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Afghan choices
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi
November 03, 2010
The endgame for the current Afghanistan crisis is supposedly approaching or is already underway. Some Taliban leaders have already been flown by Nato to Kabul for talks. Holbrooke has cautioned, however, that these are not negotiations yet, only preliminary contacts. Gen Petraeus claims the force inputs required for his counterinsurgency surge have only now begun to be put in place to degrade, divide and "soften up" the Taliban for the negotiating table. By the time of the next US review of its ****** policy in December he hopes the tide will have turned against the Taliban, forcing them into a much more pragmatic state of mind. Petraeus admits he has to be able to say his policy is working by then.
The Taliban have indicated they will not be amenable to such an approach. So too have the Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups. Pakistan has signalled the indispensability of its participation for any Afghan peace process to get off the ground. It has underlined the fact that counterinsurgency cannot succeed without its cooperation. The US acknowledges this, but also insists that Pakistan can only participate as a real partner. This requires it to take on the Haqqani and Al-Qaeda groups in North Waziristan, permit expanded covert CIA capture/kill operations on its territory, and overcome its "obsession" with India's presence in Afghanistan. The US suspects the Pakistan military has little interest in enabling the success of Petraeus on these terms.
The recent stand-off between the two countries illustrates a contest of wills. Petraeus signalled he would take an increasingly aggressive stance to compel Pakistani compliance if he sees US soldiers dying because of assistance Pakistan renders to the resistance in Afghanistan through the provision of critical safe havens and training camps as well as rest, recuperation, re-supply and recruitment opportunities. Pakistan responded ambiguously.
It reacted furiously and closed down the main supply route for supply convoys for US forces in Afghanistan for ten days and extracted an "apology" from the US. But it kept open the Chaman supply route and did nothing to interrupt US drone and other operations from bases on its territory. Moreover, the ten-day interruption did not affect US military operations in Afghanistan, and normal supply operations were resumed much before any real impact could develop. The US conveyed its message.
Subsequently, during the recent strategic dialogue the US announced an extension of the FMF (Foreign Military Financing) programme for another five years with a 30-per-cent increase subject to Congressional approval. The caveat of denying assistance to military units allegedly involved in human rights violations is pure chutzpah, given Wikileaks' revelations of systematic human rights abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were deliberately and illegally overlooked by the US military command. Although Obama has made clear he has no intention of assisting the Pakistani military against India, the Indians fret about the possibility that an increased conventional capability for Pakistan could call into question their threat "to go crazy" if another Mumbai were to happen and be traced back to Pakistan.
Obama reiterated his warning of a "retribution plan" to take out all the estimated 150 training camps for the militants in FATA should another New York-like incident occur that is traced to Pakistan. So while the US has provided Pakistan security assurances in minor key an India-US "nutcracker" threat remains the major key defining the parameters within which Pakistan has to work out its Afghan options and strategies.
What do we want in Afghanistan? We have ready formulations but no clear vision and strategy. We say we need a friendly and stable Afghanistan. But what do we mean by that? A pliant Afghanistan or a well disposed Afghanistan? Some say this means an Afghanistan that does not have much truck with India. Otherwise, we could face a nutcracker situation. But the nutcracker situation already exists on a much larger scale.
Moreover, despite differences over Pakhtunistan, etc., when has Afghanistan ever threatened us during periods of tension or conflict with India? Afghans pride themselves on having resisted "Big Brothers" since much before they even became a country. They seem to passionately believe in the Persian proverb: Sag bash, biradar-e-khurd mabash. (Be a dog, if you please, but don't be a younger brother.) Our Afghanistan policymakers just do not know how to hit the right note with our Afghan brethren.
We need to address Afghan concerns and perceptions. If, instead, we reject them as mistaken or hostile we will leave the field open to countries that are indeed unfriendly to Pakistan. This does not mean we have no legitimate concerns that require discussion. It only means they are best taken up within a context of improved Afghan perceptions about our policies.
Our Taliban experience should have taught us something. They were able to dominate Afghanistan only because of Pakistani support. They were seen in Afghanistan as Pakistani proxies. Their governance alienated Afghan opinion and turned it against Pakistan. India was guaranteed that any post-Taliban government would be anti-Pakistan and pro-India. This was a major strategic defeat for which our faceless policymakers were responsible. In trying to impose "strategic depth" we only made it available to our adversary. A stable and independent Afghanistan that has no fear of Pakistan (which is different from having no differences) is the best "strategic depth" we can ask for.
America's war in Afghanistan now Obama's war is in its tenth year. Obama says he wants to begin to thin out his combat forces and to hand over security responsibilities to the Afghans from July 2011 and to complete the process by 2014, which is unlikely.
However, in aid of this objective he has intensified and expanded the war into Pakistan. Obama's advisers see the "cancer" of terrorism as primarily located in Pakistan, which is accordingly the main battlefield in the war against it. Gen Petraeus believes counterinsurgency has to be a long war to be successful. But Obama, reading the polls, does not want to go to the American people in 2012 for a second term with more troops in Afghanistan than he inherited.
Americans fear that the Taliban informed and abetted by Pakistan will decide to wait it out until the political situation in the US lends an irreversible momentum to their troop withdrawals. Accordingly, Petraeus wants to degrade the resistance capability of the Taliban as quickly as possible. This is where the US sees the Pakistani military as an indispensable partner and, simultaneously, a "dishonest partner" that is "living a lie" by playing both sides of the fence. By increasing the costs of such "double dealing" the US wants to change its "calculus."
The Americans realise this will require helping Pakistan overcome its "obsession" with India. They also realise this is almost impossible as far as the Pakistani military is concerned, since India is its bread and butter and is "in its DNA." Moreover, the military is seen as the only "can-do" institution in Pakistan that is ready and able to do America's bidding at a price, a price that America, incidentally, is determined not to pay in full. So, in return, the Pakistani military remains determined not to play in full either the role assigned it by the US.
But this is not a contest between equals. The US has many more options than Pakistan especially a misgoverned, fragile and dependent Pakistan that lacks the will to be healthy and sustainable. For the US, the dysfunctional state of Pakistan underlines more than ever the strategic importance of its relationship with India.
What is the solution? Briefly, realise our strategic potential by rationalising our domestic, Afghan and India policies. If the military is the problem, it has to become the solution and not by taking over. Yes, it can fulfil its responsibility to the nation without threatening the democratic process.
Ashraf Jehangir Qazi
November 03, 2010
The endgame for the current Afghanistan crisis is supposedly approaching or is already underway. Some Taliban leaders have already been flown by Nato to Kabul for talks. Holbrooke has cautioned, however, that these are not negotiations yet, only preliminary contacts. Gen Petraeus claims the force inputs required for his counterinsurgency surge have only now begun to be put in place to degrade, divide and "soften up" the Taliban for the negotiating table. By the time of the next US review of its ****** policy in December he hopes the tide will have turned against the Taliban, forcing them into a much more pragmatic state of mind. Petraeus admits he has to be able to say his policy is working by then.
The Taliban have indicated they will not be amenable to such an approach. So too have the Haqqani and Hekmatyar groups. Pakistan has signalled the indispensability of its participation for any Afghan peace process to get off the ground. It has underlined the fact that counterinsurgency cannot succeed without its cooperation. The US acknowledges this, but also insists that Pakistan can only participate as a real partner. This requires it to take on the Haqqani and Al-Qaeda groups in North Waziristan, permit expanded covert CIA capture/kill operations on its territory, and overcome its "obsession" with India's presence in Afghanistan. The US suspects the Pakistan military has little interest in enabling the success of Petraeus on these terms.
The recent stand-off between the two countries illustrates a contest of wills. Petraeus signalled he would take an increasingly aggressive stance to compel Pakistani compliance if he sees US soldiers dying because of assistance Pakistan renders to the resistance in Afghanistan through the provision of critical safe havens and training camps as well as rest, recuperation, re-supply and recruitment opportunities. Pakistan responded ambiguously.
It reacted furiously and closed down the main supply route for supply convoys for US forces in Afghanistan for ten days and extracted an "apology" from the US. But it kept open the Chaman supply route and did nothing to interrupt US drone and other operations from bases on its territory. Moreover, the ten-day interruption did not affect US military operations in Afghanistan, and normal supply operations were resumed much before any real impact could develop. The US conveyed its message.
Subsequently, during the recent strategic dialogue the US announced an extension of the FMF (Foreign Military Financing) programme for another five years with a 30-per-cent increase subject to Congressional approval. The caveat of denying assistance to military units allegedly involved in human rights violations is pure chutzpah, given Wikileaks' revelations of systematic human rights abuses in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were deliberately and illegally overlooked by the US military command. Although Obama has made clear he has no intention of assisting the Pakistani military against India, the Indians fret about the possibility that an increased conventional capability for Pakistan could call into question their threat "to go crazy" if another Mumbai were to happen and be traced back to Pakistan.
Obama reiterated his warning of a "retribution plan" to take out all the estimated 150 training camps for the militants in FATA should another New York-like incident occur that is traced to Pakistan. So while the US has provided Pakistan security assurances in minor key an India-US "nutcracker" threat remains the major key defining the parameters within which Pakistan has to work out its Afghan options and strategies.
What do we want in Afghanistan? We have ready formulations but no clear vision and strategy. We say we need a friendly and stable Afghanistan. But what do we mean by that? A pliant Afghanistan or a well disposed Afghanistan? Some say this means an Afghanistan that does not have much truck with India. Otherwise, we could face a nutcracker situation. But the nutcracker situation already exists on a much larger scale.
Moreover, despite differences over Pakhtunistan, etc., when has Afghanistan ever threatened us during periods of tension or conflict with India? Afghans pride themselves on having resisted "Big Brothers" since much before they even became a country. They seem to passionately believe in the Persian proverb: Sag bash, biradar-e-khurd mabash. (Be a dog, if you please, but don't be a younger brother.) Our Afghanistan policymakers just do not know how to hit the right note with our Afghan brethren.
We need to address Afghan concerns and perceptions. If, instead, we reject them as mistaken or hostile we will leave the field open to countries that are indeed unfriendly to Pakistan. This does not mean we have no legitimate concerns that require discussion. It only means they are best taken up within a context of improved Afghan perceptions about our policies.
Our Taliban experience should have taught us something. They were able to dominate Afghanistan only because of Pakistani support. They were seen in Afghanistan as Pakistani proxies. Their governance alienated Afghan opinion and turned it against Pakistan. India was guaranteed that any post-Taliban government would be anti-Pakistan and pro-India. This was a major strategic defeat for which our faceless policymakers were responsible. In trying to impose "strategic depth" we only made it available to our adversary. A stable and independent Afghanistan that has no fear of Pakistan (which is different from having no differences) is the best "strategic depth" we can ask for.
America's war in Afghanistan now Obama's war is in its tenth year. Obama says he wants to begin to thin out his combat forces and to hand over security responsibilities to the Afghans from July 2011 and to complete the process by 2014, which is unlikely.
However, in aid of this objective he has intensified and expanded the war into Pakistan. Obama's advisers see the "cancer" of terrorism as primarily located in Pakistan, which is accordingly the main battlefield in the war against it. Gen Petraeus believes counterinsurgency has to be a long war to be successful. But Obama, reading the polls, does not want to go to the American people in 2012 for a second term with more troops in Afghanistan than he inherited.
Americans fear that the Taliban informed and abetted by Pakistan will decide to wait it out until the political situation in the US lends an irreversible momentum to their troop withdrawals. Accordingly, Petraeus wants to degrade the resistance capability of the Taliban as quickly as possible. This is where the US sees the Pakistani military as an indispensable partner and, simultaneously, a "dishonest partner" that is "living a lie" by playing both sides of the fence. By increasing the costs of such "double dealing" the US wants to change its "calculus."
The Americans realise this will require helping Pakistan overcome its "obsession" with India. They also realise this is almost impossible as far as the Pakistani military is concerned, since India is its bread and butter and is "in its DNA." Moreover, the military is seen as the only "can-do" institution in Pakistan that is ready and able to do America's bidding at a price, a price that America, incidentally, is determined not to pay in full. So, in return, the Pakistani military remains determined not to play in full either the role assigned it by the US.
But this is not a contest between equals. The US has many more options than Pakistan especially a misgoverned, fragile and dependent Pakistan that lacks the will to be healthy and sustainable. For the US, the dysfunctional state of Pakistan underlines more than ever the strategic importance of its relationship with India.
What is the solution? Briefly, realise our strategic potential by rationalising our domestic, Afghan and India policies. If the military is the problem, it has to become the solution and not by taking over. Yes, it can fulfil its responsibility to the nation without threatening the democratic process.
