CriticalThought
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Some months ago, this author criticized top military brass for being mediocre, mentally subservient, and creating an environment of excellence in knowledge generated elsewhere. In this article, I show through a practical example how a culture of knowledge creation can be establish within the armed forces. For sake of discussion, we focus on the project of designing a new rifle for the Pakistani army. We propose an indigenous, knowledge based approach, that is data-driven, multi-disciplinary, and end-user centric. The read must note that this discussion is not an accusation of incompetence towards the project. Rather, the projects serves as a convenient example to concretize an otherwise abstract discussion.
Projects are signed off based on perceived needs. It is of utmost importance to align perceived needs with actual needs from the beginning. The perceived need for a new rifle could arise based on internal and external discussions held by top generals with other generals or marketing personnel of international arms suppliers. But in order to ascertain actual needs, we need to reach out to the end-users: the soldiers who wield them in battle, and the battlefield commanders who utilize them in tactical maneuvers. An investigative committe comprising data scientists, statisticians, and requirements analysts must be formed to clarify the following points:
1. What problems are soldiers facing in the use of small arms today? This must be achieved through interviews conducted with active duty personnel that are chosen through a random sampling that ensures elimination of systemic biases. It relies on a culture of openness and honesty within the armed forces where soldiers feel empowered to share critical feedback, without fear of repercussions.
2. Are the problems better addressed through other means, such as better training? That is, is their an actual need for a new rifle, or more pressing problems need to be addressed?
3. Based on current and future projections for the next 50 years, what are the environmental profiles in which small arms will need to be wielded by Pakistan Armed Forces. Do we envisage operations in the rainforests of the Western Ghats? Are we planning to expand operational activities outside the geographical boundaries of Pakistan, such as Africa?
4. Based on current and future projections for the next 50 years, what are the environmental profiles of target and expected customers for our small arms? Are we planning to sell to operators in Africa, and Latin America?
5. Based on intelligence reports and and projected threats, what type of protection will be utilized by enemies?
The above questions are indicative, not exhaustive. Actual needs must be established through a rigorous process of data collection, analysis, and inquisition. At the same time, 'Analysis Paralysis' must be avoided. The members of the investigative committe must be trained to understand the impossibility of encompassing all issues and problems in an organization the size of the Pakistan armed forces. In order to be reactive to ever changing needs, and remain agile and nimble, such investigations must be time bounded. This author proposes a timeframe of 6 months. All hurdles and frictions that hamper such investigations need to be addressed and removed. It should be recognized that the very first study conducted according to these patters may not be successful, but lessons must be learnt and applied from these failures. It will take time for the armed forces to mold themselves into an agile, nimble, and reactive force.
In order to advance the discussion, we hypothesize the successful completion of such an activity, resulting in a hypothetical list of requirements. The new rifle must be ergonomic, light weight, have assured kill against Type II body armor from a distance of 100 m, and be able to operate in temperature ranges from 50C to -10C. Before progressing to an actual implementation, these requirements must be validated. We need to answer the question: 'If soldiers are provided with a rifle that meets all requirements, will it solve the problems that have been identified?' There are two important components of this question: providing soldiers with a rifle taht meets all requirements, and ascertaining whether this solves the identified problems. There are various means that can be employed to answer this question. For example, limited amounts of commercially available rifles could be procured which have characteristics that meet the requirements to a good degree of approximation. Or, a simulator can be created where soldiers hold mock ups of a hypothetical rifle that is deemed to meet the requirements. In any case, the determination whether the rifle solves identified problems MUST NOT be made on a test range. Rather, mission profiles should be created that recreate scenarios where identified problems lead to mission failures. The performance of soldiers should be evaluated in these missions to ascertain whether the provision of the new rifle will actually solve the problems identified. Again, the experiments must be conducted to ensure elimination of statistical biases.
If Pakistan had an established arms design facility, experienced designers would be able to determine if a single rifle could meet all given requirements, based on available technology. This proposal takes into account the current technological realities of Pakistan, where indigenous capabilities must be created ab initio. In the context of Pakistan's realities, a gap analysis of existing rifles should be performed to find improvements that can be made to existing designs to bring them in compliance with requirements. From this pont onwards, an iterative design, development, and validation process should be started.
As the first engineering step, a realistic 3D model of existing rifle must be created. It should be possible to simulate the entire process from chambering the round, to escape of the bullet from the muzzle. High speed cameras should be utilized to study characteristics of existing system in detail. The simulation should be able to replicate structural stresses, vibrations, temperature changes, wear and tear etc. Now, modifications can be made and their impacts on various characteristics can be determined. Examples of viable designs can be produced using existing manufacturing techniques and tested to verify the characteristics in the real world. In this manner, iterative improvements should be made and the improved product rolled out to actual end users to get real world feedback on the improved designs. Again, project overseers must be trained to avoid the trap of a never ending design process that produces no results. The focus should remain on getting an improved version into the hands of end users, and getting real world feedback to guide the next set of changes.
In parallel to instituting this culture of continuous improvement, a parallel effort must be made to acquire expertise in latest manufacturing tools, techniques, and technologies, thus providing designers with better tools to create modifications. In the long term, this author hopes a special cadre of generals, air marshals, and admirals will be created who have a sound grounding in science, engineering, and mathematics, and who specialize in managing such large scale, multi-disciplinary projects for continuous improvement of the armed forces.
To conclude, we have used the new rifle project to show how the armed forces should conduct continuous improvement. We have highlighted the need of specially trained generals, air marshals, and admirals, to head the likes of POF, HMC, PAC, MTC etc. But most importantly, we invite the armed forces to escape from mental subservience by adopting a knowledge creation approach to solving modern challenges.
Projects are signed off based on perceived needs. It is of utmost importance to align perceived needs with actual needs from the beginning. The perceived need for a new rifle could arise based on internal and external discussions held by top generals with other generals or marketing personnel of international arms suppliers. But in order to ascertain actual needs, we need to reach out to the end-users: the soldiers who wield them in battle, and the battlefield commanders who utilize them in tactical maneuvers. An investigative committe comprising data scientists, statisticians, and requirements analysts must be formed to clarify the following points:
1. What problems are soldiers facing in the use of small arms today? This must be achieved through interviews conducted with active duty personnel that are chosen through a random sampling that ensures elimination of systemic biases. It relies on a culture of openness and honesty within the armed forces where soldiers feel empowered to share critical feedback, without fear of repercussions.
2. Are the problems better addressed through other means, such as better training? That is, is their an actual need for a new rifle, or more pressing problems need to be addressed?
3. Based on current and future projections for the next 50 years, what are the environmental profiles in which small arms will need to be wielded by Pakistan Armed Forces. Do we envisage operations in the rainforests of the Western Ghats? Are we planning to expand operational activities outside the geographical boundaries of Pakistan, such as Africa?
4. Based on current and future projections for the next 50 years, what are the environmental profiles of target and expected customers for our small arms? Are we planning to sell to operators in Africa, and Latin America?
5. Based on intelligence reports and and projected threats, what type of protection will be utilized by enemies?
The above questions are indicative, not exhaustive. Actual needs must be established through a rigorous process of data collection, analysis, and inquisition. At the same time, 'Analysis Paralysis' must be avoided. The members of the investigative committe must be trained to understand the impossibility of encompassing all issues and problems in an organization the size of the Pakistan armed forces. In order to be reactive to ever changing needs, and remain agile and nimble, such investigations must be time bounded. This author proposes a timeframe of 6 months. All hurdles and frictions that hamper such investigations need to be addressed and removed. It should be recognized that the very first study conducted according to these patters may not be successful, but lessons must be learnt and applied from these failures. It will take time for the armed forces to mold themselves into an agile, nimble, and reactive force.
In order to advance the discussion, we hypothesize the successful completion of such an activity, resulting in a hypothetical list of requirements. The new rifle must be ergonomic, light weight, have assured kill against Type II body armor from a distance of 100 m, and be able to operate in temperature ranges from 50C to -10C. Before progressing to an actual implementation, these requirements must be validated. We need to answer the question: 'If soldiers are provided with a rifle that meets all requirements, will it solve the problems that have been identified?' There are two important components of this question: providing soldiers with a rifle taht meets all requirements, and ascertaining whether this solves the identified problems. There are various means that can be employed to answer this question. For example, limited amounts of commercially available rifles could be procured which have characteristics that meet the requirements to a good degree of approximation. Or, a simulator can be created where soldiers hold mock ups of a hypothetical rifle that is deemed to meet the requirements. In any case, the determination whether the rifle solves identified problems MUST NOT be made on a test range. Rather, mission profiles should be created that recreate scenarios where identified problems lead to mission failures. The performance of soldiers should be evaluated in these missions to ascertain whether the provision of the new rifle will actually solve the problems identified. Again, the experiments must be conducted to ensure elimination of statistical biases.
If Pakistan had an established arms design facility, experienced designers would be able to determine if a single rifle could meet all given requirements, based on available technology. This proposal takes into account the current technological realities of Pakistan, where indigenous capabilities must be created ab initio. In the context of Pakistan's realities, a gap analysis of existing rifles should be performed to find improvements that can be made to existing designs to bring them in compliance with requirements. From this pont onwards, an iterative design, development, and validation process should be started.
As the first engineering step, a realistic 3D model of existing rifle must be created. It should be possible to simulate the entire process from chambering the round, to escape of the bullet from the muzzle. High speed cameras should be utilized to study characteristics of existing system in detail. The simulation should be able to replicate structural stresses, vibrations, temperature changes, wear and tear etc. Now, modifications can be made and their impacts on various characteristics can be determined. Examples of viable designs can be produced using existing manufacturing techniques and tested to verify the characteristics in the real world. In this manner, iterative improvements should be made and the improved product rolled out to actual end users to get real world feedback on the improved designs. Again, project overseers must be trained to avoid the trap of a never ending design process that produces no results. The focus should remain on getting an improved version into the hands of end users, and getting real world feedback to guide the next set of changes.
In parallel to instituting this culture of continuous improvement, a parallel effort must be made to acquire expertise in latest manufacturing tools, techniques, and technologies, thus providing designers with better tools to create modifications. In the long term, this author hopes a special cadre of generals, air marshals, and admirals will be created who have a sound grounding in science, engineering, and mathematics, and who specialize in managing such large scale, multi-disciplinary projects for continuous improvement of the armed forces.
To conclude, we have used the new rifle project to show how the armed forces should conduct continuous improvement. We have highlighted the need of specially trained generals, air marshals, and admirals, to head the likes of POF, HMC, PAC, MTC etc. But most importantly, we invite the armed forces to escape from mental subservience by adopting a knowledge creation approach to solving modern challenges.
