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Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
by Sridhar Kumaraswami
With the Pathankot terror strike once again rattling the country, Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd), former commander of the pivotal Srinagar-based 15 Corps, tells Sridhar Kumaraswami why the situation could have been much worse and some lessons India needs to learn
We lost seven of our brave defence personnel and one civilian in Pathankot despite advance intelligence warnings. How would you rate our response?
Not every intelligence input is actionable. There are generic, background and specific inputs. The Gurdaspur superintendent of police (SP) provided some specific inputs. But there was no way of knowing when and where the terrorists would strike in Pathankot. Despite the unfortunate loss of a few precious lives, we have protected our assets like aircraft, helicopter gunships and even the 3,000 families at the airbase from being hit and that is an achievement. I would weigh this as a success. In every operation, there are glitches and we have to act on them.
But experts are saying that instead of flying in the National Security Guard (NSG) from Delhi, the operation should have been handed over immediately to the Army once the intelligence inputs came in.
Yes, it’s true that the operation should have been the responsibility of the Army where one commander could have taken the complete charge of the operation. That was not done. Let us say that it is a major lesson learnt. A major general should have been given overall charge. This is because the Army has rich experience in tackling these kinds of suicide terror missions in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere. But at the same time, despite the fact that this was not a Tier-1 city, moving of the NSG was not a mistake per se since there could have been a hostage situation and intervention may have been needed. Once the intelligence inputs come in of an imminent terror strike, the area has to be dominated. All this can be done by Army infantry units which are adept in search and destroy missions. The deployment of the NSG was for response.
Are you in any doubt that the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence plotted the attack?
There is a “deep state” in Pakistan which comprises the Pakistan Army, its ISI and terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Definitely, it was the Pakistan Army which is behind the attack. The other view is that there is a rogue element within the Pakistani military establishment. Either way, the hand of this “deep state” is very clear. The Pakistan Army is adept at keeping a situation nebulous. It’s an effective strategy that they have perfected over the years. Everything is kept in a “zone of grey”. It’s obvious that the “deep state” in Pakistan drew inspiration from the attacks by the Pakistani Taliban against the Pakistani military bases and other institutions which were hugely successful and led to the loss of strategic assets on a massive scale and also the terrible massacre of innocent children.
How did the terrorists manage to infiltrate? There is suspicion that they used the same route that drug smugglers do from Pakistan. Do you suspect any complicity?
Punjab is in the throes of a major problem of drugs due to the smuggling racket. At the same time, infiltration takes place in J&K too. There is also an anti-national network in Punjab. Infiltration requires guides and safe houses. It’s clear that there is some infrastructure of guidance in place that’s provided by certain elements to cross the border. This has to be seriously probed. However, technically it’s possible that terrorists can cross over through the riverine areas of the India-Pak border along Punjab if surveillance is poor.
However, even if a terrorist crosses the border successfully, he will not be able to carry out attacks the same night or perhaps even the next. Hence, the strategy of hijacking vehicles provides mobility and an enhanced range of targets.
Should there be some retribution for this attack, as some analysts have suggested? What should be our approach?
Pakistan has been adopting a twin-track policy of offering to talk while the “deep state” carries out terror attacks against India. As a nation, India should examine the feasibility of destroying the terror network in Pakistan through covert operations. The other aspect, preventive in nature, is to expand the J&K model of having a unified command concept to northern Punjab where strikes from across the border are taking place regularly now. This will include the Army, paramilitary forces, intelligence services and the state administration, including the police.
Should India be talking to Pakistan after what has happened?
We should not stop talking to Pakistan but, at the same time, it should not be business as usual. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has invested a lot of goodwill in bilateral ties and the Pakistan foreign office also came out with a conciliatory statement after the attack. We have presented evidence to Pakistan regarding the Pathankot attack and have made it clear that we expect them to act this time. Pakistan should be given a chance to respond. We have not called off the talks. All options are open to us on the foreign secretary-level talks which could well be postponed. Let us wait and see.
Prime Minister Modi visited Lahore despite the risks involved. Should the security agencies have anticipated a massive terror strike attempt? There is already a view that this could well have been a 26/11-type attack?
Mr Modi’s visit was taken as a cementing approach to the peace process. It was a bold decision, despite knowing the risks. Even a non-security mind would have guessed that there would be some attempt to derail this peace process. But to be fair, intelligence agencies also have to be given credit that after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, they have been able to prevent a strike on such a major scale. After all, even in Pathankot, there were families staying in buildings. The terrorists, who were armed to the teeth with 40 to 50 kg of bullets, had a choice of targets but security agencies were able to foil this. Also heartening is the apparent consensus among the political leaders, a first in India.
What are the implications of the Pathankot terror strike for India, the Pakistan civilian government and the military establishment there?
The terror strike has affected the peace process. It cannot go through with the same kind of goodwill that one witnessed in December 2015. It will take time to recapture that spirit of goodwill. It also depends whether and when more attempts will be made from across the border to carry out another strike.
The Pakistani government appears sincere but it is the military establishment there that has once again proved it is untrustworthy and that it has the ability to calibrate the peace process.
‘We must destroy terror network in Pakistan through covert operations’ | The Asian Age
