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Official: ISI Fan Club

Mjehan and A true pakistani,

Young pakistani kids need to learn how to know about people and organizations---everybody in the world is talking about ISI---most of those comments are negative---as long I have negative comments from my enemy about my intelligence agency, I need not fear about their performance---the day I would start getting concerned would be when my neighbour is happy about them. So far there is no hint for that.

Now as far as internal politics are concerned---all govt organizations are the victims of the connivance of the ruling parties. As far as balochistan and gas pipeline issues are concerned, this is not a isi issue but rather how the govt wants to manipulate the stuation.

To protect the gaspipeline---the govt needs to set up a quick deployment squad---actually multiple quick deployment squads with helicopters and gunships.

The govt says they don't have the money---they do---it is only the Ch brothers who didn't know where to look for---you have to think like an insurance agency---you know in advance that a gaspipeline is going to be blown up eg 5 times a month. Each time it blows up, it would cost the country Rs200 million in loss---multiply that by 5 times is Rs1000 millions a month---you already know that you are going to lose that money every month---so for the year it is Rs12000 millions loss---12x5=60 attacks for the year. Now here is where the money comes out off---you take a cash advance on this loss---you assume that you have already lost that money and resource in advance---eg you need surveillance drones---the cost of the system is Rs1000 million to cover the gas pipeline and electric grid line in far flung areas---now you put them in place---the cost of manpower etc is another Rs1000 million for the year---now what do you have to do to even out---you only need to stop 10 attacks a year and bring them down to 50 attacks and there you are at break even point---stopping less than 1 attack a month with this technology is not too much to ask for---even if we break even---we are ahead---our forces are now better trained with a new technology---our rapid deployment forces are better trained with the experience---it is a win win situation.

But when you have idiots like the Ch brothers in the office---who is going to think about it. This solution is a no brainer. Ther are between 15 to 20 hot spots---you give clear posting on news radio and local papers to people not to get near the bridges, gas pipelines or the elctricity pylons. Now you have the oopurtunity that even if you missed them doing the explosion, you can still track them back to where they came from through the drone---it gives the defence forces a big big punch. How you track them is easy---you immediately know the viccinity of the explosion or the downed pylon---divert the drones int that area and with a little bit of recce, you can trace the culprits with the equipment and zero in the squad---once you have killed a few of them, this problem will diminish to a minimal.
 
We all are proud of the ISI but its political wing has done more harm to its image under the pretext of "in the best interests of the nation". We live in dangerous time and all around us our neighbours are waiting to see us crash and burn and fund/support/train a proxy war.
I just hope all those reports of "deep penetration" of the ISI by CIA and Mossad during the Soviet-Afghan war are not true.
 
:guns:If possible the local agency should concentrate on the local affairs....Coutrymen and the country are living and dying pathetically..........

does ISI have the capability to take on thier mother agency,CIA.

i think that will be topic to watch???????

Father i guess.
 
ISI has to be one of the most criticized spy agency in the world! the blaming game started after soviet afghan war, to divert the international blame for training mujhedins all fingers were raised at ISI. And India the biggest opportunists also cried about ISI for being involved with terrorist activates in Indian parliament bombings and every other bomb blast in india after 9/11!

Any ways.. My bro-in-law is Major in PAK Army! Artillery regiment, currently posted in Nowshara School of Artillery. very dedicated to his work very true kind hearted person and fun guy to be around. its dream come true for any Major to be selected for "Staff Collage"! Its very important for your pormotions. even after Staff Collage test it is at gods mercy that you are selected for Staff Collage, your intelligence and luck is very important! no luck no Staff Collage.
Unfortunately he was not selected :confused:
But was selected for ISI! yep...
I have seen him study his course and also got to look at it.. he showed me clips and videos of ISI dudes in low profile during training for covert operations and for that you adopt your get up acording to the enviroment around you. i have to tell you guys that they praticlly looked beyound reconigation!
believe me or not some students were even dressed up like "beggars"!
they look just like these guys in the pictures!
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ISI :pakistan: ZINDABAD!!!
 
Abida Hussain just issued that the reason why Bilawal Zardari and Zardari went to the U.S. embassy to discuss issues with Negroponte is because the embassy has the features to neglect catching of the conversations through various tools. This should give you some further hints. ;)
 
Hi, guys salam to all of my net ISI mujahideen.

after the salam i would like to pay thanx to Mr.webmaster or our Grand Spy master for this writing for all of the ISI fans and i have a suggestion for those in urdu (AASTEEN KAY SAANP) who are busy to destroy or erase pakistan with the help of (TAFARQAH) this is very shame ful for us that we are pakistanis but nowadays we are changing our personalities example if we meet with any of the pakistani if we ask with him that who are you his answer is like I AM(Pnujabee,Sindhee,Pathan,Baluchee,Kashmeeree etc.) these type of foolish and rubbish answers are on the top till then it is important as compare to the ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF BROTHER HOOD as we know that as a muslim if all of you remember this HADITH that " if any muslim say abuses to another muslim it is equal to the killing of this person and the punishment of this person is the punishment of killer ". (s.muslim) ALLAH TAALA KUMEE BAYSHEE MAAF FARMAYEN.

So the purpose of this reply is dear SPY MASTER we are here specially i am here for finish those people who are the bloodies and blunderists of our and my nation and my country if you'll need me just mail me or call me i am here for these termites and i'll kill them with help of MY DEAR AND HEART BEAT ISI AND with you my MASTER.

Because we are here to do this.
SAY ALL OF YOU IN YOUR HEARTS.
LA-ILAHA-IL-ALLAH-0-MOHMMMAD-UR-RASOOL ALLAH.
flyahyassg.
S.EHTISHAMUDDIN
 
INSHA ALLAH IF I JOIN ISI INSHA ALLAH ISI CONTACT ME I'LL KICK OUT ALL OF THE BLOODY BLACK SHEEPS WHO ARE IN OUR KEY POSTS AND OUR COUNTRY'S MANAGEMENT AND I'LL GIVE THEM A VERY HUGE AND POISINOUS SHOCK THE SHOCK WHICH SHOULD BE A VERY BIG JERK TO ALL OF MY COUNTRY'S ENEMIES.
ISI ISI OH MY DEAR ISI PLEASE EXCEPT ME AS AN AGENT I'LL BE FAITHFUL WITH YOU
I SELUTE YOU ISI I SELUTE YOUUUUUUUUU
ONLY YOUR'S
FLYAHYASSG
S.EHTISHAMUDDIN
 
you guys think the ISI only focuses on India, you guys have no clue. let me give you guys some ISI goodies that happen in places other than India.

FBI denies file exposing nuclear secrets theft

The FBI has been accused of covering up a file detailing government dealings with a network stealing nuclear secrets

THE FBI has been accused of covering up a key case file detailing evidence against corrupt government officials and their dealings with a network stealing nuclear secrets.

The assertion follows allegations made in The Sunday Times two weeks ago by Sibel Edmonds, an FBI whistleblower, who worked on the agency’s investigation of the network.

Edmonds, a 37-year-old former Turkish language translator, listened into hundreds of sensitive intercepted conversations while based at the agency’s Washington field office.

She says the FBI was investigating a Turkish and Israeli-run network that paid high-ranking American officials to steal nuclear weapons secrets. These were then sold on the international black market to countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

One of the documents relating to the case was marked 203A-WF-210023. Last week, however, the FBI responded to a freedom of information request for a file of exactly the same number by claiming that it did not exist. But The Sunday Times has obtained a document signed by an FBI official showing the existence of the file.

Edmonds believes the crucial file is being deliberately covered up by the FBI because its contents are explosive. She accuses the agency of an “outright lie”.

“I can tell you that that file and the operations it refers to did exist from 1996 to February 2002. The file refers to the counterintelligence programme that the Department of Justice has declared to be a state secret to protect sensitive diplomatic relations,” she said.

The freedom of information request had not been initiated by Edmonds. It was made quite separately by an American human rights group called the Liberty Coalition, acting on a tip-off it received from an anonymous correspondent.

The letter says: “You may wish to request pertinent audio tapes and documents under FOIA from the Department of Justice, FBI-HQ and the FBI Washington field office.”

It then makes a series of allegations about the contents of the file – many of which corroborate the information that Edmonds later made public.

Edmonds had told this newspaper that members of the Turkish political and diplomatic community in the US had been actively acquiring nuclear secrets. They often acted as a conduit, she said, for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s spy agency, because they attracted less suspicion.

She claimed corrupt government officials helped the network, and venues such as the American-Turkish Council (ATC) in Washington were used as drop-off points.

The anonymous letter names a high-level government official who was allegedly secretly recorded speaking to an official at the Turkish embassy between August and December 2001.

It claims the government official warned a Turkish member of the network that they should not deal with a company called Brewster Jennings because it was a CIA front company investigating the nuclear black market. The official’s warning came two years before Brewster Jennings was publicly outed when one of its staff, Valerie Plame, was revealed to be a CIA agent in a case that became a cause célèbre in the US.

The letter also makes reference to wiretaps of Turkish “targets” talking to ISI intelligence agents at the Pakistani embassy in Washington and recordings of “operatives” at the ATC.

Edmonds is the subject of a number of state secret gags preventing her from talking further about the investigation she witnessed.

“I cannot discuss the details considering the gag orders,” she said, “but I reported all these activities to the US Congress, the inspector general of the justice department and the 9/11 commission. I told them all about what was contained in this case file number, which the FBI is now denying exists.

“This gag was invoked not to protect sensitive diplomatic relations but criminal activities involving US officials who were endangering US national security.”

An FBI spokesman said he was not familiar with the case file but he added: "if the FBI says it doesn't exist, it doesn't exist."

FBI denies file exposing nuclear secrets theft - Times Online
 
here's one about the ISI nabbing blueprints for the PSLV, india's polar satellite launch vehicle. this is an excerpt from the article, the link is at the bottom.

Looking at the Missile Issue

Pakistan is at a clear disadvantage to India in terms of strategic depth. Much of Pakistan's major economic and population centers lie in a band between 50 and 250 kms from the Indian border. Conversely, India has much greater strategic depth, with its key western cities of New Delhi and Bombay located over 350 kms and 600 kms respectively from Pakistan's nearest border. Although Pakistan can air-deliver its strategic weapon systems, it has a strategic need to be able to hold India in a position of vulnerability similar to itself, especially since India is now producing the Prithvi (i.e., issues of power and assured deterrence). In short, Pakistan requires longer-ranged missiles than India needs to hold India's key assets as vulnerable as Pakistan's.


There are indicators that Pakistan's indigenously developed Hatf I and Hatf II missiles, which were based on U.S. Honest John technology, are less capable than desired by Pakistan's military leadership. The Hatf I is fairly crudely machined, has a range of perhaps 80 kms carrying a payload of 500 kgs, and is very inaccurate. As a result of its limitations, the Hatf I may have been fitted to deliver a chemical warhead.63 Similarly, the Hatf II, reportedly tested in 1989, was apparently unable to achieve the 300 km range that Pakistan's military leadership expected. It is doubtful that Pakistan's indigenous Hatf II missile has been put into mass production. In fact, a number of reputable analysts believe that Pakistan's original model of the Hatf II may never be fielded.64 It is also likely that it was Pakistan's inability to field an effective Hatf II that led to the transfer of China's M-11 ballistic missile system to Islamabad.


The single-stage M-11 (CSS-7) was first test-fired by China in 1990; it entered service with the Chinese military in 1992.65 The missile was originally designed as a replacement for the Scud B and was aimed primarily at the export market. Since its advent, there has been an ongoing public dispute between China and the United States regarding the exportability of the M-11 under the guidelines of the MTCR. China claims it has a range of just under 300 kms when carrying a 500 kg warhead, which makes it MTCR compliant. Early reports of the M-11's capabilities listed it as having a throwweight of 800 kgs at 300 kms range, which would put it above the MTCR limits. Some U.S. analysts believe China artificially listed its throwweight at 500 kgs to avoid the MTCR issue.


Regardless of the disagreement over the M-11's ability to comply with MTCR guidelines, the M-11 has been exported to Pakistan; its packing boxes were first reported to have been seen there in 1991.66 Since then, several subsequent reports of M-11 shipments into the country have been reported. Most reports now claim that more than 30 M-11s are located at Sargodha Air Force Base,67 just west of Lahore;68 while Indian sources put the figure higher with at least one report claiming that a total of 84 M-11s have been delivered to Pakistan.69 Although the M-11s provide Pakistan with a limited capability against India, the single-stage system does not have the range needed to threaten India's high-value targets.


Consequently, as a national priority, Pakistan is pursuing the development of a medium-range missile system. Using blueprints and equipment supplied by China, Pakistan is building a medium-range missile factory in a Fatehgarh (just to the south of Islamabad).70 This complex, called the National Defense Complex, reportedly is being staffed by specialists from all of the related missile and nuclear developmental organizations in Pakistan, supplemented by at least 10 full-time Chinese technicians who work at the facility, six on missile guidance and control and four on solid-fuel production.71 It is believed that other Chinese specialists visit the plant as needed to provide technical assistance.72


There is a great deal of confusion regarding Pakistan's missile production plans. A number of the open source reports claim that Pakistan is planning on building a 600-1000 km range Hatf III missile that is based on M-11 technology.73 Other sources assess that the Hatf II is essentially an M-11 and that the Hatf III will be based on the Chinese M-9 (DF-15) missile.74 If the latter claim should prove correct, then the Pakistani missile factory might produce a couple of different models of M-family missiles. Based on what is known, and considering the fact that Pakistan is sensitive to perceived technological failures, it is likely that Pakistan will field a missile that it calls the Hatf II as well as a different system known as the Hatf III. While the situation is still confused, it seems likely that at least one of these missiles may have a range of 600 kms or greater.


It is also clear that Pakistan has aspirations of developing even longer-ranged systems in the future. It established, with U.S. assistance, a civilian space research organization (SUPARCO) in 1961.75 This organization "has developed two rockets: Shahpar, a seven-meter solid fuel two-stage rocket that can carry 55 kgs to an altitude of 450 kms, and the Rakhnum, which can lift 38 kgs to a distance of 100 kms. SUPARCO has also tried to develop a small satellite launcher, but the project has been stalled for want of technology."76 Clearly, Pakistan's civil program is far behind that of India's. However, there is an ongoing investigation in India that indicates that Pakistan may have been successful in penetrating the ISRO in 1994, obtaining documents and plans related to India's polar space launch vehicle (PSLV).77 If so, Pakistan could have the information needed to move its long-range missile program ahead fairly rapidly if it could obtain the technology base needed to apply the information gained.

2010 Chapter Four - Pakistan
 
here's one about the ISI hacking into and stealing critical nuclear-related material from India.

The Times of India - Jan 3, 2002

http://www.timesofindia.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=380255744

Indo-Pak war raging in cyberspace

SIDDHARTH SRIVASTAVA

TIMES NEWS NETWORK

NEW DELHI: Pakistani hackers have made several
attempts to hack into Indian sites--especially those
containing data on sensitive information relating to
nuclear test management--to access sensitive information
related to the country's security, said sources in the
Intelligence Bureau.


The sites targetted include those of Indira Gandhi Centre for
Atomic Research (IGCAR), the Nuclear Science Centre
(NSC) and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).


Although these three sites have been repeatedly hacked in
the past, according to IB officials, the recent attempts were
aimed at accessing crucial data secured under severely
firewalled servers.

"It is quite apparent that the new breed of hackers are much
more equipped and trained," say sources in the IB. Officials
also say that there could have been at least a couple of
successful attempts to break the codes of the sites.

"There have been as many as seven attempts to hack into
the BARC data since the attack on Indian Parliament on
December 13. We are also on the lookout for spy programs
that might have been installed," says an official.

The IB has already written to the defence and the home
ministry about the issue. The two ministries have, in turn,
sought the help of cyber security firms to shore up the sites.

The hackers, according to officials, may be on the payroll of
Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence.

There has been a history of infiltration into Indian sites with
sensitive information by Pakistani hackers. The first
infiltration into BARC was in 1998, when it was hacked by
three members of Milworm, a Pakistan-based hacker group.
Ever since, BARC servers have been favourite targets of
Pakistani hackers.

"This year alone, at least one spy program has been
detected in a BARC mail server," says an official.

The first intrusion into IGCAR was reported in January last
year when G-Force, a Pakistani hacker group, defaced its
main server. Subsequently, other servers in IGCAR have
been repeatedly hacked by G-Force.

Indian intelligence officials have identified one hacker as
Rsnake, who is said to have copied the master database
from IGCAR and provided some data to Pakistani
intelligence as proof of his access.

The ISI, in turn, has realised the importance of hackers after
BARC was hacked in 1998.
The first Pakistani hacker
group-Pakistani Hackers Club-was formed by two
'hacktivists' who used the pseudonyms DoctorNuker and
Mr Sweet. DoctorNuker took to hacking when he was a
computer science student at Karachi University. Along with
fellow hacker Dizasta (real name: Fahad Shamshek Khan),
he started hacking into critical Indian and US servers.

DoctorNuker, say IB officials, was the first hacker whose
skills were recognised by the ISI and under the latter's
directives, focused on critical Indian government servers
(especially those relating to nuclear and atomic
establishments).

But sources say the most active Pakistani hacker in the
recent past has been a person impersonating as Rsnake,
who started hacking from the Netherlands where he was
working with a group of portals. Inspired by DoctorNuker,
he started the hacker group G-Force from Holland.

The ISI has now got him to Pakistan to coordinate other
hackers targeting Indian websites, claim IB officials.

P.S : looks like these young boys were trying to look cool and show off in front of ISI officers.:smokin:
 
Looks like they got access to the nuclear test software, but forget about indian websites they hit the hackers' dream.

India, Pakistan battle a virtual war

Indian Intelligence Bureau, concerned by the gravity of the online war, has alerted the defence establishment.

India-Pakistan tensions are not restricted to battlefield alone. They have well spread out into the virtual space with hackers from both sides repeatedly attempting to deface sensitive sites. It is quite apparent that the new lot of hackers is much more equipped and trained. The hackers, according to officials, may be on the payroll of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence.

The first Pakistani hacker group-Pakistani Hackers Club-was formed by two 'hacktivists' who used the pseudonyms DoctorNuker and Mr Sweet. DoctorNuker took to hacking when he was a computer science student at Karachi University. Along with fellow hacker Dizasta (real name: Fahad Shamshek Khan), he started hacking into critical Indian and US servers. Pakistani hackers have recently broken into Indian sites, include those of Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR), the Nuclear Science Centre (NSC) and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), and have accessed sensitive information relating to information relating to nuclear test management. The idea was to access crucial data secured under severely firewalled servers.

The Intelligence Bureau (IB), concerned by the gravity of the online war, has alerted the defence establishment. The ministry has sought the help of cyber security firms for safeguarding the sites. There has been a history of infiltration into Indian sites with sensitive information by Pakistani hackers. The first infiltration into BARC was in 1998. Milworm, a Pakistan-based hacker group, had hacked it. At least one spy program has been detected in a BARC mail server recently. The first intrusion into IGCAR was reported in January last year when G-Force, a Pakistani hacker group, defaced its main server. Subsequently, other servers in IGCAR have been repeatedly hacked by G-Force.

Some Indian and Pakistani hackers pledged support to the US, while the US and Chinese computer security experts braced for an expected escalation in the cyber-war that has now drawn in hackers from many nations. Hackers from India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina and Malaysia, Marquis grove of security news portal said are now supporting pro-US hackers.

DoctorNuker, say IB officials, was the first hacker whose skills were recognised by the ISI and under the latter's directives, focused on critical Indian government servers (especially those relating to nuclear and atomic establishments).

But sources say the most active Pakistani hacker in the recent past has been a person impersonating as Rsnake, who started hacking from the Netherlands where he was working with a group of portals. Inspired by DoctorNuker, he started the hacker group G-Force from Holland. The ISI has now got him to Pakistan to coordinate other hackers targeting Indian websites, claim IB officials. The security of five Internet servers operated by the U.S. General Accounting Office was breached in December 2001 by a hacking group known as Anti India Crew. AIC posted a message at one of the defaced Web servers that included the statement: "We will hit the us/in/il government servers until there is peace around us!"

AIC is part of a hacking coalition calling itself the Al-Qaeda Muslim Alliance. Other members include the GForce Pakistan hacking group and the Pakistan Hackerz Club. In recent months, AIC has attacked 28 Web sites in India. The GAO servers were the first U.S. government systems compromised by the group.

Indbazaar > NetGuide > Cyber Issues
 
These ISI spies are not the last

October 26, 2006

The two non-commissioned officers, NCOs, of the army -- one posted in Leh and the other in New Delhi -- arrested by the Delhi police during the last three days on a charge of passing on classified information relating to the army to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI, are not the first moles of the ISI to be detected. Nor will they be the last.

Penetration of the Indian armed forces and other sensitive establishments like the ministries of defence, home and external affairs, the atomic energy and space departments has always been a top priority task for the ISI.

All intelligence agencies undertake penetration operations in other countries -- whether friend or foe -- for intelligence collection. Even while posing as India's strategic partner, the USA's CIA penetrated the Intelligence Bureau, the Reasearch and Analysis Wing and the National Security Council Secretariat, NSCS.

Even in the unlikely event of an improvement in India's relations with Pakistan, the ISI's penetration operations for intelligence collection will continue. We have to be on guard.

The ISI has three roles -- intelligence collection, counter-intelligence and covert action.

As an intelligence collection agency, it collects intelligence of relevance to Pakistan's national security from India and other countries. In its counter-intelligence role, it is responsible for preventing India and other countries from collecting intelligence in and from Pakistan. In its covert action role, it is responsible for clandestine procurement of nuclear material and for assisting jihadi terrorists in India and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In India, while it focuses on Muslims for carrying out acts of terrorism, it concentrates on Hindus for the collection of intelligence. This is because it thinks that the Hindus, being the majority community, will have more access to secret intelligence than Muslims.

That is why, more often than not, the ISI moles in the armed forces and other government departments detected by the IB, which is responsible for counter-intelligence, and arrested by the police are generally Hindus. This is so in respect of the present arrests also.

While the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies try to recruit officers at senior levels, the ISI's successes are generally at lower levels. This is because senior officers, who understand the serious implications to their career and social prestige if they fall into an ISI trap, are careful to keep away from it.

Officers at the lower levels, particularly those who have financial problems, easily fall into the trap of the ISI, which offers them large amounts of money in return for intelligence and secret documents.

There were many instances in the past too when military -- army, air force and navy -- officers at the lower levels were found passing on intelligence to the ISI. In the 1980s, a senior naval officer posted abroad was found having a personal relationship with a Pakistani woman, who was suspected to be from the ISI. He was removed from service. This was a rare instance of a senior officer falling into a honey trap set up by the ISI.

Only the interrogation of the two arrested army men and comprehensive damage assessment will bring out whether these were agents acting alone or whether they formed part of a network. It is generally presumed that for every mole detected, there must be one or more, which remain undetected. One has to find out whether the ISI recruited them after they had joined the army or recruited them first and then encouraged them to join the army.

Such penetrations are prevented through internal departmental security and counter-intelligence. Departmental security involves security of the set-up where public servants work, security of the classified documents kept there, physical checking of the personnel as they leave office to prevent their carrying out classified documents and monitoring the contacts of the employees with foreigners and their standard of living in order to check whether they are showing sudden signs of prosperity.

This is the responsibility of each department. Thus, the army is responsible for its internal security to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence agencies.

The large-scale computerisation of the armed forces and other government departments and the availability of means such as pen drives have made the task of ensuring departmental security very difficult. The CIA's moles in the NSCS were reported to have passed on hundreds of pages of classified information to a woman officer of the CIA posted in the US embassy in Delhi through pen drives.

The same modus operandi has been used by the two ISI moles in the army. This speaks poorly of the state of computer security in government departments, which has been taken advantage of by the CIA and the ISI.

Counter-intelligence refers to identifying suspected foreign intelligence officers working in India and keeping a physical and electronic surveillance on them and their contacts with Indians occupying sensitive positions. This is the IB's responsibility. Only when the army's internal security set-up and the IB's counter-intelligence set-up work effectively in close coordination with each other would it be possible to prevent such instances of penetration. The fact that such instances keep taking place shows weaknesses in internal departmental security and counter-intelligence.

The ISI has till now been using Kathmandu for its clandestine meetings with its Indian moles so that these meetings are not detected by the IB. One of the arrested NCOs reportedly was visiting Kathmandu repeatedly for meeting his ISI controlling officer and passing on the documents without being detected till now. The fact that this time he was intercepted at Delhi airport before he could go to Kathmandu would indicate that the IB had been tipped off by somebody or by an intercepted message of the ISI.

The ISI has recently set up a base in Colombo. It is to be expected that in future it will use Kathmandu for clandestine meetings with its moles in North India, and Colombo for its clandestine meetings with its moles in south India.

Since 2004, there has been a detection of three major instances of penetration -- of R&AW by the CIA in 2004, of the NSCS by the CIA earlier this year and of the army by the ISI now.

This shows that all is not well with the state of our internal departmental security and counter-intelligence. As a result, foreign intelligence agencies have been able to operate with impunity. Identification of the loopholes and their rectification should be given very high priority.

These ISI spies are not the last
 
Marxist-Jihadi Criminal Enterprise
19 May, 2008 09:02:00 Dr. Babu Suseelan

Marxists and Jihadis: Partners in Crime
The prevention of crime and anti-social activities is an important responsibility of the government-one in which all segments of society have a stake. But on that crime fighting ideological front, the Marxist government in Kerala has been notably deficient. (In the view of the Marxists aligned with the Jihadis, peace loving, law abiding Hindus are the real problem of social tension, crime, violence and Jihadi terrorism).

Under the Marxist government , Kerala has become the crime capital of the world. There is an explosion of crime in every aspect of life in Kerala, from homes, neighborhoods, schools, colleges, workplaces, and places of worship. People live in a world of Marxist violence and Jihadi terrorism directed at any levels of society. There is decline for human rights and law and order. A general disrespect for the rule of law is translated into numerous Marxist-Jihadi criminal activities in Kerala. Most of the victims of Marxist-Jihadi crimes are innocent Hindus. Under the Marxist government, there is no justice for Hindu victims.

Now Kerala is encountering new criminal schemes which attack financial institutions, particularly those crimes being committed by organized Jihadi groups. There has been an increase in bank fraud, fictitious document fraud, counterfeit currency distribution, Hawala transaction, as well as fraudulent identification document created with the use of computer technology.

Counterfeit Currency Distribution: Unparalleled In Our Time
There is a marked increase in the amount of counterfeit currency being circulated through Kerala. For the last several years Pakistan currency printing plants have been churning out high grade counterfeit Indian currency. A recent concern is the increasing evidence that Jihadis from Kerala settled in Dubai have been smuggling counterfeit Indian currency Printed in Pakistan security press. Dubai has become a willing pawn for the Pakistan government engaged in corrupt financial activities against India.

The Pakistan counterfeiters were able to bring counterfeit Indian currency into Kerala because the Marxist government aid and abet Jihadis as a matter of policy. There is no hope that Pakistani criminal activities can be brought to a halt until Marxist government changes its Muslim appeasement policy. A recent concern is the increasing evidence that the Marxist government has not been an innocent bystander in Pakistan traffic in bogus Indian currency.

For India, Pakistan counterfeiting of Indian currency represents a direct attack on a protected national asset. Circulation of bogus Indian Rupee might undermine confidence in Indian Rupee, and depresses its value. It will damage Indian economy. Financial industry sources estimate that losses associated with Pakistan counterfeit currency distribution amounts to crores of rupees. The bogus bills are used to buy real estate, businesses, shops and petrol pumps. It undermines legally established businesses and threatens financial stability. Officials familiar with bogus currency distribution notes its exceptional quality of counterfeit currency printed in Pakistan. The quality is so good that many cashier-level bank employees would likely not be able to detect the forgeries.
The amount of money allegedly bring to the coffers of Pakistan ISI and Jihadi terrorist groups is beyond imagination. The earnings from counterfeit Indian currency distribution also could be significant to Jihadi terrorists and subversive Islamic groups like NDF and SIMI. Money may be used to purchase weapons, fund subversive activities, and for slush funds for bribery and corrupting police and politicians.


Jihadi groups in Kerala have long relied on criminal proceeds to fund and expand operations, and were pioneers in using business structure to commingle funds to disguise their origin. Jihadi terrorist groups have used and continue to use established mechanisms to move their funds. One common method is smuggling cash, gold, electronic and computer parts through the Muslim couriers working in the middle east. Jihadi traffickers have become adept at exploiting the weakness and lack of supervision of custom officials, banking institutions and the police to move counterfeit currency.

The Marxist government denies allegations of party involvement in any counterfeit currency distribution by Jihadis. It is the consistent policy of the Marxist party not to oppose all sorts of criminal activities of Jihadi groups like NDF and SIMI for political reasons. Since Marxist party has engaged in a broad range of other crime for profit activity, inhibitions against Jihadi money laundering may not be strong. The political parties in Kerala have made no attempt to stop Jihadi counterfeit currency distribution or Hawala transactions. Allegations of Jihadi crime for profit activity have become the focus of public attention.

The Marxist government has no plans or coordinated criminal investigation strategies involving financial crime, bank fraud, computer fraud, direct deposit fraud, investigation of forgery, false presentation, documentation fraud, electronic fund transfers, fraud within Treasury payment systems, insurance fraud and organized crime by Jihadi groups.

Lack of Public Outrage
Pakistan printed counterfeit currency distribution, mafia land grab, Jihadi terrorism and Marxist crimes are increasing since there is lack of strong public outrage against these crimes. The Marxists and Jihadis are partners in crime and they have built a sophisticated defensive wall by tricks, diversion and sophistry. The Marxist-Jihadi assault on our culture and social system need to breached. The Marxist-Jihadi criminal gang has exploited our tolerance and made a mockery of the rule of law. Our national destiny depends on our ability to challenge the enemies of our civilization. It is time for the majority Hindus to confront the danger in order to preserve our ideals, culture and values.

India Forum - Indian History, Culture, Politics, News, Strategic Security, Hinduism. - Marxist-Jihadi Criminal Enterprise
 

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