The Truce Agreement does talk of tripartite negotiations, but not to
determine the details and process of demilitarization. Part II/B(1) reads:
When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission
Nehru while seeking clarifications on the resolution of 13th Aug, 1948, had sought to identify the parties to the negotiation concerning demilitarization. He wrote to Joseph Korbel, the Chairman of the Commission, on 20th Aug, 1948 (UNCIPs 1st Report):
...the paramount need for security is recognized by the Commission, and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India. (para 4)
Joseph Korbel, wrote back, on 25th Aug, 1948, confirming Nehrus interpretation (UNCIPs 1st Report):
The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the Resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation...
Pakistan, too, had sought clarification on this very issue. Joseph Korbel, in his letter to Zafarulla Khan, dated 3rd Sept, 1948, stated (UNCIPs 1st Report):
As regards paragraphs B 1 and 2 of Part II, the Commission, while recognizing the paramount need for security of the State of Jammu ad Kashmir, confirms that the minimum strength required for the purpose of assisting the local authorities in the observance of law and order, would be determined by the Commission and the Government of India. The Commission considers that it is free to hear the views of the Government of Pakistan on the subject.
In other words, India was neither obliged to negotiate with Pakistan nor to share information about demilitarization with anyone other than UN Commission. Neither did Pakistan have any right to dictate terms and conditions for its own withdrawal or seek information from India, or perhaps even from UN, about Indias withdrawal. Pakistans role was relegated to that of someone who Commission may hear, and not that of a party to the negotiation. As far as India was concerned, UN was
free to hear views of Jupiterions, if UN so desired.
UNCIPs 3rd Report, clarifies the positions of the two countries on this issue of demilitarization and the process of negotiations.
''...the Pakistan delegation held (a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces. (para 229)
India, on the other hand, has (a) never accepted the claim of Pakistan to equality of rights in a military or any other sphere, but considers that the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir constitutes an act of aggression and a violation of international law; and (b) has refused to discuss with Pakistan any feature of the withdrawal of Indian forces, maintaining that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State were matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India. The Government of India at this time also made it clear that the fulfillment by the Government of Pakistan of the conditions of withdrawal was a condition precedent to the implementation by the Government of India of any arrangement regarding the withdrawal of its own forces. (para 230)
The Truce Agreement is clear that Pakistan would have to evacuate the territories captured by it and the local authority will be looking after the administration of the evacuated territory under the direct supervision of the UN Commission.
Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. [Part II/A(3)]
By no stretch of imagination can this be construed that
the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side. This deliberately flawed position of (a) led to (b). From Pakistans point of view, if it could be established that the withdrawal was about bringing in a
military balance, it would then naturally mean that Pakistan got to decide what, for them, was an acceptable
military balance. This in turn would mean that Pakistans withdrawal was contingent upon its agreement with Indian plan of withdrawal. It would then be very easy for Pakistan to weasel out of its own obligation by simply citing its disagreement with Indian plan of demilitarization. (Thats exactly what they did eventually and continue to do)
The Commission had on several occasions, clarified, that Pakistan had to
completely withdraw from the occupied part. The evacuated land was then to become UNs concern and Pakistan had absolutely no role to play in it (not even in the subsequent plebiscite). Pakistans argument, based on its flawed premise, was in complete contradiction with the Commissions clarifications. For example, UNCIPs 3rd Report states:
...the Resolution [
], as has been pointed out, draws a distinction between the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces. Pakistan troops are to begin to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal is not conditioned on Pakistan's agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal. (para 242)
That Resolution does not suggest that Pakistan should be entitled to make her withdrawals conditional upon the consultations envisaged between the Commission and the Government of India having led to an agreed schedule of withdrawal of Indian troops. What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities. (para 243)
To summarise, (a) negotiations regarding demilitarization was very much a bipartite affair, where Pakistan had limited role to play, if at all it had any role to play, and (b) Pakistans withdrawal was unconditional and unilateral, in the sense that it didnt depend on Indias plan for demilitarization.
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End Note:
UNCIPs 1st Report was prepared by Mr Alfredo Lonazo, representative of Columbia and is dated 22, Nov, 1948. Commissions chairman was Mr Joseph Korbel.
UNCIPs 3rd Report was prepared by Mr Robert van de Karchove, representative of Belgium and is dated 9 Dec, 1949. Commissions chairman was Mr Hernando Semper.
