Operation Eagle Claw

[Abhishek_]

With due respect, what exactly was the topic here? A couple of pics sans comments of rusty tin cans in the desert with a tag of "revenge is sweet" does not make a topic. And then the OP starts an online version of some kind of primeval chest thumping display bringing into the "discussion" irrelevant topics! Makes no sense. Btw, IMHO, Joe's posts ought not to be deleted. They are as humorous and entertaining as informative, not to mention the privilege of reading them is rare these days.

quoted for truth

 

[PERSIAN GOD KING]

With due respect, what exactly was the topic here? A couple of pics sans comments of rusty tin cans in the desert with a tag of "revenge is sweet" does not make a topic. And then the OP starts an online version of some kind of primeval chest thumping display bringing into the "discussion" irrelevant topics! Makes no sense. Btw, IMHO, Joe's posts ought not to be deleted. They are as humorous and entertaining as informative, not to mention the privilege of reading them is rare these days.

If you don't like the thread then simply go elsewhere.
nobody sent you an invitation did they?

 

[gubbi]

I am more interested in reading some informative discussion on the events which led to the helis ending up e iran rather than reading about indian missile tech and turkish space aspirations -- i have already changed the title , i guess you didnt notice it

I didnt notice the title change. But here some more information for Op Eagle Claw from another forum (cannot provide the links for obvious reasons but you know what source)

By thelizman

The realities of war dictate that the face of war changes. Once upon a time, armies faced each other on battlefields, formed lines, and charged each other. As technology and tactics have advanced, so has the face of warfare. In the first of two parts of this installment of what I hope will become a series of articles examining aspects of modern warfare, we will examine the Special Operations failure of Operation Eagle Claw.

Part I examines the events surrounding the organization of the mission to rescue American hostages held at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran. Part I will contain no analysis, but is still quite long (7 typed pages). It will also provide information behind the planning, and an overview of the equipment and units chosen.

Wolves in Sheep's Clothing

November 4th, 1979
The American Embassy, Tehran Iran

The march was supposed to have continued to the west side of Tehran where a rally was to be held at the University, but students marching past the embassy stopped to stage a protest. The US had recently allowed entry into America by the recently deposed Shah of Iran for medical treatment, and this was seen as a rebuke of Iran's revolution.

Warrant Officer Joe Hall and other embassy staff were gathered around a radio. They used it to listen in on the traffic between Marine Corp security forces at the embassy. "Bulldog, the chain on the gate has been cut, three Iranians are inside". Al "Bulldog" Golancinski was head of security. The Marine guards were calm, but focused. The call went over the radio more like a statement of fact than an alert. The defense of the embassy was the duty of the Marines, but at the same time they were sensitive to the political aspects of what was now occurring. Firing on a crowd of student protestors simply wouldn't look good, and the crowd didn't appear to present an immediate danger.

But now they were flooding in. The leading body of the crowd coming through the gates was all women, and they were carrying signs that read, "Don't be afraid, we just want to set in." Sit, set, it didn't matter. They were coming in anyway. In the defense attaché office of the building, Bulldog and other embassy staff were busily destroying documents. Embassies aren't just diplomatic offices; they also act as intelligence processing stations for both political and military intelligence bodies. The only thing more important than having intelligence is keeping what you do and don't know secret.

The closed circuit monitors were now filled with scenes of the mob. They had already entered the building through the basement. Others stood on the embassy walls, and some even appeared to stand at key points throughout the compound. Then the guns came out. Suddenly, it was quite clear what had happened. Still, Rules of Engagement (ROE) prevented the Marines from using force to defend the embassy. Given that forces had already penetrated the compound, their situation was no longer defensible. The best final strategy was to continue to fall back into protected areas within the embassy.

After three hours, the decision was made to surrender peaceably. Without firing a shot, Islamic militants had taken over the compound, and had 90 hostages. 52 of them would stay the entire 444 days of the Iran Hostage Crisis. Using the cover of a student march, they had successfully approached the compound without raising an alarm, and using women as human shields they had infiltrated the embassy. Most importantly, they had maintained the appearance of disconnection with the revolutionary government of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini could claim plausible deniability. To the world watching events on TV, militant Islamic fundamentalists, students, and common citizens were holding the Americans as hostages.

To trained observers, other factors came into play such as "students" being armed with AK-47 assault rifles. AK-47's were a commodity in those days. The Russian and Chinese governments handed them out to "progressive elements" (what the West called "Marxist-Communist Rebels") as if they were candy. For your average person in any country to even get their hands on them was difficult. Moreover, although the Kalishnakov rifles (AK's) were extremely simple to operate by design, they still required a minimum amount of training to be handled effectively. The armed `students' displayed considerable familiarity with weapons handling. Simple behaviors like keeping the muzzle pointed upward or at the ground - never at a person you didn't intend to kill - were a sign that they had been trained on using assault rifles. The tactics used to take over the embassy were smart and well coordinated. They took advantage of knowledge of the guards' ROE, and western sensibilities about shooting civilians, especially women.

America had been bloodied again. It was the latest in a decade long series of slaps and political defeats on the world stage. Economically battered, and with deep wounds from the Viet Nam war, the hostage crisis enraged Americans who felt impotent in the face of communist aggression. It also further weakened President Carter's severely tarnished public image.

Mr Kyle Goes To Washington

Colonel James H. Kyle was returning home after a late dinner out. As he was pulling into the driveway, there was a note on his garage door. "Urgent. Contact Lee Hess". Kyle didn't recognize the phone number, but Hess was an AC-130 gunship pilot he had met when flying missions out of Thailand during the Viet Nam war.

A few hours, and a few phone calls later, Kyle was saying goodbye to his wife. Peacetime life had been quiet, but she knew what the words meant. She was a good wife, and she had made many sacrifices in supporting his military career. So when Kyle told her he was going away to work on something he couldn't talk about, and couldn't tell her when he'd be back, she hid her disappointment. Kyle hung up the payphone and boarded his flight to Washington DC.

The next morning, Kyle found himself in a whirlwind of uniforms. Every service was represented in the planning room, and the lowest rank he had yet seen was a First Lieutenant. This mission was important, and everyone was determined to pull it off. For the next 172 days the rest of their world would be on hold.

Carter's Hand
Before the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the United States military had absolutely no contingency plan in place for rescuing hostages. The now legendary albeit officially disavowed "Delta Force" had just recently been formed from the cream of the crop of Special Forces units. Since Viet Nam, the country's priorities had changed, and the military was in what was most charitably describes as a "sad state of affairs". Popular public support for the military had been blown away by the tumultuous events of the late 60's and early 70's. President Carter faced historic public opinion lows. The already sour economy, gas crisis, and the public distrust of the government in the wake of Viet Nam and Watergate placed him at a disadvantage before he was even elected. That election had been by a narrow 2% margin, and Carter had failed to generate a mandate in the wake of the election. His domestic and foreign policies were unpopular, even when they accomplished their goals. Then scandals erupted. Allegations of corruption painted his cabinet, from payoffs and bribes to alleged cocaine uses by his appointees. His sister's intimate public connection to a known ****ographer and his brother's marketing of a beer bearing his name tainted Carter's "born again Christian" image. Then it was discovered that the same brother had received a gift of $250,000 from Libya - a nation known to support terrorists.

The general perception of Carter in public and world opinion was that he was weak, incompetent, and impotent. It was vital that he handle the hostage situation strongly, so on November 5th Carter ordered his military commanders be able to exercise a military option to rescue the hostages in the event that diplomatic solutions failed. At the same time, Carter applied a series of trade embargoes and asset seizures against the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. The diplomatic options were doomed to failure, and it is probable that Carter sought to exercise the military option over the diplomatic one in what is known as "wagging the dog". The resignation of his Secretary of State following the raid signaled a rift in the administration over how the diplomatic negotiations were handled. Likewise, the rescue option enjoyed tremendous support from up the chain of command. Support was given by everyone from the CIA to the manufacturers of the equipment to be used in the raid, and all four military branches participated in the operation. There was less than 172 days to develop the capability to go into a major city in a country on the other side of the planet and rescue dozens of American hostages held by a crowd of hundreds of armed militia, without loss of life to Americans or Iranians.

In Part II of this article, we will focus on the tactics, weaponry, and units used to carry out this raid.


In part two of this special report in the Modern Warfare:Special Operations series, I will cover the mission plan, the aircraft to be used, and the two primary units involved in the planned raid of the US Embassy in Tehran. As we will discuss in part IV, the mission structure itself is largely a result of the limitations of equipment than any other factor.

Reference: Modern Warfare: Special Operations, Operation Eagle Claw Part I

Planning For The Unexpected, Expecting the Unplanned

When planning a "Special Operation", no one course of action can exist independently. The infamous "plan b" must always exist for any given situation, and there should also be a plan c for every plan b.

Operation Eagle Claw called for using trucks pre-positioned in Tehran by the CIA to deliver Delta Force operators to the embassy. The D-boys would be inserted into Iran on the first night of the operation by helicopter, and they would hide overnight. On the night of the Delta force raid, MH-53 Pave Low helicopters (a refitted version of the behemoth Sikorsky Stallion helicopter, the Pave Low is used by Special Operations units) flown by Air Force and Marine Corps crews would fly in and rendezvous with a flight of MC-130 Combat Talons (again a special Air Force Special Operations version of the venerable C-130 Hercules cargo plane). The MC-130's were designated as `bladder birds' because they contained giant rubber fuel tanks that collapsed as they were emptied, and their job was to refuel the helicopters for the long flight into Tehran. Across from the Embassy was a large stadium where the helicopters could land. The stadium was a natural fortress, and could easily be defended by the heavily armed Delta Forces if need be. Landing inside the embassy walls was ruled out because the hostage takers had installed steel columns anywhere large enough to take a helicopter, and landing on the roof would have made the helicopters into very large green targets, even at night.

Ideally speaking, the rendezvous point for the helicopters and bladder birds would be at an airfield known as "Manzariyeh". Manzariyeh had been built by the Shah as a kind of viewing stand for air shows and military displays. Other than a grandstand and a few hangers, the base was largely unguarded, and of no military importance to the revolutionary guard (the Pasdaran). Since the fall of the Shah, intelligence indicated that it was abandoned. On the night of the raid, MC-130's would land on the strip, and Ranger teams would rapidly deploy on dirt bikes and dune buggy like vehicles. The Rapid Assault Team (aka "RAT Patrols") would canvass the airfield and detain or neutralize (a nice way of saying "kill") any personnel found there, and also protect the airfield from assault while the aircraft were being staged. Only after the airfield was secured would the bladder birds and helicopters land. The bladder birds would then exit the scene as the helicopters flew onto Tehran to pickup the Delta Forces and rescued hostages. They would be accompanied by AC-130 Specter Gun ships. This was yet another version of the C-130 cargo plane that was designed to be able to deliver massive gunfire in support of ground forces. Specter gun ships earned a reputation in Viet Nam for their ability to deliver devastating and highly accurate fire from high altitudes where the Specter itself was fairly safe.

After the rescue was complete, the helicopters and gun ships would return to Manzariyeh and transfer the Delta Forces, Hostages, and any detainees to an Air Force C-141 Starlifter cargo jets for flight out. The 141's were selected not only for their ability to carry large numbers of people in airliner style seating, but because they also had better medical facilities to treat injuries, and could escape much more quickly than the turbo-prop C-130s.

The Manzariyeh option was preferable, but reality dictated that the airfield might not be securable. The backup to this was the Desert I option. Taking Manzariyeh would attract a lot of attention, and a quick radio call to Tehran would spoil the raid. Ideally, the airfield assault would we completed prior to the Delta operation starting so that if something went wrong the raid could be called off and Delta would not be stranded. Colonel Kyle argued strongly for finding an obscure patch of desert to operate from. This idea was uniformly agreed to, but before Kyle could take such an option seriously, he wanted to have someone go there in person and survey the area. The desert floor must be hard enough to support a fully loaded C-130. If the planes sunk in, or were bogged down, the pilots and crew would be stranded without rescue. This operation would use nearly every MC-130 the Air Force had flying, and every operational MH-53 in the Middle East. They could not afford to lose any equipment and still pull off the mission. So, nearly a month prior to the raid a small plane slipped under Iranian radar coverage and landed at the scene. Desert I was a patch of land along a rural road that was lightly traveled. The road took a sharp 45 degree turn in the desert, and satellite photographs showed deep ruts in the desert where drivers made an off-road shortcut across the sands. Any civilians who did wander into the area would have to be detained and for security purposes they would need to be flown out and later returned by commercial airliner. Desert I was remote, and would be easier for the RAT patrols to secure. Most importantly, the site met all of the criteria for becoming a staging area for the operation.

Getting to the staging area was another matter. For political reasons, we could not use airbases in Turkey to launch the raid. The only other two bases we had access to in the region were Wadi Kena in Egypt, and Masirah in Oman. Oman was right around the corner from Iran, but was ruled out for diplomatic reasons. Wadi Kena was doable, and in the days leading up to the raid, United States Central Command (CENTCOM, the organizational structure of the military responsible for Africa, the Middle East, and parts of West Asia) started shuttling aircraft similar to those to be used in the raid through Wadi Kena. The idea was to increase the "operational footprint", so that people would be used to seeing these new aircraft types. This would keep "casual observers" from raising the red flag about a possible raid. Operational Security (OpSec) was taken very seriously for this raid. At many points, even high-level Generals and Admirals were clueless about the operations being conducted on their ships and bases. More than one base or ship commander had their ears pulled for attempting to meddle in the operation or prevent its participants from working at their facilities.

The Stage, Actors, and Props

The selection of hardware and personnel for the rescue mission had a variety of factors. At that time, the US Military had less than a handful of helicopters that could refuel in the air, and they were too high profile to move to this mission. Even if they could be moved discretely, they could only be refueled in a practical manner by other helicopters as they flew to slowly to take on fuel from conventional jet tankers. They could be refueled by KC-130 Hercules tankers (yet another variant of the C-130 Hercules), but the planes would have to fly just below stall speed as the helicopters flew at their fastest to keep up. This option was tricky; hot desert air and high altitudes drastically affect engine performance. There was even some concern that the helicopters could not make it over the higher mountains in Iran if the temperatures got too hot.

The buddy system of refueling was decided to be the best bet. Early in the mission planning, the idea was to drop the fuel bladders in by parachute, then land and have ground forces assemble them for refueling the helicopters. The first attempts at this were explosively disastrous. However, continued practice made it a viable option. Then during refinement and training in this stage, the Air Force managed to dig up an old fueling system that could allow the tankers to land and offload fuel to the helicopters. Valuable time was lost in assembling the air-dropped bladders. By offloading fuel directly from the MC-130's, the planes could taxi into formation, park, and then have the helicopters taxi up behind them. This also eliminated the risk of a bad drop spewing fuel all over the staging area, and costing them the mission.

Most of the operations would be performed under the cover of darkness, and would take advantage of the poor radar coverage of Iran's defense forces. In a tactic referred to as "weaving", the aircraft would fly between nodes of radar coverage. The aircraft would be completely blacked out, from running lights to cockpit lights so visual spotters could not track the aircraft. The pilots, RAT Patrols, and Delta Forces would all take advantage of the latest in Night Observation Goggles (NOGs). In allowing them to see in the pitch dark as if it were daylight, the NOGs give a tremendous advantage to our Special Operations Forces. Unfortunately, NOGs have a limitation. One Delta Force Operator commenting in the Mark Bowden book "Blackhawk Down" compared it to "looking at the world through green soda straws". Peripheral vision was highly restricted, and everything was in green tinted monochrome. Additionally, early NOGs were monocular, and lacked the depth perception needed by pilots to safely fly their aircraft. For 172 days, the aircrews had practiced using the NOGs. The first set of MH-53 pilots from the Navy were relieved because their slow adaptation to using the NOGs and lackluster flying tactics. Marine Corp pilots were selected to fly the insertion parts of the mission because of their more aggressive (and at times somewhat suicidal) flying techniques. Backup aircrews of Air Force pilots did the navigation and en-route flying. All of the pilots were now quite skilled in landing in pitch-black darkness using the NOGs. As an added benefit, CIA advisors brought some old technology off the shelf from the days of the Office of Strategic Service's (OSS, the predecessor to the CIA) operations with the Army Air Corps over Allied Europe: A special "black" paper would cover the landing lights and black them out. Although the lights could be switched off, the black paper allowed infrared emissions through, and that lit up the night in a way only the NOGs could see. Without the NOGs, not a sliver of light could be seen from the landing lights. In developing tactics for this mission, a whole new era of nighttime operations was born for the US Special Forces.

The particular variants of the C-130's used for this mission were of special capability as well. The standard C-130 Hercules entered service at the start of the Viet Nam war, and was considered a high performance workhorse. Today, 30-year-old airframes are still in use by all branches of the US Military, with no practical replacement in sight. Older C-130's are used in the civilian world for everything from shuttling supplies into the Antarctic to fighting fires in the desert southwest.

The MC-130 Combat Talon is equipped with a variety of special electronic guidance equipment. These include Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) and Terrain Following / Terrain Avoidance Radar Systems. Using the Electronics Warfare capability of the Combat Talon, Special Operations units can be quickly inserted behind enemy lines, or even extracted using the "Fulton Recovery System". Additionally, the large cargo area of this aircraft can be fitted to either carry special listening equipment, or to drop humanitarian supplies and propaganda. During Operation Desert Storm and in Afghanistan, MC-130's also helped locate downed flyers for rescue operations and dropped the now infamous BLU-82 "Daisy Cutter" on or near Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard and the Taliban.

The AC-130 Specter gun ship is the first mass produced gun ship. Borne out of Special Operations experience in WWII with refitted C-47 cargo planes (later designated the AC-47 Spooky), the ability to deliver massive amounts of firepower from the air in support of ground forces proved invaluable. After WWII, this capability was forgotten as defense policy slowly shifted focus away from air support of conventional large-scale warfare to multi-mach high performance jet fighters equipped with guided missiles and the nuclear standoff capability provided by ICBMs and long range bombers. The war in Viet Nam revived the need for this capability, and AC-47's were quickly taken out of storage. Captain Warren Terry of the United States Air Force helped to redevelop this capability and in spite of opposition from the Pentagon. At one point, when his funding was cut off for the gunship project, he used his personal credit cards to purchase surplus machine guns and parts. His project team pooled talent from all around the Air Force, and most of his aircrews were made up of scientists and technicians instead of combat aviators. The plane given to the program (code named Pave Aegis) was nicknamed the "Specter". The ominous name had more to do with the fact that the plane had already been in three accidents before they even got it than it did with the intended purpose. Concurrently, C-119s were being modified as gun ships, but the old slow lumbering birds (aptly nicknamed "Flying Boxcars") were only marginally effective. It was effective enough to prove the usefulness of gun ships as opposed to light attack aircraft, but not to overcome the need for a more powerful aircraft.

In 1967 the first AC-130 Specter gun ships were delivered to US forces in Viet Nam. It carried four 7.62 mm miniguns, and four rapid-fire 20 mm cannons capable of a firing rate of 2500 rounds per minute of high explosive incendiary rounds. What made the Specter more deadly than the AC-119K Stingers and AC-47's currently being used was the advanced targeting electronics, which could help home in on the heat signatures from tanks and trucks, and special night vision scopes. All of the guns were mounted on the left side of the aircraft so that it could orbit over a target and rain down a deadly shower of lead. When targets were found, twin 20,000-watt xenon lamps that could produce visible light, or invisible infrared or UV light spotlighted them. Later, a 40 mm bofor gun was added. This was originally a naval artillery gun used for smaller ships. Capable of a rate of fire of some 120 rounds of artillery shells per minute, these guns added an incredible amount of firepower to an already impressive arsenal. In six months of operation, a single gunship was responsible for destroying 822 trucks on the Ho Chi Minh trail, with an average of 7.5 trucks per sortie. The Specter gun ships also became tremendously popular with ground troops who often credited the aircrews with "saving their *****". Likewise, the Viet-Cong guerillas and North Vietnamese Army came to regard the Specter with tremendous fear.

The C-141 Starlifter was roughly the size of a Boeing 707 airliner. Its internal cargo area could house two basketball courts (the B variant now in use was lengthened and can actually house 3). It can carry up to 200 people, and can be outfitted with medical facilities, airline style seat rows, or a combination of both, and can move at 3/4th the speed of sound. The Starlifter entered service in 1965, and was the first jet aircraft designed to military standards as a troop and cargo transport. It was also the first military jet transport aircraft to be used for airdropping paratroopers. The first of the stretched "B" models were received in 1979, but were not available at the time of the raid. The Starlifter currently forms the backbone of the Air Mobility Command of the United States Military.

The US Army Rangers have a long history going back to pre-revolutionary war days. The first time an American unit received the designation "Rangers" was in 1670 when Captain Benjamin Church organized a force of men to fight frontier natives during what was known as King Phillips war. Since then, Ranger regiments have served with distinction in every American war. The modern Ranger infantry started in WWII when hero of the famed 3rd Infantry Division Maj. Gen. Lucien Truscott convinced the Chief of Staff that an elite forward commando unit was needed. The decision was made to form the 1st Ranger regiment, and thousands of Army infantry volunteered. A final force was carefully selected and newly activated regiment was sent to Scotland to train under war-hardened British commandos. The 1st Rangers were the first American units to see action when they joined the Canadian and British units in the attack on Dieppe. Their actions won them high praise from the Canadian and British units who had expected little from the Americans. Ranger units later served during the Normandy invasion where their fierce fighting became the stuff of legend. As well, Ranger units continued to distinguish themselves in all WWII theaters of operation. Later, in Korea one Ranger unit of 112 men went 9 miles into enemy territory to capture and kill the commanders of the 12th North Korean division. Their bold and swift assault caused panic among Korean soldiers and forced the retreat of 2 entire divisions of Korean regulars. Army Ranger bravery during Viet Nam caused the 75th Ranger Regiment to become the first standing Ranger Regiment in peacetime.

One of the names behind Operation Eagle Claw was Colonel Charlie Beckwith. Beckwith had been detached to the British elite Special Air Service (SAS) from 1962 to 1963. Upon returning to the US Army, he began to push for the creation of an elite force within the US Army Special Operations community. In 1977, just under 2 years prior to the events of Desert I, the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta was formed. Based on the model of the SAS, Delta's primary focus is with counter-terrorist operations, hostage rescue, and special reconnaissance missions. Delta is so secret, that the US Government still will not acknowledge their existence, even though their participation in events from Eagle Claw to Task Force Ranger in Somalia is widely known. Delta Force "operators" as they are called are trained to think independently while acting in concert. They form a special nexus within the SOF community, and are allowed to have a wider degree in latitude for everything from personal appearance to carrying out their orders. When Lt. Colonel Kyle first met the Delta operators participating in Eagle Claw at Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, his first impulse was to have the unruly group of civilians arrested for being in a secure area. Deltas are the "quiet professionals" of the SpecOps community, and most of them won't even acknowledge being in the military (it helps that many of them grow their hair long and don't shave regularly, and also wear civilian clothing to work). Even regular Army and civilians living in and around Ft. Bragg North Carolina often aren't aware of Delta Force, even though they are stationed there. Operators also enjoy a greater degree of latitude in their weapons, and are allowed to employ non-general issue (non GI) weaponry from their own personally customized M-4 assault rifles to extremely expensive and highly customized versions of German made HK PSG-1 sniper rifles and MP-5SF sub machine guns.

Knowing what equipment and capability we did have is helpful, but it is just as important to recognize what capabilities we don't have. As previously alluded, the US Military in the late 70's was a gutted shell of a military machine. While we had the resources to carry out such a mission, the beating the military had taken since the end of the Viet Nam war had cost us dearly. Nobody paid a higher price than the SpecOps community who were generally disliked by regular military line units as an expensive waste of money. In the next installment of this essay, we will cover the events leading up to the incident at Desert I, the embarrassing failure of Operation Eagle Claw, and more importantly we will examine those failures in light of current capabilities.

In the final days before the raid, the decision was made to go with the Masirah starting point for Deltas assault force. The Manzariyeh airfield would still be used for extraction. Permission had not been obtained from the Sultan of Oman. Instead, US Forces would use British facilities at the Air Base. The British military provided defense for Oman on a contract basis for the Sultan. Although the British merely supplemented the Sultan of Oman's Air Force (SOAF), they controlled quite a bit of the territory on the airbase with exclusivity. US Forces regularly used Oman when doing combined operations with the British, so the appearance of the aircraft wouldn't be totally new. However, it would be in irregularity not covered in the deception operations currently taking place in Wadi Kena. It was decided that the risk of intelligence collectors raising red flags about the mission at this point was minimal. Just to make sure, the staging point was set up on a remote part of the airbase.

April 24th, 1979 Masirah

The Command of the Joint Task Force (COMJTF) was set up in a hanger that was given the codename "Red Barn". Using codenames is an important part of military operations; their nature is to hide or obscure the nature of the individual units from intelligence collectors. Therefore, the MC-130s would be codenamed "Dragons". The EC-130s were "Republics", the RH-53Ds were "Bluebeard", the carrier USS Nimitz would be "Gravel Pit", and the mission launch code would be "Foreman". At 12:20 HRS Zulu(1), the go code "Foreman" was sent out from COMJTF. At four separate staging areas around the Middle East, the participants of Operation Eagle Claw went into action.

14:05 HRS Z Oman

The EC and MC 130's were operating above their maximum load weight by about 10,000 lbs. This was referred to as Emergency Max Load, and is only used when absolutely necessary. The limited resources available to this mission made it absolutely necessary. Pilots in the bladder birds (EC-130s) would have to take the full length of the runway to get into the air.

At about the same moment Dragon I rolled down the runway with Col. Kyle aboard, all eight RH-53Ds aboard the Nimitz were brought onto the deck and prepped for flight.

14:35 HRS Z Dragon I

Intelligence had indicated that the Gulf of Oman would be clear of boat traffic. While one may not naturally think of fishing trawlers and oil tankers as being a danger to a military mission, the truth is that all major intelligence services used the cover of commercial maritime fishing and shipping vessels as naval intelligence points. This allowed them to slip up to and inside of territorial waters and perform Signal Intelligence Operations (SIGINT OPS). These boats often got a free pass because boarding a civilian boat wasn't typically a good move for international relations, especially when you sink a legitimate fishing boat.

Not surprisingly when Dragon I's co-pilot spotted about six vessels on the surface, it cause a slight bit of panic. The pilot climbed quickly to 6,000 ft to obscure the plane in the light haze and to avoid buzzing any of the ships. As a former ally of the US, Iran had C-130's of their own(3), so part of the mission would rely upon the similarity of US and Iranian assets to disguise the aircraft. All members of the JTF who would go into Iran carried nothing that could identify them other than their military id and dog tags. Name patches were stripped. Delta wore velcro patches over the US flag insignia on their shoulders. These patches would be removed once inside the embassy so the hostages would recognize that it was American forces that were rescuing them.

15:05 HRS Z Oman

Dragons II and III went into the air, to be followed quickly by Republic IV, V, and VI. Aboard the Nimitz, the RH-53Ds were also being launched. Bluebeard flight (2) would only be able to fly at about 100 - 110 knots with their current load, and would be overtaken by Dragon and Republic flights. All flights would stay low to the ground, flying between 250 and 1000 feet to avoid radar and long range visual tracking. Dragon I had taken off nearly an hour earlier in order to set up flight control operations and to secure the staging point. If anything was out of kilter, Dragon I could call the operation off without risking the rest of the JTF's men and equipment.

15:25 HRS Z Iran

Dragon I was "feet dry", meaning it had crossed over the Iranian coast. Soon, the aircraft would have to climb to 4,000 feet; most of Iran was on a plateau, and at that point 1,000 feet `off the deck' meant 4,000 feet above sea level.

Fifteen minutes later, Bluebeard flight was also feet dry. At this point, the Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) system began to malfunction on Bluebeard 5, indicating that the helicopter was yawing to the right. Bluebeard 5 would rely upon the other helicopters for guidance.

Fifty minutes later, the remaining Dragon flight along with the Republic flight went feet dry. All of the aircraft had gone overland at a point near the town of Chah Bahar, a port city near Jaz in the Hormozgan administrative region. As each flight came overland, the temperature inside the aircraft began to climb to 100 degrees (Fahrenheit). Crewman began to strip off their flight suits to cool down, and the shipboard air conditioning systems strained to keep up.

16:30 HRS Z

Dragon I's pilot began having difficulty making out the terrain. Through the NOGs, the Zagros Mountains in the distance appeared fuzzy and undefined. Soon, visibility was down to between a mile and a half-mile. Flying at night was difficult under the best conditions. Judging distances in the dark was hard enough without adding the loss of stereo vision when using NOGs, but whatever they had flown into - and it certainly wasn't fog at 120 degree desert heat - was cutting their visibility. To maintain cover, all flights were following the terrain, which meant they had to hug the ground. At 110 knots, a half-mile of warning didn't give a pilot a whole lot of maneuvering room to avoid 2,000-foot peaks.

The pilot aboard Dragon I deployed the FLIR turret. Through the FLIR monitor everything was visible in all quadrants. Whatever they had flown into had certainly made things difficult, but it was decided that it wasn't enough of an impairment to break radio silence. Even though the Satellite Communication (SATCOM) radios they were using were encrypted, any radio traffic could tip off the Iranians or Soviet listening posts in the area. All of the other flights were equipped with FLIR equipment.

The Iranians called the phenomena Dragon I encountered "ha****". Whenever cold air from a rainstorm rushes to the ground, it pushes the fine dusty particles of the desert sand up into the air. There, the particles hang about like a fog until they either fall to the ground or are pushed even higher by updrafts. Other than obscuring vision, ha**** is mostly harmless although pilots routinely avoid dust storms to save wear on their engines.

16:55 HRS Z Oman

Red Barn's "black box" operators were scouring the airwaves for SIGINT when one of the operators picked up a warning about a blacked out aircraft heading for Chah Bahar. For a moment in time, there was some concern that their cover had been blown, but both Dragon and Republic flights had long since passed that point, and were heading well away from Chah Bahar. It was decided that it was most likely a Iranian C-130 operating under blackout (a common practice for military aircraft in the Shah's Air Force). The report had also been made to the gendarmerie (the equivalent of the local sheriff) instead of the defense forces.

17:00 HRS Z Bluebeard Flight

Bluebeard 6 had a warning light come on in the cockpit. The "Blade Inspection Indicator" (BIM) indicator light required that the pilot immediately set the aircraft down. The rotor blades on the H-53s aren't solid, but are instead hollow wings. The blades are filled with nitrogen under pressure so that when a crack forms in the blade, the nitrogen loses pressure tripping a sensor. BIMs were usually a malfunction in the sensor, but procedure required that the pilot set down and inspect the rotor. If no cracks were visible, the aircraft could operate up to 15 hours, but experience told pilots they typically had less. Visible cracks immediately grounded the helicopter. The H-53 was a five bladed helicopter, but the loss of any portion of any single blade would severely unbalance the rotor, causing a crash.

On setting down, the pilot found that the BIM was real. Bluebeard 8 had circled around to provide assistance, and in fifteen minutes the entire force had transferred their equipment and all classified materials over to the other chopper. Bluebeard 6 would have to be left behind, and Bluebeard 8 was now 20 minutes behind the rest of the flight.

17:00 HRS Z Diego Garcia

Diego Garcia was a British Territory. The US and UK used Diego Garcia as a base for its fixed wing bombers in the region, giving tactical range control over most of Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. It was a long flight, so in order to have mid-air refueling the KC-135 Stratotankers would have to lift off now and rendezvous with the C-141s and C-130s in Daharan, Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, the airfield assault team was taking off from Wadi Kena in Egypt. Their flight plan called for them to head south along the Red Sea, turn west-northwest and fly straight through Saudi Arabia to Daharan for refueling, then on to Manzariyeh for the airfield assault. They would never make it to that point.

17:45 HRS Z Over Iran

Bluebeard flight was now hitting the ha****. The next 35 nautical miles was described by one Marine pilot as "the inside of a bottle of milk". After emerging on the other side, the pilots got reoriented. Radio silence was broken over the SATCOM to advise the formation to put more space between helicopters. The pilots were trained for flying blind under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), but more room still meant more safety.

Meanwhile, Dragon I was nearing the Desert I area. On a previous mission, a small team of Air Force Combat Controllers had flown in on a small prop plane to survey the area. They had also installed a special runway lighting system consisting of five highly directional lights which could only be seen well with FLIR or NOG equipment, or up close. The CIA-built landing lights were to be activated by remote, but it was an unproven system that had been sitting in the desert for over a month and running off batteries; not everyone was confident it'd work. The on signal was sent, and for a brief second the crew scanned the ground in anticipation. One of the crew spotted the lights thirty-degrees to the right. They had worked! Cheers and applause erupted aboard Dragon I.

In order to land, the FLIR turret would be deployed again. As the turret popped out, the screen lit up to show a small truck speeding down the main road. Dragon I had to pull out of its landing approach, and for a moment Col. Kyle wondered if the driver had seen the landing lights come on.

On the second approach, the pilot turned the FLIR off to drop the gear. Col Kyle suddenly realized that the nose gear door would get jammed against the FLIR turret if it were still deployed. He cursed to himself for not seeing this in the planning.

Without the FLIR, judging the distance to the ground was difficult. On approach, the pilot called for more power to slow the planes descent, but it was too late. Dragon I came in hard, and bounced a few times. In the cargo bay, Charlie Beckwith got bounced around and wound up under the RAT patrols jeep. As he crawled out, he made a joke to the effect of `any landing you could walk away from is a good landing'. Before Dragon I even came to a complete stop the cargo door was down and RAT patrol and Delta forces were already swinging into action. The Rangers, led by Wade Ishimoto, sped up the road to set up a roadblock.

Back with Bluebeard flight, Bluebeards I and II lost sight of the rest of the formation and had turned around to make a landing in the clear, and reorient themselves.

18:15 HRS Z Desert I

Desert I was picked because it was secluded and not heavily traveled. Someone probably should have informed the Iranians of that fact, because within minutes of having to abort their first landing the Rangers were facing down a bus full of forty Iranian civilians. A few warning shots didn't manage to convince the driver to slow down, but Ishimoto's 40mm grenade managed to convince him it was in his best interest to stop for the roadblock.

Col. Kyle had planned on taking a few detainees, but not civilians, and certainly not 40 of them. The decision was made for the passengers and their luggage to be loaded up and taken to Manzariyeh, where they would then be taken back to Egypt. There, they'd be put on a plane back to Iran. Letting them go wasn't an option, since any one of them would likely blow Eagle Claw's cover.

At the roadblock, the Rangers were trying to calm the detainees. Maj. Tyrone Tisdale, a fluent speaker of Farsi, began reciting poetry by Omar Khayyam, and that seemed to help as from the back one of the detainees yelled out in perfect English "It's about time you came, Yanks." Post revolutionary Iran was a mix of loyalists and revolutionaries, and many expected an American invasion to restore the Shah.

Back at the staging area, Col Kyle decided to send a message to Red Barn advising them of the detainees, when he found out that the SATCOM link to Red Barn and Gravel Pit was no longer getting good reception. The message would have to be sent by UHF, which wasn't secure.

18:30 HRS Z Desert I

It must've been rush hour, because vehicle numbers 3 and 4 were approaching the roadblock. This time it was a short fuel truck followed by a pickup. Ishimoto's team fired warning shots, and then the truck sped up. A few rounds into the engine block damaged the truck, but the driver was hell bent on ramming the Rangers. Ishimoto broke out a Light Antitank Weapon (LAW, basically a bazooka) and fired off a round. The projectile struck the ground below the truck (its not clear if Ishimoto was aiming for the truck or trying to make a crater in front of the truck) and bounced up into the fuel tank.

Back at the staging area, everyone heard the loud "WHUMP", and turned to look at the mushroom cloud. "That's a gasoline explosion," Beckwith stated as if he were commenting on the weather. Seconds later, Ishimoto came up on a dirt bike and filled them in on what happened. The driver had made it out right before his truck exploded, and escaped in the pickup trick that was following it.

There was great concern that the cover had been officially blown at this point, but Beckwith made an observation. The truck that was following was meant for the drivers escape. They were smuggling gas; American moon-shiners used the same tactic. He wasn't about to go complaining to the gendarmerie about his contraband gas getting blown to hell. But there was still the issue of an exploded fuel truck in the middle of nowhere. They decided they would have one of the Rangers ram the bus into the wreckage to make it look like an accident.

18:45 HRS Z Bluebeard I/II

After a few minutes of reckoning, they decided that they were too low on fuel to return to the Nimitz, and would have to forge on to Desert I. The TACAN transmitter at Desert I would be up soon enough, and they could follow the beacon in for a landing.

After five minutes in the air, Bluebeard II had a system failure in the secondary hydraulic lines. Although it was not the primary system, backup hydraulics are important. If the bird lost its primaries, the controls would lock up and the helo would crash. The pilot made the call to keep flying to Desert I, set the MH-53D down there, and check on the problem.

Back with Bluebeard flight, Bluebeard V was having major problems. For starters, the co-pilot was having a bad case of vertigo from using the NOGs. Another crewmember was about to take over for him, but the co-pilot was able to 'tough it out' and do his job. To add to that, the gimbal stopped working, and the backup indicator was sticking on turns. Without the gimball and its backup it would be very difficult to tell if the aircraft was flying level and straight. Bluebeard V then lost sight of the lead helicopter in the ha****.

After a few minutes, the decision was made aboard Bluebeard V to return to the Nimitz. The situation was degrading rapidly, and if it got any worse they may not make Desert I. Getting back to the coast gave them a better chance of rendezvousing with the Search and Rescue choppers stationed aboard the Nimitz.

Because radio silence was still being observed, nobody thought to radio to the lead and advise them of the situation. Bluebeard VII later circled back to look for V, but gave up on the search after ten minutes. JTF had now lost two helicopters, but that still left enough for the mission.

19:25 HRS Z Desert I

The remainder of Dragon flight and the Republic flight were landing now. The burning beacon which had been a fuel truck both helped and hindered the landing, and more than one C-130 had to retry their landing in order to avoid the flames and updrafts. The fire made the NOGs useless, and the FLIR turrets had to be retracted for the landing. As the final Republic flight was coming it, things were getting congested at the staging area. Delta troops were dragging their equipment onto the road to make room for the last C-130, and one Delta jumped on the SATCOM to warn the final C-130 about how close things were. Col Kyle watched him call out over the SATCOM in plainspoken English without encoding the message. Suddenly, he realized the stupidity and wastefulness of encoding messages that were going over a secure encrypted channel. This was another aspect missed in the preplanning, probably because the SATCOM units were added at the last minute.

As the C-130 touched down, the pilot feathered the props making the blades essentially backwards, and then went full throttle. The behemoth transport lurched to a stop with room to spare.

All engines were running on all aircraft. They were kept running at low power because if they couldn't start themselves they'd have to be abandoned. It wasn't uncommon for a perfectly good aircraft to have trouble starting, and require an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to give them a boost.

21:00 HRS Z Desert I

Bluebeard flight started arriving, and the refueling operation started immediately. But when Bluebeard II landed, the pilot shut it down for inspection. It was discovered that a nut was cracked on the primary hydraulic booster and it was leaking fluid. Combined with the failure of the backup hydraulics, if this leak got much worse the controls would lock up and the helicopter would crash.

The JTF was down to 5 helicopters now - not enough to pull the mission off. Between the two extra crews, and the lost equipment, there weren't enough resources to pull this off. Col Kyle and Charlie Beckwith began racking their brains to figure out if the mission could go on. After a few minutes, word was sent back to Red Barn: 'Operation Scrubbed.'

The task force began hurriedly reorganizing and loading up the chopper crews on the Republic birds. Dragons I and II were sent back along with Republic IIV while Col Kyle supervised the refueling of the remaining Bluebeards from Republics IV, V, and VI. Bluebeard III began to lift off when it was surrounded by a whirlwind of dust from its own rotor wash. The rotor blade struck Republic IV's tail with a loud crash that immediately drew everyone's attention.

The entire task force stood transfixed as Bluebeard III spun around in the air and came down on the EC-130's wing. The wing broke and exploded as fuel spilled out, and the chopper flipped into its side. Secondary explosions rocked Desert I sending shrapnel flying into Bluebeards I, IV, and IIX. Republic IV had fourteen people on board, and the ones who survived the crash began scrambling out -some on fire. Several members of the task force ran to the crash to help rescue the crewmembers from the airplane, while others began running to get away from the heavily damaged Bluebeards on the ground.

All of the choppers had taken heavy damage from the explosion, and the only fully working Bluebeard was VII. The task force had to get the hell out now, and one chopper wasn't worth slowing everyone down. Col Kyle began directing everyone onto the C-130s, and in minutes the planes were speeding down the desert runway. Looking back, Kyle observed that the rotor blades on one of the Bluebeards were still turning. In the rush to get out, the crew didn't even have the luxury of turning the engines off.

Everyone's heart began to sink. The tremendous weight of mission failure was bad enough, but there were 8 fallen comrades back at the crash site. The fire made it impossible to retrieve them, but in military ethos you never leave a man behind. There were also classified documents on the remaining helicopters that were supposed to be retrieved or destroyed. A request for an airstrike was called out to Red Barn, but COMJTF turned the request down. If there were any survivors at the site that had been missed, they would be killed, and the fighters might encounter Iranian aircraft - an unacceptable escalation. The flight back to Masirah would take about 4 hours - plenty of time to rethink every minute of the mission.

02:00 HRS Z Masirah

The JTF survivors were tired, sweaty, and exhausted. Worse yet, they had failed in their mission, lost their buddies, and were forced to leave them behind. The operation was a complete and utter secret, so naturally everyone on the airbase knew about it by now. From the British side of the base, a jeep came speeding up to the Red Barn area. Two British pilots got out, unloaded a few cases of cold beer, and then drove off without saying a word. Scrawled across the top of the box were the words "From us all, to you all, for having the guts to try."


"For we shall be remembered. We few, we happy few, we brothers. For he who sheds his blood with me today, shall be my brother."
-Henry V, Shakespeare

Cpt. Harold L. Lewis Jr. USAF
Cpt. Lyn D. McIntosh USAF
Cpt. Richard L. Bakke USAF
Cpt. Charles McMillian USAF
TSgt. Joel C. Mayo USAF
SSgt. Dewey Johnson USMC
Sgt. John D. Harley USMC
Cpl. George N. Holmes USMC

In the wake of the Desert I incident, there was a veritable barrage of Congressional hearings and official inquiries. It was largely decided by the buraucrats that the incompetence of the commanders, mission planners, and personnel was the source of the failure. The fact of the matter is that politics, both contemporary and historic, doomed the mission to failure before it was even called for. The men represented the finest commanders, pilots, and SpecOps units available to the armed forces at the time. The tactics were not perfect, but they were as good as was possible given the external limitations placed on the mission planners by the President and the State Department. The failure of the mission lay not in the men and tactics, but in politics.

Public support for the military was severely eroded by the Viet Nam war and the tumult of the late 60s, and official policy followed suit. Military expenditures were cut drastically as domestic policy shifted to social spending. This lack of funding resulted in cuts of equipment and training. The Special Operations community was hardest hit, since conventional military commanders largely felt that SpecOps was a drain on their already tight budgets. In particular, the following factors contributed to the failure of Operation Eagle Claw:

Poor maintenance and condition of available equipment
Lack of available resources for a deep insertion missions

The equipment to be used was in a sad state at best. The long-range aircraft (C-130s and C-141s) were maintained well enough because they formed the core of the military transport infrastructure. There was also a sufficient number of C-130s left over from Viet Nam to allow for cannibalism. It is a common practice when parts are in short supply to take an aircraft out of service or use another unservicable aircraft for parts. Additionally, complex machines are like people; they require regular use to stay in good condition. This is quite aptly referred to as exercise. Even a standard automobile cannot sit for long before the loss of lubrication in certain areas of the engine, acidification of fluids in hydraulic and fuel systems, and corrosion begins to occur. The same is also true for aircraft.

In particular, the helicopters (which turned out to be a major source of operational failure) sat stowed on the USS Nimitz for months without being used. At one point, aircrews on the Nimitz actually cannibalized the MH-53Ds that would form Bluebeard flight to keep their RH-53C minesweeping aircraft running. Also, MH-53Ds are not Naval aircraft, and lack certain modifications to make them resistant to corrosion in the harsh ocean environment.

A final insult to the mission helicopters is that just prior to their launch a training accident resulted in the helicopters being doused with fire retardant foam. This foam, while useful for suppressing fires, is hardly friendly to electronic systems. While this likely had a negligible impact on the helicopters, it is exemplary of the overall disrespect for equipment that formed the lynchpin of the operation.

While the assault forces were training with the very C-130s and C-141s to be used in the actual raid, the helicopters to be used in the raid were stowed aboard the carrier Nimitz. Since the mission didn't initially include a launch from a land base at Masirah, the USS Nimitz would be used to launch the helos, and it would not be practical to ferry the helos from training bases in southern Arizona to a carrier in the Indian Ocean for this mission. However, it would have been possible and even prudent to transport the training helicopters to Diego Garcia by C-141, offload and assemble them (transport required the removal of the rotors and part of the gearbox to fit the helicopters aboard the C-141s), and then fly them to a rendezvous point with the Nimitz while it was en-route to its launch point outside the Straits of Hormuz. The advantage to this would be that any maintenance issues that were likely to crop up during the flight into Iran (the cracked rotor blades, malfunctioning hydraulics, and broken instrumentation) would have more likely occurred during the stresses of training - and been repaired. In fact, a "Blade Inspection Method" light occurred on one of the training missions.

A more practical solution would be to use the right tools for the right job. During the mission planning, Col Kyle noted that H-53's existed with an in-flight refueling capacity. However, there were a limited number of these MH-53E Sea Dragons available, and it was felt that their movement would be too high profile. It wouldn't be until two years later that Special Operations would get their very own MH-53J Pave Low III helos with improved engines and in flight refueling capability. However, the capability did exist at the time, and it should have been taken advantage of. With the in flight capability, the helicopters could take on fuel from KC-130 Hercules tanker planes and made a direct flight into Iran eliminating the need for Desert I.

Although it ultimately had no bearing on the scrubbing of the mission, the need to use a Desert I staging point at all was the greatest hindrance to the mission. Had the CH-53E with in-flight refueling capability been employed, the choppers could have flown straight to Tehran from Turkey, and back. This would have eliminated the need for Wadi Kena, Masirah, Desert I, the tankers from Diego Garcia, and the Manzariyeh airfield assault. If Desert I could have been eliminated, the dangerous conditions necessitated by the buddy refueling system would have not existed.

In spite of the ha**** and delays caused by helo malfunctions, had Bluebeard V not had mechanical trouble, and had the collision not occurred, the remainder of the mission could have still been accomplished.

One of the biggest criticisms of the Desert I aspect was that in the rush to evacuate the scene, the damaged (and unreliable up to this point) helicopters were left behind with all classified materials aboard. Col Kyle had requested an air strike to destroy the remaining helicopters, but the lack of intelligence on the state of the Iranian air force made Maj General Vaught question the possibility of an altercation between US and Iranian fighters. There was also concern back at Red Barn that some JTF members may have been left behind.

At this point, one can reasonably claim that a Command and Control (C2) failure had occurred. The on-scene commander is responsible for his men, and if Kyle was calling in an air strike, you can safely assume anyone left behind is beyond dead already. More importantly, this kind of operation should not have been conducted without Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) in place. At the time, the E-3 AWACS was available, and could have operated from Daharan to provide full air radar coverage of Iran. If any Iranian aircraft were in the air, they would also present a hazard to the retreating task force on the C-130s and the JTF commander already has a responsibility to use fighter aircraft from the Nimitz to cover their retreat. The decision to not deploy AWACS was a matter of maintaining a low operational footprint. That and the decision to not risk an entanglement with Iranian aircraft was a political decision - not a military one.

Ultimately, the mission planners did the best they could with what they had. Even without rescuing the hostages, those responsible for the mission (including the legendary Charlie Beckwith and James Kyle) would have gone down in history as having pulled of the most spectacular SpecOps mission since the Son Tay raid if it were not for the deaths of the 8 airman and the loss of 8 aircraft. Here is why:

In training and developing this mission, the Joint Task Force (JTF) developed a whole new set of skills for Night Time special operations flying using FLIR, NOGs, and blacked out aircraft that utilized non-visible lighting for illumination.
In less than 172 days, the JTF had created from thin air the capability to fly thousands of miles into hostile enemy territory to stage a hostage rescue in the middle of a major city.
All aspects of this mission were kept a complete secret even from extremely high ranking military officials and almost all of the support personnel who were not directly involved in the actual mission itself. This level of security is rare enough with established operating units, but for an ad-hoc unit it represents the ultimate in integrity.
The JTF commanders had managed to pool talent from all four branches of the US Military and avoid the inter-service rivalries that typically plagued joint service operations. Air Force Combat Controllers, Marine Corps Pilots, Army Ranger and Delta forces, and Navy aircrews all cooperated in this mission.
The buddy refueling system - necessitated by the unavailability of the E model helicopters - was a completely original refueling method developed for the first time for Operation Eagle Claw.

In the time since Operation Eagle Claw, the military has recognized the importance of proactively developing advanced capabilities. All transport helicopters in the Army, Navy, and Air Force have a version with long range in flight refueling capability. Pilots routinely train in the use of night time and low level flying tactics, and in the 1980's the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) was created to fill this role.

The emphasis on forward operable aircraft has also increased. The Marine Corps took delivery of the first AV-8B Harrier in 1981. This aircraft could have played a crucial support role in providing air defense for the operations (a task left to the AC-130s in a role they were not designed to fill). Additionally, the V-22 Osprey which had been on the drawing board in one way or another since the early 70's began to receive serious backing. Had the MV-22 or an aircraft of similar capability been available to the military in 1979, they would have greatly simplified operations by eliminating the refueling tankers and extra transport aircraft. The MV-22 can carry 20 passengers, land like a helicopter, but fly four times faster than the H-53 helicopters.

One of the most significant realizations was that inter-service rivalry and resentment of the SpecOps community - or lack thereof - can make or break a mission. In 1997, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act established the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which receives its own funding and is able to lease resources from all four branches of the military as needed. That removed the infighting and political aspects that had previously hindered the Special Operations Community.

Ultimately, the lesson learned (or perhaps not always learned) from Operation Eagle Claw is that when you decide on a military option, you must abandon the political option and fully support your decision, or both are doomed to failure. In the wake of the failed crisis, the hostages were separated and spread about Iran. It would be nearly another year before the hostages would be released peacefully.

 

[gubbi]

Desert One - mission to rescue Iranian Embassy hostages in 1980
Airman, April, 2001 by Jim Greeley

A mission of hope turned tragic. A case of what could've been.

Nov. 4, 1979 -- More than 3,000 Iranian militant students storm the U.S. Embassy
in Tehran, Iran, taking 66 Americans hostage and setting the stage for a
showdown with the United States.

April 25, 1980 -- A defining moment for President Jimmy Carter, for the American
people and for America's military. At 7 a.m. a somber President Carter announces
to the nation, and the world, that eight American servicemen are dead and
several others are seriously injured, after a super-secret hostage rescue
mission failed.

April 26, 1980 -- Staff Sgt. J.J. Beyers lies unconscious in a Texas hospital
bed. The Air Force radio operator was one of the lucky few C-130 aircrew members
to survive a ghastly collision and explosion between his aircraft and a
helicopter on Iran's Great Salt Desert. The accident took place after the rescue
team was forced to abort its mission at a location from then on known as Desert
One.

The living room walls in J.J. Beyers' Florida home tell a story of intense pride
and patriotism -- a shrine to days and friends long past. The dark paneling in
this modest, single-story house is the canvas for a riveting collection of
photos, citations and plaques. Although faded over the years, the collection
possesses an unspoken power.

Beyers' hands and arms tell another side of the story. Settling into his
favorite recliner, the former Air Force sergeant rolls up the sleeves of his
checkered shirt. The scars on his arms and his disfigured hands tell their own
harrowing tale. Even after all these years, the tale of courage, hope, pain,
fear and disappointment jump out and scream, listen!

In 1980, Beyers was part of an elite group of airmen, soldiers, sailors and
Marines who volunteered for Operation Eagle Claw -- a bold and daring rescue
attempt of Americans held hostage in Tehran, Iran.

Beyers' scars and mementos are emblematic of the rescue mission. They're
constant reminders of the friends he lost. A reminder of the disaster he
survived. A reminder of what could've been.

"I was lucky," Beyers said. "I lived."

Five of his crewmates from the 8th Special operations Squadron at Hurlburt
Field, Fla., died in the Iranian desert, along with three Marine helicopter
crewmen (See "Remembering Heroes," Page 9).

"They were a brave, courageous and determined group of guys," Beyers said. "I
miss them."

Countdown to tragedy

The countdown to Desert One began in spring 1979 when a popular uprising in Iran
forced longtime Iranian ruler, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, into exile. After
months of internal turmoil, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni, a Shilte Muslim
cleric, took power in the country.

On Nov. 4, 1979, just a few weeks after President Jimmy Carter allowed the Shah
to enter the United States for medical treatment, thousands of Iranian students
stormed the American Embassy in Tehran, taking 66 hostages and demanding the
return of the Shah to stand trial in Iran.

American diplomatic efforts to release the hostages were thwarted by Khomeni
supporters. At the same time, Pentagon planners began examining rescue options.

Planning a rescue

The original intent was to launch a rapid rescue effort. But, every quick-reaction
alternative was dismissed. For planners, the situation was bleak. Intelligence
information was difficult to get. The hostages were heavily guarded in the
massive embassy compound. Logistically, Tehran was a city crammed with 4 million
people, yet It was very isolated -- surrounded by about 700 miles of desert and
mountains in every direction. There was no easy way to get a rescue team into
the embassy.

One scenario was parachuting an elite Army special forces team in. The team
would fight its way in and out of the embassy, rescuing the hostages along the
way. That plan was deemed suicidal.

After realizing there was no infrastructure or support for a quick strike,
planners started mapping out a long-range, multifaceted rescue.

What emerged was a complex, two-night operation. An Army rescue team would be
brought into Iran with a combination of helicopters and C-130s. The "Hercs"
would fly the troopers into a desert staging area from Oman. They would load the
rescue team on the helicopters, refuel the choppers, and then the helos and
shooters would move forward to hide in areas about 50 miles outside Tehran.

On day two, the Army team would be escorted to the embassy in trucks by American
intelligence agents. The Army team would take down the embassy, rescue the
hostages and move them to a nearby soccer stadium. The helos would pick up the
shooters and hostages at the stadium and evacuate them to Manzariyeh Air Base,
about 40 miles southeast of Tehran.

MC-130s would fly Army Rangers and combat controllers into Manzariych. The
Rangers would take the field and hold it for the evacuation. Meanwhile, AC-130H
Spectre gunships would be over the embassy and the airfield to "fix" any
problems encountered. Finally, C-141s would arrive at Manzariyeh to fly the
hostages and rescue team to safety.

Secrecy and surprise were critical to the plan. The entire mission would be done
at night, and surprise was the Army shooters' greatest advantage.

It was an ambitious plan; some say too ambitious.

"This mission required a lot of things we had never done before," said retired
Col. (then-Capt.) Bob Brenci, the lead C-130 pilot on the mission. "We were
literally making it up as we went along."

Flying using night-vision goggles was almost unheard of. There was no
capability, or for that matter, a need, to refuel helicopters at remote,
inaccessible landing zones. All these skills and procedures would be tested and
honed for this mission.

"These capabilities are routine now for special operators, but at the time we
were right there on the edge of the envelope," said retired Col. (then-Capt.)
George Ferkes, Brenci's co-pilot.

The aircrews weren't the only ones pushing the envelope. Airman First Class
Jessie Rowe was a fuels specialist at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., when he got
a late night call to pack his bags and show up at the Tampa International
Airport. He met his boss, Tech. Sgt. Bill Jerome, and the pair flew to Arizona.
They were now a part of Eagle Claw. Their job? Devise a self contained refueling
system the C-130s could carry into the desert to refuel the helicopters at the
forward staging area.

"No one told us why," said Rowe, who's now a major at Hurlburt Field and one of
just two operation participants still on active duty. "But, you didn't need to
be a rocket scientist to figure it out.

"We begged, borrowed and stole the stuff we needed to make it work," he said.
"We got it done. In less than a month, we had a working system."

The Eagle Claw players were spread out, training around the world. The Hurlburt
crews spent most of their time training in Florida and the southwestern United
States. The pieces were coming together.

At the same time, negotiations to free the hostages continued to go nowhere. By
the time April 1980 rolled around, the Eagle Claw team had been practicing
individually, and together, for five months. The aircrews averaged about 1,000
flying hours in that time. In comparison, a typical C-130 crew dog would take
three years to log 1,000 hours.

It's showtime

"We were chomping at the bit," Brenci said. "We just wanted to go and do it."

After a long training mission in Arizona and a flight to Nellis Air Force Base,
Nev., to pick up parts, Col. J.V.O. Weaver (a captain then) and his crew,
returned to Hurlburt Field to an unusual sight.

"We rolled in and noticed the maintenance guys were on the line painting all the
birds flat black," Weaver said. "They painted everything. Tail numbers,
markings. Everything."

The plan was moving forward. Less than a day later, six C-130s quietly departed
Florida bound for Wadi Kena, Egypt. The president hadn't pulled the trigger yet,
but the hammer was cocked on the operation.

The Army and Air Force troops were in Egypt awaiting orders. The Marines and
sailors, the helicopter contingent, were aboard the USS Nimitz afloat in the
Persian Gulf off the coast of Iran.

"I remember we ate C-rats (the predecessor to MREs) for days and then one
morning a truck rolls up, and we're served a hot breakfast," Rowe said. "Light
bulbs went on in everyone's minds."

The hot breakfast was a precursor to a briefing and pep talk from Army Maj. Gen.
James Vaught, the Joint Task Force commander for Eagle Claw. The mission was a
go.

"Everyone was pumped up," said retired Chief Master Sgt. Taco Sanchez (then a
staff sergeant). "Arms were in the air. We were ready!"

Next stop, Masirah. A tiny island off the coast of Oman. To say this air patch
was desolate would be kind. It was a couple of tents and a blacktop strip. It
was the final staging area -- the last stop before launching.

Just before sunset on April 24, Brenci's MC-130 took off toward Desert One. The
die was cast. Brenci's crew would be the first to touch down in Iran. They
carried the Air Force combat control team and Army Col.

Charlie Beckwith's commandos.

Also on board Brenci's plane was Col. James Kyle, the on-scene commander at
Desert One and one of the lead planners for the operation. The other Hercs left
Masirah after dark, and the helicopters launched off the Nimitz.

It was a four-hour flight. Plenty of time to contemplate what they were
attempting.

Beckwith would lead the rescue mission into the embassy.

"We just tried to stay busy," Sanchez said. "We were in enemy territory now. The
pucker factor was pretty high."

The first challenge would be to find the make-shift landing strip. Only 21 days
earlier, Maj. John Carney, a combat controller, had flown a covert mission into
Iran with the CIA to set up an infrared landing zone at Desert One. Carney was
perched over Brenci's shoulder as the C-130 neared the landing site. The lights
he had burled in the desert would be turned on via remote control from the C-130's
flight deck. The question was, would they work?

Brenci was a couple miles out when in slow succession a "diamond-and-one"
pattern appeared through his night-vision goggles. The bird touched down in the
powdery silt, and the troops went to work.

Gremlins arrive

The choppers, eight total, left the Nimitz and were supposed to fly formation,
low level, to the meet area. Because of the demands of the mission, at least six
helicopters were needed at Desert One for the mission to go forward. Two hours
into the flight the first helicopter aborted.

Further inland, the Marine helo pilots met their own private hell. Weather for
the mission was supposed to be clear. It wasn't. Flying at 500 feet, the
helicopters got caught in what is known in the Dasht-e-Kavir, Iran's Great Salt
Desert, as a "ha****" -- a blinding dust storm. The situation was bad. After
battling the storm for what seemed like days, one of the helicopters turned
back.

At Desert One, all the C-130s had landed and were taxied into place. They were
waiting for the choppers. An hour late, the first helicopter arrived.

"We weren't on the ground that long, but my God, it felt like an eternity
waiting for the helos," Beyers recalled. The first two helicopters to roll in
pulled up to Beyer's aircraft to be refueled. When the sixth chopper showed,
everyone breathed a sigh of relief.

The Army troops boarded the helicopters. The fuels guys did their magic.
Everything was good. Then word spread. One of the helicopters had a hydraulic
failure. Game over.

Beckwith needed six helicopters. Kyle, the on-scene commander, aborted the
mission.

"It was crushing," Rowe said. "We had come all that way, spent all that time
practicing, and now we had to turn back."

The decision made, now the crews had to evacuate the Iranian dust patch. Time
was a factor. The C-130s were running low on fuel. Sunrise was fast approaching,
and the team didn't want to be caught on the ground by Iranian troops. Members
had already detained a civilian bus with 40-plus passengers and were forced to
blow up a fuel truck, which wouldn't stop for a roadblock.

They had worn out their welcome. Dejected and disappointed, they just wanted to
button up and go home.

Beyers' aircraft, flown by Capt. Hal Lewis, was critically low on fuel. But,
before it could depart, the helicopter behind the aircraft had to be moved.

"We had just taken the head count," recalled Beyers. They had 44 Army troops on
board. Beyers was on the flight deck behind Lewis' seat. "We got permission to
taxi and then everything just lit up."

A fireball engulfed the C-130. According to witnesses, the helicopter lifted
off, kicked up a blinding dust cloud, and then banked toward the Herc. Its rotor
blades sliced through the Herc's main stabilizer. The chopper rolled over the
top of the aircraft, gushing fuel and fire as it tumbled.

Burning wreck

Fire engulfed the plane. Training kicked in. The flight deck crew began shut-down
procedures. The fire was Outside the plane. Beyers headed down the steps toward
the crew door. That's when someone opened the escape hatch on top of the
aircraft in the cockpit, Beyers said. Boom. Black out.

Tech. Sgt. Ken Bancroft, one of three loadmasters on the airplane, knew he had
troops to get off the plane. He went to the left troop door. Fire. Right troop
door. Jammed shut.

"I don't know how I got that door off," Bancroft said.

He did. One after another, this hulk of a man tossed the Army troops off the
burning plane like a crazed baggage handler unloading a jumbo jet.

Beyers had been knocked out. The flight deck door had hit him on the head as he
went down the steps. When he came to, he was on fire. Conscious again, he
crawled toward the rear of the plane.

"I made it halfway," Beyers said. "I quit. I knew I was dead." Somehow he moved
himself closer to the door. Then he saw two figures appear through the flames.
Two Army troopers had come back for him. He was alive, but in bad shape.

Beyers always had the bad habit of rolling up his flight suit sleeves. He
finally paid the price. His arms, from the elbows down, were terribly burned.
His hands were charred. Hair, eyebrows and eyelashes, gone. Worse were the
internal injuries. His lungs, mouth and throat were burned. Yet, he clung to
life.

The desert scene was one of organized chaos. Failure had turned to tragedy.

"I knew they were dead," Bancroft said of his crew mates in the front of the
plane. "I looked up there, and it was just a wall of fire. There was nothing I
could do."

The last plane left Desert One a half hour after the accident. Beyers was on
that airplane.

"The accident was a calamity heaped on despair. It was devastating," wrote Kyle
in his book called "The Guts to Try."

"The C-130 crews and combat controllers had not failed in any part of the
operation and had a right to be proud of what they accomplished," Kyle said.
"They inserted the rescue team into Iran on schedule, set up the refueling zone,
and gassed up the helicopters when they finally arrived. Then, when things went
sour, they saved the day with an emergency evacuation by some incredibly
skillful flying. They had gotten the forces Out of Iran to fight another day --
a fact they can always look back on with pride."

Pride and sorrow are the two mixed emotions most participants share.

"We were the ultimate embarrassment," Sanchez said. "Militarily we did some
astounding things, but ultimately we failed America. I'm proud of what we
accomplished. I was 27 years old, and when I think about that mission It still
sends shivers down my spine."

The aftermath of the rescue operation was a barrage of investigations,
congressional hearings and, believe it or not, more planning and training for a
follow-on rescue mission.

Members of the 8th SOS were involved in those plans. In fact, some of the same
crew members who participated in Eagle Claw came back and started preparing for
the follow-up mission.

Healing the wounds

At the same time, the squadron needed to bury its dead, and start healing the
wounds from Desert One. Beyers survived the tragedy. After spending a year in
the hospital, and enduring it surgeries, he was medically separated from the Air
Force.

The bodies of the eight men were eventually returned to the United States, and a
memorial service was held at Arlington National Cemetery.

Memories of that ceremony are still vivid for many of the rescue team. Weaver,
who was an escort officer, still recalls when President Carter visited the
families prior to the service. After talking with a Marine family, the president
made his way to the family Weaver was escorting.

"He came up to the family, then he looked down at those two little boys, and he
just got down on his knees and wrapped his arms around them," Weaver said.
"Tears were streaming down his cheeks. Here's the president of the United
States, on his knees, crying, holding these boys. That burned right in there,"
he said pointing to his chest.

A memorial was placed at Arlington National Cemetery honoring the eight men
killed. Subsequently, other tributes have been made remembering the men who died
at Desert One. Hurlburt has dedicated streets in their honor. New Mexico's
Holloman Air Force Base Airman Leadership School is named for Tech. Sgt. Joel
Mayo, the C-130 flight engineer killed at Desert One.

Mayo and Sanchez were good friends. "I talked to him that night," Sanchez said,
flashing back to a time long ago. "It's important people understand. Joel had no
idea he was going to give his life that night. But, if you told him he was going
to die, he still would've gone."

Sanchez's words capture the essence of every man on the mission. They were a
brave, courageous group of men, attempting the impossible, for a noble and
worthy cause. They came up short and have lived 21 years with the demons, or
gremlins, that sabotaged their mission of mercy.

"They tried, and that was important," said Col. Thomas Schaefer, the U.S.
Embassy defense attache and one of the hostages. "It's tragic eight men died,
but it's important America had the courage to attempt the rescue."

In his living room, Beyers gazes at the photos on his wall. Pointing to the
picture of his crew, he says, "How I survived and they didn't, I don't know. I
was lucky."

Even having lived so long with the horrible outcome of that mission, Beyers
never doubts his choice to take part.

"We do things other people can't do," he said. "We would rather get killed than
fail. It was an accident. But, I have no doubt, had the Army guys gotten in
there, we would've succeeded."

It comes down to that. Desert One is a story of what could've been.

Editor's note: For more on the behind-the-scene actions setting up for the
Desert One rescue mission, keep your eyes open for "A Night to Remember" in the
May issue.

Remembering heroes

Eight men died during the aborted attempt to rescue American hostages held
captive in Iran. Five of them were airmen from the 8th Special Operations
Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Fla. Three were Marine helicopter crewmen.

"Take solace in the fact [that] what they did only a few could even attempt,"
said Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz, the commander of Alaskan Command, at a 20th
anniversary commemorative ceremony at Hurlburt Field, Fla. "What they did was
keep the promise. They had the guts to try."

Schwartz was a pilot in the 8th SOS at the time of the rescue mission and went
on to command Hurlburt's 16th Special Operations Wing.

Another special operator and now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen.
Hugh Shelton, expressed similar sentiments during a speech at an April 2000
ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery honoring those killed.

"The sheer audacity of the mission, the enormity of the task, the political
situation at the time. When I reflect on the results -- both positive and
negative -- I'm awed," Shelton said.

"The very soul of any nation is its heroes. We are in the company of giants and
in the shadow of eight true heroes," he said.

Those heroes are Capt. Richard L. Bakke, 33; Capt. Harold J. Lewis, 35; Capt.
Lyn D. McIntosh, 33; Capt. James T. McMillan II, 28; Tech. Sgt. Joel C. Mayo,
34; Marine Staff Sgt. Dewey L. Johnson, 31; Marine Sgt. John D. Harvey, 21; and
Marine Cpl. George N. Holmes Jr., 22.

 

[gubbi]

From the same source:

Pictures of the RH-53's on the Nimitz leading up to the operation. Some of these have been published before, others, not so much.

Capt. Batzler, CO of the Nimitz talks with USAF Col. Keating and a Marine aviator, possibly Chuck Pitman.

Batzler and Keating again.

 

[gubbi]

 

[gubbi]

Pics Contd

Rear Admiral Kirksey talks to aircrew and Nimitz sailors.

If you don't like the thread then simply go elsewhere.
nobody sent you an invitation did they?

What do YOU know about OP Eagle Claw? Or do you HAVE to resort to the usual chest thumping to what in your mind is proving your point.

 

[Awesome]

I disagree on this instance..Eagle claw was a rescue operation..Not aggression.

Which involved heavy fire support, gunships, killing of security guards.

 

[Sina]

US troops intentionally killed one Iranian civilian during this operation, supposedly to maintain the "secrecy" of the operation. They took many civilians as hostage, and tried to kill more, but damn ... these sandstorms, you know.

Anyway, Allah has made a deal with Muslims:
"Do your best, and put your trust only in me, then you'll be victorious. I'll come to your help, when needed."


___________________________

MOD EDIT

-

Casualties and losses

Iran
1 Civillian

US
8 killed
4 wounded
1 helicopter and 1 transport aircraft destroyed
5 helicopters abandoned/captured

 

[IranZamin]

^^ rest in piss to the thugs
rest in peace to the civilian

 

[T-Rex]

US troops intentionally killed one Iranian civilian during this operation, supposedly to maintain the "secrecy" of the operation. They took many civilians as hostage, and tried to kill more, but damn ... these sandstorms, you know.

Anyway, Allah has made a deal with Muslims:
"Do your best, and put your trust only in me, then you'll be victorious. I'll come to your help, when needed."


___________________________

MOD EDIT

-

Casualties and losses

Iran
1 Civillian

US
8 killed
4 wounded
1 helicopter and 1 transport aircraft destroyed
5 helicopters abandoned/captured

This is indeed the way Almighty helps the meek against the arrogant aggressors!

I didnt notice the title change. But here some more information for Op Eagle Claw from another forum (cannot provide the links for obvious reasons but you know what source)

Jewanabes like you were truly hurt to see that their diabolical scheme didn't work against Almighty's divine intervention.