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Ahmed Rashid: "A real meltdown".

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Pakistan on the brink

Fareed Zakari interview with Ahmed Rashid, August 15th, 2011

The United States will soon begin its draw down from Afghanistan. And as that happens, greater and greater attention will be focused on next-door neighbor Pakistan. That is where much of what remains of al Qaeda's leadership lives. And it is, of course, a nuclear nation that is in terrible turmoil, filled with bombings, assassinations and what often seems like just chaos.

To talk about it all, I was joined on Sunday by the finest journalist writing in Pakistan today, Ahmed Rashid. Here's a lightly edited transcript of our interview:

Fareed Zakaria: Ahmed, the latest news out of Peshawar, this female suicide bomber wearing a veil detonates herself. Even for Pakistan this is unusual.

Ahmed Rashid: This is very unusual. We've had one or two female suicide bombers, but they've been Chechens or Central Asians. This is the first time that I know of a Pakistani woman, a young woman becoming a suicide bomber in the center of Peshawar - one of the largest cities in the country. This is very much a new development.

Fareed Zakaria: Do you look at what's going on right now and feel as though there is some kind of system in place to deal with this rising militancy? Is the army now finally mobilized? Is the political class mobilized?

Ahmed Rashid: I think, Fareed, on the country. What we've seen in the last couple of months since the killing of Osama Bin Laden is a real meltdown. The army has felt humiliated, embarrassed and demoralized to some extent. The politicians have kind of abandoned the scene and told the army, "You sort it out; this is not our problem."

There's a huge rift between the government and the army and the Americans. And that is, of course, affecting economic confidence, because we have no deal with the IMF nor the World Bank nor any of the usual big donors who should be giving money or pledging some kind of funding to Pakistan at this stage.

So there are a whole raft of issues that have arisen. which are worrying people enormously.

Fareed Zakaria: Let's talk about the rift between Pakistan and the U.S. Of course, the most recent bout of it stems from the Osama bin Laden shootings. What is the civilian government doing? What is the army doing?

Ahmed Rashid: Well, you know, first of all, this has been building up for quite some time. But the real icing on the cake has been the death of Osama bin Laden, because that is an operation carried out I think largely without Pakistani knowledge or involvement.

And the army did feel very embarrassed and humiliated. And that, of course, has created this wave of anti-Americanism, both in the public and in the army and has forced General Kayani, the Army Chief, to also show a very hard line towards the Americans. And at the moment we have a complete breakdown.

Now, in the midst of this, President Zardari has kind of abandoned the stage. We haven't seen any leadership by Zardari. For example, since bin Laden's death, he's not made a single statement on terrorism or anything like that.

Fareed Zakaria: And would it be fair to say that because of this rift in relations, the Pakistani military is not pursuing the kind of militants, the Haqqani Faction, those militants who kill Afghans and American troops and coalition troops?

Ahmed Rashid: Well, it certainly is not going to pursue it right now with this complete rift between the Pakistani military and the American military. I mean, they're barely on talking terms.

Fareed Zakaria: How do we get out of this? How do we get back to some kind of working relationship?

Ahmed Rashid: There's a huge problem here, too. And I think that problem is that there doesn't seem to be a central figure since the death of Richard Holbrooke who will deal with Pakistan? You've got Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who has been very upfront in dealing with Pakistan. But you need a senior member of the White House or the State Department to be running the policy.

And, unfortunately, it appears from Pakistan's side that the people running the policy here are at the CIA and the U.S. military. And there's no political strategy from the American side and there's no political equivalent of Holbrooke - a Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary of State - to get involved in talking to the Pakistanis.

Fareed Zakaria: So while all this is going on, the militancy in Pakistan, the fundamentalism, the jihadists seem to be thriving as the suicide bombing suggests?

Ahmed Rashid: Yes, absolutely. Remember, right off bin Laden's death, we had this attack on the naval base in Karachi in which two huge aircrafts were destroyed. That, too, was extremely embarrassing and humiliating for the military.

And secondly, how are we going to turn around this huge wave of anti-Westernism, anti- Americanism in an army, which for the last 60 years has been totally dependent on the Americans for arms, for weapons, for aid - something like $20 billion has been given in the last 10 years by the Americans, a lot of it to the military for conducting operations against the Pakistani Taliban and the extremists on the border.

Now, who's going to pay for these operations? I mean, are we in a position to pay for a billion-dollar operation over three months to chase the Pakistani Taliban? I don't think we're in a position to pay for that kind of operation.

So that is going to mean the operations will be reduced. There will be increasing use of air power, less use of manpower, and the extremists are going to be taking advantage of this.

Fareed Zakaria: So, in a strange sense, Pakistan may be getting a whole lot more unstable.

Ahmed Rashid: Well, I think what is really urgently needed is for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship to return in some shape or form as quickly as possible, and for cooperation between the CIA and the military and at the political level to resume. At the moment right now we've got a very hostile American Congress that is very anti-Pakistan.

That has to be turned around. That can only be turned around if the relationship between the Obama Administration and the Pakistan government improve.

Pakistan on the brink – Global Public Square - CNN.com Blogs
 
Ahmed Rashid (b. 1948 in Rawalpindi) is a former Pakistani revolutionary, a journalist and best-selling author of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.

Rashid attended Malvern College, England, Government College Lahore, and Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.

After graduating, Rashid spent ten years in the hills of Balochistan, western Pakistan attempting to organise an uprising against the Pakistani military dictatorships of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. He ended his guerrilla fighting days frustrated and defeated and turned his attentions to writing about his homeland.

He has been the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia Correspondent for the Daily Telegraph for more than 20 years and a correspondent for Far Eastern Economic Review. He also writes for the Wall Street Journal, The Nation, Daily Times (Pakistan) and academic journals. He appears regularly on international TV and radio networks such as CNN and BBC World.

He is a well known and vocal critic of the Bush administration in relation to the Iraq war its alleged neglect of the Taliban issue. Rashid's 2000 book, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, was a New York Times bestseller for five weeks, translated into 22 languages, and has sold 1.5 million copies since the September 11, 2001 attacks. The book was used extensively by American analysts in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

His commentary also appears in the Washington Post's PostGlobal segment.

Rashid lives in Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan with his wife and two children. His sister, Sultana Rashid is married to the Sultan of the Qu'aiti State in Hadhramaut, HRH Sultan Ghalib II bin Awadh al-Qu'aiti.

^^ Wikipedia bio of Rashid
 
I have no use for WEASELS like AHMED RASHID and NAJAM SETHI. These self promoting traitors should be put on a one way space ship and sent to outer space. :pakistan::pakistan::angry::angry::angry::angry::pakistan::pakistan:
 
By Bruce Riedel, Saturday, April 7, 1:47 AM

Five years ago, on a trip to South Asia, I asked a former Pakistani ambassador where Osama bin Laden was hiding. The ambassador replied that he would be found in a safe house built by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, near a military headquarters. I was taken aback, but the ambassador expressed complete confidence in this speculation. Clearly, Pakistanis understood their complex relationships with terror and with Washington; Americans took years to catch up.

Ahmed Rashid, one of Pakistan’s premier journalists and analysts, knows the region’s pressures better than most. He literally wrote the book on the Taliban and now has added a superb work on the future of Pakistan, a country many people deem the world’s most dangerous.“Pakistan on the Brink” depicts a nation with a severe socioeconomic crisis, and with political leadership that has neither the courage nor the will to carry out essential reforms and is building the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal on the globe. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in a state of virtual meltdown, Rashid rightly contends, with both sides to blame.

The relationship is so bad that “the United States and Pakistan are just short of going to war,” Rashid writes.

Much of the growing enmity between the two countries can be traced to the U.S. raid that killed bin Laden — and that’s where Rashid begins his tale. It did not enhance trust for the United States to discover that the al-Qaeda leader was hiding less than a mile from Pakistan’s premier military academy and had been there running his global terror network for at least five years. According to The Washington Post’s reporting on the material found in his hideout, he was in regular communication with other jihadists, including the Afghan Taliban leader, Mohammad Omar. His hideout had been built by a contracting firm often used by the ISI.

Rashid argues that there is a complex syndicate of jihadi terrorists operating today in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda gets the most attention in the United States, but it is a relatively small organization in a much larger network. Lashkar-i-Taiba, the militant Islamist terror group that attacked Mumbai in 2008, for example, has a much bigger and very overt presence in Pakistan. It routinely holds large demonstrations in Pakistan’s cities that attract tens of thousands of supporters.

Its leader, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, openly mourned bin Laden’s death last May and called for revenge on America. He and bin Laden had been close partners in terror stretching back to the 1980s, when the Saudi helped fund the creation of Lashkar-i-Taiba. The two men were in communication until the SEALs killed bin Laden in his hideout in Abbottabad, according to the materials found there.

So while al-Qaeda may be on the defensive thanks to U.S. drones and Navy SEALs, Rashid writes that its much larger allies are thriving and widening the terrain for its operations.

Pakistan is the epicenter of this jihadist syndicate, and Rashid does a great job of describing how the Pakistani army and the ISI helped build this Frankenstein’s monster over the past four decades. As he notes, the obsession of Pakistani generals with India has been the driving force behind this creation, which is increasingly out of control. But as he establishes, the army has not changed its fundamental approach of supporting jihad. We now know that the Mumbai plot, for example, was led by Lashkar-i-Taiba but funded by the ISI and inspired by al-Qaeda. The Pakistani American who helped plan the attack, David Headley, has confessed in court to how this deadly cocktail was put together.

Rashid’s focus is on how the United States has tried to defeat jihadist extremists and work with Pakistan to build stability in South Asia. President Obama embarked on a strategic engagement with Pakistan when he entered the Oval Office just months after the Mumbai massacre. There was also a new elected civilian government in Islamabad led by Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Benazir Bhutto, who was killed in an al-Qaeda plot abetted by the ISI in 2007. Zardari promised to put an end to Pakistan’s policy of taking both sides in the war on terror and to go after the jihadists.

As Rashid eloquently describes, it has not turned out that way. Zardari has never had any control of the ISI. He was clueless about bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad and out of the loop on Mumbai. The generals want to get rid of him, but he is holding on to his office in spite of their plots.

Tension has always existed between Obama’s engagement strategy and the unilateral U.S. strikes on the al-Qaeda infrastructure in Pakistan. U.S. drones that violate Pakistani sovereignty every day have created a backlash in the country, and Pakistani enmity reached a crescendo after American commandos found bin Laden. Polls show that three out of four Pakistanis opposed the raid. Pakistanis see the United States as an arrogant superpower that views their country as a killing field. Americans see Pakistan as duplicitous and dangerous. Both are right.

Rashid also highlights the strains within Obama’s camp and the infighting among his lieutenants. Dealing with Pakistan was always going to be tough, and internal bickering has made it all the harder. Rashid argues that Obama and his team bear the majority of blame for the deterioration in Pakistan because of their failure to work together, lack of clarity and contradictory statements. Much of the friction arose around the late envoy Richard Holbrooke, who Rashid says was “hated” and “snubbed” by the White House.

But he overstates the impact of the inner White House tensions. Pakistan’s problems are mostly a result of Pakistani machinations and conspiracies. The United States has often made the situation worse by backing generals over civilians, but as long as Pakistanis blame someone else for their troubles, their country will only go further toward the brink.

Obama was planning to visit Pakistan in 2011; instead, it was the year the U.S.-Pakistan relationship fell apart. The collapse occurred for many reasons, but the deadliest blow was the realization that high-value target No. 1, bin Laden, was not holed up in a cave but in a villa near a military academy, operating as the chief executive of a global terror empire. Until we know who was helping him hide in the heart of the Pakistani national security system, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will only deteriorate further.

Bruce Riedel , who recently retired after 30 years with the CIA in South Asia and the Middle East, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of the Global Jihad.”

Book review: ‘Pakistan on the Brink’ by Ahmed Rashid - The Washington Post
 
To tell bruce Reidal and Indians is to Fkkoff we don't give a damn about U liarz and evilz destroying the peace of the world.All the roots of funding for the terrorist organizations are coming from U/CIA/RAW guyz....:smokin:
 
To tell bruce Reidal and Indians is to Fkkoff we don't give a damn about U liarz and evilz destroying the peace of the world.All the roots of funding for the terrorist organizations are coming from U/CIA/RAW guyz....:smokin:

but osama bin laden has been found on ur soil and same with hafiz saeed, dawood ibrahim, behtullah masood, bla curroupt leaders, madarsas training terrorists, hypothetically fastest growing nuclear power, 2% economic growth, superfast rising population. what is world soo keen to destroy pakistan???:blink:
 
But the interesting thing is, Ahmed Rashid predicted that the Pakistan Army would fail in its Swat operations in 2009? What happened there (& there are other examples of his failed predictions)?

The role of the US in the Mumbai attacks is being underplayed as well.
 
1- Americans themselves said that they rather found ISI counterparts surprised and embarrassed when they told them about Usama's hideout. It was CIA's assessment that Pakistani military people didn't know the locality of OBL. So when the columnist says "ambassador", either he meant Haqqani or a lie cuz it makes no sense at all that what an ambassador (who is only a small outfit of administration) would know, is not know to ISI. And more importantly, not known to US. The argument doesn't make any sense.
2- Still there is no evidence against Hafiz Saeed, not presented by India nor by US. In fact, US officials got fairly embarrassed when somebody asked them that hafiz saeed's locality is known to all, why doesn't US take an action after the bounty is being announced, The official had to clarify that the money would be given to anyone who presents "evidences" to US for pursuing Hafiz Saeed. Even Indian drama of Kassab was exposed in the videoed interview when his description clearly matched that of portreyed by Indian Flims (e.g. USE of Khizab in beard, which is prohibited and only to small extent used in head. Use of bhagwan in the coversation as no muslim in Pakistan uses this word etc).
Things dont add up............
 
Everyone knows that ISI protected OBL, but handful of people choose not to believe because of hurt pride. Their problem.:lazy:
Same story is going to be repeated for hafiz saeed.
strangely, people still believe in lost cause.:blink:
 
By Bruce Riedel, Saturday, April 7, 1:47 AM

Five years ago, on a trip to South Asia, I asked a former Pakistani ambassador where Osama bin Laden was hiding. The ambassador replied that he would be found in a safe house built by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, near a military headquarters. I was taken aback, but the ambassador expressed complete confidence in this speculation. Clearly, Pakistanis understood their complex relationships with terror and with Washington; Americans took years to catch up.

Ahmed Rashid, one of Pakistan’s premier journalists and analysts, knows the region’s pressures better than most. He literally wrote the book on the Taliban and now has added a superb work on the future of Pakistan, a country many people deem the world’s most dangerous.“Pakistan on the Brink” depicts a nation with a severe socioeconomic crisis, and with political leadership that has neither the courage nor the will to carry out essential reforms and is building the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal on the globe. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is in a state of virtual meltdown, Rashid rightly contends, with both sides to blame.

The relationship is so bad that “the United States and Pakistan are just short of going to war,” Rashid writes.

Much of the growing enmity between the two countries can be traced to the U.S. raid that killed bin Laden — and that’s where Rashid begins his tale. It did not enhance trust for the United States to discover that the al-Qaeda leader was hiding less than a mile from Pakistan’s premier military academy and had been there running his global terror network for at least five years. According to The Washington Post’s reporting on the material found in his hideout, he was in regular communication with other jihadists, including the Afghan Taliban leader, Mohammad Omar. His hideout had been built by a contracting firm often used by the ISI.

Rashid argues that there is a complex syndicate of jihadi terrorists operating today in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda gets the most attention in the United States, but it is a relatively small organization in a much larger network. Lashkar-i-Taiba, the militant Islamist terror group that attacked Mumbai in 2008, for example, has a much bigger and very overt presence in Pakistan. It routinely holds large demonstrations in Pakistan’s cities that attract tens of thousands of supporters.

Its leader, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, openly mourned bin Laden’s death last May and called for revenge on America. He and bin Laden had been close partners in terror stretching back to the 1980s, when the Saudi helped fund the creation of Lashkar-i-Taiba. The two men were in communication until the SEALs killed bin Laden in his hideout in Abbottabad, according to the materials found there.

So while al-Qaeda may be on the defensive thanks to U.S. drones and Navy SEALs, Rashid writes that its much larger allies are thriving and widening the terrain for its operations.

Pakistan is the epicenter of this jihadist syndicate, and Rashid does a great job of describing how the Pakistani army and the ISI helped build this Frankenstein’s monster over the past four decades. As he notes, the obsession of Pakistani generals with India has been the driving force behind this creation, which is increasingly out of control. But as he establishes, the army has not changed its fundamental approach of supporting jihad. We now know that the Mumbai plot, for example, was led by Lashkar-i-Taiba but funded by the ISI and inspired by al-Qaeda. The Pakistani American who helped plan the attack, David Headley, has confessed in court to how this deadly cocktail was put together.

Rashid’s focus is on how the United States has tried to defeat jihadist extremists and work with Pakistan to build stability in South Asia. President Obama embarked on a strategic engagement with Pakistan when he entered the Oval Office just months after the Mumbai massacre. There was also a new elected civilian government in Islamabad led by Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Benazir Bhutto, who was killed in an al-Qaeda plot abetted by the ISI in 2007. Zardari promised to put an end to Pakistan’s policy of taking both sides in the war on terror and to go after the jihadists.

As Rashid eloquently describes, it has not turned out that way. Zardari has never had any control of the ISI. He was clueless about bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad and out of the loop on Mumbai. The generals want to get rid of him, but he is holding on to his office in spite of their plots.

Tension has always existed between Obama’s engagement strategy and the unilateral U.S. strikes on the al-Qaeda infrastructure in Pakistan. U.S. drones that violate Pakistani sovereignty every day have created a backlash in the country, and Pakistani enmity reached a crescendo after American commandos found bin Laden. Polls show that three out of four Pakistanis opposed the raid. Pakistanis see the United States as an arrogant superpower that views their country as a killing field. Americans see Pakistan as duplicitous and dangerous. Both are right.

Rashid also highlights the strains within Obama’s camp and the infighting among his lieutenants. Dealing with Pakistan was always going to be tough, and internal bickering has made it all the harder. Rashid argues that Obama and his team bear the majority of blame for the deterioration in Pakistan because of their failure to work together, lack of clarity and contradictory statements. Much of the friction arose around the late envoy Richard Holbrooke, who Rashid says was “hated” and “snubbed” by the White House.

But he overstates the impact of the inner White House tensions. Pakistan’s problems are mostly a result of Pakistani machinations and conspiracies. The United States has often made the situation worse by backing generals over civilians, but as long as Pakistanis blame someone else for their troubles, their country will only go further toward the brink.

Obama was planning to visit Pakistan in 2011; instead, it was the year the U.S.-Pakistan relationship fell apart. The collapse occurred for many reasons, but the deadliest blow was the realization that high-value target No. 1, bin Laden, was not holed up in a cave but in a villa near a military academy, operating as the chief executive of a global terror empire. Until we know who was helping him hide in the heart of the Pakistani national security system, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will only deteriorate further.

Bruce Riedel , who recently retired after 30 years with the CIA in South Asia and the Middle East, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author of “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of the Global Jihad.”

Book review: ‘Pakistan on the Brink’ by Ahmed Rashid - The Washington Post

ok ok u guys keep saying it is on the brink for years now now so when will it actually happen and go off the brink ? you guys said the same thing after bhutto assassination then when ttp took over swat then again after OBL operation nothing happened lol yet you'd think you pakistan doomsday people would be embarassed by now.
 
I didn't bother reading beyond the names Ahmed Rashid and Bruce Reidel.

Without reading a single word of the article, let me predict the main thesis:

Pak army/ISI are covertly controlling the country and are supporting Islamist extremists against India and NATO.
 
The following conversation with Rashid is actually quite interesting and he offers a, IMO, balanced approach towards resolving the problems in the region, and is critical of both the US and Pakistani policies in the region so far.

Some key points from the video:

1. There needs to be a political settlement in Afghanistan and power sharing between the Afghan Taliban and other groups

2. The US needs to speed up the process of talks and develop the will to make some concessions and reduce military operations on its side in exchange for reduced violence from the Taliban

3. The US approach so far has been fragmented, confused and short term

4. The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are distinct and separate entities, with the PT enhancing links with AQ and associated groups, while the AT are distancing themselves from AQ

5. The PT derive their influence and raison d etre from the US presence in Afghanistan, and a political settlement in Afghanistan with the Taliban would go a long way in undermining the Pakistani Taliban

U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Date: March 19, 2012 from 7:30 PM to 8:30 PM
Location: The Italian Academy, 1161 Amsterdam Avenue
This World Leaders Forum program, titled "U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan," will feature a conversation between Ahmed Rashid, Pakistani journalist and author, and Steve Coll, staff writer for The New Yorker and President, New America Foundation, followed by a question and answer session with the audience. Opening remarks will be made by Bill Grueskin, Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Professional Practice, Columbia School of Journalism.


U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan | Columbia University World Leaders Forum

World Leaders Forum: U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan - YouTube
 
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