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Pakistan's lost decade of the 1990s

RiazHaq

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Pakistani economy grew at a fairly impressive rate of 6 percent per year through the first four decades of the nation's existence. In spite of rapid population growth during this period, per capita incomes doubled, inflation remained low and poverty declined from 46% down to 18% by late 1980s, according to eminent Pakistani economist Dr. Ishrat Husain. This healthy economic performance was maintained through several wars and successive civilian and military governments in 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s until the decade of 1990s, now appropriately remembered as the lost decade.

In the 1990s, economic growth plummeted to between 3% and 4%, poverty rose to 33%, inflation was in double digits and the foreign debt mounted to nearly the entire GDP of Pakistan as the governments of Benazir Bhutto (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif (PML) played musical chairs. Before Sharif was ousted in 1999, the two parties had presided over a decade of corruption and mismanagement. In 1999 Pakistan’s total public debt as percentage of GDP was the highest in South Asia – 99.3 percent of its GDP and 629 percent of its revenue receipts, compared to Sri Lanka (91.1% & 528.3% respectively in 1998) and India (47.2% & 384.9% respectively in 1998). Internal Debt of Pakistan in 1999 was 45.6 per cent of GDP and 289.1 per cent of its revenue receipts, as compared to Sri Lanka (45.7% & 264.8% respectively in 1998) and India (44.0% & 358.4% respectively in 1998).

After a relatively peaceful but economically stagnant decade of the 1990s, the year 1999 brought a bloodless coup led by General Pervez Musharraf, ushering in an era of accelerated economic growth that led to more than doubling of the national GDP, and dramatic expansion in Pakistan's urban middle class.

Pakistan became one of the four fastest growing economies in the Asian region during 2000-07 with its growth averaging 7.0 per cent per year for most of this period. As a result of strong economic growth, Pakistan succeeded in reducing poverty by one-half, creating almost 13 million jobs, halving the country's debt burden, raising foreign exchange reserves to a comfortable position and propping the country's exchange rate, restoring investors' confidence and most importantly, taking Pakistan out of the IMF Program.

The above facts were acknowledged by the current PPP government in a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) for 2008/09-2009/10, while signing agreement with the IMF on November 20, 2008. The document clearly (but grudgingly) acknowledged that "Pakistan's economy witnessed a major economic transformation in the last decade. The country's real GDP increased from $60 billion to $170 billion, with per capita income rising from under $500 to over $1000 during 2000-07". It further acknowledged that "the volume of international trade increased from $20 billion to nearly $60 billion. The improved macroeconomic performance enabled Pakistan to re-enter the international capital markets in the mid-2000s. Large capital inflows financed the current account deficit and contributed to an increase in gross official reserves to $14.3 billion at end-June 2007. Buoyant output growth, low inflation, and the government's social policies contributed to a reduction in poverty and improvement in many social indicators". (see MEFP, November 20, 2008, Para 1)

The decade also cast a huge shadow of the US "war on terror" on Pakistan, eventually turning the nation into a frontline state in the increasingly deadly conflict that shows no signs of abating. Along with the blood and gore and chaos on the streets, there are hopeful signs that rule of law and accountability is beginning to prevail in the country with the restoration of representative democracy and independent judiciary, largely in response to an increasingly assertive urban middle class, vibrant mass media and growing civil society.

The Zardari-Gilani government inherited a relatively sound economy on March 31, 2008. It inherited foreign exchange reserves of $13.3 billion, exchange rate at Rs62.76 per US dollar, the KSE index at 15,125 with market capitalization at $74 billion, inflation at 20.6 per cent and the country's debt burden on a declining path. The government itself acknowledged in the same document that "the macroeconomic situation deteriorated significantly in 2007/08 and the first four months of 2008/09 owing to adverse security developments, large exogenous price shocks (oil and food), global financial turmoil, and policy inaction during the political transition to the new government". (Para 3 of the MEFP, November 20, 2008.

Here is how Pakistani economist and NUST Professor Ashfaque Husain Khan explains the current situation:

What went wrong? Why one of the fastest growing economies in the Asian region until two years ago has been totally forgotten in the region? Firstly, the speed and dimension of exogenous price shocks (oil and food) were of extraordinary proportions. Secondly, the present government found itself totally ill-prepared and clueless in addressing the challenges arising out of the shocks. While rest of the world was taking corrective measures and adjusting to higher food and fuel prices, Pakistan lurched from one crisis to another.

Despite peaceful election and a smooth transition to a new government, political instability persisted. For a protracted period there were no finance, commerce, petroleum and natural resources and health ministers in the country. The government lost six precious months in finding its feet. It gave the impression of having little sense of direction and purpose. A crisis of confidence intensified as investors and development partners started to walk away. The stock market nosedived, capital flight set in, foreign exchange reserves plummeted and the Pakistani rupee lost one-third of its value. In short, Pakistan's macroeconomic vulnerability had grown unbearable. It had no option but to return to the IMF for a bailout package. There were no Plan A, B and C. There was only one plan, that is, to return to the IMF.

While the country was moving rapidly towards the IMF, the ministry of finance had prepared the plan to bring $4 billion by June 30, 2008 through four transactions. A kick-off meeting was scheduled on April 23, 2008 at the ministry to give a final touch to the various roadshows. These transactions were canceled on April 20, 2008. Who ordered the cancellation of $4 billion transaction? This cancellation prompted balance of payment crisis and the rest became history.

The economy continues to remain in intensive care unit and is barely breathing thanks to the injection of funds from the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. The economy is not on the radar screen of the government and as such the economic managers have no relevance in the current political set up. The exit of Shaukat Tarin is a classic example. At least he tried his best to inject financial discipline but paid the price of teaching prudent financial management.

Since Tarin's departure, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh has assumed the position of finance minister. It is still early to judge him, as the economy has suffered yet another major jolt from the widespread devastation caused by recent floods. This has added to the already extreme challenge Pakistan's leadership faces in bringing political and economic stability to the nation.

Haq's Musings: A Brief History of Pakistani Economy 1947-2010

Haq's Musings: Pakistan's Economic Performance 2008-2010
 
The economic situation at the end of the 90s was far worse (Debt:GDP ratios, reserves, inflation etc.) than it is now. A few years of President Musharraf's competent, nationalist government fixed it all and propelled Pakistan forward significantly. The hope is that a change in leadership will return the country to a growth range between 6-8%. Frankly, the sooner the better.
 
During the 90's, we suffered heavily due to a number of reasons. Primarily this was to do with what occurred in decade before and the incompetent leaders we had during those times.

As you will be aware that as soon as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was over, US sanctioned us heavily with the Pressler Amendments. This was due to our Nuclear Program that was overlooked for the greater part of 1980's. In essence, we should have been prepared for these sanctions and started to concentrate on better economic governance. Certainly high tax collections, well devised public spending and fiscal policies would have been ideal.

Another thing that affected us adversely was the influx of Afghan immigrants, the rampant drugs increase and Kalashnikov culture that seeped into our nation. The 80's saw corruption increase a whole new level never witnessed before and favoritism and nepotism was rife. Crime was a burgeoning problem that we could not deal with and the idiotic policies wrecked the nation.

IN the 80's however, we had aid from US because of our support to Mujahideen and thus we had impressive growth during that time. As soon as the aid stopped, the double combo of Sharif and Bhutto with their inept and corrupt parties ran Pakistan into the ground. Pakistan was in utter shambolic state because of these preceding events and Musharraf had to step in to save the nation before it would have completely collapsed.
 
Seems like Pakistan just needs to finish up the WoT and things will be back to normal.
 
What Mr. Khan does not account for is the degree to which capital fled the new so called Democratic PPP government -- Capital which deposited confidence in the Musharraf regimes financial managers willingness to protect capital and property, basically expressed itself about the PPP government by taking itself out of Pakistan - who could blame them?
 
During the 90's, we suffered heavily due to a number of reasons. Primarily this was to do with what occurred in decade before and the incompetent leaders we had during those times.

As you will be aware that as soon as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was over, US sanctioned us heavily with the Pressler Amendments. This was due to our Nuclear Program that was overlooked for the greater part of 1980's. In essence, we should have been prepared for these sanctions and started to concentrate on better economic governance. Certainly high tax collections, well devised public spending and fiscal policies would have been ideal.

Another thing that affected us adversely was the influx of Afghan immigrants, the rampant drugs increase and Kalashnikov culture that seeped into our nation. The 80's saw corruption increase a whole new level never witnessed before and favoritism and nepotism was rife. Crime was a burgeoning problem that we could not deal with and the idiotic policies wrecked the nation.

IN the 80's however, we had aid from US because of our support to Mujahideen and thus we had impressive growth during that time. As soon as the aid stopped, the double combo of Sharif and Bhutto with their inept and corrupt parties ran Pakistan into the ground. Pakistan was in utter shambolic state because of these preceding events and Musharraf had to step in to save the nation before it would have completely collapsed.

I know a lot of figures thrown around and great credit given to US aid to explain Pakistan's economic performance from 2001-2007.

What is often forgotten in all of this are the following facts:

1. Pakistan's FDI dramatically increased during this period. Former US Federal Reserve Chief Alan Greenspan said in his book titled "The Age of Turbulence" : “But clearly the Licence Raj (in India) has discouraged foreign direct investment. India received $7 billion in FDI in 2005, a sum dwarfed by China’s $72 billion. India’s cumulative stock of FDI at 6 per cent of GDP at the end of 2005 compares with 9 per cent for Pakistan, 14 per cent for China, and 61 per cent for Vietnam.

2. Pakistan dramatically reduced its dependence on external debt. Pakistan's total public debt declined dramatically from 100% of GDP to about 50% of GDP during this period.

3. The foreign aid to Pakistan has increased in terms of absolute dollars in 2010, but significantly declined as a percent of GDP over the last decade.

Pakistan received $5 in aid per capita in 1960s, and it has now increased to $15 per capita, according to the world bank.

But Pakistan's per capita GDP has risen from less than $300 to about $3000 during this period, making foreign aid a minute percentage of total GDP.

4. Remittances by overseas Pakistanis soared, and are still continuing to increase to new records, expected to pass $10 billion this year.


Haq's Musings: 1999-2009: Pakistan's Decade of Urban Middle Class Growth
 
What Mr. Khan does not account for is the degree to which capital fled the new so called Democratic PPP government -- Capital which deposited confidence in the Musharraf regimes financial managers willingness to protect capital and property, basically expressed itself about the PPP government by taking itself out of Pakistan - who could blame them?

Civilian democratic governments in Pakistan did fairly well until 1980s.

Bhutto-Zardari and Sharif have been the worst of the lot we have seen to date...they gave us the lost decade of the 1990s and again the worst performance since 2008.

Haq's Musings: Pakistan's Economic Performance 2008-2010
 
Bhutto-Zardari and Sharif have been the worst of the lot we have seen to date...they gave us the lost decade of the 1990s and again the worst performance since 2008.

Haq's Musings: Pakistan's Economic Performance 2008-2010


Mr. Haq, what changed? I mean what accounts for this failure? Did something change in the how IFI could be approached? I was under the impression that Bhutto, Zardari, Sharif failed because of experimental nature of their economic policies, but increasingly I am thinking that I have been on a wrong path and perhaps it may be more productive to see how these economic managers and policies have used IFI without necessarily focusing on success of their policies but success is measured by getting IFI funding.
 
Mr. Haq, what changed? I mean what accounts for this failure? Did something change in the how IFI could be approached? I was under the impression that Bhutto, Zardari, Sharif failed because of experimental nature of their economic policies, but increasingly I am thinking that I have been on a wrong path and perhaps it may be more productive to see how these economic managers and policies have used IFI without necessarily focusing on success of their policies but success is measured by getting IFI funding.

Unfortunately, the ruling civilian politicians in Pakistan have discredited themselves yet again with their incompetence and corruption...raising serious doubts about the viability of democracy under Zardari or Sharif. I think their days are numbered unless the situation changes fundamentally for the better...and I am not hopeful it will in the foreseeable future.

Haq's Musings: Incompetence Worse Than Graft in Pakistan
 
Here is NY Times report suggesting Pakistani military is losing patience with Zardari and demanding changes to improve governance.

The military, preoccupied by a war against militants and reluctant to assume direct responsibility for the economic crisis, has made clear it is not eager to take over the government, as it has many times before in Pakistan, military officials and politicians said.

But the government’s performance since the floods, which have left 20 million people homeless and the nation dependent on handouts from skeptical foreign donors, has laid bare the deep underlying tensions between the military and the civilian leadership.

American officials acknowledge that it has also left them increasingly disillusioned with Mr. Zardari, a now deeply unpopular president who was elected two-and-half years ago on a wave of sympathy after the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto.

In a series of meetings with the civilian leaders, the army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, scolded the president and his prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, for incompetence and corruption in the government, according to officials familiar with the conversations.

The general also demanded that they dismiss at least some ministers in the oversized 60-member cabinet, many of whom face corruption charges from past cases.

The civilian government has so far resisted those demands, and Mr. Zardari told the general that, come what may, he will not be maneuvered aside, according to a Pakistani official close to the president who was familiar with the conversations but did not want to be identified.

After a meeting between Mr. Zardari, Mr. Gilani and General Kayani on Monday, the president’s office issued a statement saying they had agreed “to protect the democratic process and to resolve all issues in accordance with the constitution.”

“Sanity had prevailed,” the Pakistani official said, meaning that General Kayani chose not to precipitate a crisis.

Still, it is clear that General Kayani, head of the country’s most powerful and respected institution, has ratcheted up the pressure on the government in the past several weeks.

Having secured an exceptional three-year extension in his post from Mr. Zardari in July, General Kayani appears determined to see to it that the government prevents the economy from entering a tailspin, which would further weaken the health of the nation and also the value of the military’s own vast landholdings and other business enterprises.

Military officers in the main cities have been talking openly and expansively about their contempt for the Zardari government and what they term the economic calamity, an unusual candor, reporters and politicians said.

“The gross economic mismanagement by the government is at the heart of it,” said Rifaat Hussain, a professor of international relations at Islamabad University and a confidant of the military. “And there is the rising public disaffection with the Pakistani Peoples Party under Zardari and Gilani.”

As the military demands the overhaul, the Supreme Court is also pushing the government on the issue of corruption by threatening to remove the president’s immunity from prosecution, a move that would expose him to charges of corruption in an old money-laundering case in Switzerland.

The government has defied the court’s demand to write a letter to the Swiss government requesting a re-opening of the case against Mr. Zardari, who once served 11 years in prison in Pakistan on unproven corruption charges. On Monday, the court granted an extension of two weeks for the government to reconsider its position.

Much of the rising distain for the government has to do with the perception among the media and the public of the callous and inept handling of the floods by the nation’s wealthy ruling class.

Mr. Gilani drew public ire for appearing at an ersatz camp for flood victims set up just for television cameras. It also did not help that newspapers reported that scores of cartons from the London luxury store Harrods had arrived at his residence in Lahore at the height of the flooding. Mr. Zardari, meanwhile, was vilified for visiting his chateau in France as ******** of water wiped out millions of villagers in his home province of Sindh.

In his most recent visit to Pakistan, the American envoy, Richard C. Holbrooke, said the international community could not be expected to provide all the billions of dollars needed to repair the flood damage, a warning that was interpreted here as a rebuke of the civilian government and its mismanagement.

But Washington, not unlike Pakistan’s military leaders, is caught, American officials say, because there is no appetite for a return of military rule. Nor is there much desire to see the opposition politician and former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, resume power.

Mr. Sharif, who has also faced corruption charges during his career, is considered by Washington to be too close to some of Pakistan’s militant groups, whose members vote in the Punjab, the Sharif electoral base.

As the head of the of the main opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-N, Mr. Sharif is not ready to come to the fore in any case, his aides say, because he does not want to be associated with the paralysis of the current government.

Of mounting concern to the Obama administration is the potential for serious unrest if the economy unspools further: inflation by some predictions will reach 25 percent in the coming period. The price of sugar has tripled, and the cost of flour has doubled since the government came to power nearly three years ago.

In particular, Washington wants the government to raise taxes on the wealthy landed and commercial class, a shortcoming that has become especially galling as Pakistan’s dependence on foreign donors rises.

Pakistan’s revenues from taxes are among the lowest in the world: only two million Pakistanis of a population of 170 million pay income tax, according to estimates by the United States government.

A report in a leading newspaper The News said Monday that Mr. Gilani and 25 of his ministers, including the finance minister, Hafiz Shaikh, did not pay income taxes at all, according to sworn affidavits by the ministers to the Election Commission of Pakistan.

The alarm about the economy was first sounded by Mr. Shaikh, a former officer of the World Bank, who told a government meeting last month that the government had only enough money to pay two months’ salaries. The economy was “teetering on the brink” before the floods but was now heading for the “abyss,” Mr. Shaikh was quoted as saying.

Military officers who attended the meeting were astounded, Mr. Hussain and others informed of the meeting said, and have since pressed the government for changes, politicians and diplomats said.

As the military maneuvers for change, it is not immune from criticism. Defense spending is budgeted at 13.6 percent of total expenditures in 2011, in line with past yearly expenditures even as the civilian population suffers.

The defense budget remains beyond public scrutiny, a fact that increasingly irks the public. “Do we even know how much it costs taxpayers each year to make possible the office, the home, the car fleets, attendants, guest houses and other amenities that are enjoyed by the army chief or even a corps commander?” asked Babar Sattar, a lawyer who often writes about corruption.


http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/w...ta1&adxnnlx=1285718438-9zSEF071vLAWgTCjDzTpZw
 
We need Imran Khan or Musharraf. The last option would be the Army and that would take us back to the top of the economic food chain.
 
If 90s are the lost decade in Pakistan, you have something in common with Japan. they also call the 90s the lost decade.
 
A recent bumper sticker I saw reads as follows:

"Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country!"

After seeing failure of democracy in delivering basic services, security and human development in India, Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a growing suspicion among the poor that America's push to get democracy installed in third world countries ( knowing full well that it will fail) is a ploy to keep them in chaos and from making any kind of progress.
 

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