed by the C-in-C, although fate had still not finished with the star-crossed PAF strike project.

When the eight aircraft finally started up at Sargodha, one was found to be unserviceable, and there were no reserves. It was not considered expedient to use any of the air defence Sabres that were available, since the PAF was still expecting a dusk strike on its own bases. It was with a feeling of grave misgivings that Orp Capt Masud watched only seven Sabres taxying out to take on the entire IAF strength at two major bases, in an area 'crawling with Hunters'. The final unserviceability of yet another Sabre, manned by FIt Lt Saleem, just before take-off with generator failure, in his view was sufficient reason to have concentrated the Sargodha strike force against a single airfield, but the die was already cast. Nor was this the end of the PAF's misfortunes so far as the airfield strike plan was concerned. One of the most vital features of the plan was to have been to ensure that all the participating PAF aircraft crossed the international border simultaneously, to attain the maximum element of surprise. But while the Peshawar element took off as scheduled at 16.15hrs for the 17.00hrs (TOT) at Pathankot, the problems encountered at Sargodha meant that the first three aircraft, led by Sqn Ldr Alam, did not even get airborne until 17.10hrs to attack Adampur. There was a delay of yet another 10 minutes before the second section of three Sabres followed for Halwara, led by Sqn Ldr Rafiqui. Apart from the problems of fast-fading light, the vast resulting difference in times-over-target meant that the Pathankot strike would give the Indian defences so much warning of PAF intentions, that the Sargodha element might just as well have sent the enemy a telegram telling them they were coming.

courtesy John Fricker - Battle for Pakistan