fatman17
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Minimum deterrence?
Ehtisham Amir
Minimum deterrence is an oft repeated phrase once it comes to Pakistan nuclear policy. It is very well understood at right quarters. This theory is neither unique to Pakistan, nor has it been coined by Pakistan. However we have made full use of it when it comes to defining our nuclear policy. But certain aspects of it especially minimum deterrence and large conventional forces despite attaining nuclear capability are debated without heeding to Pakistans specific needs.
As of the dictionary meanings; deterrence is to avert or to avoid some happening. In military terms, deterrence aims at preventing the enemy from using its armed forces to impose its will on the other. Deterrence is deterrence till it is not used. If used, it is no more a deterrence. Then it has failed in its deterrence value. A simple example: if my neighbour has a shot gun, he can use it against me at will. But if I also possess a pistol, then I have created a deterrence that forces my neighbour to think twice before using his weapon. But if at some time, my neighbour gets an artillery gun, which has the potential to destroy my house along with my poor pistol before my pistol can be used, then for sure I will be attacked. It means my deterrence has failed in achieving desired result.
Deterrence aims are exactly the opposite of war aims where force is used to impose ones will on the enemy. If deterrence is used simply to prevent an enemy initiating against us an action which we are afraid of, its effect is defensive; if on the other hand it is used to prevent the enemy resisting some action which we propose to take ourselves, deterrence is offensive.
For nuclear deterrence to be understood correctly it has to be seen whether it is in its correct perspective. It has two components; capability and credibility. Lets examine both separately and in detail. Capability encompasses physical possession of nuclear warheads and its delivery means. Mere possession of nuclear warheads without means to deliver it to desired targets would not constitute a capability. So to deserve to be called capability, nation has to have warheads with appropriate delivery means. Delivery means should be available with all three branches of the armed forces to complete Nuclear Triad. At surface, missiles are used. Aircraft with modified delivery pods are the aerial mean. Lastly, submarine-based nuclear weapons are the ideal choice and permits unhindered second strike capability. That being a different subject altogether would not be discussed. Acquisition of all three or any one of the means will allow a nation to claim capability.
Then we have more difficult part which is credibility. Credibility is total sum of many factors, but indicating the will of a nation to use its nuclear warheads if situation so warrants. Capability can always be measured, assessed or gauged but credibility is hard to establish. It rests in minds of the leadership of the belligerent nation and can never be accurately measured. To phrase it for our consumption, credibility would look like: Any adversary must know that Pakistan can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against Pakistan and its forces. To remind our adversary of our national commitment to use nuclear warheads if need be, all our national leaders, political or military keep giving statements to this effect. Allocation of sufficient resources for R&D, command and control structures and other peripherals attached to nuclear architecture is also indicative of our national commitment. Pakistan has also shot down Indias No First Use (NFU) proposal. That also makes our resolve clear to our adversary.
That is for capability and credibility. Let us now examine what minimum deterrence would mean in Pakistani context. Pakistan has no offensive designs against any country. But to preserve its integrity, Pakistan has a right to define what is minimum for it. Pakistan should not stockpile nuclear warheads unnecessarily but at the same time Pakistan must have sufficient numbers to thwart any designs of aggression by imposing caution on its adversary. How many nuclear weapons does a country need to ensure nuclear deterrence? The answer would depend on the type of deterrence offensive or defensive one is looking for and also on the opponents offensive and defensive capabilities.
We begin with certain assumptions. First, we are looking for minimum defensive deterrence capability. Let us further assume that destruction of two enemy cities will meet our minimum deterrence needs and each city would need to be hit with five nuclear bombs, that our delivery means have a 50% probability of successfully penetrating the enemy defenses, and finally the enemy has the capability of destroying 50% of our nuclear assets in a pre-emptive first strike. Now with these sets of assumed determinants, the number of weapons needed to ensure minimum deterrence would be: (a) Number of bombs required to take out two cities @ 5 per city: 10 bombs, (b) After factoring in enemys 50% intercept capability: 20 bombs, (c) The enemy can take out 50% of our force in a pre-emptive strike: 40 bombs. To have 20 survivable bombs we would need 40 bombs to maintain our minimum deterrence under the given set of assumptions.
Now, if enemy has enhanced its capabilities and it can intercept 90% of our nuclear weapons because of better nuclear missile defence system; it also has increased its offensive potential through greater number of nuclear weapons with enhanced accuracy and can take out 90% of our nuclear arsenal in a pre-emptive strike, the fresh calculation would be: (a) Number of bombs required to take out two cities @ 5 per city: 10 bombs, (b) After factoring in enemys 90% intercept capabilities: 100 bombs, (c) After factoring in 90% of enemys riposte capability: 1000 bombs. What it implies is that concept of minimum deterrence has to be dynamic and alive to capability of adversary. This is just a hypothetical example and figures have been taken to highlight the point. In an actual case, the increments in the enemys offensive and defensive capabilities may not be as large, thus requiring only marginal adjustments in our own nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan chose the nuclear path under compulsion. It has unique honour of being first and only Muslim nation to acquire these ultimate weapons. For sure, weapons of this kind have their own attached strings which we have to accept and improve to keep our deterrence at acceptable level.
Ehtisham Amir
Minimum deterrence is an oft repeated phrase once it comes to Pakistan nuclear policy. It is very well understood at right quarters. This theory is neither unique to Pakistan, nor has it been coined by Pakistan. However we have made full use of it when it comes to defining our nuclear policy. But certain aspects of it especially minimum deterrence and large conventional forces despite attaining nuclear capability are debated without heeding to Pakistans specific needs.
As of the dictionary meanings; deterrence is to avert or to avoid some happening. In military terms, deterrence aims at preventing the enemy from using its armed forces to impose its will on the other. Deterrence is deterrence till it is not used. If used, it is no more a deterrence. Then it has failed in its deterrence value. A simple example: if my neighbour has a shot gun, he can use it against me at will. But if I also possess a pistol, then I have created a deterrence that forces my neighbour to think twice before using his weapon. But if at some time, my neighbour gets an artillery gun, which has the potential to destroy my house along with my poor pistol before my pistol can be used, then for sure I will be attacked. It means my deterrence has failed in achieving desired result.
Deterrence aims are exactly the opposite of war aims where force is used to impose ones will on the enemy. If deterrence is used simply to prevent an enemy initiating against us an action which we are afraid of, its effect is defensive; if on the other hand it is used to prevent the enemy resisting some action which we propose to take ourselves, deterrence is offensive.
For nuclear deterrence to be understood correctly it has to be seen whether it is in its correct perspective. It has two components; capability and credibility. Lets examine both separately and in detail. Capability encompasses physical possession of nuclear warheads and its delivery means. Mere possession of nuclear warheads without means to deliver it to desired targets would not constitute a capability. So to deserve to be called capability, nation has to have warheads with appropriate delivery means. Delivery means should be available with all three branches of the armed forces to complete Nuclear Triad. At surface, missiles are used. Aircraft with modified delivery pods are the aerial mean. Lastly, submarine-based nuclear weapons are the ideal choice and permits unhindered second strike capability. That being a different subject altogether would not be discussed. Acquisition of all three or any one of the means will allow a nation to claim capability.
Then we have more difficult part which is credibility. Credibility is total sum of many factors, but indicating the will of a nation to use its nuclear warheads if situation so warrants. Capability can always be measured, assessed or gauged but credibility is hard to establish. It rests in minds of the leadership of the belligerent nation and can never be accurately measured. To phrase it for our consumption, credibility would look like: Any adversary must know that Pakistan can and will retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against Pakistan and its forces. To remind our adversary of our national commitment to use nuclear warheads if need be, all our national leaders, political or military keep giving statements to this effect. Allocation of sufficient resources for R&D, command and control structures and other peripherals attached to nuclear architecture is also indicative of our national commitment. Pakistan has also shot down Indias No First Use (NFU) proposal. That also makes our resolve clear to our adversary.
That is for capability and credibility. Let us now examine what minimum deterrence would mean in Pakistani context. Pakistan has no offensive designs against any country. But to preserve its integrity, Pakistan has a right to define what is minimum for it. Pakistan should not stockpile nuclear warheads unnecessarily but at the same time Pakistan must have sufficient numbers to thwart any designs of aggression by imposing caution on its adversary. How many nuclear weapons does a country need to ensure nuclear deterrence? The answer would depend on the type of deterrence offensive or defensive one is looking for and also on the opponents offensive and defensive capabilities.
We begin with certain assumptions. First, we are looking for minimum defensive deterrence capability. Let us further assume that destruction of two enemy cities will meet our minimum deterrence needs and each city would need to be hit with five nuclear bombs, that our delivery means have a 50% probability of successfully penetrating the enemy defenses, and finally the enemy has the capability of destroying 50% of our nuclear assets in a pre-emptive first strike. Now with these sets of assumed determinants, the number of weapons needed to ensure minimum deterrence would be: (a) Number of bombs required to take out two cities @ 5 per city: 10 bombs, (b) After factoring in enemys 50% intercept capability: 20 bombs, (c) The enemy can take out 50% of our force in a pre-emptive strike: 40 bombs. To have 20 survivable bombs we would need 40 bombs to maintain our minimum deterrence under the given set of assumptions.
Now, if enemy has enhanced its capabilities and it can intercept 90% of our nuclear weapons because of better nuclear missile defence system; it also has increased its offensive potential through greater number of nuclear weapons with enhanced accuracy and can take out 90% of our nuclear arsenal in a pre-emptive strike, the fresh calculation would be: (a) Number of bombs required to take out two cities @ 5 per city: 10 bombs, (b) After factoring in enemys 90% intercept capabilities: 100 bombs, (c) After factoring in 90% of enemys riposte capability: 1000 bombs. What it implies is that concept of minimum deterrence has to be dynamic and alive to capability of adversary. This is just a hypothetical example and figures have been taken to highlight the point. In an actual case, the increments in the enemys offensive and defensive capabilities may not be as large, thus requiring only marginal adjustments in our own nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan chose the nuclear path under compulsion. It has unique honour of being first and only Muslim nation to acquire these ultimate weapons. For sure, weapons of this kind have their own attached strings which we have to accept and improve to keep our deterrence at acceptable level.
