Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrence

[Ali.009]

Air Marshal (R) Masood Akhtar | Exclusive to PKKH

Thank you PKKH for enabling me to record my impressions on this auspicious day. It is time we paid homage to those scientists who helped us achieve Nuclear Parity and thus security in the subcontinent. People like Dr AQ Kan, Dr Samar Mubarakmand and many technicians deserve our gratitude for this unique achievement. We must laud the outstanding effort of these visionary and courageous men and women. If Pakistan is more secure today on its eastern borders, it is Nuclear Deterrence achieved by their efforts that did the trick.


The befitting reply to the threat posed by the Pokhran explosions, on this special day twelve years back, was a milestone in our quest for security. The cataclysmic event enabled us pride and joy because it gave us a degree of invincibility from foreign aggression.

Having praised this great achievement and our heroes, we must ponder as to why are we so insecure despite being a Nuclear Pakistan? How and why were we made to climb down from Kargil heights after the initial successes? Why didn’t our Nuclear Deterrence work? Who squandered away the fruits of this great achievement made possible by the work of some truly innovative Pakistanis?

While it is true that our Nuclear Capability did play a role in deterring war but our calculations did go wrong at some point. Our initial hypothesis was that outside powers shall not permit any war between the two countries because of fear of Nuclear Escalation, and that we shall be able to exploit the initial gains at the tactical and operational level. Unfortunately this did not happen. Foreign powers in general AND the US in particular forced us to climb down despite our somewhat advantageous position. Why?

Americans feared a devastating nuclear exchange between the two nuclear powers if the skirmish was to continue and allowed to become a full fledged war. They estimated that India could attack Pakistan despite the threat of nuclear exchange. Unfortunately we have never had a dispassionate debate on this question of breakdown of Nuclear Deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence worked effectively in Europe during the Cold War because of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) Agreement between the two super powers. In our case the deterrence may not have been good enough in South Asia’s peculiar environment for two reasons. Firstly, because there is no MAD-like agreement in the subcontinent and Second, because Indians think they would have a first and second strike capability against Pakistan even after absorbing an attack from Pakistan. Simply because they have 3-4 times more weapons and have greater depth both for counter-force and counter-value targets.

How can we truly use the deterrence provided by the great AQ Kan et al? First, have a dispassionate debate on why the deterrence tended to fail that was in place before the war. Secondly use Nuclear Deterrence either in the MAD environment or else for defence and not in offence. The world powers would likely be with someone who keeps Nuclear Retaliation for legitimate self-defence rather than for reckless and thoughtless wars.

Hats off to our nuclear scientists and their technicians for the small miracles they produced for us. So much is owed by so many to so few!