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The Security Dynamics of Balochistan

@Areesh and the rest of the PDF's MRAP Brigade,

111 civilians have sadly passed away due to rains. I understand that soldiers lives are important but aren't civilians lives important too. No out roar ?

 
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A basic dictum of COIN is to separate the insurgents from the civilian population. Drones alone are incapable of facilitating population-centric goals of COIN. Their use in ‘clearing’ operations produces negative effects including collateral damage and the militarization of local populations. This not only alienates populations but can fuel further insurgency. Drones have the ability to harass and harry insurgents seeking sanctuary in the area, temporarily denying them security and freedom to operate. It does not ‘deny sanctuary’ in the long-term to the insurgents, nor eliminate their presence.

The operations in swat and FATA displaced civilians from the area and then Army went in to clear the area. Following are the lessons learnt and strategies implemented for success of COIN ops in previous ops.

-Take the heights rather than rely on traditional roads and direct approaches to towns and cities.
-Avoid collateral damage.
-Let the insurgents collect in one place and isolate and take them out.
-Use multiple thrust lines.
-Troop ratio should not be bare minimum but as much as you can afford.
-Use the local people as your front line to be able to separate “black” (bad guys) from “white”; isolate, weaken, and then take the insurgents.
- Public support is paramount.
- Avoid disconnect between the federal and provincial governments on approaching the insurgency.
- Use Quick Impact Projects to win over local population; governance issues are best tackled by good governance, not force.
- Build local social structures.
- Political follow-up is critical once the army succeeds in clearing an area.
- A national effort is needed to fight militancy, not tactical military operations.

Yet to be seen if these steps are viable in baluchistan or PA thinks COIN Ops is just LIC while major conflict is with India.

The evolution from Bajaur 2007 to Today is quite a bit and a lot of different tactics have been evolved. However, one key difference is that Balochistan is still under a hodgepodge of political tussles between MoI, Army and Government of Balochistan.

There seems to be total lack of coordination beyond Army-ISI and the synergy with FC in FATA is nowhere to be seen.

The mandate that the military enjoyed in FATA post APS 2014 doesn’t exist in Balochistan but neither did the sensitivities of a nationalist insurgency vs the terrorist narrative those ops had.

After the Akbar Bugti fiasco no one really wants to go surgical on Balochistan and do a combined military-social-political operation to clean things up because the “image” gain is negligible but the fallout from any mistakes or hurdles is a lot.
 
@Areesh and the rest of the PDF's MRAP Brigade,

111 civilians have sadly passed away due to rains. I understand that soldiers lives are important but aren't civilians lives important too. No out roar ?

They are, why would you think we would think otherwise. Many of us on PDF advocated a few years of over investing (in proportion to their population) in Baluchistan to bring their infrastructure up to the national standard to provide equal services regardless of where a citizen is living. It would also be a way to do COIN in a long lasting manner. But this is not to say the FC and Army don’t need MRAPs. There are places and projects that need significant protection, such as the Chinese engineers that were killed working on a CPEC project.

“Guns and Butter” as it were. We need stability to grow the pie and catch-up in providing equal services nationwide.
 
The evolution from Bajaur 2007 to Today is quite a bit and a lot of different tactics have been evolved. However, one key difference is that Balochistan is still under a hodgepodge of political tussles between MoI, Army and Government of Balochistan.

There seems to be total lack of coordination beyond Army-ISI and the synergy with FC in FATA is nowhere to be seen.

The mandate that the military enjoyed in FATA post APS 2014 doesn’t exist in Balochistan but neither did the sensitivities of a nationalist insurgency vs the terrorist narrative those ops had.

After the Akbar Bugti fiasco no one really wants to go surgical on Balochistan and do a combined military-social-political operation to clean things up because the “image” gain is negligible but the fallout from any mistakes or hurdles is a lot.
Perhaps a shift to more robust Gendarmerie, like the Turkish model. A police force with more robust capabilities but still just law enforcement enforce a singular national law. A force with the capability to do more intelligence/surveillance so they can arrest suspects at more opportune moments, where the risk of armed combat is less likely.
 
The evolution from Bajaur 2007 to Today is quite a bit and a lot of different tactics have been evolved. However, one key difference is that Balochistan is still under a hodgepodge of political tussles between MoI, Army and Government of Balochistan.

There seems to be total lack of coordination beyond Army-ISI and the synergy with FC in FATA is nowhere to be seen.

The mandate that the military enjoyed in FATA post APS 2014 doesn’t exist in Balochistan but neither did the sensitivities of a nationalist insurgency vs the terrorist narrative those ops had.

After the Akbar Bugti fiasco no one really wants to go surgical on Balochistan and do a combined military-social-political operation to clean things up because the “image” gain is negligible but the fallout from any mistakes or hurdles is a lot.
They are, why would you think we would think otherwise. Many of us on PDF advocated a few years of over investing (in proportion to their population) in Baluchistan to bring their infrastructure up to the national standard to provide equal services regardless of where a citizen is living. It would also be a way to do COIN in a long lasting manner. But this is not to say the FC and Army don’t need MRAPs. There are places and projects that need significant protection, such as the Chinese engineers that were killed working on a CPEC project.

“Guns and Butter” as it were. We need stability to grow the pie and catch-up in providing equal services nationwide.

My observation is that regular formations of Army are not taking part in Balochistan COIN, I could be wrong. CTD is formed of police personnel trained by SSG who are taking part in IBOs supplemented by FC and Levies. I expected 33 and 41 IDs along with 44 LID (preferably) to take part openly against united Baloch Liberation Fronts formed up of many factions. Recently, SSG arrived when Army's own officer was abducted. Secondly, The acquisition of weapons by Army are for conventional warfare such as Artillery (SH-1 and M-109s) Air Defense (HQ-9) and Armor (VT-4), along with UCAVs (TB-2) and testing different missiles. One can argue that about UCAVs since CIA used them against targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan yet it seems that UCAVs are used by Army in limited operations against terrorists. It seems that Z-10 are a counter to AH-64 rather than Ops for a COIN war replacing AH-1s, or that Z-10 will be used in theaters where Regular Army formations are deployed, not where FC or Levies are taking part in operations.

This means that MOI has to take own steps to acquire MRAPs, gunships (converted transport or older AH-1s), and UAVs. The use of T-59s by FC and 25-pounders is still not clear. Are they are deployed on border posts to provide back up in firepower across durand line and that their appearance in COIN war will provide a negative effect on local population. This is why MOI should step up on its own to fund its own forces and operations. Otherwise from a Joint command center with Corps HQ in Quetta to launch UAV support and SSG Ops rather than Army keeping TB-2s in hangars till something with India comes up or an Ops into Afghanistan.

Boils down again to formations under MOI plus maybe support from SSG and LCB, for a COIN Ops in Baluchistan. Another part of the Ops are the intel formations, the ones without uniform. How autonomous are the intel formations under MOI (IB, FIA, NID etc) and how much involvement/support is there by the military intel setup (ISI, MI, AI, NI, CMI, FIU etc).
 
The best approach for Balochistan would be eliminating mid and high level commanders in terrorist groups and exploiting all fault lines in their loose alliance to make them fight each other. Intel agencies should hunt down terrorists with direct connections to foreign agencies so isolate the terrorist groups while hunting down the commanders who are on good terms with other groups and covertly support commanders who hate other terrorist groups.
Best way to end this war and make it look like a bad and useless war in the eyes of the local population is by making these terrorist groups fight and kill each other like dogs. Maybe start some ttp vs baloch groups fighting to break their love for each other. Maybe divide the commie groups by making the religious terrorists fight the commies.
Local Baloch have a negative view on LEA’s. FC especially isn’t seen well in the eyes of locals. A army operation will just generate more hate and more sympathy for terrorists and give more propaganda opportunities to them. Even killing foot soldiers will lead to more families wanting vengeance. Best way would be make these guys fight each other to destroy the public support they have than army goes in and clears the mess so they have all the local sympathy.
 
The best approach for Balochistan would be eliminating mid and high level commanders in terrorist groups and exploiting all fault lines in their loose alliance to make them fight each other. Intel agencies should hunt down terrorists with direct connections to foreign agencies so isolate the terrorist groups while hunting down the commanders who are on good terms with other groups and covertly support commanders who hate other terrorist groups.
Best way to end this war and make it look like a bad and useless war in the eyes of the local population is by making these terrorist groups fight and kill each other like dogs. Maybe start some ttp vs baloch groups fighting to break their love for each other. Maybe divide the commie groups by making the religious terrorists fight the commies.
Local Baloch have a negative view on LEA’s. FC especially isn’t seen well in the eyes of locals. A army operation will just generate more hate and more sympathy for terrorists and give more propaganda opportunities to them. Even killing foot soldiers will lead to more families wanting vengeance. Best way would be make these guys fight each other to destroy the public support they have than army goes in and clears the mess so they have all the local sympathy.
Been telling from start, there are traitors and criminals with in. Army is quick to apprehend its own, its the Civilian Government that is the most worrying.

Those sentenced by Army so far:
1. 1 x Lt General leading FC
2. 2 x Maj General from FC
3. 3 x Brigadiers from FC

The ones sentenced by court are:
1. Finance secretary Baluchistan
2. Multiple Police officers (especially those involved in smuggling oil from Iran)

The last cadre is the lower ranks of FC, Police, FCn, and Levies having links with separation groups along with clerks, technicians, contractors from Government departments.
 
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@PanzerKiel

Your analysis of above picture in terms of :
1. Anti ambush movement
2. Convoy security
3. IED threat
 
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@PanzerKiel

Your analysis of above picture in terms of :
1. Anti ambush movement
2. Convoy security
3. IED threat
I think its easy to strike this convoy using cover of mountains by BLA. 1 IED to stop the convoy, then empty the magazines and flee in mountains. That Tundra or LC might be up-armored.
 
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