jaibi
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The near future direction of the armed forces
Note: following article is based on a recent conversation I had with a few officers of different armed forces
With the 21st century shaping new format of conflicts and warfare it is pertinent that we focus upon the direction it is headed and establish accordingly. Non-conventional warfare, integrated battle space, new frontiers and a focus upon holding rather than taking an area are quite clear. I must again highlight that this is a detached military science piece and I would not be speaking of politics nor taking a side; it does not serve any productive purpose here.
In all epochs of military development it is quite clear that the side that figures out the changing trends first is usually the one which is victorious. Holding onto untested traditions cannot just be costly but fatal for a side. We only have to see the Hellenistic forces fighting the Roman legions or the various foes that faced the unmatched speed and ruthlessness of the Mongols, the Byzantium facing against Ottoman cannons or the professional Europeans facing against levied natives in the Americas, South Asia and much of Africa and more recently, carriers facing battleships to know the point.
With that in our minds let us now focus on a few of the recent developments that have expounded on the armed forces of the 21st century:
Complex weaponry, traditional roles
Whether it is through drones or jets or an APC the main focus when it comes to controlling the battle space has remained much the same. Restrict or eliminate the enemy’s ability to strike back at you. It is an uphill battle because the other side is not focusing on the same rules as you and warfare is no longer exclusively the business of the professionals. In such an environment; it should be noted that any new system or upgrade has to be incorporated, trained upon, battle tested and communicated armed forces wide to be useful and inform both tactics (on field maneuvers) as well as strategy (overall aim) to be completely effective. That is easier said than done.
Let me explain this through an example; when the Pak Army faced the militants it relied on artillery but the topographical challenges often limited the accuracy of the batteries. Often what was best for the batteries in terms of elevation and upkeep, location wise, made it difficult to accurately support the infantry because their positions and geography made it difficult for the pinpoint accuracy of the firepower to reach the enemy’s position with ease. It took on ground learning by a generation of artillery and infantry officers to figure out how to get the best results because the enemy would always react to any change in the field. Most of the artilleries of the world are trained with the mindset that they would be used upon a flatter terrain; however, that learning experience needs to be converted into new doctrines, SOPs and training modules for the next generation. As this can increase the cost of warfare and lapses can collapse a military if it does not have a robust system backing it up.
Same goes for the air force; much of the focus was placed upon what can be called close air support but not in the traditional sense with slower aircrafts which can easily match the pace of the troops on the ground.
However as the technological angle cannot be ignored either; it has become a game of balancing out everything which is why instead of expertise the main focus has been shifting towards versatility.
Section change
If one were to write about the 21st century conflicts a few centuries later it should be titled: the infantry strikes back! During the cold war that preceded and defined the 20th century most of the world followed the two superpowers with mixed results because, again, it is easier said than done. Yet, the focus was to shift back on the man on the ground. In the end it is he who is the pivot; any other system can be circumvented or checked in terms of non-conventional warfare but the man on the ground is the key here.
In that the operational planning shifted down to division level movements instead of the traditional corps level and in some areas even down to brigade level. The tactical situation reflects that as we saw sections (squads in American terminology) being trained and used on different lines. In many situations for the nations that have fought full scale wars with a non-conventional focus the AORs (area of responsibility) were no longer up to an entire platoon (usually of 30 men) but sections (usually 9-12 men) [Please, note that they vary highly between countries therefore it is a rough estimation]. An old retired Subedar once remarked, these days every soldier has to be little commando or die, sir. I see what he means; on ground situations rapidly change and back up is not the option because this enemy is focused upon maximizing damage instead of holding the area.
It is quite common for most armed forces of the world focusing on section/squad action which just a few decades ago would be more likely to have been seen as a role of the Special Forces or commando units rather than the traditional infantry.
Cooperation
After having a truckload of paperwork, a screaming session by your boss in which he questions your very existence, usual bustle of life and still a few precious hours of sleep, imagine standing at the break of dawn with a grizzly old man screaming at you to assemble, load, aim and fire then change your stance and fire again a multitude of guns each a world of its own which makes you appreciate physics and hate engineers at the same time. Welcome to weapon’s training 101; a few piercing words sliced through me during the day I mentioned and asked you to imagine: Dushman ke liaye, ap main se koi doctor, pilot, teacher, supplier ya infantarian nahi hai, sir! Ap saab wardi walien hain! Us ne koi farq nahi rakhna. Ap sab sipha-salaar hain, fire be weyse hi karien! (To the enemy it doesn’t make a difference whether any of you are doctors, pilots, teachers, suppliers or infantrymen. All of you are uniformed and therefore it makes no difference to him. All of you are battlefield leaders therefore fire like one!).
We have seen that time and time again; there is no difference much less amongst uniformed personnel but to our pain even little children as we saw in APS Peshawar. There is no mercy. Therefore, to those who defend everyone must train like they are the ones in the midst of a battle along with other roles. This is why it is important for organizations to train and cooperate in order to make the learning curve as easy as possible. The fruits of these can be seen in the recent stock market attack in Karachi where well trained policemen were able to keep a handle on the situation before there was too much carnage inflicted. If any of you focused on their uniforms they had a badge on them which showed they were trained in anti-terrorism or counterinsurgency. Such small changes to the training earlier rather than later (the course is relatively short compared to many others) makes a big difference later on.
Synthesis
With all of these it makes quite clear that before any revolutionary changes such as a completely mechanized military is to take root we have to focus on the immediate focus. That is on the following lines:
- High stress on inter-services cooperation: each officer should have a working knowledge of other services operations and working. That is best done with rotations before command level positions and promotion
- Increased cooperation: each force would learn differently from every encounter. A heavily contented clearing the mountains would be a completely different experience for an infantryman and a ground defense airman. This is because each of them has a different focus; they can learn heavily from each other’s experience and trickle their learning into life-saving sound operational learning tactics for their respective forces
- Increased communication: building upon that it is necessary for these learning experiences to be communicated effectively within the organizations as well as to sister organizations
- Wider cooperation: at the same level, it is important to increase that learning and operational experience to civilian departments that are often in similar situations because they are often first responders and can be ready made support systems for the armed forces
- Networked communications and feeds: (suggested by @The Eagle), a singular network for communications within and amongst armed forces services for rapid exchange of information and monitoring key spaces of potential or active conflict.
Note: following article is based on a recent conversation I had with a few officers of different armed forces
With the 21st century shaping new format of conflicts and warfare it is pertinent that we focus upon the direction it is headed and establish accordingly. Non-conventional warfare, integrated battle space, new frontiers and a focus upon holding rather than taking an area are quite clear. I must again highlight that this is a detached military science piece and I would not be speaking of politics nor taking a side; it does not serve any productive purpose here.
In all epochs of military development it is quite clear that the side that figures out the changing trends first is usually the one which is victorious. Holding onto untested traditions cannot just be costly but fatal for a side. We only have to see the Hellenistic forces fighting the Roman legions or the various foes that faced the unmatched speed and ruthlessness of the Mongols, the Byzantium facing against Ottoman cannons or the professional Europeans facing against levied natives in the Americas, South Asia and much of Africa and more recently, carriers facing battleships to know the point.
With that in our minds let us now focus on a few of the recent developments that have expounded on the armed forces of the 21st century:
Complex weaponry, traditional roles
Whether it is through drones or jets or an APC the main focus when it comes to controlling the battle space has remained much the same. Restrict or eliminate the enemy’s ability to strike back at you. It is an uphill battle because the other side is not focusing on the same rules as you and warfare is no longer exclusively the business of the professionals. In such an environment; it should be noted that any new system or upgrade has to be incorporated, trained upon, battle tested and communicated armed forces wide to be useful and inform both tactics (on field maneuvers) as well as strategy (overall aim) to be completely effective. That is easier said than done.
Let me explain this through an example; when the Pak Army faced the militants it relied on artillery but the topographical challenges often limited the accuracy of the batteries. Often what was best for the batteries in terms of elevation and upkeep, location wise, made it difficult to accurately support the infantry because their positions and geography made it difficult for the pinpoint accuracy of the firepower to reach the enemy’s position with ease. It took on ground learning by a generation of artillery and infantry officers to figure out how to get the best results because the enemy would always react to any change in the field. Most of the artilleries of the world are trained with the mindset that they would be used upon a flatter terrain; however, that learning experience needs to be converted into new doctrines, SOPs and training modules for the next generation. As this can increase the cost of warfare and lapses can collapse a military if it does not have a robust system backing it up.
Same goes for the air force; much of the focus was placed upon what can be called close air support but not in the traditional sense with slower aircrafts which can easily match the pace of the troops on the ground.
However as the technological angle cannot be ignored either; it has become a game of balancing out everything which is why instead of expertise the main focus has been shifting towards versatility.
Section change
If one were to write about the 21st century conflicts a few centuries later it should be titled: the infantry strikes back! During the cold war that preceded and defined the 20th century most of the world followed the two superpowers with mixed results because, again, it is easier said than done. Yet, the focus was to shift back on the man on the ground. In the end it is he who is the pivot; any other system can be circumvented or checked in terms of non-conventional warfare but the man on the ground is the key here.
In that the operational planning shifted down to division level movements instead of the traditional corps level and in some areas even down to brigade level. The tactical situation reflects that as we saw sections (squads in American terminology) being trained and used on different lines. In many situations for the nations that have fought full scale wars with a non-conventional focus the AORs (area of responsibility) were no longer up to an entire platoon (usually of 30 men) but sections (usually 9-12 men) [Please, note that they vary highly between countries therefore it is a rough estimation]. An old retired Subedar once remarked, these days every soldier has to be little commando or die, sir. I see what he means; on ground situations rapidly change and back up is not the option because this enemy is focused upon maximizing damage instead of holding the area.
It is quite common for most armed forces of the world focusing on section/squad action which just a few decades ago would be more likely to have been seen as a role of the Special Forces or commando units rather than the traditional infantry.
Cooperation
After having a truckload of paperwork, a screaming session by your boss in which he questions your very existence, usual bustle of life and still a few precious hours of sleep, imagine standing at the break of dawn with a grizzly old man screaming at you to assemble, load, aim and fire then change your stance and fire again a multitude of guns each a world of its own which makes you appreciate physics and hate engineers at the same time. Welcome to weapon’s training 101; a few piercing words sliced through me during the day I mentioned and asked you to imagine: Dushman ke liaye, ap main se koi doctor, pilot, teacher, supplier ya infantarian nahi hai, sir! Ap saab wardi walien hain! Us ne koi farq nahi rakhna. Ap sab sipha-salaar hain, fire be weyse hi karien! (To the enemy it doesn’t make a difference whether any of you are doctors, pilots, teachers, suppliers or infantrymen. All of you are uniformed and therefore it makes no difference to him. All of you are battlefield leaders therefore fire like one!).
We have seen that time and time again; there is no difference much less amongst uniformed personnel but to our pain even little children as we saw in APS Peshawar. There is no mercy. Therefore, to those who defend everyone must train like they are the ones in the midst of a battle along with other roles. This is why it is important for organizations to train and cooperate in order to make the learning curve as easy as possible. The fruits of these can be seen in the recent stock market attack in Karachi where well trained policemen were able to keep a handle on the situation before there was too much carnage inflicted. If any of you focused on their uniforms they had a badge on them which showed they were trained in anti-terrorism or counterinsurgency. Such small changes to the training earlier rather than later (the course is relatively short compared to many others) makes a big difference later on.
Synthesis
With all of these it makes quite clear that before any revolutionary changes such as a completely mechanized military is to take root we have to focus on the immediate focus. That is on the following lines:
- High stress on inter-services cooperation: each officer should have a working knowledge of other services operations and working. That is best done with rotations before command level positions and promotion
- Increased cooperation: each force would learn differently from every encounter. A heavily contented clearing the mountains would be a completely different experience for an infantryman and a ground defense airman. This is because each of them has a different focus; they can learn heavily from each other’s experience and trickle their learning into life-saving sound operational learning tactics for their respective forces
- Increased communication: building upon that it is necessary for these learning experiences to be communicated effectively within the organizations as well as to sister organizations
- Wider cooperation: at the same level, it is important to increase that learning and operational experience to civilian departments that are often in similar situations because they are often first responders and can be ready made support systems for the armed forces
- Networked communications and feeds: (suggested by @The Eagle), a singular network for communications within and amongst armed forces services for rapid exchange of information and monitoring key spaces of potential or active conflict.
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its breath taking ..
