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Aerospace Industry Cooperation Between Ukraine and China
Moscow Defense Brief

China was the fourth country to sign a cooperation agreement with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and an intergovernmental agreement on defense industry cooperation after the republic declared independence. The two documents were signed in April 1994; seven years later Kiev and Beijing signed a protocol containing amendments to the agreements. In November 2000 the two countries also concluded an agreement on mutual protection of secret information.

During the 4th session of the Intergovernmental Commission held in Beijing in May 2008 Chinese representatives said that bilateral defense industry cooperation had attained a level which warranted stronger confidentiality arrangements. Previously, the bilateral conference headlined “Aerospace Industry Cooperation Between Ukraine and China: Problems and New Approaches”, which was held during the Aviation Expo China 2007 exhibition, was by invitation only, and off limits to the general public.

During the 5th session of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Chinese Coordination Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation, held in Kiev on August 12-14, 2009, the two sides reiterated once again that defense industry cooperation between them was of a confidential nature. They vowed to take all necessary measures to protect information about that cooperation, and agreed that neither side would disclose any such information to the mass media or to third countries without prior consent from the other. This is why reports about Ukrainian-Chinese defense industry cooperation are few and far between; in addition, they are often contradictory.

Nevertheless, according to Ukrainian officials, the Chinese military-political leadership regards Ukraine as one of its key foreign partners, with an important role to play in rearming the Chinese forces with the latest weaponry and military hardware. In addition, the Chinese have demonstrated strong interest in exchanging the results of R&D in high-tech areas; they are also keen to train their specialists in Ukrainian universities and specialist schools.

According to Chinese sources, more than 100 Ukrainian-Chinese projects had been completed as of May 2008, and the overall value of bilateral defense industry cooperation deals had reached 1bn dollars. Several large contracts worth a total of up to 800m dollars were signed in 2008-2010. One of them is a contract for aircraft engines made by Motor Sich (TV3-117VM, AI-25TLK, and AI-222K-25/25F types). Under the terms of another deal, specialists from ANTK Antonov are involved in designing a heavy transport for the Chinese Air Force and launching its mass production. The 5th session of the Intergovernmental Commission held in August 2009 in Kiev also agreed to pursue the following important projects:

Supplying radars, radio-electronic warfare technology, communication systems and radio-technical reconnaissance instruments

Refurbishing aircraft, engines and components, including Mi-8/171 helicopters, and Su-27 and Su-30 fighters

Comprehensive training of Chinese engineers and technicians in repairing aerospace hardware

Various equipment for attack and naval aviation helicopters; helicopter protection systems

Sales, repair and upgrade of air-to-air missiles and anti-tank guided missiles

Supply of spare parts for radars used on Su-27/30 aircraft


The Ukrainian partner in most of these projects is the state-owned company Ukroboronservis, a subsidiary of Ukrspetsexport; up until the mid-2000s the company was regarded as the main Ukrainian contractor for all Chinese projects.

Another company with a strong involvement in Ukrainian-Chinese aerospace industry cooperation is Antonov. Its executives have stressed on several occasions that aerospace industry cooperation between the two countries goes back 50 years. It began in 1959, when specialists of what was then the OKB-153 design bureau were helping the Chinese to launch production of the An-2 aircraft under Soviet license. Thousands of these light transports have been built in China, where they remain in production to this day (unlike in all the former Soviet republics). It was perhaps symbolic that the first deal signed between the two countries at the Air Show China’2000 exhibition was an agreement on upgrading the Y-5 (the Chinese version of the An-2), concluded with Shijiazhuang Aerospace Corporation. Another deal, signed with Shaanxi Aerospace Corporation, was to set up an after-sale service and maintenance center in China for the An-12 and Y-8 aircraft. The contract also included designer supervision and upgrade of the Chinese fleet of these aircraft. It was also revealed that back in the 1990s ANTK Antonov had fulfilled two contracts with the Shanghai Aviation University to research the aerodynamic characteristics of new passenger aircraft being designed by the Chinese. During the exhibition itself the two sides signed a new contract to conduct joint aerodynamic testing of a future regional turbojet aircraft.

Ukrainian-Chinese aerospace industry cooperation therefore entered the new century on a high note.

Cooperation between Antonov and Chinese companies

The ARJ21 regional passenger aircraft (joint project with AVIC-I)


On April 30, 2002 ANTK and AVIC-I signed a contract for joint development of the wing for the ARJ21-700 regional jet program. Work under the contract was conducted in 2002-2007. ANTK has fully delivered on its side of the deal. The rollout of the ARJ21-700 aircraft took place in December 2007. ANTK then offered its services in upgrading the ARJ21-900 plane, but the Chinese declined.

The Y-8F600 transport aircraft (joint project with AVIC-II)

In June 2002 ANTK and Shaanxi Aircraft Industry (Group) Co, Ltd (SAC, an AVIC-II subsidiary) signed a contract for joint development of the Y-8F600 aircraft. Work under the contract was conducted in 2002-2007. In September 2007 the two sides signed another contract “for the assessment of upgrade options for the Y-8F600 aircraft”. In February 2008 Ukrainian executives held talks with AVIC-II president, Zhang Hongbiao. The two sides signed a protocol of the working meeting, and agreed to continue cooperation on developing an upgraded aircraft.

The Y-9 medium transport (replacement for the Y-8F600)

Upon completion of the contract for the assessment of upgrade options for the Y-8F600, ANTK approached AVIC-II with an offer of cooperation in conducting the actual upgrade. AVIC-II president Zhang Hongbiao accepted that offer on a preliminary basis. At an exhibition in Zhuhai in 2008 representatives of the united AVIC corporation announced their intention to develop a new medium transport, the Y-9, and to involve ANTK in the project.

Heavy transport aircraft (joint project with AVIC-I and AVIC-II)

On December 18, 2003 ANTK and SAC signed an agreement on joint development of a heavy transport aircraft (HTA). In 2003-2007 there were several events held in the framework of cooperation between ANTK and AVIC-II under the HTA program. AVIC-II proposed the idea of using the An-70 design as the starting point for the HTA. In May 2007 the Chinese side informed its Ukrainian partners that the government in Beijing had designated AVIC-I as the lead developer for the program. In 2008 ANTK and AVIC-I held talks about the terms of the Ukrainian company’s participation in that program; the contract was signed in August 2008. In August 2009 the design phase of the program was completed. The two sides signed a contract for the assessment of the comprehensive technical design of the YX transport. Assembly of the first prototype began that same year. The first test flight of the Y-20 was held on January 26, 2013.

The An-26 and An-30 aircraft previously supplied to China (joint projects with the PLA Main Armaments Directorate, China TALY, and Lingyun Science & Technology Group Co)

In 2001-2004 Ukrainian and Chinese partners signed an agreement on restoring eight An-26 aircraft to flight worthiness. ANTK offered its services in restoring the flight worthiness of the Chinese fleet of these aircraft, but Beijing put the program on hold, citing lack of funds. As of today, ANTK and China’s Lingyun Science & Technology Group intend to continue their cooperation.

China’s Lingyun Science & Technology Group approached ANTK with an offer of cooperation in restoring the Chinese fleet of An-26 and An-30 (operated by the PLA) to flight worthiness. ANTK then prepared a technical and commercial offer on upgrading those planes; the company wanted a share of the subcontracts. In 2006 Aviant Aircraft Plant, which has since been renamed the Antonov Aviation Plant, continued to supply An-26 parts and components to China Taly Aviation Technologies Corp.

MA700 turboprop passenger aircraft

In November 2006 ANTK and AVIC-I held preliminary talks about cooperation in modernizing the Y-7 passenger aircraft; the talks concluded with the signing of a protocol. In August 2007 the two sides signed a memorandum on joint development of a new passenger aircraft, the MA700, to replace the Y-7. Since then, China has ended cooperation with ANTK under that program.

On the whole, Antonov has made a significant contribution to the development of China’s aerospace industry; its importance is comparable to the contribution made by Russia’s Sukhoi, Kamov, Mil, and Yakovlev. Western companies – including American, Israeli and Brazilian corporations – have also played a role. Finally, the Chinese themselves deserve credit. Almost all of the new Chinese planes and helicopters which took to the air in recent years were launched independently, with minimal involvement of foreign partners at the very early phases of R&D.

Cooperation in aircraft engine making

Ukraine’s Ivchenko-Progress and Motor Sich have maintained cooperation with Chinese partners since the mid-1950s, when China launched production under Soviet license of the AI-20 and AI-24 turboprop engines of various modifications used on the An-12/24/26 aircraft. That cooperation eventually led to the signing in December 2008 of new contracts for the AI-25TLK turbofan engines for the K-8 (JL-8) jet trainer aircraft, and for 63 TV3-117VM turboshaft engines used on Mi-171 helicopters. The Ukrainian companies are also providing designer supervision for the AI-222K-25 turbofan engines, which are used in the flight testing of the new L-15 jet trainer. Under another contrat signed in December 2005, Ukrainian companies supply AI-222K-25 and AI-222K-25F engines and components for the L-15 plane.

In October 2006 Ukraine’s ZMKB Progress provided its Chinese partners with a set of technical documents, worth 520,000 dollars, for a project to adapt the AI-222K-25 engines. In early 2007 China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC) received from Progress the first batch of four AI-222K-25 engines, worth 1.1m dollars apiece.1

According to Igor Kravchenko, chief designer of Ivchenko-Progress, the next product to be supplied to the Chinese was the AI-222K-25F engine. “As part of that project we have developed a new boost engine technology,” Ivchenko said. “In early summer 2009 we and our partners shipped the first batch of the engines to the customer. The pace of the program suits us very well. Before they began to use the AI-25TLK engines on the JL-8 trainer, there were five or six years of negotiations. It all depends on the requirements of the Chinese customer.” Kravchenko added that China had bought a total of nine AI-222K-25F engines, and signed a contract for another 40.2

The first 10 mass-produced AI-222K-25 turbofan turbojet engines with jet pipes and with a maximum thrust of 24.5 kN (2,500 kgf) were delivered to AVIC International Holding Corp. by Motor Sich in two batches of five, in May and July 2012. The unit price was 1.765m dollars.3 It appears that the engines will be upgraded to AI-222K-25F specification in China, because that is the specification stated by Ukrainian sources which wrote about the deal at the time. The AI-222K-25F model (used on the L-15 supersonic combat trainer) has a maximum thrust of 4,200 kgf in boost mode.

An even more successful product developed by the Ukrainian engine makers is a modified AI-25TL turbofan engine, which entered production in Zaporizhzhya back in the late 1960s.

The JL-8 (the base modification in China) and the K-8 (the export version) were designed as multirole combat trainers which delivered excellent value for money and were very cheap to run. The planes can be equipped with different engines, depending on the modification. In June 1998 the Chinese Air Force took delivery of the first six JL-8 trainers, which were equipped with the Ukrainian-made AI-25TLK engines. The L-11 is an upgraded version of the JL-8 equipped with a Chinese-made copy of the AI-25TLK (designated in China as the WS-11). It was only in March 2003 that the engine passed final certification, but several sources claim that the WS-11 is no longer being used on new aircraft. As of late 2012 the Chinese Air Force and the Chinese Navy operated more than 250 JL-8 aircraft, with another 200 on order.

The K-8 is the basic export version of the trainer. The aircraft supplied to foreign customers who are not under U.S. export restrictions – such as Egypt (K-8E) or Pakistan (K-8P) – are equipped with the Garrett (Honeywell) TFE731-2A turbofan engines. Other customers are offered a version of the aircraft equipped with the Ukrainian-made AI-25TLK engine. As of late 2012, such aircraft were in service with the air forces of Sudan (six K-8S), Bolivia (six K-8VB), and Venezuela (16 K-8W, with another two aircraft already lost). In the case of “problem” customers it makes a lot of sense for China to buy engines from Ukraine so as to ensure uninterrupted exports.

The AI-25TLK sales figures for 2012 have yet to be released. But in any event, based on the numbers supplied to foreign customers so far (about 270), this model is an undisputed leader in Ukrainian exports of aircraft engines.

The supplier has put in place a flexible logistical system whereby faulty engines are sent by the customer to Motor Sich, which performs the necessary repairs and returns them to China. That was the mechanism used in late 2012 for one of the AI-25TLK engine operated by Bolivia. The whole operation took only six months to complete, which is lightning-fast by post-Soviet standards.

In March 2008 the two sides signed a new contract to build an AI-25TLK engine repair facility in China; the deal entered into force the following November. The repair facility was set up by Motor Sich and China’s Tianli corporation at an aircraft repair plant in Xiangfan, Hubei Province. The overall value of the 15-year contract is about 50m dollars. It is thought to be the first of a whole package of licensing deals which include supplies of spare parts and the training of Chinese specialists.

According to Vladimir Shirkov, head of marketing at Motor Sich, the Chinese engine service and maintenance market is very promising because more than 1,000 Ukrainian-made engines are currently in service on Chinese aircraft.

Cooperation on Kh-55 missiles and missile engines

An embarrassing scandal broke out some years ago over the contraband of six Kh-55 (AS-15) long-range cruise missiles from Ukraine to China in April 2000. The missiles were supplied in breach of the international Missile Technology Control Regime, which Ukraine signed up to back in 1998. The shipment was made using a fictitious contract between Russia’s Rosvooruzhenie and Ukraine’s Progress, a foreign trading subsidiary of Ukrspetsexport, for 20 Kh-55 cruise missiles, and a forged end-user certificate purportedly issued by the Russian MoD. Another 12 Kh-55 missiles were shipped in 2001 to Iran. Several people involved in the scandal later died under suspicious circumstances.

China has never recognized that the missiles have ended up on its territory. But in 2003-2004 China’s CATIC bought six fully equipped MS-400 small turbofan engines (matching the number of missiles reportedly supplied to China), loaded with fuel and lubricant, along with GTT-MS-400 solid-fuel generators, for 145,000 dollars apiece.4 The MS-400 (also known as R95-300, R95TM-300, and Product 95) is a compact turbofan engine developed by Moscow-based NPO Soyuz. The engine is still in mass production at Motor Sich; it is used as the main engine of the Kh-55 cruise missile. In 2007 Poly Technologies Inc imported another three of these engines, paying 181,500 dollars apiece.5 Other items supplied to China included special containers, sets of spare parts, logbooks, user manuals, and electronic control systems, including Part 7815, Part BVPR-4S, and the GTT-MS-400 solid-fuel generators. The Ukrainian supplier of all these items was Motor Sich. The official claim was that the engines were bought for future Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles.

Cooperation on Il-76/78 aircraft

Ukraine is known to have exported to China two Il-76MD jet transport aircraft which were previously assigned to the Soviet 37th Transport Aviation Regiment (Artsiz). The planes were made in 1984, and in the early 1990s they were operated by private companies on commercial routes.6 The two Il-76MDs have made a contribution to China’s Project 998, a program to develop an indigenous AWACS aircraft. In 1997 Russia, Israel and China signed a contract on joint development and manufacture of the AI (A-50I) AWACS plane, to be supplied to the Chinese air force. But after coming under pressure from Washington, in the summer of 2000 Israel suspended its participation in the program. In 2001 Israel officially informed Beijing that it was pulling out of the deal.

China did not have any other readily available options for building AWACS systems. It was therefore decided to refit the Il-76MD transports bought in the 1990s into AWACS planes. But the Chinese did not have a sufficient number of them; they could not use the existing fleet of 10 Il-76MD transports operated by the Chinese Air Force because that would weaken the force’s transport capability. Buying a new aircraft was not an option because mass production of the model had already ended. That is why Beijing used one of the Il-76MDs bought in Ukraine for static testing, and the other (which had just been refurbished by the manufacturer) was refitted into a flying laboratory to test various AWACS components. As a result, China was able to conduct the necessary R&D without weakening its heavy transport fleet.

Also, in 2011-2012 Ukrspetsexport signed and began to fulfill two Chinese contracts, worth a total of 95.5m dollars, for three Il-78 tanker aircraft and five Il-76MD transports from the Ukrainian MoD surplus. The deal became possible after the Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Production Company proved unable to fulfill a Chinese contract for 34 Il-76MDs and four Il-78 tankers signed of the Rosoboronexport in September 2005.

The Nikolaev Aircraft Repair Plant (NARP) is currently conducting pre-sale repairs and refurbishment of two Il-78 aircraft (manufacturer numbers 0063465958 and 0073478359). The first of the two planes is due to be delivered to China later this year. Ukrainian-Chinese cooperation in the aerial refueling tanker segment began back in 2007, when China Taly Aviation Technologies Corp. bought at least six UPAZ-1 standard aerial refueling pods, worth 270,000 dollars apiece.

In previous years, the same Ukrainian company supplied China’s Lingyun corporation with spare parts, instruments and finished products for Il-76/78 aircraft, in addition to control and testing instrumentation and ground service hardware for those planes.

NARP has also provided assistance to the Chinese with repairs and maintenance of the aircraft’s engines. Almost every year AVIC buys from the Ukrainian company various spare parts and special components for the D-30KP Series 2 turbofan engines used on the Il-76/78 aircraft, including turbine blades and compressors. Ukrspetsexport and its subsidiaries act as intermediaries in all these contracts; each individual deal is not large, but their combined value has reached several million dollars.

Some of the exports to China were not channeled via intermediaries. For example, China Taly Aviation Technologies Corporation bought spare parts for engines used on “Tu-154M civil aviation aircraft” directly from Kiev-based ANVP Avialuks repair plant in 2011. In fact, all Chinese Tu-154Ms are in service with the Chinese Air Force; some of them are being used as ELINT reconnaissance planes. Furthermore, most of the components of the D-30KU-154 turbofan engine used on the Tu-154s are interchangeable with components of engines used on the Il-76MD transports.

Carrier-based aircraft

There is a widely held view that the first Ukrainian carrier-based plane sold to China was the T-10K-7 aircraft (serial number 03-02), bought in 2004. That was the missing aircraft component of the Project 11436 Varyag heavy aircraft carrying cruiser, which the Chinese bought in 1999. After the cruiser was delivered to China, the plane was initially left sitting at the Kyrovskoe airfield in Ukraine. In actual fact, however, the first carrier-based plane delivered by Ukraine to the Chinese was the T-10-3 (serial number 01-01), the first such aircraft assembled by KnAAPO. The plane underwent a series of tests at the NITKA aircraft carrier deck simulator (Saki airfield) and was left there because it could not make the flight back to Russia. In the mid-1990s the Ukrainian MoD scrapped the aircraft and cut it to pieces (which proved to be a big mistake later on) before eventually selling the pieces to China.

The plane was used to test various engineering solutions for carrier take-off and landing, including the design of the wing, the reinforced chassis, the landing hook, etc. Buying that aircraft was an excellent way to study the Sukhoi design bureau’s R&D process during the development of a carrier-based fighter. The plane was sold to the Chinese in early 2001, when the Varyag was still sitting in Mykolayiv, awaiting Turkey’s permission to make the passage through the Bosporus. Back at the time, officials insisted that the ship would never again be used in its original role as an aircraft carrier. But the purchase of the T-10-3 (for which China paid a ridiculously low price) was a clear indication of Beijing’s motives for buying the Varyag.

The last carrier-based aircraft supplied by Ukraine to China was an Su-25UTG, a trainer model used for practicing landing on a carrier deck. The plane was delivered in 2007. Previously, in 2006 the Ukrainian Institute of Information Registration supplied Beijing Great Gate Guang Cheng Marine Machinery Suppliers Co. with a set of documents drawn up in accordance with “Technical requirements for the development of structural and functional schemes of an aircraft complex command system”. The deal, which was channeled via the Spetstekhnoexport intermediary, was worth 100,000 dollars.

Thanks to these acquisitions, Chinese specialists obtained access to physical samples of two out of three types of Soviet carrier-based aircraft, plus reams of technical documents. Undoubtedly, this sped up the development of indigenous Chinese models as part of the country’s carrier-based aviation program.

Ukraine has also provided China with substantial assistance related to other modifications of the Su-27/30 aircraft. The leading role here was played by the Zaporizhzhia-based MiGremont. Over several years of cooperation with China Taly Aviation Technologies Corporation, the company has provided the Chinese with all the technical documentation, on electronic media as well as on paper, related to repairs and maintenance of the hull, instruments and components of Su-27 and Su-27UB planes. It has also supplied control and testing instruments and ground maintenance hardware, including the Diana 9 automated diagnostics system (MiGremont’s own original design) worth 150,000 dollars.

The state-owned Motor Repair Plant, based in Lutsk, provided similar services to CATIC. It sold the Chinese technical documents (on paper medium) related to the repairs of AL-31F turbofan engines and engine components used on the Su-27 planes. A Chinese aircraft repair plant in Chengdu obtained from Ukraine manuals for various instruments used for the repair of such AL-31F engine components as Product NR-31V and Product RSF-31V. While they still had the chance, the Chinese also got hold of operation and repair manuals for components of the RD-33 Series 2 turbofan engines used on the MiG-29s; China’s own Air Force does not operate such aircraft, but neighboring India does. That purchase pursued goals other than pure research or analysis of the potential adversary’s weapons. The Russian RD-93 turbofan engine, which is used on the Chinese-Pakistani RC-1 (JF-17) fighters, is a modification of the RD-33. There is little doubt that Chinese designers and engineers have made good use of whatever they have learnt from that engine.

The Kharkiv-based FED research and production company has been working closely with China since the late 1990s. It is a leading supplier of fuel metering systems and hydraulic equipment. It has fulfilled dozens of Chinese contracts over the years; those were mainly related to components of the Su-27 and Su-30MKK aircraft operated by the Chinese Air Force, as well as components for Mi-17 helicopters (including hundreds of NR-3 regulator pumps of various modifications). In 2008 alone, the Beijing-based China Qing An International Trading (Group) Co. Ltd bought about a hundred of NP-96M pumps manufactured by Dnipropetrovsk Machinery Plant, worth 15,000 dollars apiece. The pumps are used on Su-27 aircraft.

Indeed, FED’s cooperation with China has become so close that in 2010 it set up a Chinese subsidiary called FED China Technology. The results of that move were not long in coming. The following year, during the 14th Aviation Expo/China-2011 exhibition, the company signed four contracts with partners from Xian and the Shengyang Aircraft Engines Institute to develop new components for aircraft control systems, as well as pumps for a future engine to be used in new civilian and military planes. After the completion of the R&D phase, the hardware will be manufactured by a joint venture in China.

Another indication of the breadth of Chinese interest in aerospace innovation is the purchase by Wang Hai Long (Liaoning) of three AK1-3 ultralight helicopter kits developed and made by KB Aerocopter (based in Poltava). The contract was signed in December 2012; the price paid by the Chinese was 135,000 dollars apiece.

Airborne weapons systems

In Soviet times, the state-owned company Artem was the lead manufacturer of guided missiles for MiG-29 and Su-27 aircraft. It was therefore almost inevitable that the company would maintain close contacts with Chinese customers. In 2006 China received more than 1,500 R-27 (AA-10) missiles of various modifications; some of them were bought directly from Kiev, others were sold via Russia. Rosoboronexport had bought about 800 assembly kits via DP Progress, and exported the finished products to Beijing.

The price policy of Ukrainian supplies has also been very attractive to the Chinese. Suffice is to recall just one example: in 2006 China bought from Ukraine a batch of 90 missiles designated as Product 470-1E (R-27ER1 air-to-air missiles) and 60 missiles designated as Product 470-3E (R-27ET1 air-to-air missiles). The price was 28,000 dollars apiece. Another batch of six R-27R1 and 14 R-27T1 missiles was bought by Kintex from Bulgaria – but at a much higher price of 262,000 dollars apiece.

There is no information about any Ukrainian sales of these missiles to China in later years. That is probably because China has lost interest in R-27 series missiles, having launched production of its own weaponry in this category. Ukrainian weapons exporters have repeatedly tried to secure sales of new R-27s of various modifications, as well as new missiles developed in partnership with the Luch design bureau. These include Products 621 and 621-1 (Kombat guided anti-tank missiles); Baryer-B; and Gurt missile preparation and testing kit. They have also approached the Chinese about extending the service life of previously exported R-27 missiles and Gurt kits.

The Chinese, however, no longer require these services because they already have a sufficient pool of trained specialists. Furthermore, in 2006 CATIC received from the Kiev-based Luch design bureau a set of testing instruments and diagnostic equipment for the repair of the Gurt kits, as well as all the manuals and technical documents. That had eventually led to a sharp decline in output at Artem.

In early 2008 the Krasilov Machinery Plant supplied a set of engineering documents, user instructions and repair manuals for the APU-470 aircraft launch units and the AKU-170 aircraft ejection units to a Chinese aircraft repair plant in Wuhu. Ukrinmash was involved in the deal as an intermediary. A total of 23kg of these documents were sold for 1,199,627.5 hryvnyas, which was about 240,000 dollars at the January 2008 exchange rate. The Ukrainian company also supplied repair kits for the refurbishment of the APU-470 (1:10) product, as well as various other hardware and testing equipment for the repair of the APU-470 (including vibration benches and testing benches). The value of the deal was also about a quarter of a million dollars. Predictably, since then the Chinese have not required any Ukrainian expertise or spare parts for these products.

In the second half of the 1990s the Khmelnytskyy-based company Novator began to supply finished products N001E and N001VE to the Chinese Air Force’s aircraft repair plant in Nanking. The products in question are targeting radars used on Su-27, Su-30 and Su-30MK aircraft. Their functionality includes target detection, identification, designation and illumination. In later years the Ukrainian company also began to supply parts and components for these radars. It then developed the UM522 low-noise amplification module to replace the unreliable parametric amplifiers used in the N019-09 and N001-09A microwave receivers, and a new quartz generator with better frequency stability compared to the old Soviet-made component. The new parts were used to upgrade the radars already supplied to Beijing. After obtaining that technology, Chinese specialists have been able to reduce the running and maintenance costs by up to three quarters, with a substantial improvement in reliability. Up until very recently Novator continued to provide the Chinese with various maintenance services for the previously supplied hardware, and to supply at very short notice the entire range of spare parts for the N001 radar, as well as repair and maintenance equipment for that radar and its individual components (products N001-22M, N001-22MSE, N019-02A, N019-09A, etc). It also continued to train Chinese maintenance specialists, sharing the know-how for repairing the radar’s microwave modules (including cases which were previously thought to be beyond repair).

The Lviv-based Elektron Television Technology Plant (part of the Elektron Concern) has supplied China Taly Aviation Technologies Corp. with various TV guidance components for air-to-surface missiles; display and targeting systems used on Su-30 aircraft; and the T-1 and T-2 diagnostic kits.7

The Kharkiv-based Ukrprom continued to sell the 36Sh-01 optical locator systems to China National Friend Industry Corporation in 2008, using Ukrinmash as an intermediary. The product was described as “a device for gathering and processing various piloting and navigation parameters, and transmitting such data to various systems on a range of aircraft, including Su-27, Il-86, Il-96 and An-22”.8 It is well known, however, that the system has been installed only on Su-27 fighters; the other planes listed in the product description – including civilian models – are just a cover story.

The Kiev-based RADAR company has been supplying the Chinese with Product Osminog-E almost every year since 2006. The product is an anti-submarine detection and targeting system used on the Ka-28 helicopter. Sales have been channeled via Spetstekhnoexport; the buyer is the Shenyang-based China North-East International Trade Corporation.9

In 2005 China’s NORINCO bought from the Lviv Radio Technology Research Institute engineering designs for the manufacture of a 3mm band homing head for an air-to-air missile. The designs were on electronic and paper media (weighing over 20kg). The deal, in which a subsidiary of Promoboronexport acted as an intermediary, was worth about 1m dollars.

Naturally, this list of Ukrainian-Chinese deals in the civilian and military aerospace segments is far from complete.

Financial and legal aspects of cooperation

In December 2010 Ukrspetsexport reported record annual sales of 975.7m dollars. Sales to China also hit a record of 130m dollars (about 14 per cent of the total), placing the country firmly at the top of the list of 74 Ukrainian defense customers and partners.11 In 2011 Ukrspetsexport reported sales of about 1bn dollars; the figure remained roughly unchanged in 2012.12

During the latest (6th) sitting of the Intergovernmental Commission held in August 2010 in Beijing, the press service of Ukraine’s Industrial Policy Ministry said it hoped that bilateral trade in military hardware and services would reach 1.2bn dollars over the following three years. The accumulated figure for Ukrainian-Chinese arms imports/exports for the past eight years is 1.5bn dollars.12 In 2011 China became Ukraine’s third-largest trading partner, accounting for 3.2 per cent of Ukrainian exports and 7.5 per cent of imports. The trend continued into 2012, with Ukrainian exports to China falling by almost one-fifth to 1.78bn dollars, and imports growing by 26 per cent to 7.9bn dollars. These figures by the Ukrainian statistics agency suggest that arms trade with China will fall well below the three-year target set by the Industrial Policy Ministry; it will barely reach 600m dollars.

Problems also remain with the legal framework. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers has approached the Chinese government with a proposal to sign an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation between the two countries’ defense industry companies. But the Chinese said that they saw no need for such an agreement because the documents that have already been signed have created adequate legal framework for bilateral defense industry cooperation. They added that the existing intergovernmental coordination commission on arms trade was working to a good effect, making the necessary adjustments when the need arises, and resolving various problems.

In addition, Chinese defense industry companies are not allowed to establish direct cooperation ties with foreign companies, firms and individuals. Only certain Chinese companies and corporations authorized by the Chinese State Council have the right to conduct negotiations in this area, exchange R&D information, and import or export military and dual-use technology. That is one of the reasons why, against all Ukrainian hopes, a program of military and technical cooperation with China has yet to be signed. There have also been long delays with the preparation of a joint declaration on defense industry cooperation in third countries’ markets, and with a program to establish an investment fund for joint projects. The Ukrainian partner in the latter project was TASKO Export, another Ukrspetsexport subsidiary.

Ukraine has made a serious strategic error by allowing Beijing to acquire its defense technologies and launch production in China itself. With the existing Ukrainian policy on high-tech industries, China will not remain the country’s defense customer for too long. In a few years’ time it will have acquired sufficient know-how to make the involvement of Ukrainian partners redundant.
 
Ukraine are much more reliable partners than Russian... At least they will not go back on words once a contract is inked.

End of the day, Chinese indigenous weapon is getting stronger daily. At least we need not succumb to blackmail and unreasonable price hike like some particular countries.

The Sino-Russia Il-76 Row

or some time, military cooperation between China and Russia has been stalled over a failed deal involving China's import of Russian Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft. China claims that Russia violated the terms of an agreement involving the sale of 38 aircraft. But Russia says this claim is unfair.
Negotiations on the aircraft deal began seven years ago. By the time the contract was signed in 2005, China had agreed to purchase 30 Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft and eight Ilyushin Il-78 air-to-air refueling tankers at an extremely low price. According to a source in the Russian military industry, China initially offered only $18 million for each plane. The Russian side proposed $22 million, and eventually the two sides settled on a price tag of $20 million per aircraft.

Such a low price was unprecedented in the international transport aircraft market. By comparison, around the same time Jordan had contracted for a variant of the Ilyushin Il-76 at a price of about $50 million per aircraft.

For this reason, the deal was controversial from the outset. The discussions began in 2001, the contract was signed in 2005, but by 2008, not a single Ilyushin Il-76 transport had been delivered.

The aircraft were to be assembled from Russian parts at the Tashkent Aircraft Production Corp. in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, a former Soviet republic in Central Asia. Out of the 38 Ilyushin Il-76 transports contracted, 15 were already half finished. The other Ilyushin Il-76s were to be newly manufactured.

The Tashkent-based company was facing serious financial difficulties, however, and was unable to produce the aircraft according to schedule. This was made worse by the dramatic fluctuation in the value of the U.S. dollar and escalating inflation in Russia -- making the cost of producing the transport aircraft much higher than when the deal was originally signed.

According to the Russian side, the Chinese have been unreasonable in refusing to renegotiate the deal in light of changing circumstances.

The Russian source compared the situation with a similar one faced with India over a 2004 deal involving the refurbishing of the aging Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for use by the Indian navy. The Russian side was able to hold frank discussions with the Indian side, the source said, and acknowledged that it had made errors in the initial assessment.

The task was to refit the old aircraft carrier, but after dismantling the vessel, Russian engineers realized that the project was practically equivalent to building a brand-new aircraft carrier.

"The Indian experts saw the same situation we did, and as a result the two sides could look at the issue with mutual understanding and find a satisfactory solution to the problem," the source explained.

But the Chinese have been less understanding and less accommodating in their negotiations with the Kremlin over the Ilyushin Il-76 deal, the Russians claim. The Chinese also insist they will not sign any major military procurement agreement with Russia until this problem is solved to their satisfaction.

Why China still needs Russian aircraft
Russian officials complain that the Chinese have not been understanding and accommodating in their negotiations with the Kremlin over the long-stalled Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft deal.

The Chinese insist they will not sign any major military procurement agreement with the Kremlin until this problem is solved to their satisfaction.

The Russians say they are still willing to carry out the agreement and complete the manufacture and delivery of the Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft to China. But considering the current reality in Russia and Uzbekistan, the manufacturer feels it is only fair to readjust the price.

A source from Ilyushin Finance told UPI recently that the Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft dispute with China has made some recent progress. That is, China is now aware of the reality in Russia and is willing to discuss the possibility of signing a new contract. The China side insists, however, that the specific models of the transport aircraft, production sites and prices all will have to be renegotiated.

The Chinese side also has asked to inspect the aircraft production plant before signing a new official agreement. A more feasible plan is that the Chinese side first will inspect the Ulyanovsk Aircraft Factory, which is now preparing for the production of a brand-new version of the Ilyushin Il-76, called the Il-476.

The Ilyushin Il-476 is equipped with a full numerical flight-control system, a glass cockpit and a new-generation PS-90 engine. China is somewhat familiar with the Ulyanovsk Aircraft Factory, which in the past has produced Tupolev Tu-204 passenger aircraft for China that proved quite satisfactory in quality.

The factory will need to upgrade its equipment to manufacture the Ilyushin Il-476, as currently only 20 percent of the necessary equipment is ready. Fortunately, money is not a problem at the moment. The Ilyushin Group has sufficient financial capability to organize the production.

Russia recently set up the state-owned United Aircraft Corp., made up of the Ilyushin Group, Sukhoi and MiG. The Tashkent Aircraft Production Corp. also has decided to join this group, with the final signing ceremony to take place within two months. Once the Tashkent company formally joins the state corporation, it may receive new funding and be able to resume its full production capability.

According to the Russian source, China already has initiated preliminary contact with the United Aircraft Corp. to discuss renegotiating the Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft deal, but the whole process will take some time. It is not clear when a new agreement would be signed.

The latest developments with regard to the Ilyushin Il-76 deal are exactly in keeping with this author's prediction -- that China would have no alternative to Russia to produce its military transport aircraft.

The question now is what impact China's recent creation of the J-11B -- an illegal copy of Russia's Sukhoi Su-27 air superiority fighter -- will have on its renegotiation of the Ilyushin Il-76 deal with the Russians.

SAF expert: Y-20 outperforms Il-76 - People's Daily Online

A news spokesman of the Ministry of National Defence (MND) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) confirmed at the regular press conference of the MND held on December 27, 2012 that "China is independently developing its large transport aircraft to strengthen the building of air transport capability".

Currently, the representative types of large transport aircraft are the U.S. Boeing C-17 Globemaster III and Russian Ilyushin Il-76, and only the U.S. and Russia in the world are able to develop large transport aircraft.

Named as the Y-20, China's first large military transport aircraft carries the dream and expectation of millions of Chinese people. Compared with the Il-76MD, the Y-20 has larger volume, more reasonable fuselage space and layout, and higher engine power.

The Y-20 not only outperforms Il-76 but also has Chinese characteristics in supercritical airfoils, integrated avionics, cabin equipment, composite materials and their processing.

The performance parameters of the Y-20 are quite close to those of Russian Il-476. Operated by three aircrew members, the Y-20 has the highest load-carrying capacity of 66 tons, a fuselage length of 47 meters, a wingspan of 45 meters and a height of 15 meters, and bears the maximum take-off weight of a little more than 200 tons. It has a traditional layout and strong adaptability to take-off and landing fields, as evidenced by being able to take off and land at airstrips and carry the vast majority of combat and support vehicles of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

As to the engine, China is actively developing high-thrust turbofan engines. Currently, the Y-20 can not be equipped with such advanced engines but be fit out with the imported D-30KP2 engine temporarily. The performance of the engine is not as good as that of the PS-90A76 turbofan engine of the Il-476, therefore, the thrust of China's Y-20 is much inferior to that of the Il-476.

However, the Y-20 will have significantly-improved flight performance after being equipped with China's independently-developed high-thrust turbofan engines, thus ranking among the world's advanced large transport aircraft.

Now, the Y-20 is in the phase of test and finalization. If everything goes well, the Y-20 will have to undergo a minimum-three-year-long flight test and a minimum-five-year-long comprehensive test. Therefore, 2017 is the earliest date by which the PLA Air Force will have home-made large transport aircraft.

We do not respond to threat and unfair business enthics. We show them what we are capable of..
 
...
Ukraine has made a serious strategic error by allowing Beijing to acquire its defense technologies and launch production in China itself. With the existing Ukrainian policy on high-tech industries, China will not remain the country’s defense customer for too long. In a few years’ time it will have acquired sufficient know-how to make the involvement of Ukrainian partners redundant.



Arms industry covers 100s of sub segments each having 10s, 100s, or 1,000s core tech in case of aerospace sub segment. To have advanced basic science and overall heavy industries is the precondition to have advanced overall arms industry. In this sense, China has both yet Ukraine no, while USA have both yet Belgium no, and India has none for that matter.

Not denying even a bit of the credits of Ukraine's specialists, Ukraine is nonetheless a specialist not generalist the way China, Russia and the US are. Ukrain sepcialists involvement in some of China's aero industry is natural and to be applauded, for both, because of win-win - one gets cash and one gets some tech or simplely a matter of saving more precious time.

USA, too, has a long list of specialist tech co-operation deals for many decades with Japan, Germany, France and many other small country specialists like Belgium, Sweden, Nederlands, Spain, Italy, South Africa, etc.etc. That doesn't take away a bit of the credit of American home-grown scientists and its aero industry.

The co-operation between China and Ukraine strenched way earlier than 2004 as far as I am aware. However, a bigger part (some 20,000 individuals?) of top Ukraine (and Russian) weapon-related scienists were actually bought over to the US soon after the Soviet fell instead of China which has some 4,000. So there is even more aerospace cooperation between Urkaine and USA than that btw Ukraine and China as a matter of fact. :rofl:

Does that mean that Ukraine, or Belgium or any other country for that matter, has made a serious strategic error by allowing Washington to acquire its defense technologies and launch production in USA itself, while "in a few years’ time it will have acquired sufficient know-how to make the involvement of Ukrainian partners redundant", too? :omghaha:

It's always a 2-way street, on arms or on any tradable goods.



The laughable double talk nature of the OP lies in:

no words about even larger share of post-Soviet Ukraine (and many dozens other countries around the world) sceintists and joint-project involvements in the US, while singling out and sniping China for its far smaller share, in spite of the fact that these very "Ukraine" sceintists and specialists involved in classified Chinese projects almost all have Chinese Greencards(permanent residence), with many, together with their entire families, being granted of Chinese nationality long ago hence technically they are Chinese in fact, doing their jobs and living their Chinese Dream inside or ourside China, and get paid well for it (just like many such non-native Americans inside America or outside as expats with some even based in Kiev :lol:). What are the beef and sour grapes of the OP?
 
End of the day, China can make as many Y-20 as she wants. So as the AI-222K-25F engines for L-15 unrestricted. No need to negotiate. Even with inflation counted in and as least its returning to its own countryman. Unlike buying from foreign sources, unless you wants to boast political ties. Buying foreign sources will bring nothing to its own benefit in the long run.
 
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