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Towards a new & Improved Fauj

After today's episode of Q&As between the 'Leaders' of our Nation and its Defenders:

Towards a new & Improved Fauj - koi kasar reh gayee hai?

Your turn, guys.

Review the beginning of this thread and recall the earlier conversations in the "Don't malign..." thread -- we have been saying and have said, be smart, be ahead of the curve, make the changes and this will enable the influence to continue and broaden and that unless these transitions follow, they will MAKE these transitions for you ---

Koi Kasar reh gayee hai? DIdi it have to come this?? Yes, of course it did, for people who are unreasonable, there is no other way.
 
We have in the last few weeks discussed the need to transition, we have been made aware that public enterprises continue to lose more public funds than the entire defense budget, The armed Forces and the civilian political forces have been trying unsuccessfully to work out an arrangement that is at the center of the dysfunction that has a negative effect on the security paradigm of Pakistan -- Then we have discussed the need to revisit or actually create, a "narrative" with regard to Pakistan and her role in the WOT and her role against Islamist insurgents and one which the citizens of Pakistan can own: Below, is an instructive piece for those interested in looking soberly at our predicament and how we may change it positively:


Taking control of our national strategy
By Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Published: May 15, 2011

The writer is professor of political science at LUMS rasul.rais@tribune.com.pk

In many ways we are a state and nation in transition and face many challenges at both domestic and international levels. National security challenges top all of them in urgency, social impact and positive influence on progress. Peace, stability and social order are the primary objectives of a national-security policy. No state or society can achieve them without a national strategy that is revised routinely to make adjustments for threats from domestic elements and international powers.

On many counts, our national strategy needs an overhaul from those who frame it. This means that the institutions that take part in developing it should review the threats to the nation and also the nature of such threats. The American raid in Abbottabad, the presence of al Qaeda leaders and a melange of terrorist groups, driven by religious ideology, ethnicity or just mercenaries, employed by our adversaries there, show a crisis of national strategy. One may use different terminology to explain the prevailing security situation, but the matter of reviewing and rewriting is as urgent as the nature of the existential threat we face.

How can we go about redoing this? First, reworking the national strategy doesn’t mean that every aspect of the existing strategy (whatever it is or whatever it seeks to achieve) is in the process of being rejected without proper evaluation. We must have a rational, utilitarian approach to retain what is useful and reject what is irrelevant. Second, pragmatism, not ideology, must be the keyword in defining national strategy. What it means is that goals must be realistic, achievable and essentially embedded in our primary national interests. The second part is always about the best means available and within our reach. This also leads us to the question of power and how we can mobilise our national resources so that we can build and expand an indigenous technology base which can then help provide increased security to our people. At the same time, we should be autonomous enough to take hard decisions to preserve our national security.

Another important aspect of formulating national strategy is its inclusiveness. No person or institution can appropriate patriotism or exclusive responsibility to formulate national strategy since the latter affects every citizen, social group and part of the country. As indicated above, a national strategy is related to a state’s collective national existence and progress. Therefore, the essential logic of being a political community is that we work this out together through collective thinking and wisdom. The elected political executive must take the lead and greater responsibility in reformulating national strategy. There are issues of competence, capacity and commitment to inclusive policy formulation. But these are not unique to Pakistan — every country in the world faces them. The political executive can bring better leadership, competent researchers and more resources to the national security think-tanks that have traditionally been occupied by sycophants, job-seeking leeches and a ridiculously incompetent lot. It is time to restructure them so that they can contribute meaningfully to the national strategy discourse.

One more important point to consider is transparency in national strategy. This should be present at all levels, when the primary goals are being formulated and when the threat assessment is being done. For long, a select group within the security establishment has drawn our national strategy without much participation from academic experts, diplomats and public representatives. Sadly, much has been done in an opaque manner, and this continues to create distrust between the political and security institutions of the country. Even with the best of intentions, the national security establishment has failed to create a national ownership of national strategy.

The 12-point agenda passed by parliament on May 13 can be a new beginning for reshaping national strategy. Now, it’s time for a coherent, well-thought-out and participatory national strategy. Our future progress hinges on it.
 
Hi,

Actually my buddies in pakistan are not realizing---actually they donot have the ability to recognize that it has just barely begun---it is not even the tip of the ice burg---this poke was not even meant at the pak millitary or pak civilians at all----there wasn't even a message in it at all but for those who could comprehend---.

This board is just like the pak millitary----so many in management are like the pak generals who failed---but for one reason or the other---still are holding their position---the top thinker---doesn't even say a word---but are still there---the fruit doesnot fall too far from the tree---would there be a reason---it would be different over here.

Everyone wants a change---but not at their expense---has any mod resigned their position here because there ideology failed----any think tank member tendered his resignations because they were totally wrong---what can you do to a nation and its chikdren who don't even know that they are lost.
 
Well improvement will have to be made, at Speed and efficiency - and clearly we do need Helicopters

As for what strategic goals will the improved force will yeild simple - Protect border and control people coming in and out fristly

But I am in for invasion of Afghanistan to Pacify it , i Really feel United Afghanistan/Pakistan in Greater Pakistan is a best solution for NATO get the f out of our neighourhood

There is no other solution the solution is to GO INTO AFGHANISTAN , capture it secure it .

And integrate it as new province of Pakistan :tup:
 
Hi,

Actually my buddies in pakistan are not realizing---actually they donot have the ability to recognize that it has just barely begun---it is not even the tip of the ice burg---this poke was not even meant at the pak millitary or pak civilians at all----there wasn't even a message in it at all but for those who could comprehend---.

This board is just like the pak millitary----so many in management are like the pak generals who failed---but for one reason or the other---still are holding their position---the top thinker---doesn't even say a word---but are still there---the fruit doesnot fall too far from the tree---would there be a reason---it would be different over here.

Everyone wants a change---but not at their expense---has any mod resigned their position here because there ideology failed----any think tank member tendered his resignations because they were totally wrong---what can you do to a nation and its chikdren who don't even know that they are lost.


I wondered if this was the right place to address this important post by MK -- And it is - He's been concerned enough to pose questions and we should deal with them --

MK - it seems "unintended consequences" are not limited to Pakistani policy and lets be sober, message or no message from US, it seems the Pakistani public have taken great exception at, not the whole sovereignty BS, that's just a establishment cover, what's really got the public going is the failure of institutions to do their job -- Gen Pasha says the US played a "sting operation" of the Pakistanis - do you buy that?
 
Given recent events, this article makes some good points:

from: Pakistan after bin Laden: Humiliation of the military men | The Economist

Pakistan after bin Laden
Humiliation of the military men
Civilian leaders and the United States put pressure on the beleaguered generals

May 12th 2011 | ISLAMABAD | from the print edition

AMERICA’S killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2nd brought with it a rare chance to ease the Pakistani army’s unhealthy grip on the country’s domestic and foreign affairs. The generals have floundered since the raid in Abbottabad, unsettled by accusations of complicity with bin Laden or, if not, then incompetence. It has not helped that video clips show bin Laden apparently active as al-Qaeda’s leader in his last years.

Pakistanis cannot agree what is more shocking, that bin Laden had skulked in a military town so close to the capital, Islamabad, or that Americans nipped in to kill him without meeting the least resistance. Either way, they know to blame the humiliated men in uniform. Columnists and bloggers even call for army bosses to fall on their swagger sticks.

Ashfaq Kayani, the now sullen-faced head of the armed forces, and his more exposed underling, Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who runs the main military spy outfit, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), are unused to such cheek. Their spokesmen have fumbled to come up with a consistent line. They have claimed both that Pakistan abhorred America’s attack and helped to bring it about. Army inaction on the night was because someone forgot to turn on the radar, or because it only worked pointing east at India. And General Pasha would, and then certainly would not, fly to America to smooth things over.

That disarray gave elected leaders a chance. Neither President Asif Zardari nor Yusuf Raza Gilani, the prime minister, deludes himself that he is really in charge. Nor do outsiders. Just after they had killed bin Laden, the Americans first telephoned General Kayani, not the president. In the past year both Generals Kayani and Pasha have had their spells in office extended beyond their usual terms, without a squeak from the brow-beaten civilians.

The armed forces scoop up roughly a quarter of all public spending and large dollops of aid, with no proper oversight, says Ayesha Siddiqa, a defence analyst. They also run big firms, employ over 500,000, grab prime land for retired officers, set foreign and counterterrorism policies and scotch peace overtures to India. They are racing to expand a nuclear arsenal beyond 100 warheads—Pakistan will soon be the world’s fifth-biggest nuclear power and has been a chief proliferator.

Civilian silence thus spoke volumes. Rather than try to defend the army, both elected leaders found pressing needs to be out-of-town. Eventually, on May 9th, Mr Gilani did tell parliament of the army’s fight against terrorists. He announced an inquiry into the bin Laden affair and said that, as ever, most problems were caused by America. Yet his careful vow of “full confidence in the high command” of the army and the ISI mostly emphasised their loss of prestige, as did a promise that on May 13th General Kayani would explain to parliament what had gone wrong.

The dismayed generals have sniped back. General Kayani told fellow officers that the civilian response had been “insufficient”. Public figures with army links, notably Shah Mehmood Qureshi, a former foreign minister, and Imran Khan, a former cricketer and rising conservative politician, said the president and prime minister should quit.

Adding to the squeeze are the Americans. President Barack Obama talked again on May 8th of bin Laden’s “support network” in Pakistan, a sign he has not yet ruled out ISI complicity. His officials sought (and reportedly got) access to three of bin Laden’s widows found in the Abbottabad compound. They also want to go back to the compound, to get back bits of a helicopter abandoned in the raid. Above all, they want the names of all the ISI men who worked on al-Qaeda.

Pakistani security men say it is ridiculous to suspect any complicity: they are at war with al-Qaeda, have arrested 40 of its leaders, and suffered violent attacks, including on ISI offices and the army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi. But Americans point to a refusal to prepare a campaign against the Haqqani network, an al-Qaeda ally, in North Waziristan. They also note the ISI’s longstanding ties to the Afghan Taliban, including its leader, Mullah Omar, who is assumed to be operating out of Quetta in Baluchistan. Perhaps American special forces will now go after him.

As it is, despite strenuous efforts by America’s chief-of-staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, relations have been strained for ages. Ordinary Pakistanis have long resented American drone attacks on Afghan insurgents sheltering in their country. American and Pakistani spy agencies fell out last year as dozens of CIA men arrived without ISI oversight to hunt extremists in towns like Abbottabad. Relations only got worse in January, when police arrested a CIA contractor after he had shot two men dead in Lahore. The Americans remain bitter that normal diplomatic levers failed for weeks to free him.

The row rumbles on. This week some media, presumably fed by the ISI, outed the CIA station chief in Islamabad by giving his name. The same happened five months ago to his predecessor. On May 16th is another test, as a trial opens in Chicago of Tahawwur Rana, accused of helping a Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, who struck Mumbai in November 2008. Among others indicted (though still at large) is a suspected ISI officer, “Major Iqbal”, who is accused of helping to plan and fund the attacks which killed 170.

Generals Kayani and Pasha are struggling to calibrate their response. Both congratulated Marc Grossman, America’s regional envoy, for bin Laden’s killing when they met a few hours after the raid. In public, by contrast, General Kayani growled that America was trampling on Pakistan and must reduce its “footprint”. Over military aid, they grumble that needed helicopters and fighter jets are held back. And to show that Pakistan has other options, Mr Gilani is to visit China, its “all-weather friend”, on May 17th.

Relations with America can only get so bad, however. General Mahmud Ali Durrani, ambassador to Washington until 2008, thinks the problem is that neither side speaks frankly. Rather than pretend that it will campaign in the wilds of North Waziristan, the Pakistani army should spell out how operationally hard that would be. And the Americans should set out the evidence for why they say the ISI collaborates with extremists.

Although the bin Laden raid has rocked the relationship, few predict a full break in ties. Not only will America need to get precious supplies to Afghanistan, mainly via the Pakistani port of Karachi, for years to come, but it is wary of isolating or destabilising a country with such a fast-growing nuclear arsenal. In turn Pakistan, with a decrepit economy, needs international aid. And it frets at signs of America falling in with its old rival, India. So the two sides are stuck with each other. As a former foreign minister says, America has concluded that Pakistanis are rascals, but at least they are “still our rascals”.

from the print edition | Asia
 
The civilians have yet again had to pull the Fauji nuts out of the mess the negligence, incompetence or complicity of the Fauji, created - and of course history in Pakistan has plenty of examples Fauji gratitude - civilians may live to regret their decision - the Fauji needs to be "reconstructed", as it stands today, it is alienated from Pakistan, and a danger to the state and nation of Pakistan, deeply associated with extremist ideology and action.


As a former foreign minister says, America has concluded that Pakistanis are rascals, but at least they are “still our rascals”.

More nails needed to ensure the dead do not awaken
 
We all know of the mischief of bureaucrats and politicians, but some apologists, self assigned Thakedars, if you will, argue the at the critical focus on the military is unjustified - and they imagine that we will not notice that they are not denying that the rates of corruption in the armed forces are scandalous, that these forces need reform and restructuring, to focus on their primary mission, killing Pakistan's enemies, as the government directs them to do, and not to imagine that they are the government -- however, the piece below is thought provoking :

Unjustified expenditure: Major irregularities surface in armed forces’ accounts
By Zahid Gishkori
Published: June 6, 2011


ISLAMABAD:

The auditor-general of Pakistan has unearthed massive financial irregularities amounting to Rs56.5 billion in the accounts of the armed forces during fiscal year 2011.

According to the Audit Report 2011 on accounts of defence services, irregularities occurred due to negligence, ineffective internal controls, embezzlement and misuse of authority by officers of the armed forces.


Around 330 contract agreements were concluded from 2008 to 2010 without following the procedure laid down in the Public Procurement Rules 2004, the auditors observed.

When they pointed out irregularities, the executive stated that the ministry’s instructions were received in June 2010. The auditors said that the reply is not tenable.

Auditors found that the Pakistan Army blocked Rs3 billion in funds due to unnecessary procurement and inappropriate storage of 1,385 new vehicles at the Central Ordnance Depot, Karachi. The vehicles have not been used for the last three years.

The report discovered excess transfer of funds to the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO) for procurement of bullet-proof jackets. Out of the Rs424.2 million allocated for them, the FWO has to refund some Rs385 million in addition to the loss it incurred on account of risk and expense contracts after the supplier, Musterhaft Pvt Ltd, failed to provide more than 1,000 jackets.

The expenditure incurred on building material purchased for renovation by the military is unaccounted for since there is no record of the quantity procured and its subsequent use. The irregularities amount to Rs52.7 million in Kharian, Sialkot and Lahore cantonments. Auditors stated that executive authorities could not prove that repair work was carried out on self-help basis. Irregularities in purchase of pre-fabricated accommodation for UN missions amounted to Rs92 million, in addition to payment of Rs14.6 million as General Sales Tax, which needs to be recovered from the supplier.

Irregularities amounting to Rs6 billion surfaced in the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra, on account of irregular conclusion of contracts and procurement of goods during the current fiscal year. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) lost Rs102 million due to non-recovery of five per cent rent on flying allowance from General Duty Pilots in the past 20 years. The record was not provided on request. Auditors observed that this amounts to blatant disobedience and ineffectual administration. Failure to deposit rent in the government treasury caused a loss of Rs14.6 million by the PAF Academy, Risalpur.

The navy failed to transfer 50 per cent accommodation charges paid by foreign trainees in the government treasury, resulting in the loss of $65,516. Auditors also observed that Rs6 million incurred on excess issue of food items in PNS Bahadur and PNS Mehran for the year 2009-10 needs to be reimbursed. An amount of Rs76 million has still not been recovered by the Military Accounts General after irregularities were discovered on account of unauthorised payments to reemployed officers of the Pakistan Navy in 2009-10.

Military Lands and Cantonment inflicted a loss of Rs181 million to the cantonment fund due to irregularities in awarding lease. Cantonment Board, Lahore lost Rs30 million due to its failure to revise the tax rate on immovable property. Fraud and embezzlement caused a loss of Rs68 million to Cantonment Board, Rawalpindi in 2008. Failure to recover Rs97 million in dues added to the losses incurred by various boards. The auditors pointed out the irregularities and observed that their replies were not satisfactory
.
 
Btw.. Based on what I read elsewhere.. is the good old mingling with the enlisted still on with the commissioned class?
Or has a divide kicked in?
By which I refer not to breaking of discipline, but rather the officer's "bond" with his men?
 
^^ Musey.

It seems as if Pakistan Armed Forces are the only institutions that are audited.

Come one, give us a break, i know you have better issues to debate about :)
 
Xeric

Only those who want to reject a new and improved Fauj can offer the "break" you seek -- A new and improved Fauj is in Pakistan's best interest and if it cannot get there by itself then we should all help it get there, right? Remember Pakistan has a government, it need an army good at what the main purpose of the army is supposed to be - it's not real estate and other commercial concerns and it's not governance, we have a legitimate government, remember - Kill islamist terrorists, do it outstandingly well, Protect Pakistan, Pakistanis and their property at all cost - and then we will have the new and improved Fauj and no need to shine a critical light on it - happy days.:cheers:
 
Xeric

Only those who want to reject a new and improved Fauj can offer the "break" you seek -- A new and improved Fauj is in Pakistan's best interest and if it cannot get there by itself then we should all help it get there, right? Remember Pakistan has a government, it need an army good at what the main purpose of the army is supposed to be - it's not real estate and other commercial concerns and it's not governance, we have a legitimate government, remember - Kill islamist terrorists, do it outstandingly well, Protect Pakistan, Pakistanis and their property at all cost - and then we will have the new and improved Fauj and no need to shine a critical light on it - happy days.:cheers:

The Army can't 'kill all the terrorists' nor can it end all 'terrorism and extremism' - if that is your yardstick for a 'new and improved Fauj' then I am afraid you are living in a fantasy world.

The Army can only do what it is doing now, with some improvements, but in the longer term what is needed to put a serious dent in terrorism and extremism is a much better effort from the civilian side - governance, law enforcement, investigation and prosecution, judicial improvements etc.

Simplistic and inane solutions such as 'reorient the Fauj' as some sort of magical cure for the very complex problems Pakistan is facing are a distraction and coutnerproductive to the goal of 'ending extremism and terrorism' since they focus the attention of people on a very flawed but simplistic solution -blame and reform the bogeyman of the military.
 
I can appreciate why you think the army should not target the Islamist terrorist, but that is what it must and with "encouragement", Will do. -- And for those who answer that in the face of the islamist enemy, a litany of what the army CANNOT do, well, we'll just have to see about that.
 
Musey

Audit Objections have NOTHING NOTHING to do with the improvement of this Fauj!

Seriously Musey, do you have a job? Are you self employed or something?
 
Audits are nothing? Lat time we we spoke of investigations you offered that the Pakistan Fauj would imprison those of us who sought investigations, now you say audits are nothing -- if they are nothing, why so upset? Lest show the people the substance of "patriotism" of some Fauji hani ji?
 
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