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1962 A Missed Opportunity...

Pakistan had an excellent opportunity in the 1948 war (on multiple levels) to wrest away Kashmir militarily, but the civilian leadership sat on it too long, and then decided against one major offensive operation by the PA towards the end because they thought the dispute resolution process through the UN was appropriate.

The initiative was also lost because the PA was not officially involved in the war for a long time, and even when it was, it was restricted to defensive operations.

As we can see from Nehru's comments just a few years later, India used the UN to merely buy herself time and then renege on her commitments - that set the tone for 'back stabbing' and future hostility for years to come.
 
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Here we go again.
He is teaching me what's novel in War and what's ignoble.
Dude, don't try to teach me the International Law of War kinda thing on this.
You claim that at the time of Kargil Pak and india were in guud terms, so what kind of terms would you calls that were there before this mumbai drama??

What about all those CBMs and BS. All 8 years washed away in one click.

Probably you may also should consider the US invasion of Iraq ignoble, who even after admitting that it didn't find anything that they claim Iraq was making, is still hanging inside that country.

There is nothing noble or ignoble in War!
It's the conspiracy and dirty play that is not noble! It is the thought of Greater india and the dream of South Asian super power that is condemned by all the neighbors and it is this that should be termed as paltry. Which you find me referring to as 'back stabbing'.
You certainly dont know the meaning of the word NOVEL! I meant to say, Kargil Operation was not that great a plan or anything, It was not a brilliant Military Plan, it was a Poor Plan! But It was executed in an okayish to good manner!

Kargil was an Indian Failure, In the sense, the so called GREAT RAW, or IB failed to see some people climb up a stategic point!!!

Dont bring in Mumbai plz! and dont refer to it as a Drama! How would u feel If I say all the problems in baloch is a drama done by the Pak army to gain US military aid? Sounds BS right??? Yes It is BS, and so is calling 26/11 a drama or false flag! Finally GOP has said that Kasab is a pakistani, now dont go on about GOP being pro India and run by zionists! God Speed.
 
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You certainly dont know the meaning of the word NOVEL! I meant to say, Kargil Operation was not that great a plan or anything, It was not a brilliant Military Plan, it was a Poor Plan! But It was executed in an okayish to good manner!

Kargil was an Indian Failure, In the sense, the so called GREAT RAW, or IB failed to see some people climb up a stategic point!!!

Dont bring in Mumbai plz! and dont refer to it as a Drama! Yes It is BS, and so is calling 26/11 a drama or false flag! , now dont go on about GOP being pro India and run by zionists! God Speed.

Now you have shifted from being a philosophy teacher to an english one?
Well people will term you lame if you consider the Kargil Plan 'not guud'
It was the execution to some extent(less the start) and the end game where we f*** up.
My opinion is the other way round what you think about Kargil.
How would u feel If I say all the problems in baloch is a drama done by the Pak army to gain US military aid? Sounds BS right???
And say only that thing tha you can support with atleast something.
Finally GOP has said that Kasab is a pakistani
Yes he is Pakistani, and that too a proud one. Read my posts in the thread 'ajmal Pakistani or not' You'll get what i want to say.


BTW aren't we discussing back stabbing and playing dirty?
 
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Now you have shifted from being a philosophy teacher to an english one?
Well people will term you lame if you consider the Kargil Plan 'not guud'
It was the execution to some extent(less the start) and the end game where we f*** up.
My opinion is the other way round what you think about Kargil.

And say only that thing tha you can support with atleast something.

Yes he is Pakistani, and that too a proud one. Read my posts in the thread 'ajmal Pakistani or not' You'll get what i want to say.


BTW aren't we discussing back stabbing and playing dirty?
You got anything to prove that Mumbai Drama is a Inside job? Dont quote Hamid plz!

I believe there is a code of honour in a war. Iraq war was BS, the whole world condemned it (they couldnt do anything more than it though)

Maybe I am a loner in this claim that there is honour in battle. But isnt it what the Quran teaches us? To avoid treachery and Not to Transgress in a war?? and I am stopping this here, because I dont want to go on and on! God Speed.
 
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You got anything to prove that Mumbai Drama is a Inside job? Dont quote Hamid plz!

I believe there is a code of honour in a war. Iraq war was BS, the whole world condemned it (they couldnt do anything more than it though)

Maybe I am a loner in this claim that there is honour in battle. But isnt it what the Quran teaches us? To avoid treachery and Not to Transgress in a war?? and I am stopping this here, because I dont want to go on and on! God Speed.

Lolz...
I'll only say,
There's a Urdu saying:
900 chohay kha k billi Haj pe chali!!(Correct me people if i m wrong in the syntax)
period.
 
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Pakistan had an excellent opportunity in the 1948 war (on multiple levels) to wrest away Kashmir militarily, but the civilian leadership sat on it too long, and then decided against one major offensive operation by the PA towards the end because they thought the dispute resolution process through the UN was appropriate.

The initiative was also lost because the PA was not officially involved in the war for a long time, and even when it was, it was restricted to defensive operations.

As we can see from Nehru's comments just a few years later, India used the UN to merely buy herself time and then renege on her commitments - that set the tone for 'back stabbing' and future hostility for years to come.

I think that would be an incorrect characterization. Many in India (especially the home minister Mr. Patel) were always against going to the UN and wanted the IA to finish the job. Nehru thought otherwise and went to the UN. The UN resolutions didn't make headway for whatever reasons (we have discussed that) and possibly the cynics got the upper hand in the meanwhile. That likely made India change her position on how relevant and effective the UN resolutions were. That along with the change in the ground realities later made them wholly irrelevant over time.
 
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Pakistan was probably not ready for war in 1962. You can't fight war at a moment's notice.

While on that, both countries were not really ready even in 1965, Pakistan more so than India. I have seen reports that talk of the precarious Pakistani position in terms of ammunition left at the end of the war coupled with wrong information passed to the Indian leadership about the Indian position in the same area. If the real position had been known to Indian leaders, possibly India won't have gone for ceasefire at the time. Pakistan's position was really precarious.
 
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Pakistan was probably not ready for war in 1962. You can't fight war at a moment's notice.

I have seen reports that talk of the precarious Pakistani position in terms of ammunition left at the end of the war coupled with wrong information passed to the Indian leadership about the Indian position in the same area. If the real position had been known to Indian leaders, possibly India won't have gone for ceasefire at the time. Pakistan's position was really precarious.

It is said for a leader that whatever information(of victory) that you get from the frontline should be divided by half in order to get the true picture of the battle at hand.
Reports from the frontlines are usually exaggerated or understated.
 
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It is said for a leader that whatever information(of victory) that you get from the frontline should be divided by half in order to get the true picture of the battle at hand.
Reports from the frontlines are usually exaggerated or understated.

I agree. I am talking of reports that came much after the war was over and the real situation could be analyzed with a cool head.

Will try and post a link if I can dig that up.
 
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I agree. I am talking of reports that came much after the war was over and the real situation could be analyzed with a cool head.

Will try and post a link if I can dig that up.

That was said by a General of ours during a war game/exercise.:enjoy:
Anywaz, i'll try to find if it was in one of the books.
 
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The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_War_of_1965
 
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I found a very insightful source that provides some information of the battle ground in the Sino-Indian war of '62 C.E


State Entry Exit Combat Forces Population Losses
China 1962 1963 4000000 890000000 3000
India 1962 1963 1000000 600000000 4000



Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed territory along the 3,225-kilometer-long Himalayan border, the Chinese attacked India on October 20, 1962. At the time, nine divisions from the eastern and western commands were deployed along the Himalayan border with China. None of these divisions was up to its full troop strength, and all were short of artillery, tanks, equipment, and even adequate articles of clothing.

In Ladakh the Chinese attacked south of the Karakoram Pass at the northwest end of the Aksai Chin Plateau and in the Pangong Lake area about 160 kilometers to the southeast. The defending Indian forces were easily ejected from their posts in the area of the Karakoram Pass and from most posts near Pangong Lake. However, they put up spirited resistance at the key posts of Daulat Beg Oldi (near the entrance to the pass) and Chushul (located immediately south of Pangong Lake and at the head of the vital supply road to Leh, a major town and location of an air force base in Ladakh). Other Chinese forces attacked near Demchok (about 160 kilometers southeast of Chusul) and rapidly overran the Demchok and the Jara La posts.

In the eastern sector, in Assam, the Chinese forces advanced easily despite Indian efforts at resistance. On the first day of the fighting, Indian forces stationed at the Tsang Le post on the northern side of the Namka Chu, the Khinzemane post, and near Dhola were overrun. On the western side of the North-East Frontier Agency, Tsang Dar fell on October 22, Bum La on October 23, and Tawang, the headquarters of the Seventh Infantry Brigade, on October 24. The Chinese made an offer to negotiate on October 24. The Indian government promptly rejected this offer.

With a lull in the fighting, the Indian military desperately sought to regroup its forces. Specifically, the army attempted to strengthen its defensive positions in the North-East Frontier Agency and Ladakh and to prepare against possible Chinese attacks through Sikkim and Bhutan. Army units were moved from Calcutta, Bihar, Nagaland, and Punjab to guard the northern frontiers of West Bengal and Assam. Three brigades were hastily positioned in the western part of the North-East Frontier Agency, and two other brigades were moved into Sikkim and near the West Bengal border with Bhutan to face the Chinese. Light Stuart tanks were drawn from the Eastern Command headquarters at Calcutta to bolster these deployments.

In the western sector, a divisional organization was established in Leh; several battalions of infantry, a battery of twenty-five-pounder guns, and two troops of AMX light tanks were airlifted into the Chushul area from Punjab. On November 4, the Indian military decided that the post at Daulat Beg Oldi was untenable, and its defenders were withdrawn over the 5,300-meter-high Sasar Brangsa Pass to a more defensible position.

The reinforcements and redeployments in Ladakh proved sufficient to defend the Chushul perimeter despite repeated Chinese attacks. However, the more remote posts at Rezang La and Gurung Hill and the four posts at Spanggur Lake area fell to the Chinese.

In the North-East Frontier Agency, the situation proved to be quite different. Indian forces counterattacked on November 13 and captured a hill northwest of the town of Walong. Concerted Chinese attacks dislodged them from this hard-won position, and the nearby garrison had to retreat down the Lohit Valley.

In another important section of the eastern sector, the Kameng Frontier Division, six Chinese brigades attacked across the Tawang Chu near Jang and advanced some sixteen kilometers to the southeast to attack Indian positions at Nurang, near Se La, on November 17. Despite the Indian attempt to regroup their forces at Se La, the Chinese continued their onslaught, wiping out virtually all Indian resistance in Kameng. By November 18, the Chinese had penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border.

The Chinese did not advance farther and on November 21 declared a unilateral cease-fire. They had accomplished all of their territorial objectives, and any attempt to press farther into the plains of Assam would have stretched their logistical capabilities and their lines of communication to a breaking point. By the time the fighting stopped, each side had lost 500 troops.

The fighting war was over, but a new diplomatic war had begun. After more than thirty years of border tension and stalemate, high-level bilateral talks were held in New Delhi starting in February 1994 to foster "confidence-building measures" between the defense forces of India and China, and a new period of better relations began.

Source: China India War 1962-1963


Wow this is a great read very informative!
 
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7eab385915cb6207b1bb52a05d7e29b5.jpg



Very interesting image.

"At a national level, we did not read the enemy's [China] intentions properly. There are letters from Vallabhbhai Patel to the prime minister that are published that ratify all that I am saying: Mr Patel draws the attention of the government to the fact that the Chinese should not be underestimated. Their intentions are not as honourable as they appear. The nation should prepare for the worst. But unless you recognise that an adversary is an adversary, your preparations will never match the situation. "- Indian Lieutenant General (retd) Ravi Eipe

Source: rediff.com: Special Series: The Sino-Indian War of 1962


So it is clear the Indians had committed a very deadly blunder, I suggest we should have taken opportunity of their chaotic and confusing situation and we should have struck hard at the Indian military, and a major operation to capture the whole of Kashmir as well...
 
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