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A glimpse of the past: Was Pakistan ready to respond to India’s overt nuclearization?
Global Village Space |
Samson Simon Sharaf |
When Narasimha Rao, the Indian National Congress (INC) Prime Minister, called for snap elections in 1996, it was time for Pakistan to brace itself for the events particularly if BJP came to power. The party had posed serious challenges to the INC coalition on charges of corruption and was poised to electioneer on issues that were most endearing to the philosophy of Bharat Varsha.
Pre-election opinion polls indicated that BJP was most likely to emerge as the single largest party.
The destiny placed me in the footsteps of a great Pakistani diplomat, S. M. Burke, who had been most instrumental in procuring Pakistan’s first nuclear reactor from Canada.
The most challenging question for Pakistan’s security planners was: Would the party follow its rhetoric of nuclear testing if it came to power? As destiny would have it, I was the only officer in the General Staff with sound academic credentials in Nuclear Proliferation and Strategy.
Though the study was simultaneously being carried out by many concerned branches, the ultimate responsibility of carrying out the final analysis for the General Staff in GHQ fell on my shoulders. The destiny placed me in the footsteps of a great Pakistani diplomat, S. M. Burke, who had been most instrumental in procuring Pakistan’s first nuclear reactor from Canada.
Read more: India’s first use Nuclear Policy: Should Pakistan be worried?
To carry out an accurate study, it was time for an in-depth appraisal of known Indian nuclear capabilities and development. The first step in the study was to pinpoint the deficiencies in India’s technical nuclear capabilities and what were they most likely to do to address them. Within a week, my team had read through and sifted extremely important findings of the Indian Nuclear and Space Development Programme.
Simultaneously, through the recently introduced internet, we got a special connection and hooked on to a satellite that transmitted pictures of Pokhran with a 48-hour delay.
We continued receiving inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic chatter, and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan.
Initially, there was no activity but by February 1998, we began noticing track marks and considerable activity. We estimated three months before India could resume nuclear testing. At the same time, we continued receiving inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic chatter, and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan. These bits and pieces were accurately fitting into our knowledge base and the photography.
By mid-February, the analysis was ready and subjected to an in-house discussion in the General Staff Branch after which it was put before the COAS, General Jahangir Karamat.
The preparations in Pakistan began.
Read full article:
A glimpse of the past: Was Pakistan ready to respond to India’s overt nuclearization?
Global Village Space |
Samson Simon Sharaf |
When Narasimha Rao, the Indian National Congress (INC) Prime Minister, called for snap elections in 1996, it was time for Pakistan to brace itself for the events particularly if BJP came to power. The party had posed serious challenges to the INC coalition on charges of corruption and was poised to electioneer on issues that were most endearing to the philosophy of Bharat Varsha.
Pre-election opinion polls indicated that BJP was most likely to emerge as the single largest party.
The destiny placed me in the footsteps of a great Pakistani diplomat, S. M. Burke, who had been most instrumental in procuring Pakistan’s first nuclear reactor from Canada.
The most challenging question for Pakistan’s security planners was: Would the party follow its rhetoric of nuclear testing if it came to power? As destiny would have it, I was the only officer in the General Staff with sound academic credentials in Nuclear Proliferation and Strategy.
Though the study was simultaneously being carried out by many concerned branches, the ultimate responsibility of carrying out the final analysis for the General Staff in GHQ fell on my shoulders. The destiny placed me in the footsteps of a great Pakistani diplomat, S. M. Burke, who had been most instrumental in procuring Pakistan’s first nuclear reactor from Canada.
Read more: India’s first use Nuclear Policy: Should Pakistan be worried?
To carry out an accurate study, it was time for an in-depth appraisal of known Indian nuclear capabilities and development. The first step in the study was to pinpoint the deficiencies in India’s technical nuclear capabilities and what were they most likely to do to address them. Within a week, my team had read through and sifted extremely important findings of the Indian Nuclear and Space Development Programme.
- We knew that the explosion in 1974 was a conventional 1950 design and needed to be fine-tuned for confirmation and miniaturization.
- We knew that based on decay rates, India needed further data not only to confirm its previous testing but also calculate the life of the warheads.
- We knew that though India was already refining plutonium, the fissile material had never been tested in an explosion and the subsequent data crucial to warhead designs.
- We knew that the warhead designs had to be compact so as to be placed in the tips of the delivery systems.
- We understood that the quest for Bharat Varsha would be incomplete without India boasting thermonuclear devices.
Simultaneously, through the recently introduced internet, we got a special connection and hooked on to a satellite that transmitted pictures of Pokhran with a 48-hour delay.
We continued receiving inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic chatter, and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan.
Initially, there was no activity but by February 1998, we began noticing track marks and considerable activity. We estimated three months before India could resume nuclear testing. At the same time, we continued receiving inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic chatter, and the intelligence agencies of Pakistan. These bits and pieces were accurately fitting into our knowledge base and the photography.
By mid-February, the analysis was ready and subjected to an in-house discussion in the General Staff Branch after which it was put before the COAS, General Jahangir Karamat.
The preparations in Pakistan began.
Read full article:
A glimpse of the past: Was Pakistan ready to respond to India’s overt nuclearization?
Great intel though.
