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1999 US Senate Investigation Report
For those of you to whom Zardari'sprobable properties list seemed ambiguous, these properties do exist on Google maps. Whether they belong to him or not is a different matter altogether.
In any case, all this man had in 1981 was two cinema houses. He was a well to do chap, but nowhere close to where he is at now! You may like to read below CONCRETE evidence of at least 200 million dollars that he siphoned off.The attached investigation was done by a US Senate Subcommittee in 1999.http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/110999_report.htm
Basically, a 1999 US Senate investigation (exact reference given at end) into Citibank, provides a fascinating inside look at how Citibank helped launder some of the ill-gotten gains of Asif Ali Zardari. Of the four case histories provided in the Report, the following is a complete excerpt of the Case History for Asif Zardari. The report also provides photocopies of signed documents, banks records, etc. (listed below, at the end).
The Facts
The case history involves Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan. Ms. Bhutto was elected Prime Minister in 1988, dismissed by the President of Pakistan in August 1990 for alleged corruption and inability to maintain law and order, elected Prime Minister again in October 1993, and dismissed by the President again in November 1996. At various times, Mr. Zardari served as Senator, Environment Minister and Minister for Investment in the Bhutto government. In between the two Bhutto administrations, he was incarcerated in 1990 and 1991 on charges of corruption; the charges were eventually dropped. During Ms. Bhutto's second term there were increasing allegations of corruption in her government, and a major target of those allegations was Mr. Zardari.
It has been reported that the government of Pakistan claims that Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari stole over $1 billion from the country.
During the period 1994 to 1997, Citibank opened and maintained three private bank accounts in Switzerland and a consumer account in Dubai for three corporations under Mr. Zardari's control. There are allegations that some of these accounts were used to disguise $10 million in kickbacks for a gold importing contract to Pakistan.
Structure of Private Bank Relationship.
Mr. Zardari's relationship with Citibank began in October 1994, through the services of Kamran Amouzegar, a private banker at Citibank private bank in Switzerland, and Jens Schlegelmilch, a Swiss lawyer who was the Bhutto family's attorney in Europe and close personal friend for more than 20 years. According to Citibank, Mr. Schlegelmilch represented to Mr. Amouzegar that he was working for the Dubai royal family and he wanted to open some accounts at the Citibank branch office in Dubai. Mr. Schlegelmilch had a Dubai residency permit and a visa signed by a member of the Dubai royal family. Mr. Amouzegar agreed to introduce Mr. Schlegelmilch to a banker in the Citibank branch office in Dubai.
According to Citicorp, Mr. Schlegelmilch told the Citibank Dubai banker that he wanted to open an account in the name of M.S. Capricorn Trading, a British Virgin Island PIC. The stated purpose of the account was to receive money and transfer it to Switzerland. The account was opened in early October 1994.
According to Citibank, Mr. Schlegelmilch informed the Dubai banker that he would serve as the representative of the account and the signatory on the account. Under Dubai law, a bank is not required to know an account's beneficial owner, only the signatory. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Schlegelmilch did not reveal to the Dubai banker that Mr. Zardari was the beneficial owner of the PIC [Private Investment Company: an offshore company often used to launder money], and the account manager never asked him the identity of the beneficial owner of the account. Instead, according to Citibank, she assumed the beneficial owner of the account was the member of the royal family who had signed Mr. Schlegelmilch's visa. According to Citibank, the account manager actually performed some due diligence on the royal family member whom she believed to be the beneficial owner of the account.
Shortly after opening the account in Dubai, Mr. Schlegelmilch signed a standard referral agreement with Citibank Switzerland private bank guaranteeing him 20% of the first three years of client net revenues earned by the bank from each client he referred to the private bank.
On February 27, 1995, Mr. Schlegelmilch, working with Mr. Amouzegar, opened three accounts at the Citibank Switzerland private bank. The accounts were opened in the name of M.S. Capricorn Trading, which already had an account at Citibank's Dubai branch, as well as Marvel and Bomer Finance, two other British Virgin Island PICs established by Mr. Schlegelmilch, according to Citibank. Each private bank account listed Mr. Schlegelmilch as the account contact and signatory. Citibank informed the Subcommittee that the Swiss Form A, a government-required beneficial owner identification form, identified Mr. Zardari as the beneficial owner of each PIC.
Lack of Due Diligence.
The decision to allow Mr. Schlegelmilch to open the three accounts on behalf of Mr. Zardari, according to Citibank, involved officials at the highest levels of the private bank. The officials were: (a) Mr. Amouzegar, the private banker; (b) Deepak Sharma, then head of private bank operations in Pakistan; (c) Phillipe Holderbeke, then head of private bank operations in Switzerland (who became head of the Europe, Middle East, Africa Division in February 1996); (d) Salim Raza, then head of the EMEA Division of the private bank; and (e) Hubertus Rukavina, then head of the Citibank private bank. Mr. Rukavina told the Subcommittee staff that when he was asked about opening the Zardari accounts, he did not make the decision to open them, but rather directed that the matter be discussed with Mr. Sharma. According to Mr. Rukavina, he never heard whether the accounts were ultimately opened. Mr. Rukavina left the private bank in 1996 and left Citibank in 1999.
Citibank informed the Subcommittee staff that the private bank was aware of the allegations of corruption against Mr. Zardari at the time it opened the accounts in Switzerland. However, Citibank reasoned that if the charges for which Mr. Zardari had been incarcerated for two years had any merit, they would not have been dropped. Bank officials also believed that the family wealth of Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari was large enough to support a large private bank account, even though Citibank was not able to specify what actions were taken to verify the amount and source of their wealth. Citibank said that bank officials were also aware of the M.S. Capricorn Trading account in Dubai, and they were comforted by the fact that there had been no problems with that account. According to Citibank, Mr. Amouzegar informed his superiors that Mr. Zardari was the beneficial owner of the Capricorn account in Dubai when they were considering the request to open the accounts in Switzerland. Inexplicably, however, the Dubai account manager was apparently still operating under the assumption that the beneficial owner of the Dubai Capricorn account was a member of the Dubai royal family.
Subcommittee staff have been unable to determine whether Citibank officials were unaware of or inattentive to the serious inconsistency between Citibank Switzerland and Citibank Dubai with respect to the Capricorn Trading account. Citibank also informed the Subcommittee staff that bank officials had some concerns that if they turned down the accounts, their actions may have implications for the corporation's operations in Pakistan; however, they said they never received any threats on that issue.
Citibank told the Subcommittee staff the private bank decided to allow Mr. Schlegelmilch to open the three accounts for Mr. Zardari on the condition that the private bank would not be the primary accounts for Mr. Zardari's assets and the accounts would function as passive investment accounts. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Holderbeke signed a memo delineating the restrictions placed on the accounts, including a $40 million aggregate limit on the size of the three accounts, and transaction restrictions requiring the accounts to function as passive, stable investments, without multiple transactions or funding pass-throughs. None of the Citibank personnel interviewed by Subcommittee staff could identify any other private bank account with these types of restrictions. Other private banks interviewed by the Subcommittee staff were asked if they had ever accepted a client on the condition that certain restrictions be imposed on the account. The banks all said they had not. One bank representative explained that if the bank felt that it needed to place restrictions on the client's account, it didn't want that type of client. The existence of the restrictions are in themselves proof of the private bank's awareness of Mr. Zardari's poor reputation and concerns regarding the sources of his wealth.
Movement of Funds.
Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that, once opened, only three deposits were made into the M.S. Capricorn Trading account in Dubai. Two deposits, totaling $10 million were made into the account almost immediately after it was opened. Citibank records show that one $5 million deposit was made on October 5,1994, and another was made on October 6, 1994. The source of both deposits was A.R.Y. International Exchange, a company owned by Abdul Razzak Yaqub [since then, the owner of several ARY television channels that, incidentally, have been providing favorable coverage of Ms. Bhutto's recent political activities], a Pakistani gold bullion trader living in Dubai.
According to the New York Times, in December 1994, the Bhutto government awarded Mr. Razzak an exclusive gold import license. In an interview with the New York Times, Mr. Razzak acknowledged that he had used the exclusive license to import more than $500 million worth of gold into Pakistan. Mr. Razzak denies, however, making any payments to Mr. Zardari. Citibank could not explain the two $5 million payments. Ms. Bhutto told the Subcommittee staff that since A.R.Y. International Exchange is a foreign exchange business, the payments did not necessarily come from Mr. Razzak, but could have come from a third party who was merely making use of A.R.Y.'s exchange services. The staff invited Ms. Bhutto to provide additional information on the M.S. Capricorn Trading accounts, but she has not yet done so.
On February 25, 1995, a third deposit of $8 million was made into the Dubai M.S. Capricorn Trading account. Records show that the payment was made through American Express, with the originator of the account listed as "Morgan NYC." Citibank indicated it does not know who Morgan NYC is, nor does it know the source of the $8 million.
All of the funds in the Dubai account of M.S. Capricorn Trading were moved to the Swiss accounts in the Spring of 1995. On March 6, 1995, $8.1 million was transferred; and on May 5, 1995, another $10.2 million was transferred. Both transfers involved U.S. dollars and were routed through Citibank's New York offices. Citibank informed the Subcommittee staff that M.S. Capricorn Trading closed its Dubai account shortly after the last transfer was completed.
Citibank has indicated that significant amounts of other funds were also deposited into the Swiss accounts. As described below, the $40 million cap was reached, and millions of additional dollars also passed through those accounts. However, Swiss bank secrecy law has prevented the Subcommittee from obtaining the details on the transactions in the Zardari accounts.
Account Monitoring.
Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that, in 1996, the Swiss office of the private bank conducted a number of reviews of the Zardari Swiss accounts, finally deciding in October to close them. The first review was allegedly in early 1996, triggered by increasing publicity about allegations of corruption against Mr. Zardari. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Messrs. Holderbeke, [Salim] Raza, Sharma and Amouzegar participated in the review, and apparently concluded that the allegations were politically motivated and that the accounts should remain open. The Subcommittee staff was told that the review did not include looking at the accounts' transaction activity.
In March or April, 1996, Mr. Amouzegar asked that the overall limit on the Zardari accounts be increased from $40 million to $60 million, apparently because the accounts had reached the previously imposed limit of $40 million. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Holderbeke considered the request, but declined to increase the $40 million limit.
In June, press reports in the United Kingdom that Mr. Zardari had purchased real estate in London triggered still another review of the Zardari accounts. Citibank private bank told the Subcommittee staff that its Swiss office internally discussed the source of the funds for the property purchase. Mr. Amouzegar and Mr. [Salim] Raza then met with Mr. Schlegelmilch, who allegedly informed them that funds had been deposited into the Citibank accounts, transferred to another PIC account outside of Citibank and used to purchase the property. Mr. Schlegelmilch allegedly indicated the funds had come from the sale of some sugar mills and were legitimate. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff it is not sure if anyone at the private bank attempted to validate the information about the sale of the sugar mills. In addition, even though this account activity violated the condition imposed by Citibank that the accounts were not to be used as a pass through for funds, the accounts were kept open.
Closing the Accounts.
In July 1996, after Mr. Amouzegar left the private bank to open his own company, another private banker, Cedric Grant, took over management of the Zardari accounts. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Grant began to review the Zardari accounts about one month later to familiarize himself with them. He also reviewed the transactions that had taken place within the accounts.
In September and October 1996, press accounts in Pakistan repeatedly raised questions about corruption by Mr. Zardari and Ms. Bhutto, as Ms. Bhutto's re-election campaign increased its activities prior to a February election date. In September, Ms. Bhutto's only surviving brother, Murtaza Bhutto, was assassinated, and Ms. Bhutto's mother accused Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari of masterminding the murder, because the brother had been leading opposition to Ms. Bhutto.
In October, Mr. Grant completed his review of the Zardari accounts and provided a written analysis to Messrs. Holderbeke, Sharma and [Salim] Raza, according to Citibank. Mr. Grant had found numerous violations of the account restrictions imposed by Citibank, including multiple transactions and funding pass-throughs. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that the accounts had functioned more as checking accounts than passive investment accounts, directly contrary to the private bank's restrictions. Apparently, well over $40 million had flowed through the accounts, though Subcommittee staff were unable to ascertain the actual amount because Swiss bank secrecy law prohibits Citibank from sharing that information with the Subcommittee. Citibank indicated that Mr. Amouzegar had either ignored or did not pay attention to the account activity. Mr. Grant recommended closing the accounts, and they were closed by January 1997.
[Note: In May 1997, Mr. Shaukat Aziz was transferred at Citibank's New York headquarters, from his position as head of credit card operations to head of private banking. In November 1996, Mr. Farooq Laghari had dismissed the government of Ms. Benazir Bhutto-Zardari; and in February 1997, Mr. Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister.]
Legal Proceedings.
On September 8, 1997, the Swiss government issued orders freezing the Zardari and Bhutto accounts at Citibank and three other banks in Switzerland at the request of the Pakistani government. Since Citibank had closed its Zardari accounts in January 1997, it took no action nor did it make any effort to inform U.S. authorities of the accounts until late November 1997. Citibank contacted the Federal Reserve and OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the banking supervision arm of the US Department of Treasury] about the Zardari accounts in late November, in anticipation of a New York Times article that eventually ran in January 1998, alleging that Mr. Zardari had accepted bribes, and that he held Citibank accounts in Dubai and Switzerland. On December 8 and 11, 1997, Citibank briefed the OCC and the Federal Reserve, respectively, about the accounts and the steps it had taken as a result of the Zardari matter. These steps included: closing all of the accounts that had been referred by Mr. Schlegelmilch to the private bank and terminating his referral agreement; reviewing all of the accounts opened in the Dubai office; and tightening up account opening procedures in Dubai, including requiring the Dubai office to identify the beneficial owner of all Dubai accounts. Citibank did not identify any changes made or planned for the Swiss office, even though the majority of the activity with respect to the Zardari accounts had taken place in Switzerland.
On December 5, 1997, Citibank prepared a Suspicious Activity Report on the Zardari accounts and filed it with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network at the U.S. Department of Treasury. The filing was made fourteen months after its decision to close the Zardari accounts; thirteen months after Mr. Zardari was arrested a second time for corruption in November 1996; and nearly two months after the Swiss government had ordered four Swiss banks (including Citibank Switzerland) to freeze all Zardari accounts.
In June 1998, Switzerland indicted Mr. Schlegelmilch and two Swiss businessmen, the former senior executive vice president of SGS and the managing director of Cotecna, for money laundering in connection with kickbacks paid by the Swiss companies for the award of a government contract by Pakistan. In July 1998, Mr. Zardari was indicted for violation of Swiss money laundering law in connection with the same incident. Ms. Bhutto was indicted in Switzerland for the same offense in August 1998. A trial on the charges is expected.
In October 1998, Pakistan indicted Mr. Zardari and Ms. Bhutto for accepting kickbacks from the two Swiss companies in exchange for the award of a government contract. On April 15, 1999, after an 18-month trial, Pakistan's Lahore High Court convicted Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari of accepting the kickbacks and sentenced them to 5 years in prison, fined them $8.6 million and disqualified them from holding public office. Ms. Bhutto, who now lives in London, denounced the decision. Mr. Zardari remains in jail. Additional criminal charges are pending against both in Pakistani courts.
On December 11, 1997, Citicorp's Chairman John Reed wrote the following to the Board of Directors:
"We have another issue with the husband of Ex-Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan. I do not yet understand the facts but I am inclined to think that we made a mistake. More reason than ever to rework our Private Bank."
Mr. Reed told the Subcommittee staff that it was the combination of the Salinas and Zardari accounts that made him charge Mr. [Shaukat] Aziz [currently, Prime Minister of Pakistan], the new private bank head, with taking a hard look at the bank's public figure policy and public figure accounts.
The Issues
The Zardari case history raises issues involving due diligence, secrecy and public figure accounts. The Zardari case history begins with the Citibank Dubai branch's failure to identify the true beneficial owner of the M.S. Capricorn Trading account. As a result, the account officer in Dubai performed due diligence on an individual who had no relationship to the account being opened. In Switzerland, Citibank officials opened three private bank accounts despite evidence of impropriety on the part of Mr. Zardari. In an interview with Subcommittee staff, Citigroup Co-Chair John Reed informed the Subcommittee staff that he had been advised by Citibank officials in preparation for a trip to Pakistan in February 1994, that there were troubling accusations concerning corruption surrounding Mr. Zardari, that he should stay away from him, and that he was not a man with whom the bank wanted to be associated. Yet one year later, the private bank opened three accounts for Mr. Zardari in Switzerland. Mr. Reed told the Subcommittee staff that when he learned of the Zardari accounts he thought the account officer must have been "an idiot."
Citibank has been unable to confirm that bank employees verified that Mr. Zardari had a level of wealth sufficient to support the size of the accounts that he was opening. In addition, the Swiss private banker took no action to validate the legitimacy of the source of the funds that were deposited into the account. For example, there was no effort made to verify the claims that some of the funds derived from the sale of sugar mills.
Citibank also performed no due diligence on the client owned and managed PICs that were the named accountholders. Because the PICs were client-created, the bank's failure to perform due diligence on the PICs meant that it had no knowledge of the activities, assets or entities involved with the corporations. One of the PICs, Bomer Finance, has been determined to have been a repository for kickbacks paid to Mr. Zardari, and those kickbacks tainted funds deposited at the Geneva branch of Union Bank of Switzerland. Documentation has not been made available to determine whether Bomer Finance also used its Citibank account for illicit funds.
Another due diligence lapse was the private bank's failure to monitor the Zardari accounts to ensure that the account restrictions imposed on them were being followed. When officials were presented with evidence in 1996 that the restrictions were being violated, they nevertheless allowed the accounts to continue.
The Zardari accounts in Switzerland were opened one day before Raul Salinas was arrested. The account was repeatedly reviewed in 1996, after the Salinas scandal became public. Yet there is no evidence that anyone in the private bank had been sensitized to the problems associated with handling an account of a person suspected of corruption.
The Zardari example also demonstrates the practical consequences of secrecy in private banking. Citibank claims that its decisionmaking in the Zardari matter cannot be fully explained or documented, since all Citibank officials are subject to Swiss secrecy laws prohibiting discussion of client-specific information. In light of the fact that U.S. banks are supposed to oversee their foreign branches and enforce U.S. law, including anti-money laundering requirements, this inability to produce documentation related to a troubling case again highlights the problems with U.S. banks choosing to operate in secrecy jurisdictions.
Pattern of Poor Account Management.
The Zardari case history took place during a series of critical internal and federal audits between 1992 and 1997 of the Swiss office which, during most of that time, served as the headquarters of the private bank. The shortcomings identified in the audits included policies, procedures, and problems that affected the management of the Zardari accounts. They included:
· failure of the "corporate culture" in the Swiss office to foster " 'a climate of integrity, ethical conduct and prudent risk taking' by U.S. standards";
· inadequate due diligence;
· "less than acceptable internal controls";
· lack of oversight and control of third party referral agents such as Schlegelmilch; and
· inadequate monitoring of accounts; all of which resulted in "unacceptable" internal audit ratings. In December 1995, the Swiss office received the lowest audit score received by any office in the private bank during the 1990s. These audit scores indicate the office's poor handling of the Zardari accounts was part of an ongoing pattern of poor account management.
The Report features as an annex to S. Hrg. 106-248PRIVATE BANKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING: A CASE STUDY OF OPPORTUNITIES AND VULNERABILITIES, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, November 9 and 10, 1999.
This xiv+1114 pages report is available at:Maintenanceas TEXT [424KB] and as PDF [30MB] files
It provides (on page numbers indicated) the following:
Documents relating to Asif Ali Zardari:
a. Swiss Form A identifying Asif Ali Zardari as the beneficial owner of the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in the Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland [600]…………………………………. 445 [Signed by "Asif Ali Zardari, Bilawal House, Karachi (Pak)"]
b. Wire transfer records documenting transfers of $18 million into Mr. Zardari's Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Dubai and transfers of $18.3 million out of the Dubai account into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland ……………………………………… 446
10/5/94 transfer of $5 million from A.R.Y. International Exchange into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai [X6903-4];
10/6/94 transfer of $5 million from A.R.Y. International Exchange into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai [X6900-2]
2/24/95 transfer of $8 million from Morgan NYC into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai;
3/6/95 transfer of $8.1 million from the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland;
5/3/95 transfer of $10.2 million from the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland;
5/4/94 record of Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland credit of $10.2 million to account of Capricorn Trading S.A.
c. Mandate Agreement between Asif Ali Zardari and Jens Schlegelmilch concerning Bomer Finance, Inc. [601-2]………………………………… 466
d. Mandate Agreement between Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Jens Schlegelmilch concerning Mariston Securities, Inc. [603-4]………………………………… 468
e. British Virgin Islands Certificate of Incorporation for Capricorn Trading S.A. [605]………………………………….. 470
f. 6/29/94 letter from Cotecna Inspection S.A., stating that if it receives a contract from the government of Pakistan for the inspection and price verification of imported goods, it will pay Mariston Securities, Inc., 6 percent of the payments made under the contract [597]…………………………………..
Hello All……its almost4 AM…..
Congratulations to Pakistanis on the impending appointment of President Zardari.Any nation, where he can become the president, obviously deserves him!Here is a list of his assets which cannot be verified by me, but who cares anyway???? We now have a 'rejuvenated, honest by-the-books leader'. I have no idea about the total valuation of the wealth itemized here but I suspect it could easily be an aggregated wealth of $2 billion or more. His deceased wife's properties areNOTlisted here. It also seems that this 'compilation' of assets has been leaked from the NRO….
ZARDARI'S LOCAL ASSETS:
1. Plot no. 121, Phase VIII, DHA Karachi.
2. Agricultural land situated in Deh Dali Wadi, Taluka, Tando Allah Yar.
3. Agricultural property located in Deh Tahooki Taluka, District Hyderabad measuring 65.15 acres.
4. Agricultural land falling in Deh 76-Nusrat, Taluka, District Nawabshah measuring 827.14 acres
5. Agricultural land situated in Deh 76-Nusrat, Taluka, District Nawabshah measuring 293.18 acres
6. Residential plot No 3 (Now House) Block No B-I, City Survey No 2268 Ward-A Nawabshah
7. Huma Heights (Asif Apartments) 133, Depot Lines, Commissariat Road, Karachi
8. Trade Tower Building 3/CL/V Abdullah Haroon Road, Karachi
9. House No 8, St 9, F-8/2, Islamabad
10. Agricultural land in Deh 42 Dad Taluka/ District Nawabshah
11. Agricultural land in Deh 51 Dad Taluka Distt Nawabshah
12. Plot No 3 & 4 Sikni (residential) Near Housing Society Ltd. Nawabshah
13. CafT Sheraz (C.S No.. 2231/2 & 2231/3) Nawabshah
14. Agricultural land in Deh 23-Deh Taluka & District Nawabshah
15. Agricultural property in Deh 72-A, Nusrat Taluka, Nawabshah
16. Agricultural land in Deh 76-Nusrat Taluka, Nawabshah
17. Plot No. A/136 Survey No 2346 Ward A Government Employee's Cooperative Housing Society Ltd, Nawabshah
18. Agricultural land in Deh Jaryoon Taluka Tando Allah Yar, Distt. Hyderabad
19. Agricultural land in Deh Deghi Taluka Tando Mohammad Khan
20. Agricultural land in Deh Rahooki Taluka, Hyderabad
21. Property in Deh Charo Taluka, Badin
22. Agricultural property in Deh Dali Wadi Taluka, Hyderabad
23. Five acres prime land allotted by DG KDA in 1995/96
24. 4,000 kanals on Simli Dam
25. 80 acres of land at Hawkes Bay
26. 13 acres of land at Maj Gulradi (KPT Land)
27. One acre plot, GCI, Clifton
28. One acre of land, State Life (International Center, Sadar)
29. FEBCs worth Rs. 4 million
SHARES IN MILLS:
1. Sakrand Sugar Mills Nawabshah
2. Ansari Sugar Mills Hyderabad
3. Mirza Sugar Mills Badin
4. Pangrio Sugar Mills Thatta
5. Bachani Sugar Mills Sanghar
FRONT COMPANIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES:
1. Bomer Fiannce Inc, British Virgin Islands
2. Mariston Securities Inc, British Virgin Islands
3. Marleton Business S A, British Virgin Islands
4. Capricorn Trading S A, British Virgin Islands
5. Fagarita Consulting INc, British Virgin Islands
6. Marvil Associated Inc, British Virgin Islands
7. Pawnbury Finance Ltd, British Virgin Islands
8. Oxton Trading Limited, British Virgin Islands
9. Brinslen Invest S A, British Virgin Islands
10. Chimitex Holding S A, British Virgin Islands
11. Elkins Holding S A, British Virgin Islands
12. Minister Invest Ltd, British Virgin Islands
13. Silvernut Investment Inc, British Virgin Islands
14. Tacolen Investment Ltd, British Virgin Islands
15. Marlcrdon Invest S A, British Virgin Islands
16. Dustan Trading Inc, British Virgin Islands
17. Reconstruction and Development Finance Inc, British Virgin Islands
18. Nassam Alexander Inc.
19. Westminster Securities Inc.
20. Laptworth Investment Inc 202, Saint Martin Drive, West Jacksonville
21. Intra Foods Inc. 3376, Lomrel Grove, Jacksonville, Florida
22. Dynatel Trading Co, Florida
23. A..S Realty Inc. Palm Beach Gardens Florida
24. Bon Voyage Travel Consultancy Inc, Florida
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN UK:
1. 355 acre Rockwood Estate, Surrey (Now stands admitted)
2. Flat 6, 11 Queensgate Terrace, London SW7
3. 26 Palace Mansions, Hammersmith Road, London W14
4. 27 Pont Street, London, SW1
5. 20 Wilton Crescent, London SW1
6. 23 Lord Chancellor Walk, Coombe Hill, Kingston, Surrey
7. The Mansion, Warren Lane, West Hampstead, London
8. A flat at Queensgate Terrace, London
9. Houses at Hammersmith Road, Wilton Crescent, Kingston and in Hampstead.
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN BELGIUM:
1. 12-3 Boulevard De-Nieuport, 1000, Brussels, (Building containing 4 shops and 2 large apartments)
2. Chausee De-Mons, 1670, Brussels
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN FRANCE:
La Manoir De La Reine Blanche and property in Cannes
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN USA
in the name of Asif Zardari and managed by Shimmy Qureshi:
1. Stud farm in Texas
2. Wellington Club East, West Palm Beach
3. 12165 West Forest Hills, Florida
4. Escue Farm 13,524 India Mound, West Palm Beach
5. 3,220 Santa Barbara Drive, Wellington Florida
6. 13,254 Polo Club Road, West Palm Beach Florida
7. 3,000 North Ocean Drive, Singer Islands, Florida
8. 525 South Flager Driver, West Palm Beach, Florida
9. Holiday Inn Houston Owned by Asif Ali Zardari, Iqbal Memon and Sadar-ud-Din Hashwani
ZARDARI'S BANK ACCOUNTS IN FOREGN COMPANIES:
1. Union Bank of Switzerland (Account No. 552.343, 257.556.60Q, 433.142.60V, 216.393.60T)
2. Citibank Private Limited (SWZ) (Account No. 342034)
3. Citibank N A Dubai (Account No. 818097)
4. Barclays Bank (Suisse) (Account No. 62290209)
5. Barclays Bank (Suisse) (Account No. 62274400)
6. Banque Centrade Ormard Burrus S A
7. Banque Pache S A
8. Banque Pictet & Cie
9. Banque La Henin, Paris (Account No. 00101953552)
10. Bank Natinede Paris in Geneva (Account NO.. 563.726.9)
11. Swiss Bank Corporation
12. Chase Manhattan Bank Switzerland
13. American Express Bank Switzerland
14. Societe De Banque Swissee
15. Barclays Bank (Knightsbridge Branch) (Account No. 90991473)
16. Barclays Bank, Kingston and Chelsea Branch, (Sort Code 20-47-34135)
17. National Westminster Bank, Alwych Branch (Account No. 9683230)
18. Habib Bank (Pall Mall Branch).
19. National Westminster Bank, Barking Branch, (Account No. 28558999).
20. Habib Bank AG, Moorgate, London EC2
21. National Westminster Bank, Edgware Road, London
22. Banque Financiei E Dela Citee, Credit Suisse
23. Habib Bank AG Zurich, Switzerland
24. Pictet Et Cie, Geneva
25. Credit Agricole, Paris
26. Credit Agridolf, Branch 11, Place Brevier, 76440, Forges Les Faux
27. Credit Agricole, Branch Haute – Normandie, 76230, Boise Chillaum
For those of you to whom Zardari'sprobable properties list seemed ambiguous, these properties do exist on Google maps. Whether they belong to him or not is a different matter altogether.
In any case, all this man had in 1981 was two cinema houses. He was a well to do chap, but nowhere close to where he is at now! You may like to read below CONCRETE evidence of at least 200 million dollars that he siphoned off.The attached investigation was done by a US Senate Subcommittee in 1999.http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/110999_report.htm
Basically, a 1999 US Senate investigation (exact reference given at end) into Citibank, provides a fascinating inside look at how Citibank helped launder some of the ill-gotten gains of Asif Ali Zardari. Of the four case histories provided in the Report, the following is a complete excerpt of the Case History for Asif Zardari. The report also provides photocopies of signed documents, banks records, etc. (listed below, at the end).
The Facts
The case history involves Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan. Ms. Bhutto was elected Prime Minister in 1988, dismissed by the President of Pakistan in August 1990 for alleged corruption and inability to maintain law and order, elected Prime Minister again in October 1993, and dismissed by the President again in November 1996. At various times, Mr. Zardari served as Senator, Environment Minister and Minister for Investment in the Bhutto government. In between the two Bhutto administrations, he was incarcerated in 1990 and 1991 on charges of corruption; the charges were eventually dropped. During Ms. Bhutto's second term there were increasing allegations of corruption in her government, and a major target of those allegations was Mr. Zardari.
It has been reported that the government of Pakistan claims that Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari stole over $1 billion from the country.
During the period 1994 to 1997, Citibank opened and maintained three private bank accounts in Switzerland and a consumer account in Dubai for three corporations under Mr. Zardari's control. There are allegations that some of these accounts were used to disguise $10 million in kickbacks for a gold importing contract to Pakistan.
Structure of Private Bank Relationship.
Mr. Zardari's relationship with Citibank began in October 1994, through the services of Kamran Amouzegar, a private banker at Citibank private bank in Switzerland, and Jens Schlegelmilch, a Swiss lawyer who was the Bhutto family's attorney in Europe and close personal friend for more than 20 years. According to Citibank, Mr. Schlegelmilch represented to Mr. Amouzegar that he was working for the Dubai royal family and he wanted to open some accounts at the Citibank branch office in Dubai. Mr. Schlegelmilch had a Dubai residency permit and a visa signed by a member of the Dubai royal family. Mr. Amouzegar agreed to introduce Mr. Schlegelmilch to a banker in the Citibank branch office in Dubai.
According to Citicorp, Mr. Schlegelmilch told the Citibank Dubai banker that he wanted to open an account in the name of M.S. Capricorn Trading, a British Virgin Island PIC. The stated purpose of the account was to receive money and transfer it to Switzerland. The account was opened in early October 1994.
According to Citibank, Mr. Schlegelmilch informed the Dubai banker that he would serve as the representative of the account and the signatory on the account. Under Dubai law, a bank is not required to know an account's beneficial owner, only the signatory. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Schlegelmilch did not reveal to the Dubai banker that Mr. Zardari was the beneficial owner of the PIC [Private Investment Company: an offshore company often used to launder money], and the account manager never asked him the identity of the beneficial owner of the account. Instead, according to Citibank, she assumed the beneficial owner of the account was the member of the royal family who had signed Mr. Schlegelmilch's visa. According to Citibank, the account manager actually performed some due diligence on the royal family member whom she believed to be the beneficial owner of the account.
Shortly after opening the account in Dubai, Mr. Schlegelmilch signed a standard referral agreement with Citibank Switzerland private bank guaranteeing him 20% of the first three years of client net revenues earned by the bank from each client he referred to the private bank.
On February 27, 1995, Mr. Schlegelmilch, working with Mr. Amouzegar, opened three accounts at the Citibank Switzerland private bank. The accounts were opened in the name of M.S. Capricorn Trading, which already had an account at Citibank's Dubai branch, as well as Marvel and Bomer Finance, two other British Virgin Island PICs established by Mr. Schlegelmilch, according to Citibank. Each private bank account listed Mr. Schlegelmilch as the account contact and signatory. Citibank informed the Subcommittee that the Swiss Form A, a government-required beneficial owner identification form, identified Mr. Zardari as the beneficial owner of each PIC.
Lack of Due Diligence.
The decision to allow Mr. Schlegelmilch to open the three accounts on behalf of Mr. Zardari, according to Citibank, involved officials at the highest levels of the private bank. The officials were: (a) Mr. Amouzegar, the private banker; (b) Deepak Sharma, then head of private bank operations in Pakistan; (c) Phillipe Holderbeke, then head of private bank operations in Switzerland (who became head of the Europe, Middle East, Africa Division in February 1996); (d) Salim Raza, then head of the EMEA Division of the private bank; and (e) Hubertus Rukavina, then head of the Citibank private bank. Mr. Rukavina told the Subcommittee staff that when he was asked about opening the Zardari accounts, he did not make the decision to open them, but rather directed that the matter be discussed with Mr. Sharma. According to Mr. Rukavina, he never heard whether the accounts were ultimately opened. Mr. Rukavina left the private bank in 1996 and left Citibank in 1999.
Citibank informed the Subcommittee staff that the private bank was aware of the allegations of corruption against Mr. Zardari at the time it opened the accounts in Switzerland. However, Citibank reasoned that if the charges for which Mr. Zardari had been incarcerated for two years had any merit, they would not have been dropped. Bank officials also believed that the family wealth of Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari was large enough to support a large private bank account, even though Citibank was not able to specify what actions were taken to verify the amount and source of their wealth. Citibank said that bank officials were also aware of the M.S. Capricorn Trading account in Dubai, and they were comforted by the fact that there had been no problems with that account. According to Citibank, Mr. Amouzegar informed his superiors that Mr. Zardari was the beneficial owner of the Capricorn account in Dubai when they were considering the request to open the accounts in Switzerland. Inexplicably, however, the Dubai account manager was apparently still operating under the assumption that the beneficial owner of the Dubai Capricorn account was a member of the Dubai royal family.
Subcommittee staff have been unable to determine whether Citibank officials were unaware of or inattentive to the serious inconsistency between Citibank Switzerland and Citibank Dubai with respect to the Capricorn Trading account. Citibank also informed the Subcommittee staff that bank officials had some concerns that if they turned down the accounts, their actions may have implications for the corporation's operations in Pakistan; however, they said they never received any threats on that issue.
Citibank told the Subcommittee staff the private bank decided to allow Mr. Schlegelmilch to open the three accounts for Mr. Zardari on the condition that the private bank would not be the primary accounts for Mr. Zardari's assets and the accounts would function as passive investment accounts. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Holderbeke signed a memo delineating the restrictions placed on the accounts, including a $40 million aggregate limit on the size of the three accounts, and transaction restrictions requiring the accounts to function as passive, stable investments, without multiple transactions or funding pass-throughs. None of the Citibank personnel interviewed by Subcommittee staff could identify any other private bank account with these types of restrictions. Other private banks interviewed by the Subcommittee staff were asked if they had ever accepted a client on the condition that certain restrictions be imposed on the account. The banks all said they had not. One bank representative explained that if the bank felt that it needed to place restrictions on the client's account, it didn't want that type of client. The existence of the restrictions are in themselves proof of the private bank's awareness of Mr. Zardari's poor reputation and concerns regarding the sources of his wealth.
Movement of Funds.
Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that, once opened, only three deposits were made into the M.S. Capricorn Trading account in Dubai. Two deposits, totaling $10 million were made into the account almost immediately after it was opened. Citibank records show that one $5 million deposit was made on October 5,1994, and another was made on October 6, 1994. The source of both deposits was A.R.Y. International Exchange, a company owned by Abdul Razzak Yaqub [since then, the owner of several ARY television channels that, incidentally, have been providing favorable coverage of Ms. Bhutto's recent political activities], a Pakistani gold bullion trader living in Dubai.
According to the New York Times, in December 1994, the Bhutto government awarded Mr. Razzak an exclusive gold import license. In an interview with the New York Times, Mr. Razzak acknowledged that he had used the exclusive license to import more than $500 million worth of gold into Pakistan. Mr. Razzak denies, however, making any payments to Mr. Zardari. Citibank could not explain the two $5 million payments. Ms. Bhutto told the Subcommittee staff that since A.R.Y. International Exchange is a foreign exchange business, the payments did not necessarily come from Mr. Razzak, but could have come from a third party who was merely making use of A.R.Y.'s exchange services. The staff invited Ms. Bhutto to provide additional information on the M.S. Capricorn Trading accounts, but she has not yet done so.
On February 25, 1995, a third deposit of $8 million was made into the Dubai M.S. Capricorn Trading account. Records show that the payment was made through American Express, with the originator of the account listed as "Morgan NYC." Citibank indicated it does not know who Morgan NYC is, nor does it know the source of the $8 million.
All of the funds in the Dubai account of M.S. Capricorn Trading were moved to the Swiss accounts in the Spring of 1995. On March 6, 1995, $8.1 million was transferred; and on May 5, 1995, another $10.2 million was transferred. Both transfers involved U.S. dollars and were routed through Citibank's New York offices. Citibank informed the Subcommittee staff that M.S. Capricorn Trading closed its Dubai account shortly after the last transfer was completed.
Citibank has indicated that significant amounts of other funds were also deposited into the Swiss accounts. As described below, the $40 million cap was reached, and millions of additional dollars also passed through those accounts. However, Swiss bank secrecy law has prevented the Subcommittee from obtaining the details on the transactions in the Zardari accounts.
Account Monitoring.
Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that, in 1996, the Swiss office of the private bank conducted a number of reviews of the Zardari Swiss accounts, finally deciding in October to close them. The first review was allegedly in early 1996, triggered by increasing publicity about allegations of corruption against Mr. Zardari. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Messrs. Holderbeke, [Salim] Raza, Sharma and Amouzegar participated in the review, and apparently concluded that the allegations were politically motivated and that the accounts should remain open. The Subcommittee staff was told that the review did not include looking at the accounts' transaction activity.
In March or April, 1996, Mr. Amouzegar asked that the overall limit on the Zardari accounts be increased from $40 million to $60 million, apparently because the accounts had reached the previously imposed limit of $40 million. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Holderbeke considered the request, but declined to increase the $40 million limit.
In June, press reports in the United Kingdom that Mr. Zardari had purchased real estate in London triggered still another review of the Zardari accounts. Citibank private bank told the Subcommittee staff that its Swiss office internally discussed the source of the funds for the property purchase. Mr. Amouzegar and Mr. [Salim] Raza then met with Mr. Schlegelmilch, who allegedly informed them that funds had been deposited into the Citibank accounts, transferred to another PIC account outside of Citibank and used to purchase the property. Mr. Schlegelmilch allegedly indicated the funds had come from the sale of some sugar mills and were legitimate. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff it is not sure if anyone at the private bank attempted to validate the information about the sale of the sugar mills. In addition, even though this account activity violated the condition imposed by Citibank that the accounts were not to be used as a pass through for funds, the accounts were kept open.
Closing the Accounts.
In July 1996, after Mr. Amouzegar left the private bank to open his own company, another private banker, Cedric Grant, took over management of the Zardari accounts. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that Mr. Grant began to review the Zardari accounts about one month later to familiarize himself with them. He also reviewed the transactions that had taken place within the accounts.
In September and October 1996, press accounts in Pakistan repeatedly raised questions about corruption by Mr. Zardari and Ms. Bhutto, as Ms. Bhutto's re-election campaign increased its activities prior to a February election date. In September, Ms. Bhutto's only surviving brother, Murtaza Bhutto, was assassinated, and Ms. Bhutto's mother accused Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari of masterminding the murder, because the brother had been leading opposition to Ms. Bhutto.
In October, Mr. Grant completed his review of the Zardari accounts and provided a written analysis to Messrs. Holderbeke, Sharma and [Salim] Raza, according to Citibank. Mr. Grant had found numerous violations of the account restrictions imposed by Citibank, including multiple transactions and funding pass-throughs. Citibank told the Subcommittee staff that the accounts had functioned more as checking accounts than passive investment accounts, directly contrary to the private bank's restrictions. Apparently, well over $40 million had flowed through the accounts, though Subcommittee staff were unable to ascertain the actual amount because Swiss bank secrecy law prohibits Citibank from sharing that information with the Subcommittee. Citibank indicated that Mr. Amouzegar had either ignored or did not pay attention to the account activity. Mr. Grant recommended closing the accounts, and they were closed by January 1997.
[Note: In May 1997, Mr. Shaukat Aziz was transferred at Citibank's New York headquarters, from his position as head of credit card operations to head of private banking. In November 1996, Mr. Farooq Laghari had dismissed the government of Ms. Benazir Bhutto-Zardari; and in February 1997, Mr. Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister.]
Legal Proceedings.
On September 8, 1997, the Swiss government issued orders freezing the Zardari and Bhutto accounts at Citibank and three other banks in Switzerland at the request of the Pakistani government. Since Citibank had closed its Zardari accounts in January 1997, it took no action nor did it make any effort to inform U.S. authorities of the accounts until late November 1997. Citibank contacted the Federal Reserve and OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the banking supervision arm of the US Department of Treasury] about the Zardari accounts in late November, in anticipation of a New York Times article that eventually ran in January 1998, alleging that Mr. Zardari had accepted bribes, and that he held Citibank accounts in Dubai and Switzerland. On December 8 and 11, 1997, Citibank briefed the OCC and the Federal Reserve, respectively, about the accounts and the steps it had taken as a result of the Zardari matter. These steps included: closing all of the accounts that had been referred by Mr. Schlegelmilch to the private bank and terminating his referral agreement; reviewing all of the accounts opened in the Dubai office; and tightening up account opening procedures in Dubai, including requiring the Dubai office to identify the beneficial owner of all Dubai accounts. Citibank did not identify any changes made or planned for the Swiss office, even though the majority of the activity with respect to the Zardari accounts had taken place in Switzerland.
On December 5, 1997, Citibank prepared a Suspicious Activity Report on the Zardari accounts and filed it with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network at the U.S. Department of Treasury. The filing was made fourteen months after its decision to close the Zardari accounts; thirteen months after Mr. Zardari was arrested a second time for corruption in November 1996; and nearly two months after the Swiss government had ordered four Swiss banks (including Citibank Switzerland) to freeze all Zardari accounts.
In June 1998, Switzerland indicted Mr. Schlegelmilch and two Swiss businessmen, the former senior executive vice president of SGS and the managing director of Cotecna, for money laundering in connection with kickbacks paid by the Swiss companies for the award of a government contract by Pakistan. In July 1998, Mr. Zardari was indicted for violation of Swiss money laundering law in connection with the same incident. Ms. Bhutto was indicted in Switzerland for the same offense in August 1998. A trial on the charges is expected.
In October 1998, Pakistan indicted Mr. Zardari and Ms. Bhutto for accepting kickbacks from the two Swiss companies in exchange for the award of a government contract. On April 15, 1999, after an 18-month trial, Pakistan's Lahore High Court convicted Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Zardari of accepting the kickbacks and sentenced them to 5 years in prison, fined them $8.6 million and disqualified them from holding public office. Ms. Bhutto, who now lives in London, denounced the decision. Mr. Zardari remains in jail. Additional criminal charges are pending against both in Pakistani courts.
On December 11, 1997, Citicorp's Chairman John Reed wrote the following to the Board of Directors:
"We have another issue with the husband of Ex-Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan. I do not yet understand the facts but I am inclined to think that we made a mistake. More reason than ever to rework our Private Bank."
Mr. Reed told the Subcommittee staff that it was the combination of the Salinas and Zardari accounts that made him charge Mr. [Shaukat] Aziz [currently, Prime Minister of Pakistan], the new private bank head, with taking a hard look at the bank's public figure policy and public figure accounts.
The Issues
The Zardari case history raises issues involving due diligence, secrecy and public figure accounts. The Zardari case history begins with the Citibank Dubai branch's failure to identify the true beneficial owner of the M.S. Capricorn Trading account. As a result, the account officer in Dubai performed due diligence on an individual who had no relationship to the account being opened. In Switzerland, Citibank officials opened three private bank accounts despite evidence of impropriety on the part of Mr. Zardari. In an interview with Subcommittee staff, Citigroup Co-Chair John Reed informed the Subcommittee staff that he had been advised by Citibank officials in preparation for a trip to Pakistan in February 1994, that there were troubling accusations concerning corruption surrounding Mr. Zardari, that he should stay away from him, and that he was not a man with whom the bank wanted to be associated. Yet one year later, the private bank opened three accounts for Mr. Zardari in Switzerland. Mr. Reed told the Subcommittee staff that when he learned of the Zardari accounts he thought the account officer must have been "an idiot."
Citibank has been unable to confirm that bank employees verified that Mr. Zardari had a level of wealth sufficient to support the size of the accounts that he was opening. In addition, the Swiss private banker took no action to validate the legitimacy of the source of the funds that were deposited into the account. For example, there was no effort made to verify the claims that some of the funds derived from the sale of sugar mills.
Citibank also performed no due diligence on the client owned and managed PICs that were the named accountholders. Because the PICs were client-created, the bank's failure to perform due diligence on the PICs meant that it had no knowledge of the activities, assets or entities involved with the corporations. One of the PICs, Bomer Finance, has been determined to have been a repository for kickbacks paid to Mr. Zardari, and those kickbacks tainted funds deposited at the Geneva branch of Union Bank of Switzerland. Documentation has not been made available to determine whether Bomer Finance also used its Citibank account for illicit funds.
Another due diligence lapse was the private bank's failure to monitor the Zardari accounts to ensure that the account restrictions imposed on them were being followed. When officials were presented with evidence in 1996 that the restrictions were being violated, they nevertheless allowed the accounts to continue.
The Zardari accounts in Switzerland were opened one day before Raul Salinas was arrested. The account was repeatedly reviewed in 1996, after the Salinas scandal became public. Yet there is no evidence that anyone in the private bank had been sensitized to the problems associated with handling an account of a person suspected of corruption.
The Zardari example also demonstrates the practical consequences of secrecy in private banking. Citibank claims that its decisionmaking in the Zardari matter cannot be fully explained or documented, since all Citibank officials are subject to Swiss secrecy laws prohibiting discussion of client-specific information. In light of the fact that U.S. banks are supposed to oversee their foreign branches and enforce U.S. law, including anti-money laundering requirements, this inability to produce documentation related to a troubling case again highlights the problems with U.S. banks choosing to operate in secrecy jurisdictions.
Pattern of Poor Account Management.
The Zardari case history took place during a series of critical internal and federal audits between 1992 and 1997 of the Swiss office which, during most of that time, served as the headquarters of the private bank. The shortcomings identified in the audits included policies, procedures, and problems that affected the management of the Zardari accounts. They included:
· failure of the "corporate culture" in the Swiss office to foster " 'a climate of integrity, ethical conduct and prudent risk taking' by U.S. standards";
· inadequate due diligence;
· "less than acceptable internal controls";
· lack of oversight and control of third party referral agents such as Schlegelmilch; and
· inadequate monitoring of accounts; all of which resulted in "unacceptable" internal audit ratings. In December 1995, the Swiss office received the lowest audit score received by any office in the private bank during the 1990s. These audit scores indicate the office's poor handling of the Zardari accounts was part of an ongoing pattern of poor account management.
The Report features as an annex to S. Hrg. 106-248PRIVATE BANKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING: A CASE STUDY OF OPPORTUNITIES AND VULNERABILITIES, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, November 9 and 10, 1999.
This xiv+1114 pages report is available at:Maintenanceas TEXT [424KB] and as PDF [30MB] files
It provides (on page numbers indicated) the following:
Documents relating to Asif Ali Zardari:
a. Swiss Form A identifying Asif Ali Zardari as the beneficial owner of the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in the Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland [600]…………………………………. 445 [Signed by "Asif Ali Zardari, Bilawal House, Karachi (Pak)"]
b. Wire transfer records documenting transfers of $18 million into Mr. Zardari's Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Dubai and transfers of $18.3 million out of the Dubai account into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland ……………………………………… 446
10/5/94 transfer of $5 million from A.R.Y. International Exchange into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai [X6903-4];
10/6/94 transfer of $5 million from A.R.Y. International Exchange into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai [X6900-2]
2/24/95 transfer of $8 million from Morgan NYC into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai;
3/6/95 transfer of $8.1 million from the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland;
5/3/95 transfer of $10.2 million from the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank in Dubai into the Capricorn Trading S.A. account in Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland;
5/4/94 record of Citibank Private Bank in Switzerland credit of $10.2 million to account of Capricorn Trading S.A.
c. Mandate Agreement between Asif Ali Zardari and Jens Schlegelmilch concerning Bomer Finance, Inc. [601-2]………………………………… 466
d. Mandate Agreement between Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Jens Schlegelmilch concerning Mariston Securities, Inc. [603-4]………………………………… 468
e. British Virgin Islands Certificate of Incorporation for Capricorn Trading S.A. [605]………………………………….. 470
f. 6/29/94 letter from Cotecna Inspection S.A., stating that if it receives a contract from the government of Pakistan for the inspection and price verification of imported goods, it will pay Mariston Securities, Inc., 6 percent of the payments made under the contract [597]…………………………………..
Hello All……its almost4 AM…..
Congratulations to Pakistanis on the impending appointment of President Zardari.Any nation, where he can become the president, obviously deserves him!Here is a list of his assets which cannot be verified by me, but who cares anyway???? We now have a 'rejuvenated, honest by-the-books leader'. I have no idea about the total valuation of the wealth itemized here but I suspect it could easily be an aggregated wealth of $2 billion or more. His deceased wife's properties areNOTlisted here. It also seems that this 'compilation' of assets has been leaked from the NRO….
ZARDARI'S LOCAL ASSETS:
1. Plot no. 121, Phase VIII, DHA Karachi.
2. Agricultural land situated in Deh Dali Wadi, Taluka, Tando Allah Yar.
3. Agricultural property located in Deh Tahooki Taluka, District Hyderabad measuring 65.15 acres.
4. Agricultural land falling in Deh 76-Nusrat, Taluka, District Nawabshah measuring 827.14 acres
5. Agricultural land situated in Deh 76-Nusrat, Taluka, District Nawabshah measuring 293.18 acres
6. Residential plot No 3 (Now House) Block No B-I, City Survey No 2268 Ward-A Nawabshah
7. Huma Heights (Asif Apartments) 133, Depot Lines, Commissariat Road, Karachi
8. Trade Tower Building 3/CL/V Abdullah Haroon Road, Karachi
9. House No 8, St 9, F-8/2, Islamabad
10. Agricultural land in Deh 42 Dad Taluka/ District Nawabshah
11. Agricultural land in Deh 51 Dad Taluka Distt Nawabshah
12. Plot No 3 & 4 Sikni (residential) Near Housing Society Ltd. Nawabshah
13. CafT Sheraz (C.S No.. 2231/2 & 2231/3) Nawabshah
14. Agricultural land in Deh 23-Deh Taluka & District Nawabshah
15. Agricultural property in Deh 72-A, Nusrat Taluka, Nawabshah
16. Agricultural land in Deh 76-Nusrat Taluka, Nawabshah
17. Plot No. A/136 Survey No 2346 Ward A Government Employee's Cooperative Housing Society Ltd, Nawabshah
18. Agricultural land in Deh Jaryoon Taluka Tando Allah Yar, Distt. Hyderabad
19. Agricultural land in Deh Deghi Taluka Tando Mohammad Khan
20. Agricultural land in Deh Rahooki Taluka, Hyderabad
21. Property in Deh Charo Taluka, Badin
22. Agricultural property in Deh Dali Wadi Taluka, Hyderabad
23. Five acres prime land allotted by DG KDA in 1995/96
24. 4,000 kanals on Simli Dam
25. 80 acres of land at Hawkes Bay
26. 13 acres of land at Maj Gulradi (KPT Land)
27. One acre plot, GCI, Clifton
28. One acre of land, State Life (International Center, Sadar)
29. FEBCs worth Rs. 4 million
SHARES IN MILLS:
1. Sakrand Sugar Mills Nawabshah
2. Ansari Sugar Mills Hyderabad
3. Mirza Sugar Mills Badin
4. Pangrio Sugar Mills Thatta
5. Bachani Sugar Mills Sanghar
FRONT COMPANIES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES:
1. Bomer Fiannce Inc, British Virgin Islands
2. Mariston Securities Inc, British Virgin Islands
3. Marleton Business S A, British Virgin Islands
4. Capricorn Trading S A, British Virgin Islands
5. Fagarita Consulting INc, British Virgin Islands
6. Marvil Associated Inc, British Virgin Islands
7. Pawnbury Finance Ltd, British Virgin Islands
8. Oxton Trading Limited, British Virgin Islands
9. Brinslen Invest S A, British Virgin Islands
10. Chimitex Holding S A, British Virgin Islands
11. Elkins Holding S A, British Virgin Islands
12. Minister Invest Ltd, British Virgin Islands
13. Silvernut Investment Inc, British Virgin Islands
14. Tacolen Investment Ltd, British Virgin Islands
15. Marlcrdon Invest S A, British Virgin Islands
16. Dustan Trading Inc, British Virgin Islands
17. Reconstruction and Development Finance Inc, British Virgin Islands
18. Nassam Alexander Inc.
19. Westminster Securities Inc.
20. Laptworth Investment Inc 202, Saint Martin Drive, West Jacksonville
21. Intra Foods Inc. 3376, Lomrel Grove, Jacksonville, Florida
22. Dynatel Trading Co, Florida
23. A..S Realty Inc. Palm Beach Gardens Florida
24. Bon Voyage Travel Consultancy Inc, Florida
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN UK:
1. 355 acre Rockwood Estate, Surrey (Now stands admitted)
2. Flat 6, 11 Queensgate Terrace, London SW7
3. 26 Palace Mansions, Hammersmith Road, London W14
4. 27 Pont Street, London, SW1
5. 20 Wilton Crescent, London SW1
6. 23 Lord Chancellor Walk, Coombe Hill, Kingston, Surrey
7. The Mansion, Warren Lane, West Hampstead, London
8. A flat at Queensgate Terrace, London
9. Houses at Hammersmith Road, Wilton Crescent, Kingston and in Hampstead.
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN BELGIUM:
1. 12-3 Boulevard De-Nieuport, 1000, Brussels, (Building containing 4 shops and 2 large apartments)
2. Chausee De-Mons, 1670, Brussels
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN FRANCE:
La Manoir De La Reine Blanche and property in Cannes
ZARDARI'S PROPERTIES IN USA
in the name of Asif Zardari and managed by Shimmy Qureshi:
1. Stud farm in Texas
2. Wellington Club East, West Palm Beach
3. 12165 West Forest Hills, Florida
4. Escue Farm 13,524 India Mound, West Palm Beach
5. 3,220 Santa Barbara Drive, Wellington Florida
6. 13,254 Polo Club Road, West Palm Beach Florida
7. 3,000 North Ocean Drive, Singer Islands, Florida
8. 525 South Flager Driver, West Palm Beach, Florida
9. Holiday Inn Houston Owned by Asif Ali Zardari, Iqbal Memon and Sadar-ud-Din Hashwani
ZARDARI'S BANK ACCOUNTS IN FOREGN COMPANIES:
1. Union Bank of Switzerland (Account No. 552.343, 257.556.60Q, 433.142.60V, 216.393.60T)
2. Citibank Private Limited (SWZ) (Account No. 342034)
3. Citibank N A Dubai (Account No. 818097)
4. Barclays Bank (Suisse) (Account No. 62290209)
5. Barclays Bank (Suisse) (Account No. 62274400)
6. Banque Centrade Ormard Burrus S A
7. Banque Pache S A
8. Banque Pictet & Cie
9. Banque La Henin, Paris (Account No. 00101953552)
10. Bank Natinede Paris in Geneva (Account NO.. 563.726.9)
11. Swiss Bank Corporation
12. Chase Manhattan Bank Switzerland
13. American Express Bank Switzerland
14. Societe De Banque Swissee
15. Barclays Bank (Knightsbridge Branch) (Account No. 90991473)
16. Barclays Bank, Kingston and Chelsea Branch, (Sort Code 20-47-34135)
17. National Westminster Bank, Alwych Branch (Account No. 9683230)
18. Habib Bank (Pall Mall Branch).
19. National Westminster Bank, Barking Branch, (Account No. 28558999).
20. Habib Bank AG, Moorgate, London EC2
21. National Westminster Bank, Edgware Road, London
22. Banque Financiei E Dela Citee, Credit Suisse
23. Habib Bank AG Zurich, Switzerland
24. Pictet Et Cie, Geneva
25. Credit Agricole, Paris
26. Credit Agridolf, Branch 11, Place Brevier, 76440, Forges Les Faux
27. Credit Agricole, Branch Haute – Normandie, 76230, Boise Chillaum
