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The risks of US listings by Chinese companies

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The risks of US listings by Chinese companies
By John Ross

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China is the only one of the world's three largest economies in which a significant number of its most important companies are listed on share markets outside direct regulatory control of their home country's main financial administration. Almost all the major U.S. companies are listed in the United States. The same applies in Japan. But many Chinese companies are listed in Hong Kong, part of China but with separate regulation and capital markets from China's mainland economy. Furthermore, a significant number of Chinese companies are listed in London and the United States.

This was highlighted by Alibaba's IPO on the New York Stock Exchange. Alibaba became history's largest IPO. But this success was only the latest upswing of a roller coaster record of U.S. listings by China's companies. The wild oscillations raise two questions:

• Immediately, what can be done to minimise risks for U.S. listed Chinese companies?

• Over the long run can these risks be controlled?- is it strategically sensible for China, and for China's companies, to list in the United States?


Analysing short-term risk, the recent IPOs are not the first time Chinese companies have rushed into U.S. listings. In 2008-11, over 60 Chinese companies listed on U.S. exchanges- 38 in 2010 alone. But by 2012 this had collapsed to two new listings. This precipitate fall accompanied accounting and other scandals.

The most notorious case, affecting sentiment towards U.S. listed Chinese companies, was Sino-Forest- although it was listed in Canada. In 2011 Muddy Waters Research, the short selling firm, accused Sino-Forest of fraud. Sino-Forest's shares fell and eventually the company filed for bankruptcy. Other U.S. listed Chinese companies were hit by auditor resignations, stock de-listings, and investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Particularly severely hit were Chinese companies practicing reverse mergers- buying listed U.S. companies, thereby avoiding regulatory procedures associated with IPOs. Amid scandals, 82 companies in the Bloomberg Chinese Reverse mergers index lost 52 percent of their market value in June and July 2011. This was followed by severe falls in the overall value of U.S. listed Chinese companies. The China Development Bank then supplied funds for Chinese companies to buy back shares and leave U.S. markets.

This led to a regulatory clash between China and the United States. The SEC wanted audit documents from China which international auditors could not give, as that violated Chinese law.

In this context, Alibaba's original intention was not a U.S. listing. The company originally investigated listing in Hong Kong, but abandoned this as Hong Kong's exchange prohibits guaranteed company control by a preferred shareholder group which Alibaba wanted- in line with Facebook and Google.

In the short term China's companies have learned to avoid the risks which led to the 2010-11 debacle. Reverse takeovers have been abandoned as a strategy, it is understood major accounting irregularities will be discovered, Muddy Waters type short seller risk are well known. Against a backdrop of strong rises in U.S. stock markets, shares from Chinese companies began to outperform again- a new upswing of the roller coaster after precipitate descent. By the end of 2013, as Dhara Ranasinghe of CNBC noted:

"Shares of Qunar Cayman Islands more than doubled in their U.S. debut… valuing the Chinese travel website controlled by internet giant Baidu at US$1.05 billion. Shares of 58.com, a classifieds website… soared more than 45 percent when they started trading."

By the beginning of 2014, the Financial Times found the eight Chinese companies going public in the United States in the previous year usually delivered gains of over 10 percent on their debuts. The 55 biggest Chinese stocks listed in the United States climbed 18 percent over the previous two years. Alibaba's successful IPO therefore came on the crest of short term spectacular gains by U.S. listed Chinese companies.

But warning signs are beginning. In December, less than three months after Alibaba's IPO, an advertising campaign was launched against it by U.S. retailers. As the Financial Times noted: ‘‘Bricks-and-mortar retailers… have now turned their fire on Alibaba…

"A campaign group whose members include Target, Best Buy, Home Depot and JC Penney have aimed their ad at U.S. lawmakers, claiming that Alibaba will ‘decimate' local retailers unless a new law can be passed to prevent online shoppers avoiding sales tax… We believe it's just a matter of time before Alibaba exploits this loophole."

This attack was a political manoeuvre. Alibaba's U.S. retail presence is insignificant compared to Amazon, but politically U.S. retailers found it more convenient to attack a Chinese company. The effect of politically inspired campaigns, if backed by the U.S. government, is shown in such successful Chinese companies as Huawei and ZTE being effectively shut out of the U.S. market.

In parallel, Alibaba began to lose its premium compared to the performance of U.S. shares. Between its September IPO and the first weeks in November Alibaba shares had risen by 27 percent compared to a one percent rise for the S&P 500- a 26 percentage point Alibaba premium. But by the beginning of December Alibaba had fallen to only 12 percent above its first day price compared to a 3 percent S&P 500 rise in the same period- only a 9 percent premium, with a clear downward direction.

Future pressure that can be put on Alibaba by U.S. authorities is evident- including potentially by regulatory probes. If Alibaba does not go along with U.S. government demands, actions can be taken limiting its U.S. expansion. Such threats can make Alibaba an instrument of pressure on China as the company tries to prevent such measures.

In the author's judgement, regarding the immediate situation, Hong Kong made a serious mistake in not accepting Alibaba's proposed share structure. As the company was not asking for a state subsidy, and nothing relevant was hidden, private shareholders should have been left to decide if they wanted to invest given its proposed share structure.

More fundamentally, the risks of having a country's major companies listed on share markets outside its own directly regulated territory are insurmountable- the good reason why the largest economies have their companies listed in their own jurisdictions. A country's largest companies are important national assets. Ability to regulate these companies is a key feature of national policy. The bases for significant clashes if companies are listed outside a major country's jurisdiction are inevitable given differing structures of different countries and can become conscious policy matters.

Objective structural issues were illustrated in the China-U.S. auditing dispute. In January 2014 an SEC judge ruled the Chinese branches of the main Western auditing firms should be suspended for six months. Even if this immediate issue is solved, the clash of regulatory regimes is inevitable. The Financial Times drew attention to the risk:"Because of restrictions on foreign investment in the Chinese internet sector, China's tech companies have listed in the United States as ‘variable interest entities'. U.S. shareholders are tied to these companies through contractual obligations… rather than as their actual owners. This has been a clever structure for working around China's rules. Yet it is also one that can crumble apart under pressure, whether because a Chinese company chooses to ignore the agreement or because the Chinese regulator decides it has had enough of the ruse."

In addition to inevitable regulatory issues, the possibility for direct political pressure exists- as seen with Huawei and ZTE, and as has begun with Alibaba. This occurred when relations between the United States and China were not extremely tense. But if there were major tension between the U.S. and China, the temptation of U.S. authorities to put pressure on Chinese listed companies in the U.S. would almost certainly be irresistible.

The conclusion is evident. It evidently does not matter if second or third rank Chinese companies list in the United States, they must simply comply with U.S. regulation whether or not they agree with it. But for the same reasons that almost all first tier U.S. companies are listed in the United States, the most important Chinese companies should be listed in China. The wild up and down roller coaster seen in the last period, plus the structural features, shows that while short term measures can be taken the risks of having first rank Chinese companies listed in the United States cannot in fact be controlled in the long run.

@Chinese-Dragon , @tranquilium , @Edison Chen @Raphael , @JSCh , @ChineseTiger1986 et al.
 
China stock market adopts verification system (核准制), US stock markets use registration system (注册制). The latter one provides easier way for companies going public to get approved, under registration system, companies submit their annual reports including financial information relating to the company for the past financial year to SEC. The authority only examines the files, it's quite a convenient way to get public than the complicated process under verification system. Because it may take as long as several years and multiple rounds of reviewing process under verification system, time is money, this cost too much for companies to grow bigger. The review process is more efficient in the US. It's not hard to understand, US stock market though has experienced several big shockwaves in the past century, it's still most vigorous, due to its strict regulation and healthy capital market environment. The advanced capital market of US contributes to the superpower status of United States. China is adopting registration system in 2015 or 2016, according to Ernst & Young, at that time, there will be 70% huge increase of IPOs in Chinese stock market (A股). China should adopt easier access to allow companies raise capital inside China, to remove the block that has distorted and betrayed the basic principle of supply and demand of new stock offerings. It also helps to ease the financial burden of banks, as well to millions of qualified SMEs with good operating and earning abilities to raise fund in China, then China's economy can be saved. It's not Alibaba don't want to go public inside China, but the qualifications due to current verification system, as well as the corruption during the IPO process, there is too much conspiracies and shady relevant trade. I hope mature administrative supervision to come into practice. Many garbage companies still went public because of government's pressure to finish their target, the more public companies, the more taxes. @LeveragedBuyout Would you mind sharing something about the US registration system if convenient, thanks!
 
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China stock market adopts verification system (核准制), US stock markets use registration system (注册制). The latter one provides easier way for companies going public to get approved, under registration system, companies submit their annual reports including financial information relating to the company for the past financial year to SEC. The authority only examines the files, it's quite a convenient way to get public than the complicated process under verification system. Because it may take as long as several years and multiple rounds of reviewing process under verification system, time is money, this cost too much for companies to grow bigger. The review process is more efficient in the US. It's not hard to understand, US stock market though has experienced several big shockwaves in the past century, it's still most vigorous, due to its strict regulation and healthy capital market environment. The advanced capital market of US contributes to the superpower status of United States. China is adopting registration system in 2015 or 2016, according to Ernst & Young, at that time, there will be 70% huge increase of IPOs in Chinese stock market (A股). China should adopt easier access to allow companies raise capital inside China, to remove the block that has distorted and betrayed the basic principle of supply and demand of new stock offerings. It also helps to ease the financial burden of banks, as well to millions of qualified SMEs with good operating and earning abilities to raise fund in China, then China's economy can be saved. It's not Alibaba don't want to go public inside China, but the qualifications due to current verification system, as well as the corruption during the IPO process, there is too much conspiracies and shady relevant trade. I hope mature administrative supervision to come into practice. Many garbage companies still went public because of government's pressure to finish their target, the more public companies, the more taxes. @LeveragedBuyout Would you mind sharing something about the US registration system if convenient, thanks!

You did a fine job explaining the concept. Formally, a company hires an investment bank to help them prepare and underwrite the offering (i.e. the investment bank actually buys the shares from the company, and then sells them into the market at the IPO). Then the firm files a Form S-1 and does a roadshow, or literally traveling around to institutions investors, to pitch their company and entice the institutional investor to commit to an allocation in the IPO. This is also known as "building the book," and the demand from these investors is used to determine the best offering price range.

The mechanics of the offering are less important that the vetting that takes place. First, the firm must have a reputable auditor audit the company's financials, and prepare at least three years of audited financials for the offering to take place. Thanks to a regulation called Sarbanes-Oxley that was introduced over a decade ago, the officers of the company (usually CEO and CFO, but sometimes lower) must sign and attest that the numbers presented are accurate, under penalty of prosecution. The investment bank that's hired usually does its own due diligence under a process that's called Know Your Client.

Then the Investment Bank prepares the S-1 through discussions with management, the company's accountants, and the company's attorneys (the bank hires its own attorneys to check details and represent the bank's interests). When I was still on the sell-side, the investment bank would ask the company's auditors for a "comfort letter," which was basically the auditor's stamp of approval that they also believed the numbers to be accurate and true. In the last years I was in the industry, it was getting progressively harder to obtain this comfort letter, because the legal liability of issuing a letter was very dangerous to the auditor (Arthur Andersen was destroyed because of one of its offices' incompetence in regards to Enron).

The roadshow is the last vetting step, because institutional investors are sophisticated, and have their own research and models to compare against the company's claims.

Only then is the IPO accomplished, and as @Edison Chen pointed out, the SEC rules require regular updates of the financials in order to keep the market apprised as to the company's activities. The American system of quarterly reports has often been criticized as leading to a short-term outlook by management, but I think it's important for shareholders to be kept up to date frequently, so they can make informed decisions. I personally do not think the semi-annual updates that are used in the UK are sufficient, given how much can change in a few short months, but that's a side issue.

It's a pretty good system. It sometimes fails when a villain is determined to manipulate the system, but most such efforts are eventually caught, due to the multiple layers of due diligence involved. As @Edison Chen pointed out, that's the main reason why the US market is the largest, most liquid, and deepest market in the world, because of the trust our system engenders, and protections that are offered to shareholders.
 
I think the tax loophole with Alibaba is due to it being offshore and having no offices in the US. I believe the tax laws say if you don't have a presence in a particular state you don't have to collect state taxes.

Up until about a year ago Amazon didn't charge taxes for my state. Now it does because it purchased a local company that does robotic shelf inventory and that counts as an office.
 
You did a fine job explaining the concept. Formally, a company hires an investment bank to help them prepare and underwrite the offering (i.e. the investment bank actually buys the shares from the company, and then sells them into the market at the IPO). Then the firm files a Form S-1 and does a roadshow, or literally traveling around to institutions investors, to pitch their company and entice the institutional investor to commit to an allocation in the IPO. This is also known as "building the book," and the demand from these investors is used to determine the best offering price range.

The mechanics of the offering are less important that the vetting that takes place. First, the firm must have a reputable auditor audit the company's financials, and prepare at least three years of audited financials for the offering to take place. Thanks to a regulation called Sarbanes-Oxley that was introduced over a decade ago, the officers of the company (usually CEO and CFO, but sometimes lower) must sign and attest that the numbers presented are accurate, under penalty of prosecution. The investment bank that's hired usually does its own due diligence under a process that's called Know Your Client.

Then the Investment Bank prepares the S-1 through discussions with management, the company's accountants, and the company's attorneys (the bank hires its own attorneys to check details and represent the bank's interests). When I was still on the sell-side, the investment bank would ask the company's auditors for a "comfort letter," which was basically the auditor's stamp of approval that they also believed the numbers to be accurate and true. In the last years I was in the industry, it was getting progressively harder to obtain this comfort letter, because the legal liability of issuing a letter was very dangerous to the auditor (Arthur Andersen was destroyed because of one of its offices' incompetence in regards to Enron).

The roadshow is the last vetting step, because institutional investors are sophisticated, and have their own research and models to compare against the company's claims.

Only then is the IPO accomplished, and as @Edison Chen pointed out, the SEC rules require regular updates of the financials in order to keep the market apprised as to the company's activities. The American system of quarterly reports has often been criticized as leading to a short-term outlook by management, but I think it's important for shareholders to be kept up to date frequently, so they can make informed decisions. I personally do not think the semi-annual updates that are used in the UK are sufficient, given how much can change in a few short months, but that's a side issue.

It's a pretty good system. It sometimes fails when a villain is determined to manipulate the system, but most such efforts are eventually caught, due to the multiple layers of due diligence involved. As @Edison Chen pointed out, that's the main reason why the US market is the largest, most liquid, and deepest market in the world, because of the trust our system engenders, and protections that are offered to shareholders.

Very professional opinions from the industry, thank you! Bookmarked your thread. Always curious to find out how exactly it works, the whole process in China is roughly similar, the differences maybe some very detailed requirement of the financials and management board. By the way it's not hard at all to get the auditor's signature in China.
 
Very professional opinions from the industry, thank you! Bookmarked your thread. Always curious to find out how exactly it works, the whole process in China is roughly similar, the differences maybe some very detailed requirement of the financials and management board. By the way it's not hard at all to get the auditor's signature in China.

I suspect that the main difference between China and the US is at the auditor level--after all, more due diligence could never hurt, right? One would assume that the longer-lasting and more arduous Chinese verification system would yield better results, but it probably doesn't due to weaknesses with the auditors (as demonstrated by the Chinese law preventing disclosure of financial information in the hands of auditors to the SEC, and the problems with the Chinese companies that reverse-merged into the US market that had been presumably audited at least in China).

I should add about the KYC process, by the way, that we take it very seriously in the US. Again, when I was in the industry, we would even sometimes hire private investigators to find out more information on certain officers or major shareholders. Banks protect their reputation fiercely, as it's their major asset. Once a bank screws up and allows fraud to get through, it takes many, many years to regain the trust of investors and clients.
 
IPO rules drafted: CSRC
2014-12-01 13:35 Global Times/Agencies

China's top securities regulator said it had finished draft rules for a new management system for IPO and would submit them to the country's cabinet by the end of the month.

The comments were made by Zhang Xiaojun, a spokesman for the CSRC, at a weekly press conference on Friday.

The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) said in December 2013 it planned to dump its approval-based IPO system, which had decided which firms would get listed and when, and switch to a registration-based system similar to those currently used in the US and other developed markets.

It said it plans to unveil details of the new system by the end of the year.

The system aims to allow market forces to determine the reception and pricing of IPOs and speed up the process for the long line of hopefuls.

China's bourses have been volatile despite measures adopted by the CSRC to curb excessive speculation.
 
I suspect that the main difference between China and the US is at the auditor level--after all, more due diligence could never hurt, right? One would assume that the longer-lasting and more arduous Chinese verification system would yield better results, but it probably doesn't due to weaknesses with the auditors (as demonstrated by the Chinese law preventing disclosure of financial information in the hands of auditors to the SEC, and the problems with the Chinese companies that reverse-merged into the US market that had been presumably audited at least in China).

I should add about the KYC process, by the way, that we take it very seriously in the US. Again, when I was in the industry, we would even sometimes hire private investigators to find out more information on certain officers or major shareholders. Banks protect their reputation fiercely, as it's their major asset. Once a bank screws up and allows fraud to get through, it takes many, many years to regain the trust of investors and clients.

The auditor level, you mean expertise? Agreed. The long verification ≠ better results. They want to make everything get fully prepared after IPO, because in China there is nearly no delisting rules for them to quit the market once the company failed. It's still up to the companies themselves, the role of verification is still limited.

Sounds like detectives. :D Anyway they should do that, to investigate information on officers. For commercial banks in China, we try to know more things about the customer's (officer or main shareholder) life before credit rating and issuance of credit. Indeed the reputation risk is as important as market risk or operation risk.
 
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The auditor level, you mean expertise? Agreed. The long verification ≠ better results. They want to make everything get fully prepared after IPO, because in China there is nearly no delisting rules for them to quit the market once the company failed. It's still up to the companies themselves, the role of verification is still limited.

Sounds like detectives. :D Anyway they should do that, to investigate information on officers. For commercial banks in China, we try to know more things about the customer's (officer or main shareholder) life before credit rating and issuance of credit. Indeed the reputation risk is as important as market risk or operation risk.

关于退市

  退市是上市公司由于未满足交易所有关财务等其他上市标准而主动或被动终止上市的情形,即由一家上市公司变为非上市公司。退市可分主动性退市和被动性退市,并有复杂的退市的程序。

业绩标准

  A股公司因业绩因素的退市标准是连续3年亏损就要暂停上市(暂时保留代码和资格),如果之后6个月内仍继续亏损就要面临退市处理。退市的另一种情况发生在公司实施私有化时,在大股东或战略投资者回购全部流通股后即可宣布公司由公众上市公司重新变为私有公司,如中石化(600028)对旗下多家上市子公司实施私有化后这些子公司就将一一退市。

终止上市

  到目前为止,沪深两市被终止上市的公司已经有12家,分别是PT水仙、PT中浩、PT粤金曼、PT金田、ST中侨、PT南洋、ST九州、ST海洋、ST银山、ST宏业、ST生态、ST鞍一工(均用退市前股票简称)。
 
关于退市

  退市是上市公司由于未满足交易所有关财务等其他上市标准而主动或被动终止上市的情形,即由一家上市公司变为非上市公司。退市可分主动性退市和被动性退市,并有复杂的退市的程序。

业绩标准

  A股公司因业绩因素的退市标准是连续3年亏损就要暂停上市(暂时保留代码和资格),如果之后6个月内仍继续亏损就要面临退市处理。退市的另一种情况发生在公司实施私有化时,在大股东或战略投资者回购全部流通股后即可宣布公司由公众上市公司重新变为私有公司,如中石化(600028)对旗下多家上市子公司实施私有化后这些子公司就将一一退市。

终止上市

  到目前为止,沪深两市被终止上市的公司已经有12家,分别是PT水仙、PT中浩、PT粤金曼、PT金田、ST中侨、PT南洋、ST九州、ST海洋、ST银山、ST宏业、ST生态、ST鞍一工(均用退市前股票简称)。

我必须知道这些,不用给我百度这些东西。只不过现实中因为各种原因很少退市的,制度形同虚设,等于没有。人家成熟资本市场的退市制度比A股完善多了。

目前A股2500多家上市公司,有毛病有问题的多了去了,你能保证除了这12家都能正常连续盈利分红派息?
 
我必须知道这些,不用给我百度这些东西。只不过现实中因为各种原因很少退市的,制度形同虚设,等于没有。人家成熟资本市场的退市制度比A股完善多了。

目前A股2500多家上市公司,有毛病有问题的多了去了,你能保证除了这12家都能正常连续盈利分红派息?

I didnt say the companies do not have problems or they do have problems
BUT there is a set of rules for delisting you cant deny

However I wont go further because it was between you and the other guy's conversation
which is none of my business hahaha BYE!:woot:
 
I didnt say the companies do not have problems or they do have problems
BUT there is a set of rules for delisting you cant deny

However I wont go further because it was between you and the other guy's conversation
which is none of my business hahaha BYE!:woot:

That's useless rule they have, just like the Chinese congress. 退市制度自从股市诞生就设计好了,从上个世纪90年代初上交深交所成立,也没多少退市的,都包装的很好,相反股市变成了吸老百姓钱的地方。
 
That's useless rule they have, just like the Chinese congress. 退市制度自从股市诞生就设计好了,从上个世纪90年代初上交深交所成立,也没多少退市的,都包装的很好,相反股市变成了吸老百姓钱的地方。

You have just changed the subject accepting there are rules but not in practice! Hahaha :cheesy:
 
我本身就知道有退市机制。只不过没意义罢了。你理解错了。

My goodness what did you say @#8

"because in China there is nearly no delisting rules for them to quit the market once the company failed" :dirol:
 

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