The SC
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 13, 2012
- Messages
- 32,233
- Reaction score
- 21
- Country
- Location
The strategic and operational lessons
The strategic lessons
1. First Lesson
To ensure the implementation of the strategy of action, which ensures the achievement of the strategic objectives of war, at all stages of military operations, and work to prevent the enemy from achieving its counter strategy.
In the October 1973 war, the strategy of action from outside lines was the most appropriate. In coordination with the Syrian political and military leadership, which placed its forces under unified command with the Egyptian forces, the unified leadership can follow this strategy on both fronts with one thought that prevents Israel from implementing its strategy by operating internal lines that enable it to lure each state on its own. In the fighting, with the same strategy that it did in the wars of June 1967 and before in the 1948 Palestine War.
During the fighting, after the first phase successfully completed, the Egyptian military leadership did not follow the news of the fighting on the Syrian front, although it is the unified leadership of the two fronts. As a result, the hostilities on both fronts did not allow Israel to implement its strategy by operating internal lines, Therefore, as soon as the Egyptians stopped on the direct line of armies on 9 October, Israel turned to Syria to do its utmost to resolve the war for its benefit on the Golan front and then turn to the Sinai front starting on October 16 to try to resolve the fighting to its advantage on this front as well, Working from Internal lines.
2. Second lesson
Planning of operational delays in terms of timing related to the achievement of the tasks, the work carried out, and the purpose.
It is not necessary to implement it, and one can bypass the operational pause without making it, if the conditions are appropriate to continue to put pressure on the enemy.
3. Third lesson
The need for leaders at all levels to maintain reserves, effective, capable of carrying out the tasks entrusted to them, and maintaining their organizational structure.
One of the main mistakes of the Egyptian General Command in the fragmentation of reserve forces, was to withdraw units, and sub-units from them for the benefit of the front lines. Then, when it was decided to use this reserve, to carry out a task, it was difficult to combine what has been withdrawn from it, which has often decreased its combat capability, as a result of its equipment losses, as well as the fatigue of its personnel and leaders.
4. Fourth lesson
The operational leaders and the general command take their decision to conduct the military operation by anticipating the enemy's actions and on the basis of accumulated information indicating its intentions. This means that the lower levels, when implementing the decision, can implement the preparations and organization of the battle in a timely manner.
5. Fifth lesson
Major leaders (operational and public) should have a detailed knowledge of the position of their combat units and their combat capabilities, as well, at all times, which makes them feel good to use their elements.
6. Sixth lesson
Should not leave a separation between the formative, tactical and strategic, without filling it with reserves, to secure it.
Because the second echelons of the Egyptian armies were ordered to develop in the east, without transferring the reserve of the larger (strategic) level to replace them, the tactical balance of the armies was disrupted by the absence of a tactical reserve. This means that the rear zone lacks a strong reserve between the first combat pattern and the first one that follows it to the larger level. This results in the discovery that the opponent pushes his reserves early to influence the fighting patterns. And leads to operational or strategic imbalance.
7. Seventh Lesson
Attention to gather information about the enemy during the fighting, good use of it for the task, and make decision in the light of this information, on which often the second formations (or reserve) work in light of them.
8. Eighth lesson
The training and arming of non-combat elements, and elements of the popular defense, to combat fighting, defense of cities and local defense.
During the war, especially in the latter stages, it was clear that the administrative and technical elements and the specialized reserves had low combat capabilities and were not trained to fight effectively, so they could not withstand the attacks of Israeli tanks that crossed to the west. Top leaders had the opportunity to assess the situation and send reserves in time to control the situation.
9. Ninth lesson
The speed of decision making, in critical situations, to do strong and decisive work, maneuvering forces and means from quiet positions, to areas most in need of forces, to strike a balance with the enemy forces, in this direction, or surpass it.
The reluctance of the General Command to take decisive and strong action against Israeli forces in the West has increased its size and spread to a wide confrontation, making it difficult to contain. Also, the commanders of the armies did not deal well with the Israeli forces that appeared in the rear (in the west), and waited for the decision of the General Command.
10. Tenth lesson
The need for States to maintain large, high-level backup elements that can mobilize and form new units, when necessary and during combat, so that they can cope with developments in the fighting.
It is strange that Israel can mobilize and gather active armed forces and reserves with a size greater than that of two states (Egypt and Syria) with their 12 times larger populations than that of Israel.
The Operational lessons of war
1. Lesson 1
The study of problems, which may interfere with the implementation of configurations by the subsidiary units and and interfere in their tasks, and develop more realistic practical solutions
for them.
The Egyptian General Command has been able to examine and study the strategic problems that are expected to impede the forces in the performance of their duties and have directed their solutions. The operational leaderships (the commanders of the armies) were limited to these directives in some matters. In the course of implementation, during the war, it became apparent that it wasn't functional in all cases; the opening of gaps in the sand embankment on the distant shore in the sector of the Nineteenth Infantry Division at the right of the third army field, led to the cohesion of the soil with different characteristics instead of its dispersement.
2. Lesson two
The plans must be flexible, so that the change is accepted, in accordance with the situation, in the part that needs the amendment only, so as not to disturb the leadership due to the frequent change in plans.
When the dredging of the water pumps was not successful in the eastern embankment of the southern sector of the Third Army, the plans were modified to use the moving and crossing bridges of the 7th Infantry Regiment for the crossing of the Nineteen Infantry Division, without affecting the flow of troops to the head of the two divisions bridge.
3. Lesson three
Take care of planning the movements of troops and controlling them, before and during combat.
During the October 1973 war, the accuracy of the planning of the crossing and the deployment of trained personnel to control the movements and their flow into the transit area, as well as their rapid deployment and direction, were clarified following the crossing. This high-level implementation was the result of careful planning and continuous training to overcome all problems of movement and transit, through an independent system, the Commander's Service System.
4. Lesson Four
To equip the forces, so that they can overcome the the most superior fighting elements of the enemy, and neutralize them, so that the forces can carry out their operations efficiently.
In the October War, there were two main problems that could be caused by the enemy's combat style, the first was heavy air attacks on troops in transit and in the early stages on the east bank, which could last throughout the war. The second was the anti-armoured attacks, which will be launched by the enemy in the early stages, with high intensity until the Egyptian forces return to the Canal again before they establish their feet on the east bank, especially as they fight without its tanks, which will be delayed for more than 36 hours before crossing. Alternatives were therefore developed to neutralize these two weapons (aircraft and tank) by intensive use of their counter elements. Either from the West Bank, if the range is permitted, or support for first-stage crossing with anti-tank projectiles and shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft missiles with high intensity, which have enabled the first-line forces to withstand and inflict heavy losses on the enemy.
5. Lesson Five
To deepen the study of the enemy, in all fields, and to know all his experiences and tricks, and methods of combat, and style of thinking in different situations, and to take advantage of this when planning, and when making decisions during combat.
The detailed study of the enemy helps to anticipate combat, prepare for, or frustrate combat operations, if possible, which is the best choice.
6. Lesson six
Insisting on the realization of the principles and bases of the battle of joint weapons, by involving all disciplines in planning the war, and when studying the situation. And that each professional component has a role and a mission when making a decision.
It is customary for the command to take the lead and monopoly in decision-making, with neglect of the specialized professionals' input or opinions and so with the inevitable result; a decision away from reality, the loss of specialized capabilities that have not been given a role in combat, the misuse of a specialized element that is destroyed without reaction, Or the exhaustion of its energies in acts which are not appropriate for his nature.
The five Egyptian infantry commanders, used the armored personnel carriers (tanks), and anti-armour weapons units in misguided support efforts, resulting in exhaustion, multiple casualties, and loss of their effectiveness in battle.
7. Lesson Seven
Organizing cooperation and coordination of efforts in joint work for its success. It is not important who caused the victory, but what is important is that the unit obtains the victory from the performance and collective work of the organization.
Therefore, cooperation must be organized and coordinated between the units or the formation elements on the battlefield, and each specialized unit as well as the sub-elements.
8. Lesson eight
Intensive use of all available reconnaissance elements in order to obtain sufficient and accurate information (confirmed) as early as possible to address future situations.
It turns out that the forces overlook their specialized capabilities, and seek information from top-level sources, which is a burden on the higher levels when it has to work permanently for the lower levels, thus losing the importance and outstanding capabilities of the operational reconnaissance role by its elements, since the operational planning and organizing process of the operational reconnaissance provides commanders with early information up to 72 hours, enabling commanders to make decisions to frustrate enemy actions or confront them with appropriate mobilization.
9. Lesson nine
Pay attention to the training of troops in the wide and deep maneuvering, and encourage commanders to plan and carry it out with their main forces.
The commanders did not exploit the capabilities of their units (according to their type and armament) to carry out a deep maneuver, to surprise the enemy, and to exploit its weakest points, which the Israeli forces excelled in (based on areal reconnaissance provided to them by the US). It was clear that the local Egyptian commanders underestimated the depth of the maneuvers in the gap, which led to the loss of large numbers of equipment.
10. Lesson ten
To pay attention to the combat security of the forces in all its components.
The lack of attention on the part of commanders at various levels to secure the work of fighting by their forces has resulted in heavy losses, both from hostile air attacks, sudden counter-attacks of enemy tanks, ambushes and anti-tank curtains, loss of direction when moving to carry out missions, getting into spot of land not appropriate for movement, and other hazards that caused the depletion of combat capabilities, or loss of valuable time.
Lessons learned from the application of the principles of war and the use of forces
Application of the principles of war
1. The first lesson
The clear and precise definition of the goal, in all its dimensions and limitations, and then commitment to achieve it, as required, with the least losses and cost, and the fastest time.
The main objective of the war of October 1973 was to revive the world's attention to the issue of Israel's occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967. It was necessary to reach that goal. It was not possible to convince the major powers to find a just and comprehensive solution, just by engaging the Israeli forces, but it was necessary to provoke an all-out war against them and to defeat their forces, which would be alarming, until the great powers moved. The Arab armed forces achieved the goal from the early hours of the war and, as far as possible, maintained it in the following days and months.
The military-strategic objective was to destroy the Israeli security doctrine, based on natural obstacles, and to use a deterrence strategy to denote its military capabilities based on the duel and the tank. The Egyptian and Syrian forces were able to refute all the items of this theory and prove their ineffectiveness through several measures that were successfully carried out during the war.
2. The second lesson
The mobilization of all useful material and moral capacities, and direct them to the benefit of war, to achieve superiority over the opponent, by coordination with allied forces, which put the balance on its side when compared with the enemy, thus providing a better opportunity to achieve victory.
The Arab armed forces, in Egypt and Syria, have relied on a superior number of troops to overcome Israel's qualitative superiority. However, this number of troops was unable to cope with the speed of the pace of the war, which requires the speed of penetration, the rapid change in efforts and interim goals, and the speed of access to the lines of tasks. So the Egyptian superior number of troops were not all that useful all the time. After the Egyptian forces were able to provide five full supported divisions to start operations, it failed to mobilize sufficient forces to develop, or to continue to fight with the same efficiency. The five infantry divisions have transformed from a miraculous force, miraculously miraculous in the crossing, into an impotent force that has impeded the leadership and became a major preoccupation to secure that enormous force, incapable of rapid movement. (by orders from Sadat)
3. Lesson Three
It is important that the leadership be able to make a decision to start the war, within the legitimacy of its demands, and the justice of its cause.
But it is also important to preserve that principle until the end of the war. This requires conscious leadership.
The decision of the war, on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, was unlikely to bridge the Israeli political and military leadership. This has led to a violent shock, enabling the Egyptians and the Syrians to achieve the initiative at all levels. During the early days of the war, Israeli forces reacted to the Egyptians' combat actions on their front. By the end of the first phase, the Egyptians stopped (operational stop October 10-13). It was unnecessary, too long, and it was voluntarily accepted, at the outset, by all levels, to the other side, which did not hesitate to make the most of this mistake. The Israeli forces took the initiative from the Syrian forces in the Golan, mobilized the main forces in front of them, and then repulsed them and pushed them back. Then they turned to try to do the same against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai, at a time when the Egyptian forces began by political decision to move east again.
4. Lesson Four
Despite considerable progress, in surveillance equipment, the surprise is still possible.
"The information was all in front of us, well before the war, but we did not see it. We misunderstood its signals, and the commentators erred in their explanations." the Israelis say.
It was a fact that the Egyptian and Syrian deception plan managed to hide the offensive intentions, which the eavesdropping devices can not capture and do not benefit from satellites. Rather, they need a thorough understanding of the intangible forces of the adversary, his mentality and the trends of his thinking. So, under the new events, not in the old frame. The will can be created, when environmental conditions change, or it is up to the end, the ideas change, the directions change accordingly, and the surprises occur.
5. Lesson Five
It is necessary to maintain coordination between the elements of the fighting forces, as well as coordination between the combatants according to the level to achieve cooperation, in the triangle of time, place and objective.
The leaders seek to organize cooperation with their constituents to determine the responsibility for joint action, and how to overcome the difficulties and the enemy at the border between them. Leaders also organize efforts for their combat elements to achieve maximum benefit, with minimal effort.
In the war of 1973, many commanders lost due coordination to some of the main elements of the fighting (control, information, communications, fire, cohesion, trauma, administrative service), the lack of cooperation and the difficulty of achieving and coordinating. It was clear that the Israeli forces on 16 October, on the side of the 16th Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Infantry Division, had carried out minimal cooperation because one of their elements, General Sharon and his group of operations, had failed to maintain coordination on the target, Which, in that event (coordination), meant that General Adan could have achieved with his combat force, a major breakthrough against the Egyptian defending forces, but the lack of coordination had led to disaster. When Adan failed in his attempt, he sought help from Sharon, who was not in the proper position or the place, and to rectify the situation, he would have wasted time, hence the cooperation was no longer useful, and Aden stopped attacking.
6. Lesson six
Victory is achieved in combat, when the objective is achieved with the least possible losses, and in the fastest time. And to reduce losses, it requires the adoption of appropriate security measures. Therefore, measures to achieve security are no less important than other measures of combat.
The lesson is not by using multiple methods of code and cipher in communication, restricting moves, darkening, and following rules of concealment and camouflage. But in the preference between the factor of speed and time, and the factor of secrecy so that the enemy does not get the information that he is lacking. The famous German commander, Fidel Marshal Erwin Rommel, spoke to the commanders of his units, in wireless devices, without secrecy, only when the benefit of the information was not available to the opponent when the work had already begun and fighting will start soon, hence, before the adversary benefited from the information.
Israeli commanders have also allowed more than once the full illumination of their combat vehicles and tanks during the advance and attack, so that they can see better, to obtain definite results from shooting at the opponent, who is surprised by the method that does not take into account the origins of confidentiality and safety.
On the other hand, General Ariel Sharon lost all his gains in the war, for which he was trying to win his glory, when his forces failed to continue fighting, and stopped in front of his main goal, which his troops almost touched. This was because of his deliberate neglect of all security measures in order to achieve the goal before other generals competing with him. This led to heavy losses suffered by his armored brigades, and he was unable to continue.
7. Lesson Seven
The offensive spirit of the troops must be preserved, no matter how close the fighting is ( defense, siege or withdrawal), and this can be achieved only through positive combat activities.
Although the Egyptian leadership planned to push the different detachments and formation units in the stages of the whole battle from the beginning. The forces abandoned it twice, and lost the combat offensive spirit, which started the war. The first time was when the troops stopped on the direct line of armies, to carry out the operational pause, and considered it a passive pause. It was after the 2nd Infantry Division commander's decision on the first day of the operational pause "to stick to the lines that were reached and reinforce them."
In order to do so, the gaps between battalions and brigades were sealed, tank battalions took command lines, main lines of fire were opened, and anti-tank reserves were opened at all levels (6 reserves consisting of 10 antitank units, some of which were recoilless and mostly guided missiles). In this context, the commander of the second field army ordered the commanders of the subordinate divisions to carry out positive fighting, to deprive the enemy of freely maneuvering its forces and means from one direction to another, and continue to drain the forces with successive counter-attacks.
The army commander's ordered positive actions to be carried out during reinforcement of the bridgehead in the operational stand were to include:
A. Dispatch reconnaissance patrols and reconnaissance groups behind the enemy lines, to obtain information about the enemy's actions and reserves, and take measures to thwart them.
B. Arrange the ambushes on the axes of approach to the top of the bridge.
C. Activate the reinforcement positions by Dispatching combat groups to raid the enemy.
D. Dispatch strong combat detachments to collide with the enemy who is trying to launch counter-attacks on top of the bridge.
8. Lesson eight
Excessive superiority in numbers in key directions, may become more damaging than useful, but shrinking the number of troops does not mean achieving the principle of economy of power.
The Israeli leadership paid a heavy price for all that it lost in the October 1973 war as a result of the realization of this principle, which was misplaced. The Israelis built their plan to defend the southern front (Sinai) on the basis of the power of the water barrier as an obstacle to any Egyptian attack. To save the troops and the cost too, the troops would occupy the fortified positions in the Barlev line. These forces were reduced, some of the fortified points were closed, and this enabled the Egyptians to overcome that fortified line quickly, and the sites that had stood longer did not have a significant impact on the Egyptians to weaken their strength.
9. Lesson nine
Combat action succeeds when the hostile commander is forced to make decisions as reactions. This is achieved through maneuvers in both branches; movement and fire, which require agility, intellectual flexibility and mobility.
10. Lesson ten
It is necessary to maintain the morale of the forces, high. Which can be done in preparation for the battle, in many ways. During the fighting, there are three factors, most influential on
morale, the high level of training of troops, the continuation of positive active actions, and the strength of the religious faith of combatants.
The military and political leadership of Egypt paid tribute to the morale of the forces, especially after the defeat of June 1967. It began to increase the useful training doses on the combat tasks and led the soldiers to the professional level in the use of weapons and equipment. The war of attrition increased the confidence of soldiers and officers themselves, Their spirits rose several degrees higher. The proliferation of religious clergy among members of the armed forces, and their strong desire to understand their religious faith properly, have had a good impact on the forces' carrying out of adversity, and at the critical moments.
Use of forces
1. The first lesson
Necessity of familiarisation of the leaders with how to optimize the use of the air effort allocated, so as to use the full potential and give the desired effect.
In the October 1973 war, the military command retained the effort of air force ground support to the land forces in the hands of the commander-in-chief, or the commanders of the armies who received a part of the air effort. This situation, with land commanders unfamiliar with the characteristics and capabilities of the various aircrafts available to them, has led to the land forces not benefiting from these capabilities at different stages of advance, which often require meaningful air support.
2. The second lesson
The importance of integrating the basic elements of the air defense system, which are:
a. Warning and alarm networks.
b. Command and Control centers.
c. Active weapons.
d. Sites, structural and deception equipment, .
e. Stable, secure communication means.
3. Lesson Three
The integrated use of all naval forces, is better than numerical superiority, in vessel numbers.
Despite the superiority of the Egyptian and Syrian fleets, each on its own, the Israeli fleet was able to commit them to defend, most of the period of the war.. But passive Egyptian actions succeeded, which was the closure of the Straits of Bab al-Mandab by a group of Egyptian submarines, destroyers and frigates to the Israeli Navy. Another successful passive action is the use of mines to close the the Gulf of Suez. The Egyptian Navy lacked strategic sea surveillance, electronic warfare, sophisticated surface-to-surface missiles (particularly for small targets, which the Israeli navy had from the US), and the most important lack of Egyptian naval support. Therefore, the Egyptian Navy's combat operations were limited, but it was well used passively.
4. Lesson Four
The importance of appropriate caliber and movement capabilities of the main sources of fire to the level and the main organization working with it.
The Egyptian artillery, despite its obvious superiority, was unable to provide effective firepower assistance to the armored and mechanized units. The artillery, especially the half-track, was unable to keep pace with the mobile forces. Most artillery and support units failed to reach their transport areas during the attack development phase .
In addition, the caliber was not always appropriate. The artillery of the front must be extended to the Israeli artillery positions and the artillery of the Divisions must be extended to the artillery of the Israeli operations groups; the reserve of this force (front-group operations) is often found near the artillery group. They are the two main objectives of the corresponding artillery.
5. Lesson Five
The importance of the availability of anti-armor elements, with all types of units, even at the level of very small units, including elements of air defense, at any level.
The war of October 1973 proved the effectiveness of the armored units, supported by advanced motorized vehicles, with good use. Israeli tanks failed in their attacks against Egyptian infantry without their own infantry, while Egyptian infantry effectively repulsed Israeli tanks, with its various anti-tank elements.
6. Lesson six
Weapons of the third dimension, are weapons of the future.
The war of October 1973, on the Egyptian and Syrian front, proved the importance and effectiveness of elements and weapons of the third dimension. Several vital and important targets were seized by aerial air raids. Tactical missile strikes were also effective and inflential against important and large targets. It is noted that these forces need complex security procedures.
After the war of October 1973, as a result of this important lesson, many countries, led by the United States of America, the Western countries and Israel, expanded the size of these forces and weapons and developed them to become more effective, and introduced new elements as well, such as guided ballistic missiles and tactical Land / Land missiles to clear mine fields..
7. Lesson Seven
Future wars will depend on electronic warfare to increase the effectiveness of their weapons and to weaken the effectiveness of enemy weapons and forces.
The war of October 1973, by many commentators and experts following the war, was called the First Electronic War, because of the use by both parties to the war (Egypt and Israel) of trained elements and relatively advanced devices (at the time) for all electronic warfare activities; Electronic wireless and radar reconnaissance, Eavesdropping elements, Electronic jamming, routing elements and Electronic deception. It is no longer limited to fixed devices, but is also mobile, airborne and equipping UAVs (which are becoming more advanced and more useful), with some using spy satellites, giving them new dimensions in use.
8. Lesson eight
The importance of night operations, to advance, and seize the appropriate targets and lines at night.
Most of the work of the detachments, the raids and the ambushes carried out at night were successful. The other party was surprised by it, or did not realize it until it had achieved its tasks. This requires the training of the forces to fight at night, in the different battle circumstances, the generalization of night vision devices, and track devices to maintain the direction.
9. Lesson nine
The best use of the armored elements, and the motorised elements, is to exploit their capabilities fully, using them in combination, and in offensive actions, which achieve shock, agility and fire, which are the most important characteristics of those elements.
The two sides, the Egyptians and the Israelis, used their armored forces badly at the beginning of the war. Both of them destroyed their armored units. This was more evident in the Israeli forces, which allocated small sub-units (factions and brigades) to support the strong points of the Barlev line. Those small units lost the required effectiveness, and so, in counter-attacks, which grew in size until they reached armored brigades, they attacked individually. The Israeli commanders have mastered this mistake, mobilized their armored forces, used armored combat groups from 2 to 3 armored brigades, and cooperated with each other, leading to better results in some stages of the war.
Egyptian forces, supported the infantry brigades by armored brigades, most of which were withdrawn from the Armored and mechanised Divisions (Operational Reserve and Strategic Reserve), which weakened them when they began their combat missions. Similarly, infantry brigade commanders used armored brigades supporting them, with battalions and smaller units sometimes, which increased their fragmentation, and were often used at defensive lines and fire lines, thus losing their most important characteristics by becoming anti-armor pieces.
Conclusion
The experts considered that the war of October 1973, with its history of events, was one of the greatest modern wars, in which all theories of modern military science were applied. The results were lessons for all. More than a quarter of a century later, the seminars were held to study this war, Lessons, for future generations.
No matter what the October 1973 war is said, there is no doubt that its military value will remain precious to the military, and its lessons will remain an example taught in military institutes.
The combat performance was high-level, from planning on the scientific grounds, to the soldier's performance as he climbs the dirt embankment, attacking the fortified line fort by fort, or defending what he gained from land, inch by inch.
The war of October 1973 showed new values for weapons and individuals. The rockets were the most widely used in many fields. They produced prophecies that began to materialize in the following decades. They also destroyed theories and changed other theories in the sea, air, and ether. The first electronic war, the war of modern armour, the war of ancient forts, The war included water sites, desert, mountains and agricultural lands, it was an all-out war.
The effects of the October War extended decades later, and expanded their scope to influence the global and regional politics, the international and regional economy and changed the concepts of contemporary societies, in their area of events to demonstrate once again these effects universality.
* Parts adapted From Dr. Yahia-Al-Shaer and other sources
Last edited:
