Pakistan's role in US-India relations

[kashith]

Sadanand Dhume: The Pakistan Problem - WSJ.com

Those who accuse Barack Obama of cold-shouldering Britain and stiff-arming Israel might find his choice of a country to shower with praise somewhat perplexing. According to the White House, the president opened a meeting Sunday with Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani "by noting that he is very fond of Pakistan, having visited the country during college." Mr. Obama also spoke about "shared values" between the United States and Pakistan, and "the fight we are both engaged in against extremists operating in South Asia."

For the most part, this kind of polite blather is par for the course in diplomacy. So we can ignore the incongruity of claiming shared values with a country that boasts a rogue nuclear program, a notoriously double-dealing intelligence establishment, a patchy commitment to democracy and one of the most virulently anti-American populations on the planet. (According to the Pew Global Attitudes project, only one in six Pakistanis holds a favorable opinion of America.) But Mr. Obama's bonhomie toward Mr. Gilani is accompanied by a much more troublesome development, an apparent willingness to consider a flawed Pakistani roadmap to peace in South Asia.



As this newspaper reported last week, in December Mr. Obama issued a secret directive to step up American diplomacy aimed at easing tensions between India and Pakistan. Washington has begun to lean on New Delhi to limit its training of the Afghan army. There is talk of asking India to pull back troops from its border with Pakistan, and thin its forces in the disputed territory of Kashmir. If Islamabad has its way, India's consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar may be shuttered, and its humanitarian work among Afghanistan's war-ravaged population ended or severely curtailed.

At first blush, this tilt toward Pakistan isn't entirely unreasonable. America requires the cooperation of the Pakistani military, the only functioning institution in the country, to battle the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan and lay the groundwork for withdrawing American troops from a thankless war. Moreover, since last year, Pakistan's army has shown a new willingness to combat some of the Islamist militias it helped spawn. Soldiers have wrested the picturesque Swat valley in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly called North West Frontier Province) back from the Pakistani Taliban. In February, Pakistan helped American intelligence agents nab Mullah Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's military chief. They would do more, say Pakistan's generals, if only Indian troops on their borders, and bustling Indian consulates in Afghanistan, didn't make Islamabad feel insecure.

But Pakistan's insecurities are largely in its generals' minds. Its sheer size may make India appear threatening, but its disposition tells a different story. The government in New Delhi, headed by a mild-mannered Oxford-educated economist Manmohan Singh, has put economic development at the heart of its agenda. Despite repeated provocations, including the November 2008 murder in Mumbai of 166 people by Pakistani terrorists, New Delhi has refused to be drawn into war with Islamabad.

Moreover, as even a cursory glance at the country's newspapers and magazines shows, India's strategic establishment is far more preoccupied by the internal threat posed by a violent Maoist movement—responsible for killing 76 federal police officers in the central Indian state of Chhattisgarh earlier this month—than on dreams of capturing Lahore or Karachi. India's popular culture is similarly inward looking. Cricket, Bollywood, the endless machinations of domestic politics, and, of late, breathless tales of freshly minted billionaires, dominate the airwaves. The average Indian spends more time worrying about the fortunes of his favorite Indian Premier League cricket team than fretting about force posture on the Western border. In short, left to its own devices, India—democratic, self-obsessed and increasingly prosperous—would more likely yawn at Pakistan than growl at it.

Unfortunately, Pakistan's peculiar history, and the disproportionate role of its army in national life, doesn't allow India to ignore it. Carved out of British India in 1947 as the world's first modern state created solely on the basis of Islam, Pakistan has always been touched by a certain messianic zeal. In the 1970s, this manifested itself in genocide against Bangladeshis. In the 1980s, the country became ground zero for a global jihad against the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the Pakistani army's notorious Inter-Services Intelligence sponsored the Taliban in its quest for "strategic depth" and desire to turn Afghanistan into a client state to offset India's larger size. At the same time, it cultivated a jihadist network in both Pakistan and Indian Kashmir. It's hard to think of any other bankrupt country—Pakistan is kept afloat by multilateral donors and Western largesse, most recently a $7.5 billion aid package from America—with such delusions of grandeur.

Needless to say, the Obama administration is right in seeking to wield American influence for peace in South Asia. But rewarding Pakistan for its pursuit of jihadism while punishing India for nurturing democracy and opening up its economy ought to be a bridge too far even for an administration with a reputation for stiffing friends and coddling enemies.

 

[Usama86]

It is very evident that this artical has been posted here to get the posters on both sides of the border staring at each other with hands on the keyboards. If we are to believe the author about USA's support for Pakistan then it means that the huge Indian lobby in the US has failed in making sure that Pakistan is isolated and doesnot receive any millitary aid and etc etc. The question in everyone's mind now should be that WHY did US change its stance? India being the apple of the eye of the international community and still US punishing them for being a democracy and a growing economy WHY? One thing we all know about US is that she looks after her interests alone and doesnot go out of the way to help out any one. So WHAT is it that the US has discovered which has made her part ways with India? I am sure the mild-mannered Oxford-educated economist sitting in New Delhi must have let out atleast one swear word out of frustration on this situation and understandably the Indian lobby which has not turned out to be effective enough is continuing to vent out anger and justifications through WSJ. The following article also appeared in WSJ. In his writing Mr. Ganguly basically begs Washington to consider the Indian army for a role in Afghanistan. Not doing that, he warns, would amount to ‘a grave strategic error’. The Indian analyst sounded almost desperate with his pushy sales pitch Example: India's army enjoys an optimal "teeth to tail" ratio, specifically trained in counterinsurgency operations.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704804204575068981162639698.html

By SUMIT GANGULY

Training the Afghan army is "the most critical part" of America's "long-term strategy" in the country, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke said Monday. Pakistan agrees, and has suggested it can help, too. Yet the best candidate for the task is the Indian Army.

This million-strong force has had close to 60 years' of intense counterinsurgency experience in a variety of terrains. Indian troops have successfully carried out campaigns in jungles in India's northeast, at high altitudes in Jammu and Kashmir and in the plains in the Punjab. Its officers and enlisted men have counterinsurgency experience in both urban and rural environments.

India already has the capacity to impart this knowledge to friendly forces. The country boasts one of the world's largest military training establishments, with the ability to train officers and men for varying combat duties. Educational facilities include a major counterinsurgency training base—the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School—and a school focused on urban warfare in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the site of an ongoing insurgency. Both can simulate a variety of combat situations and provide the Afghan Army with training relevant to the terrain and physical conditions that its troops are likely to encounter upon deployment. India's counterinsurgency schools also come complete with firing ranges, obstacle courses and training areas for the detection and handling of improvised explosive devices.
Beyond such infrastructure, however, the Indian Army has at its command significant accumulated knowledge of counterinsurgency operations and techniques. Its substantial cadre of instructors have ample field experience and routinely train India's forces in counterinsurgency operations. The Indian military has formulated a viable, codified doctrine to fight counterinsurgency. This doctrine calls for important restraints on the use of force, highlights the significance of not alienating civilian populations, insists upon respect for local customs and emphasizes the importance of an eventual political solution to all insurgencies. These principles are routinely stressed in the curricula of the counterinsurgency schools and applied to the best extent possible in field operations. There is little reason to believe that within a specified span of time they could not be inculcated into the Afghan Army too.

Finally, thanks to some setbacks over the years, most notably in its operations in Sri Lanka and subsequently in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Army has taken heed of and learned a great deal from its past errors. Its leadership has undertaken a number of organizational innovations to best cope with counterinsurgency operations. Since 1990, for instance, India has fielded a contingent called the Rashtriya Rifles (literally "National Rifles"), forces with an optimal "teeth to tail" ratio, specifically trained in counterinsurgency operations. These units, drawn from the regular Indian Army, have proven especially effective when deployed in Jammu and Kashmir and have managed to restore more than a modicum of order in the state.

The Indian Army has other advantages, too. Thanks to its cheap labor costs, it can train Afghan forces at a fraction of the costs of training them in similar duties almost anywhere in the United States or Western Europe. Rank and file Afghan soldiers would feel much more at ease in India than in most other parts of the world. India has cultural bonds with Afghanistan of very long standing and Afghans have over centuries traveled to various parts of northern India. Finally, critics of the Indian Army's counterinsurgency operations notwithstanding, its forces have learned to operate within the scope of the rule of law. Many officers who have exceeded their brief have been subject to court-martial and charges of human-rights violations are not swept under the carpet.

If training the Afghan Army is as important as the U.S.-led coalition says it is, then why not accelerate training in the place that's best served to do it? Not turning to India would amount to a grave strategic error.

Mr. Ganguly holds the Ngee Ann Kongsi Chair in International Relations at the Rajaratnam School for International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.


Hope to get some decent answers to my questions.

 

[genetic_nomad]

it is very hard to ascertain the when and why of global politics, the fact remains, every nation acts according to its own interests. U.S., Pakistan and India are equally justified in using diplomacy/politics to push their agendas.