Why China Is Not a Superpower

GWXP · Mar 13, 2023

China might be a massive regional power at this moment, but they will certainly become a global superpower by 2035 and they will be superior to USA in many aspects.

1) Today, China is the biggest economy in the world if calculated by GDP PPP and they will certainly surpass US in nominal GDP by 2035

2) Today, China holds 33% share of global manufacturing by value (compared to USA's 16% share) and probably 45-50% share of global manufacturing by quantity

3) Today, China publish more scientific papers than USA (744.000 papers vs 624.000) and make more innovations than US as shown by patent applications statistics (1,44mln patent applications in China vs 0,5mln in USA) and China will certainly dominate global science and technology by 2035

4) By 2035 China will have a network of military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as shown by China's String of Pearls strategy

5) By 2035, with the collapse of the unipolar world, China will build an alliance with Russia, Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and other countries against the West and of course China will be the dominant power within this anti-Western coalition the same way as USA is the dominant power within the Western world.

6) By 2035 China will reach military parity with USA in all aspects: navy, air force, ground force, nuclear, space

Navy:

Between 1967 and 1979 USSR built 122 nuclear submarines (10 nuclear submarines per year) and 5 aircraft carriers (one aircraft carrier per 2,5 years on average)

China is much richer than USSR and China holds 47% share of global shipbuilding industry. It is obvious that China can build a massive Navy over the next 12 years.

According to this article from 2019

Predicting the Chinese Navy of 2030

Making predictions for the Chinese Navy a decade in advance is difficult given the PLA’s overall opacity.

thediplomat.com

By 2030 China might have 6 aircraft carriers, 82 destroyers, 37 SSN, 10 SSBN, 11 large amphibious assault ships (compared to USA: 11 aircraft carrier, 84 cruisers and destroyers, 50 SSN, 15 SSBN, 9 large amphibious assault ships).

By 2035 Chinese Navy can easily reach parity with US Navy in total number of advanced ships and surpass US Navy in total tonnage.

Air Force:

If China mass produce J-20 and J-31 in hundreds per year, by 2035 they will have thousands of 5th generation fighters and reach parity with US air force.

Over the next 12 years, China can also mass produce strategic bombers and hundreds of transport aircrafts and this will add to China's power projection capabilities.

Nuclear arsenal:

China set to expand nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads by 2035,

China set to expand nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads by 2035, US says

Expansion of forces comes as Washington grows increasingly concerned about rival powers

www.ft.com

So, by 2035 China will become a superpower and will be superior to US in population size, economy, manufacturing, science and technology and will have anti-Western allies + a network of military bases, and reach military parity with USA in all military aspects.

Laser · Mar 13, 2023

Baray Mazakiye ho

Get Ya Wig Split said:
Why China Is Not a Superpower How the United States, China, and the former Soviet Union stack up.
View attachment 919904
China’s growing power is the single most influential driver of geopolitical change today. Notwithstanding Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, the United States has clearly identified China as its number one challenge. In June 2022, for the first time ever, NATO included China in its Strategic Concept, signaling a radical shift in the bloc’s security outlook.

But how mighty is China really? Measuring and comparing power between nations and across time is an imprecise exercise at best. Nonetheless, we can gain valuable information about China’s current power position if we compare it to the contemporary United States and Cold War-era Soviet Union—and consider three important concepts: polarity, hegemony, and the original definition of a superpower.

Such a comparison reveals that the United States is a pole, regional hegemon, and superpower. The Soviet Union was a pole and a superpower—but did not have regional hegemony. And although China is a pole in what is now a bipolar U.S.-China system, it is neither a regional hegemon nor a superpower. While these categorizations might read like abstract nuances in a scholarly debate, they actually have major, concrete implications for strategy and policy in the 21st century.

Polarity is simply the number of great powers in the international system. The most common method to determine which powers count as great is to look at key indicators: population, territorial size, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and policy competence. Using these seven indicators, we can see the international system now has a distinct bipolar power structure, with China and the United States as the two poles—similar to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War.

In terms of economic power, the current system is actually even more perfectly bipolar than during the Cold War, with China’s aggregated economic wealth almost equaling that of the United States. The Soviet economy, on the other hand, never accounted for more than 50 percent of the U.S. economy. With regard to military power, however, the current international system is less perfectly bipolar than it was during the Cold War, with a larger gap in military might between Washington and Beijing now than Washington and Moscow then. The major reason for the larger gap is that China spends a smaller share of its GDP on defense than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.

According to the theory of structural realism, the number of poles in a power structure informs great power behavior and international order in unique ways. A bipolar power structure is expected to drive the two poles toward an intensive, all-encompassing rivalry and create a distinct two-bloc divide between the two rivals and their respective allies—a divide that extends to military, economic, and other matters. This was the case during the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, and we see signs of a similar development today. (The debate even asks whether the U.S.-China rivalry will turn into a new cold war.)

Polarity alone, however, does not provide us with the full picture of China’s might. Unlike polarity, which derives from power and size, the concepts of hegemony and superpower are geopolitical concepts that provide us with additional information about the reach and limits of China’s influence.
“Superpower” was coined as a concept by the American international relations scholar William T. R. Fox in his book The Superpowers, published in 1944. With the United States and China the two dominant states in a bipolar power structure, it is common to refer to both countries as superpowers. Needless to say, only poles in the international system can be superpowers—but being a pole is not the only requirement for being a superpower. If one goes by Fox’s original definition, China is not a superpower.

Fox divided great powers into two categories: superpowers and regional powers. According to Fox, superpowers have global influence and the capability to throw their armed forces into any major theater of war dictated by grand strategy. Regional powers, on the other hand, may enjoy the formal and ceremonial prestige of great power status, but their influence is great in only a single theater of power conflict. Fox stressed that only a power with a huge territorial range can be a power in more than one part of the world. In 1944, Fox still defined Britain as a superpower due to its Commonwealth and empire—and its ability to project power in all the main theaters of the world, including with large numbers of colonial troops. Yet after World War II, it soon became obvious that Britain was no longer either a pole or a superpower.

The United States is undoubtedly a superpower, with a world-wide network of alliance agreements and overseas bases enabling it to deploy and move forces rapidly between various theaters. The Soviet Union, too, was a superpower. Although Moscow was never able to establish a world-wide network of military bases on a similar scale as Washington, its position in the Eurasian heartland allowed it to influence the strategic theaters in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union also had a navy with global reach.

China, however, is only a regional power. It wields global economic power and influence, but the geographic reach of its military is largely limited to the Asian and Indo-Pacific theaters. From its position in the East Asian rimland, China has more limited geographic reach into the Eurasian continent than the Cold War-era Soviet Union did—and less access to the high seas than either the United States or the Soviet Union. The United States’ blessed geographic position gives it direct and unhindered access to the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic oceans. Although the Soviet Union’s access to the high seas was more restricted than that of the United States, it still had direct access from its homeland to the Pacific and Arctic oceans, as well as almost-but-not-quite direct access to the Atlantic Ocean. China only borders the Pacific Ocean—and is largely hemmed in by major island chains it does not control.

Naturally, China’s nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities all have worldwide reach. China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear force as well as its nuclear delivery platforms. Moreover, with nearly 600 satellites in orbit—of which 229 are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites—China has the world’s second largest fleet of satellites after the United States. Chinese cyber capabilities can wreak havoc in every corner of the world. And these days, balloons should perhaps also be added to the picture as a potent capability with global reach.

Nevertheless, the geographic reach of these technologies is insufficient to strongly influence strategic theaters beyond Asia. Even in an age of space and cyber warfare, coercive diplomacy is more effective when troops can be physically deployed to a border or shore. Gunboat diplomacy still requires boats, and airplanes still need airfields to operate in far-flung regions. In other words, geography makes China even more dependent than the United States and former Soviet Union on overseas bases and willing allies to move its armed forces beyond its home region. China has almost none of either.

China currently has only one overseas base—its naval facility in Djibouti staffed with 400 Chinese marines. While the U.S. Navy sails the world’s oceans on a daily basis, the Chinese navy only occasionally conducts naval diplomacy missions beyond the Indo-Pacific. This may change, of course, with the Chinese navy now adding aircraft carriers and other blue-water vessels to its fast-growing fleet. China is reportedly looking to add more overseas bases in the Pacific Ocean and Africa. However, it is still a long-term project for China to turn itself into a true superpower with world-wide military reach. Moreover, the U.S. forward posture in China’s neighborhood complicates such a scenario—which is where the third concept, regional hegemony, comes in.

Regional hegemony is one state’s dominance over the other states in a geographic region, in terms of military and economic power. The United States is a regional hegemon in the Western hemisphere because no other state in that region is in a position to challenge its dominance. Dominance in its home region allows the United States to devote more resources to other geographic regions rather than having to secure its own. In contrast, the Soviet Union was never a regional hegemon, and neither is China today.

The main purpose of great power balancing has always been for a state to counter the rise of a hegemon that can threaten its survival. Since the early 19th century, the United States has continually been concerned with preventing the rise of European and East Asian hegemons that would consider expansion into the Western hemisphere. In order to prevent Soviet hegemony in Eurasia during the Cold War, the United States contained Soviet interests and influence throughout the Eurasian rimlands, including Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. This policy not only prevented Soviet hegemony in its region, but also limited the Soviets’ room to maneuver.

China is now facing a similar situation. In order to prevent Chinese hegemony in East Asia, the United States is likely to keep a strong forward posture in the region. Moreover, just like countries in the Eurasian rimlands feared Soviet dominance and welcomed U.S. balancing efforts during the Cold War, Indo-Pacific states are now strengthening their security cooperation with Washington. Australia, India, and Japan are working with the United States in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, while Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea have all stepped up their dialogue with NATO.

Each of these three concepts—polarity, superpower, and regional hegemony—provides insight to unique and important characteristics of China and the international system. Seen together, they lay out a substantially more comprehensive picture of China’s current power position. From this, we can draw three main conclusions: First, despite China’s impressive rise and the resulting shifts in the international system and global balance of power, China is not yet a superpower. It largely remains a regional power. Second, the United States and its allies will seek to prevent China from gaining regional hegemony. Third, if China decides that it is not satisfied being a regional power and aims to become a superpower in the true sense of the word, it will need to leapfrog the geopolitical constraints of its home region.

China’s geopolitical position, including its lack of true superpower status, has two main strategic implications. First, in a short to medium-term perspective, the U.S.-China rivalry will be regional—restricted to Asia and the Indo-Pacific—and a predominantly naval contest. The confinement of the U.S.-China rivalry to these theaters will challenge trans-Atlantic relations in unprecedented ways, while its maritime element points toward a dynamic and potentially unstable rivalry. The other and more long-term strategic implication concerns any attempts by China to leapfrog the geopolitical constraints of its home region. The manner in which China sets about doing this, and United States’ efforts to prevent it, would then define their rivalry.

Why China Is Not a Superpower

How the United States, China, and the former Soviet Union stack up.

foreignpolicy.com

Jeeten Parikh · Mar 13, 2023

beijingwalker said:
lol, guess you guys don't know, "superpower" is a bad word in China.

I'd go even further. The old definition of superpower is just not valid enough anymore.

Two important factors are very different from 1940s:

1. Globalization, cyber everything and irrevocable interdependence

2. Intent. My read is China wants influence globally, not territorial dominance.

Given these two, I'd say China is a already a superpower, though lagging USA significantly.

serenity · Mar 13, 2023

Superpower may be a Cold War era and post Soviet word that has less relevance today but in the sense of the proper definition, of course there is only one superpower. It is simply that English written articles have often abused the word and use it when talking about China's perceived security and competition threat to the previous world order that there also is this balance where other English articles feel the need to tell the opposite story of why China is not a superpower.

Well here let's forget media abuse of words and simply say there is only one superpower and while it was very clear in 1991, it is much less clear today albeit still considered to be the US.

The thing with these power transitions is that only after the second place has long overtaken first place, do the common folks begin to understand. When the British overtook the Dutch, there were many, many, many decades before it was clear and "proven". When the US overtook all European nations well before WW2 began, it was not clear the US was already in position 1 with WW2 of course cementing that further until the supposed Cold War competition which the US was in the overall lead from day 1. I suggest that we as commoners will not know even if the US has already been displaced until many decades after the fact if there was a finite and quantifiable point at which (as defined by a superior intelligence/power) any other has overtaken the US. Data itself already lags. News and internet chatter obfuscate reality to an incredibly delusional degree.

One must have many points of reference and know both well before even having a minor understanding of their true relative positions. I posit that most westerners have next to zero clue of how reality actually is. Abundantly clear all over the internet.

When I say know both well, I mean that. Not based on one sided propaganda etc but having lived worked and understood deeply, as many aspects of each side as humanly possible. From those people, one may find more grounded and sensible takes. On this forum? well lol.

beijingwalker · Mar 13, 2023

Jeeten Parikh said:
I'd go even further. The old definition of superpower is just not valid enough anymore.

Two important factors are very different from 1940s:

1. Globalization, cyber everything and irrevocable interdependence

2. Intent. My read is China wants influence globally, not territorial dominance.

Given these two, I'd say China is a already a superpower, though lagging USA significantly.

Superpower in Chinese is closely associated with imperialism and hegemony and carries very negative connotation.

BHAN85 · Mar 13, 2023

China likes to look weaker than really is, so China must be happy with this article of lies.

CailynZhang · Mar 13, 2023

What are some important concepts that can be used to compare the power of nations? How do these concepts apply to China's power position compared to the US and the USSR during the Cold War?
There are three important concepts that can be used to compare the power of nations and understand their geopolitical influence: polarity, hegemony, and the original definition of a superpower.
Polarity refers to the number of great powers in the international system. Using key indicators such as population, territorial size, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and policy competence, the current international system has a distinct bipolar power structure, with China and the United States as the two poles.
Hegemony is a geopolitical concept that provides information about the reach and limits of a nation's influence. A regional hegemon may enjoy the formal and ceremonial prestige of great power status, but its influence is great in only a single theater of power conflict. In this context, the US is a regional hegemon, while China is not.
The original definition of a superpower, as defined by William T. R. Fox in his book The Superpowers, published in 1944, divides great powers into two categories: superpowers and regional powers. According to Fox, only a power with a huge territorial range can be a power in more than one part of the world, making China a regional power with a limited geographic reach into the Eurasian continent.
Comparing the power of the US, USSR, and China using these concepts, the US is a pole, regional hegemon, and superpower. The USSR was a pole and a superpower but did not have regional hegemony. China is a pole in a bipolar system with the US, but it is neither a regional hegemon nor a superpower. While these categorizations might seem like abstract nuances, they have major implications for strategy and policy in the 21st century.

renhai · Mar 13, 2023

Broccoli said:
Xi is now as powerful as Mao was after cultural revolution so whatever he says goes.

Again; Purges are over and only his friends are now in positions of power... do you think anyone would oppose his orders to invade Taiwan next month?

The Chinese don't like the word "super power". If you love it. We are willing to admit that you are a super power.

On the Taiwan issue. Whether China is democratic or autocratic. China must complete national reunification. Facts may make you despair~If China is the democratic country you expect, China may use force against Taiwan Province earlier.

You think that "democratic China will not use force to unify Taiwan". It's funny. I understand that you are anti-IQ because of anti-China.

Jeeten Parikh · Mar 14, 2023

beijingwalker said:
Superpower in Chinese is closely associated with imperialism and hegemony and carries very negative connotation.

Unfortunately under that definition, it is a superpower !

MH.Yang · Mar 14, 2023

The real Chinese will not like the word "superpower", which is a derogatory term.

If Indians like "superpower", then we recognize India as a superpower.

Please don't call China a "superpower", thank you.

beijingwalker · Mar 14, 2023

Jeeten Parikh said:
Unfortunately under that definition, it is a superpower !

For US, yes.

Jeeten Parikh · Mar 14, 2023

beijingwalker said:
For US, yes.

the US should be us

khansaheeb · Apr 26, 2023

Get Ya Wig Split said:
Why China Is Not a Superpower How the United States, China, and the former Soviet Union stack up.
View attachment 919904
China’s growing power is the single most influential driver of geopolitical change today. Notwithstanding Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, the United States has clearly identified China as its number one challenge. In June 2022, for the first time ever, NATO included China in its Strategic Concept, signaling a radical shift in the bloc’s security outlook.

But how mighty is China really? Measuring and comparing power between nations and across time is an imprecise exercise at best. Nonetheless, we can gain valuable information about China’s current power position if we compare it to the contemporary United States and Cold War-era Soviet Union—and consider three important concepts: polarity, hegemony, and the original definition of a superpower.

Such a comparison reveals that the United States is a pole, regional hegemon, and superpower. The Soviet Union was a pole and a superpower—but did not have regional hegemony. And although China is a pole in what is now a bipolar U.S.-China system, it is neither a regional hegemon nor a superpower. While these categorizations might read like abstract nuances in a scholarly debate, they actually have major, concrete implications for strategy and policy in the 21st century.

Polarity is simply the number of great powers in the international system. The most common method to determine which powers count as great is to look at key indicators: population, territorial size, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and policy competence. Using these seven indicators, we can see the international system now has a distinct bipolar power structure, with China and the United States as the two poles—similar to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War.

In terms of economic power, the current system is actually even more perfectly bipolar than during the Cold War, with China’s aggregated economic wealth almost equaling that of the United States. The Soviet economy, on the other hand, never accounted for more than 50 percent of the U.S. economy. With regard to military power, however, the current international system is less perfectly bipolar than it was during the Cold War, with a larger gap in military might between Washington and Beijing now than Washington and Moscow then. The major reason for the larger gap is that China spends a smaller share of its GDP on defense than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War.

According to the theory of structural realism, the number of poles in a power structure informs great power behavior and international order in unique ways. A bipolar power structure is expected to drive the two poles toward an intensive, all-encompassing rivalry and create a distinct two-bloc divide between the two rivals and their respective allies—a divide that extends to military, economic, and other matters. This was the case during the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, and we see signs of a similar development today. (The debate even asks whether the U.S.-China rivalry will turn into a new cold war.)

Polarity alone, however, does not provide us with the full picture of China’s might. Unlike polarity, which derives from power and size, the concepts of hegemony and superpower are geopolitical concepts that provide us with additional information about the reach and limits of China’s influence.
“Superpower” was coined as a concept by the American international relations scholar William T. R. Fox in his book The Superpowers, published in 1944. With the United States and China the two dominant states in a bipolar power structure, it is common to refer to both countries as superpowers. Needless to say, only poles in the international system can be superpowers—but being a pole is not the only requirement for being a superpower. If one goes by Fox’s original definition, China is not a superpower.

Fox divided great powers into two categories: superpowers and regional powers. According to Fox, superpowers have global influence and the capability to throw their armed forces into any major theater of war dictated by grand strategy. Regional powers, on the other hand, may enjoy the formal and ceremonial prestige of great power status, but their influence is great in only a single theater of power conflict. Fox stressed that only a power with a huge territorial range can be a power in more than one part of the world. In 1944, Fox still defined Britain as a superpower due to its Commonwealth and empire—and its ability to project power in all the main theaters of the world, including with large numbers of colonial troops. Yet after World War II, it soon became obvious that Britain was no longer either a pole or a superpower.

The United States is undoubtedly a superpower, with a world-wide network of alliance agreements and overseas bases enabling it to deploy and move forces rapidly between various theaters. The Soviet Union, too, was a superpower. Although Moscow was never able to establish a world-wide network of military bases on a similar scale as Washington, its position in the Eurasian heartland allowed it to influence the strategic theaters in Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. Toward the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union also had a navy with global reach.

China, however, is only a regional power. It wields global economic power and influence, but the geographic reach of its military is largely limited to the Asian and Indo-Pacific theaters. From its position in the East Asian rimland, China has more limited geographic reach into the Eurasian continent than the Cold War-era Soviet Union did—and less access to the high seas than either the United States or the Soviet Union. The United States’ blessed geographic position gives it direct and unhindered access to the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic oceans. Although the Soviet Union’s access to the high seas was more restricted than that of the United States, it still had direct access from its homeland to the Pacific and Arctic oceans, as well as almost-but-not-quite direct access to the Atlantic Ocean. China only borders the Pacific Ocean—and is largely hemmed in by major island chains it does not control.

Naturally, China’s nuclear, space, and cyber capabilities all have worldwide reach. China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear force as well as its nuclear delivery platforms. Moreover, with nearly 600 satellites in orbit—of which 229 are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites—China has the world’s second largest fleet of satellites after the United States. Chinese cyber capabilities can wreak havoc in every corner of the world. And these days, balloons should perhaps also be added to the picture as a potent capability with global reach.

Nevertheless, the geographic reach of these technologies is insufficient to strongly influence strategic theaters beyond Asia. Even in an age of space and cyber warfare, coercive diplomacy is more effective when troops can be physically deployed to a border or shore. Gunboat diplomacy still requires boats, and airplanes still need airfields to operate in far-flung regions. In other words, geography makes China even more dependent than the United States and former Soviet Union on overseas bases and willing allies to move its armed forces beyond its home region. China has almost none of either.

China currently has only one overseas base—its naval facility in Djibouti staffed with 400 Chinese marines. While the U.S. Navy sails the world’s oceans on a daily basis, the Chinese navy only occasionally conducts naval diplomacy missions beyond the Indo-Pacific. This may change, of course, with the Chinese navy now adding aircraft carriers and other blue-water vessels to its fast-growing fleet. China is reportedly looking to add more overseas bases in the Pacific Ocean and Africa. However, it is still a long-term project for China to turn itself into a true superpower with world-wide military reach. Moreover, the U.S. forward posture in China’s neighborhood complicates such a scenario—which is where the third concept, regional hegemony, comes in.

Regional hegemony is one state’s dominance over the other states in a geographic region, in terms of military and economic power. The United States is a regional hegemon in the Western hemisphere because no other state in that region is in a position to challenge its dominance. Dominance in its home region allows the United States to devote more resources to other geographic regions rather than having to secure its own. In contrast, the Soviet Union was never a regional hegemon, and neither is China today.

The main purpose of great power balancing has always been for a state to counter the rise of a hegemon that can threaten its survival. Since the early 19th century, the United States has continually been concerned with preventing the rise of European and East Asian hegemons that would consider expansion into the Western hemisphere. In order to prevent Soviet hegemony in Eurasia during the Cold War, the United States contained Soviet interests and influence throughout the Eurasian rimlands, including Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. This policy not only prevented Soviet hegemony in its region, but also limited the Soviets’ room to maneuver.

China is now facing a similar situation. In order to prevent Chinese hegemony in East Asia, the United States is likely to keep a strong forward posture in the region. Moreover, just like countries in the Eurasian rimlands feared Soviet dominance and welcomed U.S. balancing efforts during the Cold War, Indo-Pacific states are now strengthening their security cooperation with Washington. Australia, India, and Japan are working with the United States in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, while Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea have all stepped up their dialogue with NATO.

Each of these three concepts—polarity, superpower, and regional hegemony—provides insight to unique and important characteristics of China and the international system. Seen together, they lay out a substantially more comprehensive picture of China’s current power position. From this, we can draw three main conclusions: First, despite China’s impressive rise and the resulting shifts in the international system and global balance of power, China is not yet a superpower. It largely remains a regional power. Second, the United States and its allies will seek to prevent China from gaining regional hegemony. Third, if China decides that it is not satisfied being a regional power and aims to become a superpower in the true sense of the word, it will need to leapfrog the geopolitical constraints of its home region.

China’s geopolitical position, including its lack of true superpower status, has two main strategic implications. First, in a short to medium-term perspective, the U.S.-China rivalry will be regional—restricted to Asia and the Indo-Pacific—and a predominantly naval contest. The confinement of the U.S.-China rivalry to these theaters will challenge trans-Atlantic relations in unprecedented ways, while its maritime element points toward a dynamic and potentially unstable rivalry. The other and more long-term strategic implication concerns any attempts by China to leapfrog the geopolitical constraints of its home region. The manner in which China sets about doing this, and United States’ efforts to prevent it, would then define their rivalry.

Why China Is Not a Superpower

How the United States, China, and the former Soviet Union stack up.

foreignpolicy.com

Then why is the west so scared of China:-

China is preparing for war with the West

Story by Matthew Henderson • Yesterday 6:00 PM

The Telegraph
China is preparing for war with the West
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The Foreign Secretary’s Mansion House speech on China may go down in history, but for all the wrong reasons. In remarks released ahead of his set-piece address on Tuesday night, he urged China to come clean about its “biggest military build-up in peacetime”, warning of the risks of a “tragic miscalculation”. Yet, bizarrely, he also argued that Britain must continue to engage with China. “To give up on China would be to give up on addressing humanity’s biggest problems,” he stated.

Chinese President Xi Jinping - TINGSHU WANG/Reuters© TINGSHU WANG/Reuters
It suggests that the British Government has learned nothing from the litany of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lies and abuses exposed during the pandemic; from the fate of Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong and Xinjiang; from Beijing’s crude imperialist ambitions to annex Taiwan, a de facto sovereign democracy; and from their crucial economic support for Vladimir Putin and his atrocities in Ukraine.
The CCP, a vastly wealthy, unelected gang of Marxist revolutionaries, is busily pursuing asymmetric warfare with the US and the rest of the free world, while building up arsenals of everything from drone swarms and lasers to nuclear warheads and hypersonic missiles capable of winning or forestalling full-on nuclear hostilities. The only reason one would acquire these weapons is the expectation of future confrontation with the West; it plainly shows who they perceive the real enemy to be.
“Peacetime” and “peaceful co-existence” are not in the Communist dictionary. Some commentators might argue that nuclear proliferation cannot be solved without China. But the CCP’s bid for world domination in place of the declining West is backed by massive nuclear proliferation. Can Britain alone alter this by continuing to “engage”?
The same disconnection from reality informs the notion that solving global warming requires cooperation with Beijing. Xi Jinping is heavily dependent on coal – his idea of cleaner energy involves geostrategic quantities of imported oil and gas from Russia and Iran. With Xi in power, the chances of a serious reduction in China’s emissions seem slim.
The British Government is also keen to emphasise the importance of working with China to prevent future pandemics. Yet when the Covid-19 outbreak started, the CCP deliberately ignored its obligations under the International Health Regulations, misleading the World Health Organisation about the fact of human-to-human transmission long enough for the virus to spread across the globe. The CCP still refuses to share vital Covid data, and there is every chance that the next pandemic will originate in China, and that the CCP will again try to cover it up.

Related video: Ukraine war: China downplays USSR quip after uproar (Reuters)

In short: Britain appears to be in wilful denial of the ruthless truth of Xi’s regime.
And that’s before one even considers its brutality at home: years before their putsch in Hong Kong, Beijing assured a very senior UK visitor that torture was illegal in the Chinese judicial system. They did not respond when he handed them a Chinese police gazette recording hundreds of cases of torture the previous year in a single province.
Here and now, Xi and Putin are colluding to disunite and overthrow the democratic, law-based international order. To do so, they use everything from cyber and human espionage to bribery and influence operations, threats to key national infrastructure, “grey zone” operations, coercive diplomacy, theft of key military and security technologies, collusion with tyrannical regimes, subversion of international institutions to industrial-scale black propaganda and disinformation campaigns.
In the well-chosen words of Rishi Sunak, “China is consciously competing for global influence using all the levers of state power.” But despite the obvious implications of this statement, the British Government persists in a contradictory and weak approach to confronting the greatest security challenge the international community has ever faced.
Baudelaire was right: “The smartest ruse of the devil is persuading you that he doesn’t exist”. It’s time for a genuine policy refresh: one combining honest dialogue and a big stick.
Matthew Henderson is an associate fellow at the Council on Geostrategy
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