Modern Iranian armed forces & armements
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Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part V: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) frequently make headlines. They are usually the subject of ridicule as a result of terrible reporting from Iran’s semi-official media. For example, many a UAV has been claimed to be ‘stealthy’ by such outlets, despite the UAVs design showing otherwise, and the Iranian government has done itself few favours by unveiling UAVs at almost ludicrous ceremonies (compare the public unveiling and the internal unveiling). As a result of such incidents, many have taken Iranian UAV developments as propaganda and bluster. While this is correct for some projects, such notions unfortunately inhibit the recognition that Iran’s UAVs have come a long way and that the country is designing and producing unique and capable UAVs.
Iran’s experience with UAVs predates popular conceptions about the introduction of UAVs in warfare. While Iran operated target drones for training purposes prior to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, its first serious foray was the Ababil UAV. A small and simple UAV, the Ababil was first used during the Iran-Iraq War. It is still in use and has been developed into a large number of variants. The Ababil is used for tasks ranging from finding targets for artillery units, used by warships for maritime surveillance, and locating insurgents. Additionally, ‘suicide’ variant is known to exist with a reported 40kg warhead.
Sarir UAV
The Ababil is launched off a rail by a rocket or a pneumatic launcher and is recovered by a parachute. It has been used in the Iran-Iraq War, in counter-insurgency in Iran, over Iraq during the American occupation, over Iraq at present, over Syria during the civil war, by Hezbollah over Lebanon and Israel, and over American aircraft carriers. It is likely the most common Iranian UAV based on numbers produced and in service.
Shortly after the Ababil was designed and built, Iran introduced the Mohajer UAV during the Iran-Iraq War. A slightly larger and more capable UAV, the Mohajer is still in use and in production. It exists in many variants, including the most recent, the Mohajer 4. Like the Ababil, it is launched off a rail and is recovered by a parachute. While recent Mohajers have not been seen carrying any armaments, the Mohajer was armed during the Iran-Iraq war and fired inaccurate RPG-7 rockets. Mohajer has been used by Hezbollah over Lebanon and Israel, by Sudan, by Iran over Syria, by Iran over Iraq today, and by Venezuela (it claims to produce it as the Arpia-001).
Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has been busy developing and fielding a large and diverse fleet of UAVs. Many of these are target drones or unsophisticated UAVs that will not be covered in this article. Whilst the Ababil and Mohajer are still in use and likely in production, Iran has developed more capable UAVs with similar capabilities. It has developed the Saegheh UAV and a number of UAVs in the Shahed series. Publicly known members of the series include the Shahed 100 that exists in at least two variants (wheeled and with skids), the Shahed 123, and the Shahed 125 (which can be armed). Iran has also developed the H-110/Sarir UAV and the Ababil-3. The latter has seen extensive service over Syria and Iraq, as well as serving in the Sudanese military. Few details are known about these systems but all have been seen flying, some of them in active use and in combat areas. It is unclear, however, if these are prototypes, technology demonstrators, failed competitors in development programmes, or actually in service.
While the aforementioned UAVs are mostly indigenous in terms of design, Iran has not hesitated to copy foreign technology. Two excellent examples of this are the Sayeh and Yasir UAVs. They are based on the American ScanEagle UAV, a type widely used by American and allied forces. Iran claims to have captured and reverse engineered the type, resulting in the Sayeh – a direct copy of the ScanEagle – and the Yasir, a modified design that adds a twin tail boom and a v-tail rudder. They are launched using a pneumatic launcher and the Yasir was (re)designed for naval use. The Yasir has been extensively used over Syria, with a number being shot down and captured by rebels. Any doubts about the Sayeh/Yasir’s capabilities were put to rest when Iran ‘gifted’ one to the visiting head of the Russian Air Force. Neither the Sayeh nor the Yasir are armed UAVs.
Iran has also developed a number of armed UAVs. As already mentioned, an Ababil ‘suicide’ variant exists and the Mohajer has been armed in the past. Beyond these, Iran has developed the Ra’ad-85 suicide UAV – essentially a propeller powered cruise missile. In addition, Iran displayed a single unit of the South African Lark UAV. Interestingly, the UAV on display is equipped with an anti-radiation seeker, a type used to attack enemy radar by homing in on the signal. The Lark was shown in 2006 and has not been seen since.
A combat UAV that has made many headlines is the jet-powered Karrar. The Karrar began life as a target drone for use in training by air defence systems and fighter aircraft. Someone in Iran got the idea to add an autopilot and use it as a UAV, and, in time, to arm it as well. Being (turbo)jet powered, the Karrar is very fast but is not useful for surveillance as a consequence as its propulsion system is inefficient for that task. Instead, the Karrar can be equipped with a reconnaissance pod and with guided and unguided bombs and missiles.
With the exception of the Karrar, all the UAVs mentioned above are, at best, medium range and medium endurance (i.e., max 400km range, max 8 hours endurance). As the specifications make clear, these UAVs, while very useful, are not suitable for long-distance and/or long-endurance surveillance or reconnaissance tasks. Moreover, again with the exception of the Karrar, their relatively small size and payload severely limits their utility as combat UAVs.
To deal with this problem, Iran has developed two UAVs, the Shahed 129 and the Fotros. The Shahed 129 was first unveiled in 2012, but was seen in low resolution imagery for some time before then. Prior to its official unveiling, its size was unknown. Once revealed, it became clear that this was Iran’s first large long-endurance UAV. The Shahed 129 is reported to be capable of flying for 24 hours and can be armed with up to 8 Sadid anti-tank missiles. The Shahed 129 provides Iran with capabilities similar to the well-known American Predator UAV (although the latter is much more advance).
The Fotros was unveiled in late 2013 and reportedly has a range of 2,000km and an endurance of up to 30 hours. It was displayed with two anti-tank missiles. No new information or imagery has been released since its unveiling. The fact that there are two UAVs with similar capabilities is interesting. The Shahed 129 is only used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Fotros by the ‘regular’ military. The Shahed 129 has been seen flying over Syria unarmed, indicating that it is now in Iranian service.
Iran’s UAV developments have made headlines, but for all the wrong reasons. A consequence of focusing on less than stellar semi-official reporting and propaganda is that important developments in Iran’s UAV capabilities have been overlooked. A significant number of the aforementioned UAVs may never make it into service, but each UAV designed and prototyped gives Iranian engineers and operators a wealth of experience that leads to successful designs such as the Shahed 129.
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part V: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
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Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part III: Air Defences Section I
Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program has overshadowed most discussions on Iran in the past decade. In addition to Iran’s land-attack conventionally armed missiles and rockets discussed in the previous articles, Iran’s air defences have been under the spotlight given its role in any potential Israeli and/or American airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. As a result, in the past decade (examples from 2006 and 2014) much ink has been devoted to the ability of Israel and the United States to conduct effective airstrikes in Iran. Unfortunately, these analyses are either outdated (the 2006 report), or, more frequently, paying scant attention to the modernization of Iran’s air defence capabilities (the 2014 report).
Iranian Mobile Hawk Missile
For many years Iran’s air defences mainly consisted of aged (pre-1979) American and Soviet-era surface to air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Linking these systems was a radar network also composed of (pre-1979) outdated Soviet-era and pre-1979 American radar. Moreover, Iran’s air force is a pale shadow of its former glory. It has just a few dozen aircraft operational and combat-capable at any time due to a severe shortage of spare parts (mainly for its pre-1979 supplied American aircraft) and an increasingly aging fleet.
Prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the breakdown in relations with the United States, Iran developed a large air force and bought hundreds of the most capable aircraft made in the United States. These aircraft not only allowed Iran to develop a powerful offensive air force, but were also the mainstay of Iran’s air defences. The country’s vastness and its mountainous terrain are not conducive to ground-based air defences. As such, analysts looking at Iran’s air defences in the context of a Israeli and/or American airstrike on nuclear facilities have prudently written off Iran’s air defences. But in the past few years, Iran has revealed impressive developments that while insufficient for preventing the United States from engaging in a pre-emptive air strike, certainly reduce Israel’s chances and increase the risk for both Washington and Jerusalem.
The first sign of Iran’s air defence modernization emerged with the unveiling of the Mersad SAM system in 2010. The Mersad is a reverse engineered derivate of the American medium-range Hawk SAM system (40km range), the mainstay of Iran’s SAM forces. The ‘original’ American-supplied Hawk is old in terms of its electronic components, and has insufficient range to deal with aircraft conducting ‘standoff’ (i.e., long way from target) airstrikes with precision guided munitions. Nevertheless, the Mersad provides Iran with a Hawk SAM system that is fully digital and is Iran’s first serious attempt to address the shortcomings of its air defence system. In addition to upgrading the Hawk system’s radar, Iran has also upgraded the system’s missiles with the Shahin and Shalamcheh missiles. Iran has also developed a mobile version of the Mersad system known as the Ghader.
Iran has also been busy upgrading its older air defence systems. It has been upgrading the missiles and the launchers of the (very) long-ranged static SA-5 system, reportedly even making the system mobile to an unspecified degree (the SA-5 is a very heavy and bulky system). Similarly, the Chinese derivate of the French Crotale system, the FM-80, has been modernized into the Ya Zahra towed short-range system and its mobile truck-mounted variant, the Herz-9. Iran has also upgraded its medium-range SA-6 system. Most noticeably, it has developed a more cost-effective and lower-signature truck-based launcher to replace the tracked launcher the system was originally mounted on. This upgraded system, the Ra’ad-1, also incorporates at least two new sensors (1, 2) that combine radar and electro-optical detection in addition to the SA-6’s organic sensors.
Raad Anti-Air Missile System
The increasing use of electro-optical sensors is important in that they will function even in a heavily jammed electronic environment where radar may cease to function. A similar system utilizes a missile similar to that used by the Russian/Soviet Buk system, the Soviet successor system to the SA-6. This system, the Ra’ad-2, is believed to utilize the same combined radar and electro-optical detection systems used by the Ra’ad-1 and a new missile, believed to be derivate from that used by the Buk, known as the Taer missile family (more below). In other words, Iran has adopted a newer, longer-ranged and more sophisticated missile for its upgraded SA-6 SAMs.
The origins of the Ra’ad-2 system are unclear in that Iran is not reported to have received the Buk system from Russia or any other country. While Iran may have received the systems from Syria and/or Belarus (amongst others), the large number of units displayed makes the Iranian claim that the system is being nationally produced more credible. Moreover, the missiles exhibit a number of important design distinctions that makes them more than mere copies.
The Ra’ad-2 and its associated missiles (Taer-1, Taer-2, Taer-2B; no details are given on the difference(s) between the models) are utilized by a confusing array of mobile launchers. Moreover, these launchers utilize different radar systems in addition to the system apparently associated with the SA-6. The Taer missile is used by two different SAM systems that utilize two distinct search/engagement radar systems. The least-sophisticated radar that used on the Tabas launcher, is similar to the ‘Fire Dome’ radar used by the Buk M1. The other launcher, the Third of Khordad, uses a phased array radar similar in general appearance, but different from the radar used on the latest version of the Buk, the Buk M2. Regardless of the launcher or radar used, the Taer missile has a range of approximately 50 kilometers, making it a medium-range system. It should be noted that the Taer missiles have a much higher reported flight ceiling (altitude) than the missiles used by Iran’s HAWK SAMs.
In addition to the aforementioned radar, there is also a longer-ranged search radar system known as the Bashir. Notably, it is used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and not the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Forces (IRIADF). As such, the system is likely intended to defend vital political infrastructure (such as the Supreme leader’s palace) and protect Iran’s ballistic missile units.
Iran also appears to have produced an enlarged version of the Taer missile family. This missile, the Sadid-630, has been depicted on a poster present at a major Iranian arms exhibition alongside the Alam-ol-Hoda radar. The Alam-ol-Hoda is said to be a very high frequency (VHF) fire control radar that will guide the Sadid-630. Little is known about the Sadid-630 and the Alam-ol-Hoda radar. However, the imagery of the radar and the missile indicate that these systems have already been built and are at least at the prototype stage of development.
While the IRGC has adopted the various Taer missile equipped SAM systems, the IRIADF has adopted a different new medium-range SAM system, the Talash-2 SAM. The Talash utilizes the Sayyad-2 missile, a reverse-engineered derivate of the American RIM-66 Standard missile. The range of the Sayyad-2 missile is not known but is almost certainly at least 60km. It is unclear what radar(s) the Talash II utilizes, but an unknown multi-spectral sensor was displayed at a recent parade alongside the system. Iranian officials have previously described the Talash-2 SAM as being developed to serve as a medium-range component of the (very) long range SA-5 SAM system, but Iran will likely deploy the system as an independent SAM system as well.
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part III: Air Defences Section I
Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part III: Air Defences Section I
Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program has overshadowed most discussions on Iran in the past decade. In addition to Iran’s land-attack conventionally armed missiles and rockets discussed in the previous articles, Iran’s air defences have been under the spotlight given its role in any potential Israeli and/or American airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. As a result, in the past decade (examples from 2006 and 2014) much ink has been devoted to the ability of Israel and the United States to conduct effective airstrikes in Iran. Unfortunately, these analyses are either outdated (the 2006 report), or, more frequently, paying scant attention to the modernization of Iran’s air defence capabilities (the 2014 report).
Iranian Mobile Hawk Missile
For many years Iran’s air defences mainly consisted of aged (pre-1979) American and Soviet-era surface to air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Linking these systems was a radar network also composed of (pre-1979) outdated Soviet-era and pre-1979 American radar. Moreover, Iran’s air force is a pale shadow of its former glory. It has just a few dozen aircraft operational and combat-capable at any time due to a severe shortage of spare parts (mainly for its pre-1979 supplied American aircraft) and an increasingly aging fleet.
Prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the breakdown in relations with the United States, Iran developed a large air force and bought hundreds of the most capable aircraft made in the United States. These aircraft not only allowed Iran to develop a powerful offensive air force, but were also the mainstay of Iran’s air defences. The country’s vastness and its mountainous terrain are not conducive to ground-based air defences. As such, analysts looking at Iran’s air defences in the context of a Israeli and/or American airstrike on nuclear facilities have prudently written off Iran’s air defences. But in the past few years, Iran has revealed impressive developments that while insufficient for preventing the United States from engaging in a pre-emptive air strike, certainly reduce Israel’s chances and increase the risk for both Washington and Jerusalem.
The first sign of Iran’s air defence modernization emerged with the unveiling of the Mersad SAM system in 2010. The Mersad is a reverse engineered derivate of the American medium-range Hawk SAM system (40km range), the mainstay of Iran’s SAM forces. The ‘original’ American-supplied Hawk is old in terms of its electronic components, and has insufficient range to deal with aircraft conducting ‘standoff’ (i.e., long way from target) airstrikes with precision guided munitions. Nevertheless, the Mersad provides Iran with a Hawk SAM system that is fully digital and is Iran’s first serious attempt to address the shortcomings of its air defence system. In addition to upgrading the Hawk system’s radar, Iran has also upgraded the system’s missiles with the Shahin and Shalamcheh missiles. Iran has also developed a mobile version of the Mersad system known as the Ghader.
Iran has also been busy upgrading its older air defence systems. It has been upgrading the missiles and the launchers of the (very) long-ranged static SA-5 system, reportedly even making the system mobile to an unspecified degree (the SA-5 is a very heavy and bulky system). Similarly, the Chinese derivate of the French Crotale system, the FM-80, has been modernized into the Ya Zahra towed short-range system and its mobile truck-mounted variant, the Herz-9. Iran has also upgraded its medium-range SA-6 system. Most noticeably, it has developed a more cost-effective and lower-signature truck-based launcher to replace the tracked launcher the system was originally mounted on. This upgraded system, the Ra’ad-1, also incorporates at least two new sensors (1, 2) that combine radar and electro-optical detection in addition to the SA-6’s organic sensors.
Raad Anti-Air Missile System
The increasing use of electro-optical sensors is important in that they will function even in a heavily jammed electronic environment where radar may cease to function. A similar system utilizes a missile similar to that used by the Russian/Soviet Buk system, the Soviet successor system to the SA-6. This system, the Ra’ad-2, is believed to utilize the same combined radar and electro-optical detection systems used by the Ra’ad-1 and a new missile, believed to be derivate from that used by the Buk, known as the Taer missile family (more below). In other words, Iran has adopted a newer, longer-ranged and more sophisticated missile for its upgraded SA-6 SAMs.
The origins of the Ra’ad-2 system are unclear in that Iran is not reported to have received the Buk system from Russia or any other country. While Iran may have received the systems from Syria and/or Belarus (amongst others), the large number of units displayed makes the Iranian claim that the system is being nationally produced more credible. Moreover, the missiles exhibit a number of important design distinctions that makes them more than mere copies.
The Ra’ad-2 and its associated missiles (Taer-1, Taer-2, Taer-2B; no details are given on the difference(s) between the models) are utilized by a confusing array of mobile launchers. Moreover, these launchers utilize different radar systems in addition to the system apparently associated with the SA-6. The Taer missile is used by two different SAM systems that utilize two distinct search/engagement radar systems. The least-sophisticated radar that used on the Tabas launcher, is similar to the ‘Fire Dome’ radar used by the Buk M1. The other launcher, the Third of Khordad, uses a phased array radar similar in general appearance, but different from the radar used on the latest version of the Buk, the Buk M2. Regardless of the launcher or radar used, the Taer missile has a range of approximately 50 kilometers, making it a medium-range system. It should be noted that the Taer missiles have a much higher reported flight ceiling (altitude) than the missiles used by Iran’s HAWK SAMs.
In addition to the aforementioned radar, there is also a longer-ranged search radar system known as the Bashir. Notably, it is used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and not the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Forces (IRIADF). As such, the system is likely intended to defend vital political infrastructure (such as the Supreme leader’s palace) and protect Iran’s ballistic missile units.
Iran also appears to have produced an enlarged version of the Taer missile family. This missile, the Sadid-630, has been depicted on a poster present at a major Iranian arms exhibition alongside the Alam-ol-Hoda radar. The Alam-ol-Hoda is said to be a very high frequency (VHF) fire control radar that will guide the Sadid-630. Little is known about the Sadid-630 and the Alam-ol-Hoda radar. However, the imagery of the radar and the missile indicate that these systems have already been built and are at least at the prototype stage of development.
While the IRGC has adopted the various Taer missile equipped SAM systems, the IRIADF has adopted a different new medium-range SAM system, the Talash-2 SAM. The Talash utilizes the Sayyad-2 missile, a reverse-engineered derivate of the American RIM-66 Standard missile. The range of the Sayyad-2 missile is not known but is almost certainly at least 60km. It is unclear what radar(s) the Talash II utilizes, but an unknown multi-spectral sensor was displayed at a recent parade alongside the system. Iranian officials have previously described the Talash-2 SAM as being developed to serve as a medium-range component of the (very) long range SA-5 SAM system, but Iran will likely deploy the system as an independent SAM system as well.
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part III: Air Defences Section I
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Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part I: Ballistic Missiles
Iran’s conventional military modernization has been largely overshadowed by discussions about its alleged nuclear weapons program. With the exception of long-range ballistic missiles presumed to be delivery systems for potential Iranian nuclear weapons, mainstream international media rarely discusses other aspects of Iran’s ongoing military modernization. This multi-part series for the NATO Council of Canada will cover Iran’s ballistic missiles, rockets and cruise missiles, air defences, naval forces, and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs).
Iran has made impressive progress in developing its military modernization capabilities in the past decade. In 2004, Iran’s military was a largely decrepit force incapable of dealing with the four most likely major threats scenarios (from Tehran’s perspective) the country faced: an American invasion, a naval conflict with the United States in the Persian Gulf, a conflict with any of the Arab Gulf states with or without American involvement, and Israeli and/or American airstrikes on Iran’s then relatively emerging nuclear program.
Iran’s response was tempered by technological shortcomings, limited materials and intellectual resources, and the inherent difficulty in challenging a superpower and its allies and clients. In light of the circumstances, Iran decided to build upon existing strengths and to bolster weaker aspects of its conventional military forces. It undertook what is generally referred to as an asymmetric approach – intentionally focusing on capabilities that take advantage of an adversary’s material, tactical, strategic, economic, psychological, moral, and political limitations and vulnerabilities. The fruits of these efforts took time to manifest themselvesm but are becoming increasingly clear today.
For coercive and deterrent purposes, Iran continued developing its then emerging conventionally-armed ballistic missile forces. Iran’s small but growing inventory of Shahab-1 (Scud) and Shahab-2 (~750 km range) short range ballistic missiles were supplemented by increasing number of Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missiles (~2,000km range in its most recent variant, the Ghadr). The newer systems, the Shahab-3 and Ghadr, allowed Iran to strike all its neighbouring countries, American bases in the region, and, for the first time, targets in Israel. Iran acquired some of these missiles via third parties that had obtained Soviet-built Scuds, and later purchased a production line from North Korea for a number of systems derived from the Soviet Scud.
Scud Missile
While the Shahab-3 is Iran’s best known ballistic missile, it is no longer Iran’s most capable medium range ballistic missile and has been considered a second-tier weapon for a number of years. The Shahab-3’s effectiveness is hampered by its liquid fuelled propulsion system that necessitates a long fuelling process prior to launch. Iran designed the Ghadr, a modified and improved Shahab-3, to partially minimize the disadvantages inherent in the Shahab-3’s design. Notably, Ghadr marked the evolution of Iranian ballistic missiles beyond simple copies of a license-produced North Korean product.
To overcome the larger problem, Iran developed the Sejjil medium-range ballistic missile (~2,200 km range) in 2008. An original ‘Iranian’ design, the Sejjil is Iran’s first solid-fuelled medium-range ballistic missile – a system that enables Iran to rapidly launch missiles at any of its neighbours without undergoing lengthy fuelling prior to launch. Whilst some foreign experts and commentators have previously voiced scepticism about the Sejjil’s operational status given the low number of test launches, Iran appears to have inducted the missile into service in significant numbers based on the large number of transporter erector launchers (TELs – i.e., launch vehicles) displayed on recent military parades and delivery ceremonies.
While Iran has long been alleged to either have or be developing longer-range ballistic missiles that would bring much of India, Europe, Russia, and even the United States within range, it appears to have decided the current coverage provided by the Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Sejjil to be sufficient for its purposes. Instead of developing systems with greater range, Iran has been improving the aforementioned missiles by improving its mastery of propulsion, structural design and composition, and warhead design. The existence of the Ghadr, Sejjil, and Qiam are testimony to this view.
In addition, Iran has been developing shorter-range ballistic missiles for the purpose of targeting the Arab Gulf states and American bases in the Arab Gulf states. Iran last unveiled an entirely new ballistic missile in 2010 in the form of the Qiam 1 ballistic missile (~750 km range). While the Qiam appears to be based on the design of the Shahab-2, it is a new ballistic missile and no mere copy of any existing design. Qiam is significantly smaller than the Shahab-3 and Sejjil missiles but is described as being more capable of penetrating the numerous anti-ballistic missile defences fielded by the Arab Gulf states and the United States. Of main interest to observers are the Qiam’s warhead design and aerodynamic controls – developments that are indicative of a more sophisticated system. However, the Qiam’s range is not remotely sufficient to target any part of Israel, an indicator of the purposes of Iran’s conventionally-armed ballistic missile forces beyond any nuclear delivery role.
At a lower tier, Iran has been refining the Fateh-110 short-range (quasi) ballistic missile (200-300km range depending on the variant) first introduced in 2002. Based on a Chinese design that led to the Zelzal rocket, the Fateh-110 has been one of Iran’s most successful missile projects, spawning a number of generations and variants, including export models. Whilst incapable of striking targets deep inland on the Arab side of the Gulf, the Fateh-110 enables the targeting of many coastal cities, military facilities, desalination plants, ports and airports, and hydrocarbon-related facilities. The Fateh-110 is solid fuelled, a characteristic that enables rapid launch without fuelling, and is generally considered to be Iran’s most accurate ballistic missile.
The Fateh-110 has been modified to create at least three distinct variants beyond the four evolutionary generational variants. The first to be unveiled was the Khaleej Fars missile, an anti-ship ballistic missile that will be discussed in a forthcoming article in the series. The second and third were simultaneously unveiled in 2014. Of these, one is the Hormuz-1 missile, a Fateh-110 with an anti-radiation seeker that enables the ballistic missile to passively home in on emitting radar systems. If successful in this mission, no small feat, the Hormuz-1 would render useless the large numbers of anti-ballistic missiles operated by Iran’s adversaries by depriving them of vital radar targeting and detection inputs. The second, the Hormuz-2, is externally similar to the Hormuz-1 but was described as having a naval role and will also be discussed in a forthcoming article of the series.
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part I: Ballistic Missiles
Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part II: Battlefield Rockets and Cruise Missles
In addition to the ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles discussed in the previous article, Iran has been further developing its numerous battlefield rockets by improving their accuracy and increasing their range. In 2014, Iran has unveiled no fewer than three new variants of existing ballistic rockets with improved accuracy.
An Iranian Qader anti-ship cruise missile launcher. A derivate of the Qader may be used as a land-attack cruise missile.
One variant is a version of the Zelzal-3 unguided ballistic rocket with a cluster/submunition warhead, a development that can help minimize the inaccuracy of that unguided rocket system. It should be noted that the Zelzal-3 is the forefather of the guided Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile. Iran also introduced a new, apparently more accurate variant of the Naze’at heavy rocket with what appears to be a separating warhead. Even smaller rockets, such as the Fajr-5, are being developed into guided rockets, making them ‘missiles.’ Other than the aforementioned systems, Iran has developed a number of variants of a number of rockets, ranging from the 107mm light rocket system, the ubiquitous 122mm Arash (Grad) rocket system, the Falaq series, and the multi-calibre Naze’at heavy rocket. Finally, Iran appears to be developing new launchers for battlefield rockets that enable more rapid reloading.
While most of these rockets are likely intended for use by Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah against Israel, they do reflect an Iranian attempt to increase the accuracy of its rocket forces for tactical and operational level battlefield use that will increase Iran’s own capabilities. For example, a rocket like the Zelzal-3 can be used to saturate the missile defences of nearby targets, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the larger ballistic missiles should the latter be used in follow-up strikes.
In addition to ballistic missiles and battlefield rockets, Iran has also been quietly developing its land attack cruise missile (LACM) capability. A LACM, and a cruise missile more generally, is unlike a ballistic missile. While a ballistic missile is best described as what would be recognized as a large rocket, a cruise missile is a small unmanned plane. The best known of the two are the V-2 and the V-1 produced and used by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The former was the first operational ballistic missile, the latter, euphemistically called the ‘buzz-bomb’, was the first operational cruise missile.
The status of Iran’s land-attack cruise missile program is unclear. Ukraine illegally exported a small number of Soviet KH-55 LACMs to Iran and China in 2001. Since that date, China has developed a number of LACMs. While Iran has long been assumed to be working on reverse engineering the KH-55 for its own use, potentially with Chinese aid or even in conjunction with China, it has never revealed any such system. Iran has long remained quiet on the issue of LACMs, but in 2012 a senior Iranian officer told Iranian news media that a LACM, the Meshkat, with a range of 2,000km would be unveiled. While that unveiling appears to have been cancelled given that no further details or images were provided, Western intelligence agencies have taken the announcement seriously.
The Meshkat’s cited range is similar to the KH-55 and equivalent to the Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Sejjil ballistic missiles, making it capable of striking targets as far as Israel. Such a system would add a more potent threat to Iran’s adversaries given that cruise missile defence is still in its infancy compared to maturing ballistic missile defence systems. It should be noted, however, that the Meshkat could have a different origin and be unrelated to the KH-55. But given that Iran almost certainly obtained KH-55s, it is unlikely that it would develop a missile very different from the KH-55. In 2014, Iranian media published photographs of an additional LACM on display at an exhibition and the missile was discussed by an Iranian officer in a recent interview. This LACM, the Ya Ali missile is believed to have a range of approximately 700km, making it a LACM compliment to the Qiam-1 ballistic missile.
Iranian anti-ship missile being fired.
Iran has long been suspected of attempting to modify anti-ship cruise missiles into land-attack cruise missiles. While a simple conversion in theory, the technical differences in terms of guidance and structural design make the design requirements for each system quite different. In the late 1980s, Iran acquired significant numbers of Chinese made HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles. In the mid 2000s, it tested the Ra’ad anti-ship missile, a greatly modified and upgraded Silkworm. The Ra’ad is reported to have a range of 360km, making it the first cruise missile in Iran’s inventory capable of reaching targets on the other shore of the Gulf. As such, the Ra’ad is a prime candidate for Iran’s first LACM, but there has been no confirmation of this. Moreover, Iran would have experienced technical difficulties utilizing a LACM version of the Ra’ad for anything but the targeting of coastal facilities.
Iran’s recent unveiling of a 300km range anti-ship cruise missile, the Qader, may be modified into an additional LACM, albeit one likely limited to attacking coastal targets due to technical differences between a LACM and a anti-ship cruise missiles. Nevertheless, such a missile would allow Iran to compliment its three tiers of ballistic missile with three tiers of land-attack cruise missiles. (ranged at ~2000km for targets as far as Israel and targets in Iran’s larger neighbours, ~700km for targets deep inside bordering countries, and ~300km for coastal targets in the Gulf and Caspian countries).
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part II: Battlefield Rockets and Cruise Missles
The terms of the game
If the goal is to compare military capabilities between Iran and the US, the answer would be easy and clear. There is no parity between the resources and capabilities of the two countries, neither in terms of budget nor technological level, preparation or equipment. Most of the Iranian tanks are old, older than the Iranian Revolution. The same is true when it comes to the air force. The last serious military deal that Iran signed with another country to modernize its army was in the early 1990s, when it bought a number of T-72 tanks and MiG-29 planes from Russia, in addition to two submarines. These are the “newest” imported weapons in Iran’s traditional arsenal today.
The confrontation with Iran does not involve a direct war across the borders of the two countries. As a matter of fact, the protagonist has to send its forces to an area that is thousands of kilometers away from the US mainland, deploy them in flying distance from Iran, secure safe routes for air refueling and seize control of a large lake – the Arabian Gulf – whose width in many places is less than 200 kilometers (124 miles) and depth less than 50 meters (164 feet). Taking advantage of the circumstances of the Iraq-Iran War, the US navy entered the Gulf in the 1980s, wielding its influence by force after a series of skirmishes that turned into a quick war against the Iranian navy that the US forces easily won (Operation Praying Mantis). Iraq itself was not happy with this US expansion even though it was directed at its enemy. In 1987, an Iraqi jet aircraft hit the American frigate USS Stark with a French-built Exocet missile killing over 35 Americans.
The Iraqi government said the attack was a mistake but many analysts believed that the missile was an Iraqi message aimed at discouraging the US from having a military presence in this strategic area, especially that there were claims that the pilot was not punished, but rather promoted after the “incident.” (In 2011, the US forced Iraq to set up a US$ 400 million fund to pay compensation for the victims of USS Stark and American prisoners of war from the multiple US invasions of Iraq). During the Gulf War in 1991, the US military presence became firmly-established with permanent bases and a comprehensive support structure after signing semi-colonial “protective” agreements with all the countries on the Western bank of the Gulf.
In this sense, there is a similarity between Iran and China. Both countries are focused on a specific military goal, namely, confronting a Western attack supported by local allies and preventing it from seizing full control of the maritime area that surrounds the country, blockading and hitting it.
The difference is that China expects a limited, though violent, confrontation in the South China Sea in the context of competing for influence. China knows that such a clash can not develop into an invasion of the Chinese mainland or an attack to overthrow its regime and destroy its economy, given the nuclear deterrent that China has and Iran does not yet. This is exactly the scenario that the US wants to preempt. If the conditions of the confrontation were different and the Gulf was not an expected theater of war, most of the Iranian weapon systems would not have constituted a threat to US forces. Iran, for instance, focused on importing modern anti-ship missiles from China (C-801 and C-802), developing them and building new models whose range exceeds 200 kilometers (124 miles) and with several guidance systems.
If the conditions of the confrontation were different and the Gulf was not an expected theater of war, most of the Iranian weapon systems would not have constituted a threat to US forces.
This would not mean much if the confrontation were to take place in the high seas where aircraft carriers and the destroyers accompanying them enforce a prohibition area that extends to more than 400 kilometers (248 miles) in all directions, not allowing a boat or a plane to cross through, let alone fire missiles at US ships. In the Gulf, however, the situation is different. The distance between the Iranian mainland and the base of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain is less than 190 kilometers (118 miles). This means that any US ship in the Gulf lies within the range of missiles fired by speedboats and aircrafts in addition to the a large number of mobile terrestrial platforms deployed along the eastern coast of the Gulf.
In the same sense, small submarines – dozens of which are produced by Iran – have no value whatsoever in international waters where US submarines and airplanes roam in “hunting teams” to subdue these kinds of threats. But like a naval mine, they become a scary weapon in the shallow Gulf that is full of targets, where the sonar does not work effectively. Besides, the huge US submarines cannot operate or dive in most areas of the Gulf.
The same scenario applies to the Iranian missile arsenal and US bases in nearby countries. Some Iranians say that the Fateh-110 precision missile of which Iran produced at least three generations so far is called the “Lebanon missile” among Iranians because its range and characteristics suit the Lebanese terrain as though it were designed for it. But Fateh also constitutes a threat to US bases in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (in addition of course to oil facilities and the oil export ports near these bases). In addition to Fateh, Iran has a huge number of Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles after years of production, which can be utilized in major confrontations to take down missile defenses, whether in the Gulf or Afghanistan.
War without borders
There are two factors that summarize the reasons behind US reluctance to engage in a military adventure against Iran. First, the difficulty of confining the war and keeping it within the limits desired by the US. Second, because the war against Iran threatens to be the first confrontation that the US military wages under the conditions of “modern war,” meaning an adversary whose military does not belong to the previous century, but rather knows ahead of time American strengths and prepares technical means to neutralize them. In other words, war against Iran will not be a walk in the park and a chance to showcase superior US technology. The US military knows that it will enter an arena where the GPS system will be jammed and drones may not be able to contact their bases via satellite. The US may actually be deprived of space and electronic reconnaissance, all of which are central pillars of the current US war doctrine. It is almost impossible for example to use far-range ammunition in the absence of the GPS system. The only alternative is to guide through laser or cameras which requires drones to be near their targets and therefore within the enemy’s air defense range.
These fears are not exaggerations or mere assumptions. They are all based on experience and on proven capabilities in the battlefield. For example, during the same month that Iran was able to control an “invisible” US spy plane, bringing it down and capturing it last year, Americans were surprised when Iranians “blinded” a spy satellite that was passing over Iran through a laser burst that most likely hit its lense. The lesson from the two incidents is that Iran possesses radars and means of reconnaissance that allow it to track invisible drones and low-orbiting satellites. For war planners, this raises a lot of concern. The US B-2 Bomber, expected to spearhead any air campaign, is slow, unable to manoeuvre and depends almost entirely on its radar-invisible technology to sneak into a hostile airspace and strike its air defenses. When Iran proves its ability to conquer radar-invisible technology, the most expensive bomber in the world – and the US owns less than 20 versions of them – becomes an easy target for air defenses.
The US got used to third world armies that threaten and huff and puff but have fragile structures with a lot of propaganda and no military effectiveness. The performance of Iranian-supported militias in Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq, however, draws a distinction between propaganda and reality and provides an undeniable example of the level of combat that any invading power will face. When the Israeli navy ship Hanit was hit in 2006 with an Iranian-made missile, many experts say, the war on Iran was postponed for years. Arabs were the first to introduce anti-ship missiles in military history when two Egyptian missile boats managed to sink the Israeli bomber Eilat with old Russian Styx missiles in October 1967. Hitting Eilat inaugurated a new era in naval warfare around the world as military experts realized that these new missiles enable a small boat to destroy much bigger ships. Arabs, however, were not able to repeat this feat against Israel for 40 more years, until 2006. The same thing applies to the IEDs that terrified US troops in Iraq, the tactics that debilitated the Israelis in Lebanon and Gaza and the performance of Iranian-trained forces in Syria.
Finally, the conditions of the confrontation prevent the US from planning a limited or containment strike that would disable Iran from retaliating. As Seymour Hersh wrote in a report about this issue years ago, US military officials discovered that limiting the war against Iran, the way it happened in Iraq in 1991, is impossible. It is not possible to hit Iranian nuclear sites without securing US air bases in the region. This requires hitting Iranian missile platforms but this could not be done while the Gulf is teeming with anti-ship missiles. Hence, little by little, the targets of the US campaign began to expand to include invading the Iranian coast and destroying a large number of military facilities in the country. The quick air campaign turned into a comprehensive war plan with hundreds and thousands of targets. US generals went as far as seriously contemplating using tactical nuclear bombs to quell Iranian defenses according to Hersh’s sources.
Hitting Iran in 2004 was easier than in 2007. And the war on Iran in 2007 is incomparable to a war that might break out today because Iran has developed new weapons and capabilities.
Therefore, the war against Iran becomes a risky proposition. Some American researchers, especially those close to Israel, tried to encourage the US government to hit Iran, insisting that the Iranian defenses will not pose a threat to the superior US fleet. But no country in the world will go to war if the cost of a mistake or misjudgement might be sinking an aircraft carrier or destroying bases that house thousands of US troops. The high stakes lead to reluctance. Postponing the war on Iran made it harder and more complicated. Hitting Iran in 2004 was easier than in 2007. And the war on Iran in 2007 is incomparable to a war that might break out today because Iran has developed new weapons and capabilities and its production lines worked for years to produce and accumulate missiles whose effectiveness and precision improved every year. (In the past few years, Iranians started replacing the old military warheads on Shabab-3 for example with new warheads that are more effective and precise). That is why the Israelis were rushing the Americans to hit Iran arguing that delaying the confrontation will make it harder and more complicated until it becomes impossible. The Iranians began showcasing the cruise missiles they are designing, which, like previous developments, will introduce a new element that will change the equation entirely as soon as they enter into service.
An example of Iran’s preparations: Unveiling stealth aircrafts
Third world countries can buy the best technology manufactured by the West or Russia and it will not be of concern to the US as one – less effective – radar manufactured by the country itself with its own capabilities. The characteristics and specifications of all the systems that are exported are known and the electronic means aboard planes are pre-programmed to monitor enemy radar waves, imitate and jam them. What scares an invading army are the things it does not expect, the radar it does not know about and the defense methods it is not prepared for. In modern warfare, an air defense battery, when working freely, can bring down a whole squadron of planes in minutes. Iranian military shows always play on the idea of fear of the unknown and display different and varied systems even if they perform the same task.
The invisibility technology is a clear example of military investment in Iran. The US was able, through multiple wars, to turn stealth aircrafts into an irreversible technological advantage. The F-117 aircraft (the prototype of stealth aircrafts) hit Iraqi radars in the raides that launched the Second Gulf War. The same aircrafts, in addition to the B-2 Bombers, played a central role in the Yugoslavia and Iraq campaigns in 2003. On the other hand, several technological methods were developed to offset the invisibility advantage and Iran concentrated its research and production in these areas specifically.
The first method has to do with the type of radar. The Russians quickly discovered that stealth aircrafts are designed to avoid a specific kind of radars, namely the high-frequency radars with the thin wave (X band) used aboard enemy aircraft and in missile guidance radars. This frequency produces a narrow radar beam, its width in centimeters, which is ideal for detecting targets with precision and guiding ammunition.
So the Russians began to build on the wide wave technology (K band and L band and in HF which is a metric wave, i.e., its width exceeds one meter), which they have used since the end of World War II. Its drawback, however, is in its lack of precision and the inability to use it for guidance (the wider the wave, the more scattered it is at long distances, giving inaccurate coordinates about the target). The advantage of the wide wave is that its large size makes the stealth aircraft design useless. Aircraft surfaces are designed to scatter, deflect and absorb the small centimeter waves but will not prevent a wide beam from reverting to the source and detecting the target.
When the F-117 aircraft was shot down over Yugoslavia, many experts attributed it to the Yugoslav use of old Russian radars (L band, a decimetric wave) in the Sam-3 System, which downed the aircraft. After the Yugoslav War, the Russians went a step further in developing a new generation of modern metric radars whose precision is comparable to high-frequency radars. This system became integrated into each S-300 battery operated by Russia. Iran has for years displayed different types of wide wave radars, the most famous are Matla-ul-Fajr-1 and Matla-ul-Fajr-2 (Breaking Dawn). The latter resembles the Russian Nebo radar considered an invisibility detector in S-400 batteries.
Iranian generals claim that these radars have become ubiquitous completely covering the Iranian air space.
The second method used to offset invisibility technologies calls for adopting visual equipment instead of radars. With the development of modern thermal cameras, pilots discovered that they can be an excellent alternative to the radar in many cases. They are an important monitoring device (the enemy does not know that it is following them). The Russians knew since the 1980s that modern cameras are capable of monitoring US bombers from a long distance of over 90 kilometers (55 miles) without the need to operate a radar, especially at high altitudes where there is a large temperature disparity between the aircraft and the cold atmosphere surrounding it. No other country in the world today relies on visual systems the way Iran does. It integrates them in all kinds of air defense systems and constantly develops new and light systems capable of detecting targets and guiding missiles and machine guns. This is another Iranian invention as the defense establishment noticed that anti-aircraft artillery considered by many to be old-fashioned can become highly effective if connected to a modern radar and operated within a group by using computer programs that can guide a wave of firearms, forming it precisely, thus creating a wall or rather a square of shrapnel in the sky around the target. These methods become ideal for shooting down cruise missiles and reconnaissance aircrafts and protecting sensitive areas.
Conclusion
It [Iran] knows in advance that it will never be able to confront a Western power in air or at sea. It is from here that asymmetrical war technologies emerged.
Iran built its deterrent capabilities while avoiding competition with the US on its turf. It knows in advance that it will never be able to confront a Western power in air or at sea. It is from here that asymmetrical war technologies emerged, trying to exploit existing gaps and hit the enemy with unconventional means, like missiles for instance. For years, the US was busy developing defense means for protection against Russian, Chinese, North Korean and Iranian missiles. But a report published recently in the Economist magazine explains the difficulty of doing so. The US could not stop talking about the missile shield program but few people know that a program which cost more than US$ 40 billion failed in all five interceptor tests conducted since 2008. The Economist says that about a US$ 100 billion were spent in the last decade on similar programs that did not get the US any closer to neutralizing the missile threat. On the contrary, it may have proved that the goal itself is impossible and that, indeed, is the conclusion that many US Generals who worked in this field came to. The problem is not limited to technical difficulties – trying to intercept a warhead or multiple warheads the size of a small closet floating in space at a distance of 8 Mach or more – but also has to do with how easy it is to mislead complex defence systems with simple methods. Russian missiles today are designed to launch dozens of fake targets when the warhead separates from it in outer space, all of them similar in size and moving at the same speed, thus, making it almost impossible to distinguish between them. As the US develops new interceptor technologies, Russia launches counter measures that nullify their effect.
From:
What is it about Iran that scares the US?: On Tehran’s military capabilities | Al Akhbar English
Iran’s conventional military modernization has been largely overshadowed by discussions about its alleged nuclear weapons program. With the exception of long-range ballistic missiles presumed to be delivery systems for potential Iranian nuclear weapons, mainstream international media rarely discusses other aspects of Iran’s ongoing military modernization. This multi-part series for the NATO Council of Canada will cover Iran’s ballistic missiles, rockets and cruise missiles, air defences, naval forces, and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs).Iran has made impressive progress in developing its military modernization capabilities in the past decade. In 2004, Iran’s military was a largely decrepit force incapable of dealing with the four most likely major threats scenarios (from Tehran’s perspective) the country faced: an American invasion, a naval conflict with the United States in the Persian Gulf, a conflict with any of the Arab Gulf states with or without American involvement, and Israeli and/or American airstrikes on Iran’s then relatively emerging nuclear program.
Iran’s response was tempered by technological shortcomings, limited materials and intellectual resources, and the inherent difficulty in challenging a superpower and its allies and clients. In light of the circumstances, Iran decided to build upon existing strengths and to bolster weaker aspects of its conventional military forces. It undertook what is generally referred to as an asymmetric approach – intentionally focusing on capabilities that take advantage of an adversary’s material, tactical, strategic, economic, psychological, moral, and political limitations and vulnerabilities. The fruits of these efforts took time to manifest themselvesm but are becoming increasingly clear today.
For coercive and deterrent purposes, Iran continued developing its then emerging conventionally-armed ballistic missile forces. Iran’s small but growing inventory of Shahab-1 (Scud) and Shahab-2 (~750 km range) short range ballistic missiles were supplemented by increasing number of Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missiles (~2,000km range in its most recent variant, the Ghadr). The newer systems, the Shahab-3 and Ghadr, allowed Iran to strike all its neighbouring countries, American bases in the region, and, for the first time, targets in Israel. Iran acquired some of these missiles via third parties that had obtained Soviet-built Scuds, and later purchased a production line from North Korea for a number of systems derived from the Soviet Scud.
Scud Missile
While the Shahab-3 is Iran’s best known ballistic missile, it is no longer Iran’s most capable medium range ballistic missile and has been considered a second-tier weapon for a number of years. The Shahab-3’s effectiveness is hampered by its liquid fuelled propulsion system that necessitates a long fuelling process prior to launch. Iran designed the Ghadr, a modified and improved Shahab-3, to partially minimize the disadvantages inherent in the Shahab-3’s design. Notably, Ghadr marked the evolution of Iranian ballistic missiles beyond simple copies of a license-produced North Korean product.
To overcome the larger problem, Iran developed the Sejjil medium-range ballistic missile (~2,200 km range) in 2008. An original ‘Iranian’ design, the Sejjil is Iran’s first solid-fuelled medium-range ballistic missile – a system that enables Iran to rapidly launch missiles at any of its neighbours without undergoing lengthy fuelling prior to launch. Whilst some foreign experts and commentators have previously voiced scepticism about the Sejjil’s operational status given the low number of test launches, Iran appears to have inducted the missile into service in significant numbers based on the large number of transporter erector launchers (TELs – i.e., launch vehicles) displayed on recent military parades and delivery ceremonies.
While Iran has long been alleged to either have or be developing longer-range ballistic missiles that would bring much of India, Europe, Russia, and even the United States within range, it appears to have decided the current coverage provided by the Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Sejjil to be sufficient for its purposes. Instead of developing systems with greater range, Iran has been improving the aforementioned missiles by improving its mastery of propulsion, structural design and composition, and warhead design. The existence of the Ghadr, Sejjil, and Qiam are testimony to this view.
In addition, Iran has been developing shorter-range ballistic missiles for the purpose of targeting the Arab Gulf states and American bases in the Arab Gulf states. Iran last unveiled an entirely new ballistic missile in 2010 in the form of the Qiam 1 ballistic missile (~750 km range). While the Qiam appears to be based on the design of the Shahab-2, it is a new ballistic missile and no mere copy of any existing design. Qiam is significantly smaller than the Shahab-3 and Sejjil missiles but is described as being more capable of penetrating the numerous anti-ballistic missile defences fielded by the Arab Gulf states and the United States. Of main interest to observers are the Qiam’s warhead design and aerodynamic controls – developments that are indicative of a more sophisticated system. However, the Qiam’s range is not remotely sufficient to target any part of Israel, an indicator of the purposes of Iran’s conventionally-armed ballistic missile forces beyond any nuclear delivery role.
At a lower tier, Iran has been refining the Fateh-110 short-range (quasi) ballistic missile (200-300km range depending on the variant) first introduced in 2002. Based on a Chinese design that led to the Zelzal rocket, the Fateh-110 has been one of Iran’s most successful missile projects, spawning a number of generations and variants, including export models. Whilst incapable of striking targets deep inland on the Arab side of the Gulf, the Fateh-110 enables the targeting of many coastal cities, military facilities, desalination plants, ports and airports, and hydrocarbon-related facilities. The Fateh-110 is solid fuelled, a characteristic that enables rapid launch without fuelling, and is generally considered to be Iran’s most accurate ballistic missile.
The Fateh-110 has been modified to create at least three distinct variants beyond the four evolutionary generational variants. The first to be unveiled was the Khaleej Fars missile, an anti-ship ballistic missile that will be discussed in a forthcoming article in the series. The second and third were simultaneously unveiled in 2014. Of these, one is the Hormuz-1 missile, a Fateh-110 with an anti-radiation seeker that enables the ballistic missile to passively home in on emitting radar systems. If successful in this mission, no small feat, the Hormuz-1 would render useless the large numbers of anti-ballistic missiles operated by Iran’s adversaries by depriving them of vital radar targeting and detection inputs. The second, the Hormuz-2, is externally similar to the Hormuz-1 but was described as having a naval role and will also be discussed in a forthcoming article of the series.
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part I: Ballistic Missiles
Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part II: Battlefield Rockets and Cruise Missles
In addition to the ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles discussed in the previous article, Iran has been further developing its numerous battlefield rockets by improving their accuracy and increasing their range. In 2014, Iran has unveiled no fewer than three new variants of existing ballistic rockets with improved accuracy.
An Iranian Qader anti-ship cruise missile launcher. A derivate of the Qader may be used as a land-attack cruise missile.
One variant is a version of the Zelzal-3 unguided ballistic rocket with a cluster/submunition warhead, a development that can help minimize the inaccuracy of that unguided rocket system. It should be noted that the Zelzal-3 is the forefather of the guided Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile. Iran also introduced a new, apparently more accurate variant of the Naze’at heavy rocket with what appears to be a separating warhead. Even smaller rockets, such as the Fajr-5, are being developed into guided rockets, making them ‘missiles.’ Other than the aforementioned systems, Iran has developed a number of variants of a number of rockets, ranging from the 107mm light rocket system, the ubiquitous 122mm Arash (Grad) rocket system, the Falaq series, and the multi-calibre Naze’at heavy rocket. Finally, Iran appears to be developing new launchers for battlefield rockets that enable more rapid reloading.
While most of these rockets are likely intended for use by Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah against Israel, they do reflect an Iranian attempt to increase the accuracy of its rocket forces for tactical and operational level battlefield use that will increase Iran’s own capabilities. For example, a rocket like the Zelzal-3 can be used to saturate the missile defences of nearby targets, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the larger ballistic missiles should the latter be used in follow-up strikes.
In addition to ballistic missiles and battlefield rockets, Iran has also been quietly developing its land attack cruise missile (LACM) capability. A LACM, and a cruise missile more generally, is unlike a ballistic missile. While a ballistic missile is best described as what would be recognized as a large rocket, a cruise missile is a small unmanned plane. The best known of the two are the V-2 and the V-1 produced and used by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The former was the first operational ballistic missile, the latter, euphemistically called the ‘buzz-bomb’, was the first operational cruise missile.
The status of Iran’s land-attack cruise missile program is unclear. Ukraine illegally exported a small number of Soviet KH-55 LACMs to Iran and China in 2001. Since that date, China has developed a number of LACMs. While Iran has long been assumed to be working on reverse engineering the KH-55 for its own use, potentially with Chinese aid or even in conjunction with China, it has never revealed any such system. Iran has long remained quiet on the issue of LACMs, but in 2012 a senior Iranian officer told Iranian news media that a LACM, the Meshkat, with a range of 2,000km would be unveiled. While that unveiling appears to have been cancelled given that no further details or images were provided, Western intelligence agencies have taken the announcement seriously.
The Meshkat’s cited range is similar to the KH-55 and equivalent to the Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Sejjil ballistic missiles, making it capable of striking targets as far as Israel. Such a system would add a more potent threat to Iran’s adversaries given that cruise missile defence is still in its infancy compared to maturing ballistic missile defence systems. It should be noted, however, that the Meshkat could have a different origin and be unrelated to the KH-55. But given that Iran almost certainly obtained KH-55s, it is unlikely that it would develop a missile very different from the KH-55. In 2014, Iranian media published photographs of an additional LACM on display at an exhibition and the missile was discussed by an Iranian officer in a recent interview. This LACM, the Ya Ali missile is believed to have a range of approximately 700km, making it a LACM compliment to the Qiam-1 ballistic missile.
Iranian anti-ship missile being fired.
Iran has long been suspected of attempting to modify anti-ship cruise missiles into land-attack cruise missiles. While a simple conversion in theory, the technical differences in terms of guidance and structural design make the design requirements for each system quite different. In the late 1980s, Iran acquired significant numbers of Chinese made HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles. In the mid 2000s, it tested the Ra’ad anti-ship missile, a greatly modified and upgraded Silkworm. The Ra’ad is reported to have a range of 360km, making it the first cruise missile in Iran’s inventory capable of reaching targets on the other shore of the Gulf. As such, the Ra’ad is a prime candidate for Iran’s first LACM, but there has been no confirmation of this. Moreover, Iran would have experienced technical difficulties utilizing a LACM version of the Ra’ad for anything but the targeting of coastal facilities.
Iran’s recent unveiling of a 300km range anti-ship cruise missile, the Qader, may be modified into an additional LACM, albeit one likely limited to attacking coastal targets due to technical differences between a LACM and a anti-ship cruise missiles. Nevertheless, such a missile would allow Iran to compliment its three tiers of ballistic missile with three tiers of land-attack cruise missiles. (ranged at ~2000km for targets as far as Israel and targets in Iran’s larger neighbours, ~700km for targets deep inside bordering countries, and ~300km for coastal targets in the Gulf and Caspian countries).
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part II: Battlefield Rockets and Cruise Missles
The terms of the game
If the goal is to compare military capabilities between Iran and the US, the answer would be easy and clear. There is no parity between the resources and capabilities of the two countries, neither in terms of budget nor technological level, preparation or equipment. Most of the Iranian tanks are old, older than the Iranian Revolution. The same is true when it comes to the air force. The last serious military deal that Iran signed with another country to modernize its army was in the early 1990s, when it bought a number of T-72 tanks and MiG-29 planes from Russia, in addition to two submarines. These are the “newest” imported weapons in Iran’s traditional arsenal today.
The confrontation with Iran does not involve a direct war across the borders of the two countries. As a matter of fact, the protagonist has to send its forces to an area that is thousands of kilometers away from the US mainland, deploy them in flying distance from Iran, secure safe routes for air refueling and seize control of a large lake – the Arabian Gulf – whose width in many places is less than 200 kilometers (124 miles) and depth less than 50 meters (164 feet). Taking advantage of the circumstances of the Iraq-Iran War, the US navy entered the Gulf in the 1980s, wielding its influence by force after a series of skirmishes that turned into a quick war against the Iranian navy that the US forces easily won (Operation Praying Mantis). Iraq itself was not happy with this US expansion even though it was directed at its enemy. In 1987, an Iraqi jet aircraft hit the American frigate USS Stark with a French-built Exocet missile killing over 35 Americans.
The Iraqi government said the attack was a mistake but many analysts believed that the missile was an Iraqi message aimed at discouraging the US from having a military presence in this strategic area, especially that there were claims that the pilot was not punished, but rather promoted after the “incident.” (In 2011, the US forced Iraq to set up a US$ 400 million fund to pay compensation for the victims of USS Stark and American prisoners of war from the multiple US invasions of Iraq). During the Gulf War in 1991, the US military presence became firmly-established with permanent bases and a comprehensive support structure after signing semi-colonial “protective” agreements with all the countries on the Western bank of the Gulf.
In this sense, there is a similarity between Iran and China. Both countries are focused on a specific military goal, namely, confronting a Western attack supported by local allies and preventing it from seizing full control of the maritime area that surrounds the country, blockading and hitting it.
The difference is that China expects a limited, though violent, confrontation in the South China Sea in the context of competing for influence. China knows that such a clash can not develop into an invasion of the Chinese mainland or an attack to overthrow its regime and destroy its economy, given the nuclear deterrent that China has and Iran does not yet. This is exactly the scenario that the US wants to preempt. If the conditions of the confrontation were different and the Gulf was not an expected theater of war, most of the Iranian weapon systems would not have constituted a threat to US forces. Iran, for instance, focused on importing modern anti-ship missiles from China (C-801 and C-802), developing them and building new models whose range exceeds 200 kilometers (124 miles) and with several guidance systems.
If the conditions of the confrontation were different and the Gulf was not an expected theater of war, most of the Iranian weapon systems would not have constituted a threat to US forces.
This would not mean much if the confrontation were to take place in the high seas where aircraft carriers and the destroyers accompanying them enforce a prohibition area that extends to more than 400 kilometers (248 miles) in all directions, not allowing a boat or a plane to cross through, let alone fire missiles at US ships. In the Gulf, however, the situation is different. The distance between the Iranian mainland and the base of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain is less than 190 kilometers (118 miles). This means that any US ship in the Gulf lies within the range of missiles fired by speedboats and aircrafts in addition to the a large number of mobile terrestrial platforms deployed along the eastern coast of the Gulf.
In the same sense, small submarines – dozens of which are produced by Iran – have no value whatsoever in international waters where US submarines and airplanes roam in “hunting teams” to subdue these kinds of threats. But like a naval mine, they become a scary weapon in the shallow Gulf that is full of targets, where the sonar does not work effectively. Besides, the huge US submarines cannot operate or dive in most areas of the Gulf.
The same scenario applies to the Iranian missile arsenal and US bases in nearby countries. Some Iranians say that the Fateh-110 precision missile of which Iran produced at least three generations so far is called the “Lebanon missile” among Iranians because its range and characteristics suit the Lebanese terrain as though it were designed for it. But Fateh also constitutes a threat to US bases in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (in addition of course to oil facilities and the oil export ports near these bases). In addition to Fateh, Iran has a huge number of Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles after years of production, which can be utilized in major confrontations to take down missile defenses, whether in the Gulf or Afghanistan.
War without borders
There are two factors that summarize the reasons behind US reluctance to engage in a military adventure against Iran. First, the difficulty of confining the war and keeping it within the limits desired by the US. Second, because the war against Iran threatens to be the first confrontation that the US military wages under the conditions of “modern war,” meaning an adversary whose military does not belong to the previous century, but rather knows ahead of time American strengths and prepares technical means to neutralize them. In other words, war against Iran will not be a walk in the park and a chance to showcase superior US technology. The US military knows that it will enter an arena where the GPS system will be jammed and drones may not be able to contact their bases via satellite. The US may actually be deprived of space and electronic reconnaissance, all of which are central pillars of the current US war doctrine. It is almost impossible for example to use far-range ammunition in the absence of the GPS system. The only alternative is to guide through laser or cameras which requires drones to be near their targets and therefore within the enemy’s air defense range.
These fears are not exaggerations or mere assumptions. They are all based on experience and on proven capabilities in the battlefield. For example, during the same month that Iran was able to control an “invisible” US spy plane, bringing it down and capturing it last year, Americans were surprised when Iranians “blinded” a spy satellite that was passing over Iran through a laser burst that most likely hit its lense. The lesson from the two incidents is that Iran possesses radars and means of reconnaissance that allow it to track invisible drones and low-orbiting satellites. For war planners, this raises a lot of concern. The US B-2 Bomber, expected to spearhead any air campaign, is slow, unable to manoeuvre and depends almost entirely on its radar-invisible technology to sneak into a hostile airspace and strike its air defenses. When Iran proves its ability to conquer radar-invisible technology, the most expensive bomber in the world – and the US owns less than 20 versions of them – becomes an easy target for air defenses.
The US got used to third world armies that threaten and huff and puff but have fragile structures with a lot of propaganda and no military effectiveness. The performance of Iranian-supported militias in Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq, however, draws a distinction between propaganda and reality and provides an undeniable example of the level of combat that any invading power will face. When the Israeli navy ship Hanit was hit in 2006 with an Iranian-made missile, many experts say, the war on Iran was postponed for years. Arabs were the first to introduce anti-ship missiles in military history when two Egyptian missile boats managed to sink the Israeli bomber Eilat with old Russian Styx missiles in October 1967. Hitting Eilat inaugurated a new era in naval warfare around the world as military experts realized that these new missiles enable a small boat to destroy much bigger ships. Arabs, however, were not able to repeat this feat against Israel for 40 more years, until 2006. The same thing applies to the IEDs that terrified US troops in Iraq, the tactics that debilitated the Israelis in Lebanon and Gaza and the performance of Iranian-trained forces in Syria.
Finally, the conditions of the confrontation prevent the US from planning a limited or containment strike that would disable Iran from retaliating. As Seymour Hersh wrote in a report about this issue years ago, US military officials discovered that limiting the war against Iran, the way it happened in Iraq in 1991, is impossible. It is not possible to hit Iranian nuclear sites without securing US air bases in the region. This requires hitting Iranian missile platforms but this could not be done while the Gulf is teeming with anti-ship missiles. Hence, little by little, the targets of the US campaign began to expand to include invading the Iranian coast and destroying a large number of military facilities in the country. The quick air campaign turned into a comprehensive war plan with hundreds and thousands of targets. US generals went as far as seriously contemplating using tactical nuclear bombs to quell Iranian defenses according to Hersh’s sources.
Hitting Iran in 2004 was easier than in 2007. And the war on Iran in 2007 is incomparable to a war that might break out today because Iran has developed new weapons and capabilities.
Therefore, the war against Iran becomes a risky proposition. Some American researchers, especially those close to Israel, tried to encourage the US government to hit Iran, insisting that the Iranian defenses will not pose a threat to the superior US fleet. But no country in the world will go to war if the cost of a mistake or misjudgement might be sinking an aircraft carrier or destroying bases that house thousands of US troops. The high stakes lead to reluctance. Postponing the war on Iran made it harder and more complicated. Hitting Iran in 2004 was easier than in 2007. And the war on Iran in 2007 is incomparable to a war that might break out today because Iran has developed new weapons and capabilities and its production lines worked for years to produce and accumulate missiles whose effectiveness and precision improved every year. (In the past few years, Iranians started replacing the old military warheads on Shabab-3 for example with new warheads that are more effective and precise). That is why the Israelis were rushing the Americans to hit Iran arguing that delaying the confrontation will make it harder and more complicated until it becomes impossible. The Iranians began showcasing the cruise missiles they are designing, which, like previous developments, will introduce a new element that will change the equation entirely as soon as they enter into service.
An example of Iran’s preparations: Unveiling stealth aircrafts
Third world countries can buy the best technology manufactured by the West or Russia and it will not be of concern to the US as one – less effective – radar manufactured by the country itself with its own capabilities. The characteristics and specifications of all the systems that are exported are known and the electronic means aboard planes are pre-programmed to monitor enemy radar waves, imitate and jam them. What scares an invading army are the things it does not expect, the radar it does not know about and the defense methods it is not prepared for. In modern warfare, an air defense battery, when working freely, can bring down a whole squadron of planes in minutes. Iranian military shows always play on the idea of fear of the unknown and display different and varied systems even if they perform the same task.
The invisibility technology is a clear example of military investment in Iran. The US was able, through multiple wars, to turn stealth aircrafts into an irreversible technological advantage. The F-117 aircraft (the prototype of stealth aircrafts) hit Iraqi radars in the raides that launched the Second Gulf War. The same aircrafts, in addition to the B-2 Bombers, played a central role in the Yugoslavia and Iraq campaigns in 2003. On the other hand, several technological methods were developed to offset the invisibility advantage and Iran concentrated its research and production in these areas specifically.
The first method has to do with the type of radar. The Russians quickly discovered that stealth aircrafts are designed to avoid a specific kind of radars, namely the high-frequency radars with the thin wave (X band) used aboard enemy aircraft and in missile guidance radars. This frequency produces a narrow radar beam, its width in centimeters, which is ideal for detecting targets with precision and guiding ammunition.
So the Russians began to build on the wide wave technology (K band and L band and in HF which is a metric wave, i.e., its width exceeds one meter), which they have used since the end of World War II. Its drawback, however, is in its lack of precision and the inability to use it for guidance (the wider the wave, the more scattered it is at long distances, giving inaccurate coordinates about the target). The advantage of the wide wave is that its large size makes the stealth aircraft design useless. Aircraft surfaces are designed to scatter, deflect and absorb the small centimeter waves but will not prevent a wide beam from reverting to the source and detecting the target.
When the F-117 aircraft was shot down over Yugoslavia, many experts attributed it to the Yugoslav use of old Russian radars (L band, a decimetric wave) in the Sam-3 System, which downed the aircraft. After the Yugoslav War, the Russians went a step further in developing a new generation of modern metric radars whose precision is comparable to high-frequency radars. This system became integrated into each S-300 battery operated by Russia. Iran has for years displayed different types of wide wave radars, the most famous are Matla-ul-Fajr-1 and Matla-ul-Fajr-2 (Breaking Dawn). The latter resembles the Russian Nebo radar considered an invisibility detector in S-400 batteries.
Iranian generals claim that these radars have become ubiquitous completely covering the Iranian air space.
The second method used to offset invisibility technologies calls for adopting visual equipment instead of radars. With the development of modern thermal cameras, pilots discovered that they can be an excellent alternative to the radar in many cases. They are an important monitoring device (the enemy does not know that it is following them). The Russians knew since the 1980s that modern cameras are capable of monitoring US bombers from a long distance of over 90 kilometers (55 miles) without the need to operate a radar, especially at high altitudes where there is a large temperature disparity between the aircraft and the cold atmosphere surrounding it. No other country in the world today relies on visual systems the way Iran does. It integrates them in all kinds of air defense systems and constantly develops new and light systems capable of detecting targets and guiding missiles and machine guns. This is another Iranian invention as the defense establishment noticed that anti-aircraft artillery considered by many to be old-fashioned can become highly effective if connected to a modern radar and operated within a group by using computer programs that can guide a wave of firearms, forming it precisely, thus creating a wall or rather a square of shrapnel in the sky around the target. These methods become ideal for shooting down cruise missiles and reconnaissance aircrafts and protecting sensitive areas.
Conclusion
It [Iran] knows in advance that it will never be able to confront a Western power in air or at sea. It is from here that asymmetrical war technologies emerged.
Iran built its deterrent capabilities while avoiding competition with the US on its turf. It knows in advance that it will never be able to confront a Western power in air or at sea. It is from here that asymmetrical war technologies emerged, trying to exploit existing gaps and hit the enemy with unconventional means, like missiles for instance. For years, the US was busy developing defense means for protection against Russian, Chinese, North Korean and Iranian missiles. But a report published recently in the Economist magazine explains the difficulty of doing so. The US could not stop talking about the missile shield program but few people know that a program which cost more than US$ 40 billion failed in all five interceptor tests conducted since 2008. The Economist says that about a US$ 100 billion were spent in the last decade on similar programs that did not get the US any closer to neutralizing the missile threat. On the contrary, it may have proved that the goal itself is impossible and that, indeed, is the conclusion that many US Generals who worked in this field came to. The problem is not limited to technical difficulties – trying to intercept a warhead or multiple warheads the size of a small closet floating in space at a distance of 8 Mach or more – but also has to do with how easy it is to mislead complex defence systems with simple methods. Russian missiles today are designed to launch dozens of fake targets when the warhead separates from it in outer space, all of them similar in size and moving at the same speed, thus, making it almost impossible to distinguish between them. As the US develops new interceptor technologies, Russia launches counter measures that nullify their effect.
From:
What is it about Iran that scares the US?: On Tehran’s military capabilities | Al Akhbar English
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