Operations in Dir and Buner
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Xeric
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You didnt read my post carefully i suppose.
Wake up!!
But still in order to help you recover from your bashing feeds, i'll give you one example.
A newly passed out officer (who actually haven't done is basic course and was basing his knowledge on vague assessments)said that the house should be targeted by using the "BCT" procedure!
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Solomon2
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"The numbers issued by the military are wildly exaggerated," a military intelligence official said, noting that the military is overlying on air and artillery strikes instead of engaging the Taliban. "This is like a bad movie we've all seen before. The Pakistani military levels large areas, claims success, and thinks we'll be conned into believing it if they pump up the Taliban body counts." link
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Oh, and of course this anonymous official would be on Roggio's site and in his article - I had a suspicion it was him even before I clicked the link to check the source.
No facts, no evidence, nothing - just unsubstantiated rubbish to malign the PA as usual from Roggio's pen.
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Administration officials often brief reputable reporters anonymously, and I haven't heard anything other than that Roggio is considered reputable. Which means, of course, that the "anonymous" quote accurately represents the thinking of the Obama Administration.
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Roggio states:
That is an piece by Rahimullah Yousufzai who talks about Ibn Aqeel's death, hi brother and some other commanders.
In fact even Yousufzai states that Ibn Aqeel may have not have been deliberately targeted as a commander, but was killed since he was part of an assault on PA positions.
Such distortions and dishonesty is common from Roggio - anything he can lie and manipulate to bash the PA.
And after distorting the facts he sets up his strawman to bash the PA - no doubt he'll use this in the future as well to call into question the 'claims of the PA'.
Now, if you read through the link he offers as support for his statement you'll find there is no reference of the Pakistani Military making that claim.
That is an piece by Rahimullah Yousufzai who talks about Ibn Aqeel's death, hi brother and some other commanders.
In fact even Yousufzai states that Ibn Aqeel may have not have been deliberately targeted as a commander, but was killed since he was part of an assault on PA positions.
Such distortions and dishonesty is common from Roggio - anything he can lie and manipulate to bash the PA.
And after distorting the facts he sets up his strawman to bash the PA - no doubt he'll use this in the future as well to call into question the 'claims of the PA'.
AgNoStiC MuSliM
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He has distorted the facts before, and I just pointed out one instance where he distorted facts to bash the PA in this article.
His sole aim is to somehow bash the PA - the only people who could find him credible are those whose agenda and bias fits with his.
I fail to see how someone who distorts facts so obviously can be considered 'reputable and credible' by anyone.
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AgNoStiC MuSliM
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I see he has your penchant for believing the Taliban claims in Pakistan but ignoring their claims of inflicting heavy casualties on US and NATO troops in Afghanistan and suffering far fewer casualties than US/NATO claim.
Perhaps its because of that 'over reliance on Air and artillery strikes' that kill so many civilians. The Taliban must be right - all those claims of 'Taliban KIA' by the US must have instead been civilians!
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The biggest death toll (in one day) so far has been the 200 killed yesterday.
However, the majority of those casualties occurred in an attack on a militant training camp. That makes the accounts more credible since a concentrated presence of militants would be expected in a training camp. Those casualties have also been confirmed by at least one non-military official:
However, the majority of those casualties occurred in an attack on a militant training camp. That makes the accounts more credible since a concentrated presence of militants would be expected in a training camp. Those casualties have also been confirmed by at least one non-military official:
blain2
Here is something that I have stated above. Comparing Indian COIN experience with Pakistan's recent campaign is like comparing apples with oranges..read on:
Interestingly, I have also got many emails from Indian readers using the same argument. It is grounded, mostly, in a sense of pique: our boys are more professional and they can do it, and did it, better than you have fared.
Really this kind of sentiment is rarely, if ever, expressed by any professional. As such, the perception maybe displayed by other general public members, in which case the justification of subsequent points is irrelevant.
There are two issues here: one deals with professionalism, the other with the question of whether the COIN operations Pakistan Army is dealing with have the same magnitude, extent and severity as those conducted by the Indian Army.
The two most important and pertinent issues are: a. The orientation and ability of PA troops in terms of logistics and supplies to wage a CI operation over a sustained period of time. b. The conditions prevailing.
Professionalism is exhibited by any trained army in this world, and as such is redundant point to be raised. None has described PA as being a ragtag army. Indeed it would be a misfortune for those who do and gross distortion of the image of a fine professional military organisation that has acquitted itself in many a theaters with distinction.
At no point, not even in Kashmir at the height of the freedom struggle, did the Indian army face insurgents at the scale, both in terms of numbers and the area under their control, which the Pakistan Army is confronted with. The only slightly close parallel is the IPKF’s (Indian Peace Keeping Force) operations against the LTTE and we know that that was not a success story.
The claim of magnitude of problem faced by IA was never large is false. I have earlier repeated the example where Sopore was "lost" for over 2 years in early 90s and was effectively under militant control as the force levels in the valley were inadequate to ensure dominance on ground. In addition, Sri Lankan intervention was militarily not a defeat, however it was a political fiasco as the original plan to bifurcate the country into Sinhala and Tamil provinces and permanently station Indian troops there was never realised and IA was shifted from the role of an occupying force to a peace keeping to peace enforcing force without a coherent exit policy/long term political objectives in lieu of sustained presence. Again it underlines what I have repeatedly said - that a counter insurgent effort's outcome is dictated by the political will and determination of any nation to wage a sustained campaign against the insurgents/ANEs.
One, there was full deployment of the Indian Army along the Line of Control as an essential part of India’s Pakistan-specific military strategy. Active deployment along the LoC, constant patrolling and fencing of the Line ensured that crossing east-west and west-east was never easy. When trouble in Kashmir started, the Indian Army beefed up its presence by inducting additional battalions of paramilitary and police. Soon after the Kargil conflict, the Indian Army raised another full corps for the area.\
Deployment of army was negligible in Gurez-Dras-Kargil sector, something Pakistan drew our attention to in 1999. In addition, the military presence was similarly MAINLY poised for local engagements in which tactical advantage was sought or lost by either sides overnight by localised engagements. The deployment was purely to deal with PA presence across LoC. Fencing came towards the end of 90s-early 2000s. The additional corps raised is meant for Ladakh-Aksai-Chin, keeping in view the growing Chinese capability in the region and probability of local confrontation in the area. Its not CI oriented corps.
COIN operations inside Kashmir could, therefore, be easily plugged into the existing ORBAT (order of battle) which was based on the Indian Army’s threat perception from Pakistan.
Agreed as post Op. Gibraltar it was seen that PA will use inserted troops for neutralisation of vital assets.
Two, at no point could insurgents hold ground in any area. They only relied on classic hit-and-run tactics.
Early 90s they held Sopore and adjoining townships. The area was taken after about 2 years by brutal force and minimal casualties. Now there has never been a repeat of such an incident again as the sheer number of troops ensured that the insurgents DO NOT have the space to regroup and reorganise. This is the rationale for induction of significantly higher number of troops.
While the Indian Army at places was operating in a hostile environment, so were the insurgents.
A fallacy. Local populance in early days was exclusively pro-insurgents and anti-India. Most of the cadres were homegrown and Kashmiris from WITHIN the valley. Sustained military operations in CI format broke that will of the Kashmiri youth to indulge in such practices as over the period of time the unrest saw loss of tourists, a vital industry for the economic survival of the valley.As such the public support started to wane in 1996 period itself, when for the first time cadres from Afghan war, Somalia, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Pakistani controlled Kashmir, Gilgit, NWFP etc started being seen. I have explained their approach and the reasons why these elements did not win the support of the local populance earlier too.
The local population, despite being alienated, never could really offer cadres in numbers that could help them control any areas or create viable operational bases.
It was not so in the early years when a majority held sympathies that were converted into extensive support. However, due to the economic woes, and increasing costs in terms of lives lost to Kashmiris themselves, for a conflict that increasingly began to be seen as being a mere tool of external forces (Benazir Bhutto had promised support to Kashmiri people in their insurrection and her failure to intervene in 1990 was a determinant here). In addition, the idom of 'power corrupts' was aptly at work here. The initial success, and support to the groups, led them to think that they could get away with any and everything in name of jihad and freedom and it was about this time that they started forcibly occupying houses and forcing themselves upon young women and daughters of the host house. This was another determinant to further decrease in popular support.
Given this, and given the fact that additional induction of troops had turned J&K into a large prison, the ability of insurgents to trouble Indian security forces remained very limited beyond mounting raids and ambushes before either getting killed or melting away.
And so the rationale for higher ratio of troops. You are in complete dominance of area, you do not displace local population/evacuate area on the mass we are seeing in NWFP/FATA and you have lower costs of operations which will run into decades either ways.
Finally, specifically in Kashmir, the Indian Army was not operating against co-religionists. If anything, because Kashmir is Muslim and because the threat was linked up with the traditional enemy (i.e., Pakistan), the Indian Army did not need to “motivate” troops to fight.
Am aware of units having mixed formations ie 1 company of muslim troops .... and they had no qualms about religion. This perspective DOES NOT exist in IA units and organisations as the moment you join you are serving a nation not religious philosophy. Now before some one intervenes with Col Purohit, that is not yet established beyod doubt, has plenty of loopholes and is taken by army in its own assessment, as being false.
Operating against Sikhs in East Punjab was difficult enough; operating against insurgent cadres of the Hindu rightwing, hypothetically speaking, would be a nightmare for the Indian Army.
Nothing of the sort. In Punjab the militancy was brought in control by PUNJAB POLICE and it was the Sikh component which made up the bulk of this force. In addition, army troops played a vital and continuous role.
Yet, and this is a matter of record, Indian soldiers committed suicides; deserted; ran amok and killed officers and comrades-in-arms; all of this being the upshot of the extreme stress that COIN operations, LICs (low-intensity conflicts) and IS (internal security) duties can extract from an army over a longer trajectory.
Its the so called post-traumatic stress disorder here. Operating in a CI environ, where you have to go for cordon and search operations every alternate day and are a target for sniper (radio operators are primary followed by officers) or setting up an ambush or carrying out a patrol where the potential of being targetted is high, day and night, does tend to take a heavy toll on troops moral and mental make up. Its seen in every army world over.
Also, it should be clear that at no point did the Indian Army require conducting any operation on the scale at which the Pakistan Army is operating.
I agree. For GoI did not sign peace accords and then allow the groups to entrench themselves in Valley.The approach was straight and effective, deal militarily while offering possibility of peace through talks. Perceptions are changing albeit slowly but they are. To enforce peace you must be willing to wage war.
There is trouble in Afghanistan and groups operating on both sides have the advantage of internal lines of communication, kinship bonds, terrain, sympathetic populations, entrenched gun culture, a long history of warfare in the area, the same religion, a porous border, etc. This allows them to not only create operational bases in the mountain redoubts but actually control areas further afield.
As such had advocated fencing along the border, which has been credited to Afghani opposition for inaction. Seems GoP has no will to enforce its own authority in its own area. As such the above excuse is merely an attempt at trying to obfuscate the fact of lack of strategic foresight and ability to take decisive decision and action.
It calls for difficult decisions. What do you do when insurgents are entrenched within the population in a built-up area: fight every inch of the way in and lose men or use artillery and air? The Israelis should be able to answer because they have taken out Hamas leaders in Gaza.
Israelis ALWAYS operate in enemy territory and NOT in own. US is operating in Afghanistan, where collateral damage and civillian casualties, if sustained, are irrelevant to the political directives given to US forces. The question is, is PA fighting in its own or foreign territory?
When insurgents are entrenched in an urban area, you use the power available judiciously. Quoting US and Israel as examples, they had used extensive amounts of PGMs in afghanistan during the surge period of 2007-08 (for US) and in Gaza by Israelis. PAF IS NOT USING PGMs.
In addition, the role of Air Power and Artillery is exemplified and enunciated in plenty of US military publications and doctrines. (Refer FM 3-24 superseded by FM 3-24.2)
There is a fundamental difference in fighting a CI operation in own territory or in foreign. Even IA used air assets in Sri Lanka, with helicopter gunships seeing extensive action in close air support as also ICVs, and T-72s being deployed there. There were no restrictions of use in time and space.
But the main issue has to do with scale, gravity and magnitude. And that is where the Pakistan Army is facing a threat the Indian Army has never had to. Even so, insurgencies in India, despite decades of efforts, have, at best, become simmering confrontations, diabetic cases that the polity has learnt to live with.
We have managed to control and limit them to irritants as we have a policy of inducting large forces to ensure that the collateral damage and casualties of civillians is extensively minimised thus not antagonising the local population (which is Indian even as per their own admissions lest you get after Kashmir specific views here)
Lastly, the Indian Army has had the advantage of operating under the overhang of a majority consensus. The Pakistan Army, for various reasons, is still grappling with the problem of buy-in.
I agree here. The general population backs army 100% and even if some politician is seen to be limiting Army's ability to engage the ANEs, his political career will be awfully short.
Here is something that I have stated above. Comparing Indian COIN experience with Pakistan's recent campaign is like comparing apples with oranges..read on:
Interestingly, I have also got many emails from Indian readers using the same argument. It is grounded, mostly, in a sense of pique: our boys are more professional and they can do it, and did it, better than you have fared.
Really this kind of sentiment is rarely, if ever, expressed by any professional. As such, the perception maybe displayed by other general public members, in which case the justification of subsequent points is irrelevant.
There are two issues here: one deals with professionalism, the other with the question of whether the COIN operations Pakistan Army is dealing with have the same magnitude, extent and severity as those conducted by the Indian Army.
The two most important and pertinent issues are: a. The orientation and ability of PA troops in terms of logistics and supplies to wage a CI operation over a sustained period of time. b. The conditions prevailing.
Professionalism is exhibited by any trained army in this world, and as such is redundant point to be raised. None has described PA as being a ragtag army. Indeed it would be a misfortune for those who do and gross distortion of the image of a fine professional military organisation that has acquitted itself in many a theaters with distinction.
At no point, not even in Kashmir at the height of the freedom struggle, did the Indian army face insurgents at the scale, both in terms of numbers and the area under their control, which the Pakistan Army is confronted with. The only slightly close parallel is the IPKF’s (Indian Peace Keeping Force) operations against the LTTE and we know that that was not a success story.
The claim of magnitude of problem faced by IA was never large is false. I have earlier repeated the example where Sopore was "lost" for over 2 years in early 90s and was effectively under militant control as the force levels in the valley were inadequate to ensure dominance on ground. In addition, Sri Lankan intervention was militarily not a defeat, however it was a political fiasco as the original plan to bifurcate the country into Sinhala and Tamil provinces and permanently station Indian troops there was never realised and IA was shifted from the role of an occupying force to a peace keeping to peace enforcing force without a coherent exit policy/long term political objectives in lieu of sustained presence. Again it underlines what I have repeatedly said - that a counter insurgent effort's outcome is dictated by the political will and determination of any nation to wage a sustained campaign against the insurgents/ANEs.
One, there was full deployment of the Indian Army along the Line of Control as an essential part of India’s Pakistan-specific military strategy. Active deployment along the LoC, constant patrolling and fencing of the Line ensured that crossing east-west and west-east was never easy. When trouble in Kashmir started, the Indian Army beefed up its presence by inducting additional battalions of paramilitary and police. Soon after the Kargil conflict, the Indian Army raised another full corps for the area.\
Deployment of army was negligible in Gurez-Dras-Kargil sector, something Pakistan drew our attention to in 1999. In addition, the military presence was similarly MAINLY poised for local engagements in which tactical advantage was sought or lost by either sides overnight by localised engagements. The deployment was purely to deal with PA presence across LoC. Fencing came towards the end of 90s-early 2000s. The additional corps raised is meant for Ladakh-Aksai-Chin, keeping in view the growing Chinese capability in the region and probability of local confrontation in the area. Its not CI oriented corps.
COIN operations inside Kashmir could, therefore, be easily plugged into the existing ORBAT (order of battle) which was based on the Indian Army’s threat perception from Pakistan.
Agreed as post Op. Gibraltar it was seen that PA will use inserted troops for neutralisation of vital assets.
Two, at no point could insurgents hold ground in any area. They only relied on classic hit-and-run tactics.
Early 90s they held Sopore and adjoining townships. The area was taken after about 2 years by brutal force and minimal casualties. Now there has never been a repeat of such an incident again as the sheer number of troops ensured that the insurgents DO NOT have the space to regroup and reorganise. This is the rationale for induction of significantly higher number of troops.
While the Indian Army at places was operating in a hostile environment, so were the insurgents.
A fallacy. Local populance in early days was exclusively pro-insurgents and anti-India. Most of the cadres were homegrown and Kashmiris from WITHIN the valley. Sustained military operations in CI format broke that will of the Kashmiri youth to indulge in such practices as over the period of time the unrest saw loss of tourists, a vital industry for the economic survival of the valley.As such the public support started to wane in 1996 period itself, when for the first time cadres from Afghan war, Somalia, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Pakistani controlled Kashmir, Gilgit, NWFP etc started being seen. I have explained their approach and the reasons why these elements did not win the support of the local populance earlier too.
The local population, despite being alienated, never could really offer cadres in numbers that could help them control any areas or create viable operational bases.
It was not so in the early years when a majority held sympathies that were converted into extensive support. However, due to the economic woes, and increasing costs in terms of lives lost to Kashmiris themselves, for a conflict that increasingly began to be seen as being a mere tool of external forces (Benazir Bhutto had promised support to Kashmiri people in their insurrection and her failure to intervene in 1990 was a determinant here). In addition, the idom of 'power corrupts' was aptly at work here. The initial success, and support to the groups, led them to think that they could get away with any and everything in name of jihad and freedom and it was about this time that they started forcibly occupying houses and forcing themselves upon young women and daughters of the host house. This was another determinant to further decrease in popular support.
Given this, and given the fact that additional induction of troops had turned J&K into a large prison, the ability of insurgents to trouble Indian security forces remained very limited beyond mounting raids and ambushes before either getting killed or melting away.
And so the rationale for higher ratio of troops. You are in complete dominance of area, you do not displace local population/evacuate area on the mass we are seeing in NWFP/FATA and you have lower costs of operations which will run into decades either ways.
Finally, specifically in Kashmir, the Indian Army was not operating against co-religionists. If anything, because Kashmir is Muslim and because the threat was linked up with the traditional enemy (i.e., Pakistan), the Indian Army did not need to “motivate” troops to fight.
Am aware of units having mixed formations ie 1 company of muslim troops .... and they had no qualms about religion. This perspective DOES NOT exist in IA units and organisations as the moment you join you are serving a nation not religious philosophy. Now before some one intervenes with Col Purohit, that is not yet established beyod doubt, has plenty of loopholes and is taken by army in its own assessment, as being false.
Operating against Sikhs in East Punjab was difficult enough; operating against insurgent cadres of the Hindu rightwing, hypothetically speaking, would be a nightmare for the Indian Army.
Nothing of the sort. In Punjab the militancy was brought in control by PUNJAB POLICE and it was the Sikh component which made up the bulk of this force. In addition, army troops played a vital and continuous role.
Yet, and this is a matter of record, Indian soldiers committed suicides; deserted; ran amok and killed officers and comrades-in-arms; all of this being the upshot of the extreme stress that COIN operations, LICs (low-intensity conflicts) and IS (internal security) duties can extract from an army over a longer trajectory.
Its the so called post-traumatic stress disorder here. Operating in a CI environ, where you have to go for cordon and search operations every alternate day and are a target for sniper (radio operators are primary followed by officers) or setting up an ambush or carrying out a patrol where the potential of being targetted is high, day and night, does tend to take a heavy toll on troops moral and mental make up. Its seen in every army world over.
Also, it should be clear that at no point did the Indian Army require conducting any operation on the scale at which the Pakistan Army is operating.
I agree. For GoI did not sign peace accords and then allow the groups to entrench themselves in Valley.The approach was straight and effective, deal militarily while offering possibility of peace through talks. Perceptions are changing albeit slowly but they are. To enforce peace you must be willing to wage war.
There is trouble in Afghanistan and groups operating on both sides have the advantage of internal lines of communication, kinship bonds, terrain, sympathetic populations, entrenched gun culture, a long history of warfare in the area, the same religion, a porous border, etc. This allows them to not only create operational bases in the mountain redoubts but actually control areas further afield.
As such had advocated fencing along the border, which has been credited to Afghani opposition for inaction. Seems GoP has no will to enforce its own authority in its own area. As such the above excuse is merely an attempt at trying to obfuscate the fact of lack of strategic foresight and ability to take decisive decision and action.
It calls for difficult decisions. What do you do when insurgents are entrenched within the population in a built-up area: fight every inch of the way in and lose men or use artillery and air? The Israelis should be able to answer because they have taken out Hamas leaders in Gaza.
Israelis ALWAYS operate in enemy territory and NOT in own. US is operating in Afghanistan, where collateral damage and civillian casualties, if sustained, are irrelevant to the political directives given to US forces. The question is, is PA fighting in its own or foreign territory?
When insurgents are entrenched in an urban area, you use the power available judiciously. Quoting US and Israel as examples, they had used extensive amounts of PGMs in afghanistan during the surge period of 2007-08 (for US) and in Gaza by Israelis. PAF IS NOT USING PGMs.
In addition, the role of Air Power and Artillery is exemplified and enunciated in plenty of US military publications and doctrines. (Refer FM 3-24 superseded by FM 3-24.2)
There is a fundamental difference in fighting a CI operation in own territory or in foreign. Even IA used air assets in Sri Lanka, with helicopter gunships seeing extensive action in close air support as also ICVs, and T-72s being deployed there. There were no restrictions of use in time and space.
But the main issue has to do with scale, gravity and magnitude. And that is where the Pakistan Army is facing a threat the Indian Army has never had to. Even so, insurgencies in India, despite decades of efforts, have, at best, become simmering confrontations, diabetic cases that the polity has learnt to live with.
We have managed to control and limit them to irritants as we have a policy of inducting large forces to ensure that the collateral damage and casualties of civillians is extensively minimised thus not antagonising the local population (which is Indian even as per their own admissions lest you get after Kashmir specific views here)
Lastly, the Indian Army has had the advantage of operating under the overhang of a majority consensus. The Pakistan Army, for various reasons, is still grappling with the problem of buy-in.
I agree here. The general population backs army 100% and even if some politician is seen to be limiting Army's ability to engage the ANEs, his political career will be awfully short.
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ajpirzada
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Forces may soon purge Buner district of militants
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
By Mushtaq Yusufzai
PESHAWAR: Security forces may clear the Buner district very soon as majority of militants, including their commander Maulana Khalilur Rahman, have left the district.
Sources close to the militants said on Monday that almost all the Taliban fighters, who had arrived recently from the neighbouring Swat district, started abandoning their positions amid heavy bombing by jet fighters, gunship helicopters and artillery shelling.
Taliban commander in Buner Maulana Khalil-ur-Rahman also told this scribe that he had left Buner on the directives of his senior command.
Maulana Khalil from Swat had led hundreds of Taliban fighters to capture Buner without facing any resistance from law-enforcement agencies. Maulana Khalil argued that all the Taliban fighters from Swat left Buner and at the moment, only the local militants were fighting against security forces.
Denying any major losses in the military operation, he said they would continue resistance against security forces in Swat. The sources said the militants suffered heavy losses in Buner and were now on the retreat.
“Buner has almost been cleared after the withdrawal of the Swati Taliban. Security forces will soon clear the whole district from the Taliban, enabling the IDPs to return home,” a military official said, wishing not to be named. The official said the Taliban had gathered in the mountains of Upper Swat, where they had safe havens.
Forces may soon purge Buner district of militants
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
By Mushtaq Yusufzai
PESHAWAR: Security forces may clear the Buner district very soon as majority of militants, including their commander Maulana Khalilur Rahman, have left the district.
Sources close to the militants said on Monday that almost all the Taliban fighters, who had arrived recently from the neighbouring Swat district, started abandoning their positions amid heavy bombing by jet fighters, gunship helicopters and artillery shelling.
Taliban commander in Buner Maulana Khalil-ur-Rahman also told this scribe that he had left Buner on the directives of his senior command.
Maulana Khalil from Swat had led hundreds of Taliban fighters to capture Buner without facing any resistance from law-enforcement agencies. Maulana Khalil argued that all the Taliban fighters from Swat left Buner and at the moment, only the local militants were fighting against security forces.
Denying any major losses in the military operation, he said they would continue resistance against security forces in Swat. The sources said the militants suffered heavy losses in Buner and were now on the retreat.
“Buner has almost been cleared after the withdrawal of the Swati Taliban. Security forces will soon clear the whole district from the Taliban, enabling the IDPs to return home,” a military official said, wishing not to be named. The official said the Taliban had gathered in the mountains of Upper Swat, where they had safe havens.
Forces may soon purge Buner district of militants
Ghareeb_Da_Baal
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The footage i am seeing is pretty serious on truly independent new channels in Pakistan........... Who cares what the G dude say.
they had pretty good & solid reports about everyone & everything apparently & look where they ended up!
In any case, the op has just recently started & it will take a while regardless. Like a very wise Indian member said above that PA is operating in its own territory & not in the enemy territory. perhaps
those who are too critical of of our efforts should be sent there as advisors & while they are there, might as well make a quick stop in Kabul to eval. & advise Nato!
they had pretty good & solid reports about everyone & everything apparently & look where they ended up!
In any case, the op has just recently started & it will take a while regardless. Like a very wise Indian member said above that PA is operating in its own territory & not in the enemy territory. perhaps
those who are too critical of of our efforts should be sent there as advisors & while they are there, might as well make a quick stop in Kabul to eval. & advise Nato!
seems they (TTP & Co.) are realising the importance of dispersion to engage the PA ...... change in strategy or simply breaking of will to fight?
I doubt that its latter. Classical approach would be - to break up into smaller groups and avoid engagements. Head for remote areas and allow local population to come back in relative period of calm and then restart afresh. Lets see if thats so.
rokhanyousafzai
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paratroopers have been dropped in some of the areas that the taliban would of been buying time
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