India's Cold Start Is Too Hot
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alimobin memon
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i mean lets make a hot start!!let's make a cold start
Jango
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Is IAF ready for Cold War Strategy?
definitely not
wind
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First increase the IAF strength to 70 squ until then it is not even worth the value of paper it is presented.
asad71
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Pak response to Cold Start is here I think.
The Atlantic
Pakistan Seen Readying to Cross Nuclear Threshold
By Global Security Newswire Staff
Jun 2 2011, 11:50 AM ET
Pakistan's test launch last month of a new short-range ballistic missile, when added to its quickly growing arsenal of lower-power nuclear weapons, indicates the South Asian country is seriously readying to use its nuclear deterrent should war break out again with India, the Times of India reported on Sunday.
Federation of American Scientists Nuclear Information Project Director Hans Kristensen said the nuclear-capable Hatf 9 missile appears to be designed to attack an invading force of Indian soldiers.
"While that wouldn't threaten Indian survival in itself, it would of course mean crossing the nuclear threshold early in a conflict, which is one of the particular concerns of a short-range nuclear weapon," Kristensen said.
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MORE FROM NATIONAL JOURNAL:
Report: Pakistan Approves CIA Search of bin Laden Compound
National Security Insiders Split Down Middle on Cutting Aid to Pakistan
The missile's 37-mile flight range means it could not strike any major Indian population center. However, the weapon could undermine the Indian military's unconfirmed "Cold Start" doctrine, which focuses on the rapid deployment of armed forces into Pakistan for a targeted strike following a terrorist assault on the scale of the 2008 attacks on Mumbai.
Islamabad evidently is increasing its capabilities in response to the likelihood that New Delhi would forcefully respond to another large-scale terrorist attack perpetrated by Pakistani-based extremists.
"A [Hatf 9] would have to drive all the way up to the Indian border to be able to reach important targets in India," Kristensen said. "Amritsar would be one candidate, as would several smaller cities along the border. But that would also expose the missile to counterattack."
The Pakistani army previously said the Hatf 9 "could carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy" and possesses the ability to be quickly relocated following use.
Kristensen said the time had come for Islamabad to provide information on the size, scope, and intent of its nuclear arsenal.
Though Pakistan is widely seen to have the world's fastest-growing deterrent, speculation that the state would overtake France as the planet's fourth-largest nuclear weapons state is "a decade or two ahead," Kristensen said.
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is not equal to the number of warheads that could potentially be produced by all the highly enriched uranium and plutonium Pakistan might have produced. The size also depends on other factors such as the number of delivery vehicles and other limitations," he said.
Concerns about Pakistani nuclear security led France in 2009 to choose not to export atomic power technology to the energy-hungry country, the Press Trust of India reported on Sunday. French presidential diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte informed U.S. diplomats that Paris was "not sure that the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is secure," particularly given "the frequent movement of nuclear weapons by the Pakistani military," according to a September 3, 2009, U.S. cable made public by the transparency group WikiLeaks.
French Defense Minister Gerard Longuet, speaking in New Delhi last week, voiced his worries about India's nuclear-armed rival: "This part of the world needs some clarification and stability as well. India is an old strategic partner.... Regarding Pakistan we are waiting for clarifications." International concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons were renewed by incidents that called into question the military's competence -- the news that al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was able to escape detection for years in the country and a 17-hour siege on a naval base in Karachi last week by a handful of militants.
There are a number of scenarios in which Pakistani nuclear weapons might be placed at risk for diversion to rogue actors, according to Reuters.
Islamabad generally keeps its nuclear warheads apart from their carriers, but they could be combined and fielded in the event of conflict with India. Authentication codes would still be required to fire weapons such as the Hatf 9, said Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom.
"However, in a fluid battlefield context such codes will likely be released to prevent the weapons being overrun before they can be used," he stated in an e-mail message to Reuters. "In such a 'release delegated' state... it's possible that terrorists could seize a functioning weapon."
There are also concerns about radicalized military officers in positions of authority, who might collaborate with extremists or pass on authorization codes or nuclear systems.
"The expected increase in radicalization, especially within the Pakistani army after the U.S. raid and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad... raises additional concerns," said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
The attack on the naval base highlighted the threat that militants might launch an assault against military nuclear sites.
"I think the attack on PNS Mehran... show that terrorists are developing tactics which enable them to penetrate highly-secure bases and hold space within them for hours," Gregory said. "This suggests nuclear weapons security is increasingly vulnerable."
Weapons material from an unarmed nuclear warhead, even a smaller tactical weapon, could still be removed for dispersal through a radiological "dirty bomb," according to Reuters.
"Responsible Pakistani stewards of their nuclear assets have no choice but to reevaluate their security requirements and procedures," said Michael Krepon, director of the South Asia and Space Security programs at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington.
Meanwhile, disgraced former Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in a Sunday interview said his country's nuclear weapons effort had for the past 10 years been "running without any break," Gulf News reported.
"Although I have not been associated with the program for the past 10 years, I know that it has been running without any break and the process of uranium enrichment is in progress," the newspaper Dawn quoted Khan as saying.
Khan confessed in 2004 to operating a black market proliferation ring that sold nuclear technology and information to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. He was released in 2009 from a five-year term of house arrest.
While the Pakistani program was not giving the "final shape to new nuclear weapons," bomb-grade material was being generated and could be used to construct warheads as needed, Khan said.
He insisted the state's nuclear arsenal was safe from any Pakistani Taliban or foreign assault thanks to a "highly secured system which has been improved gradually." At no time were the country's nuclear weapons at risk of being seized, Khan asserted.
Pakistani nuclear weapons were located at multiple sites and only a small number of individuals know their whereabouts. "You can count these people on fingers who exactly know about the location of nuclear arsenals," Khan said.
The Atlantic
Pakistan Seen Readying to Cross Nuclear Threshold
By Global Security Newswire Staff
Jun 2 2011, 11:50 AM ET
Pakistan's test launch last month of a new short-range ballistic missile, when added to its quickly growing arsenal of lower-power nuclear weapons, indicates the South Asian country is seriously readying to use its nuclear deterrent should war break out again with India, the Times of India reported on Sunday.
Federation of American Scientists Nuclear Information Project Director Hans Kristensen said the nuclear-capable Hatf 9 missile appears to be designed to attack an invading force of Indian soldiers.
"While that wouldn't threaten Indian survival in itself, it would of course mean crossing the nuclear threshold early in a conflict, which is one of the particular concerns of a short-range nuclear weapon," Kristensen said.
NJ logo.JPG
MORE FROM NATIONAL JOURNAL:
Report: Pakistan Approves CIA Search of bin Laden Compound
National Security Insiders Split Down Middle on Cutting Aid to Pakistan
The missile's 37-mile flight range means it could not strike any major Indian population center. However, the weapon could undermine the Indian military's unconfirmed "Cold Start" doctrine, which focuses on the rapid deployment of armed forces into Pakistan for a targeted strike following a terrorist assault on the scale of the 2008 attacks on Mumbai.
Islamabad evidently is increasing its capabilities in response to the likelihood that New Delhi would forcefully respond to another large-scale terrorist attack perpetrated by Pakistani-based extremists.
"A [Hatf 9] would have to drive all the way up to the Indian border to be able to reach important targets in India," Kristensen said. "Amritsar would be one candidate, as would several smaller cities along the border. But that would also expose the missile to counterattack."
The Pakistani army previously said the Hatf 9 "could carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy" and possesses the ability to be quickly relocated following use.
Kristensen said the time had come for Islamabad to provide information on the size, scope, and intent of its nuclear arsenal.
Though Pakistan is widely seen to have the world's fastest-growing deterrent, speculation that the state would overtake France as the planet's fourth-largest nuclear weapons state is "a decade or two ahead," Kristensen said.
"Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is not equal to the number of warheads that could potentially be produced by all the highly enriched uranium and plutonium Pakistan might have produced. The size also depends on other factors such as the number of delivery vehicles and other limitations," he said.
Concerns about Pakistani nuclear security led France in 2009 to choose not to export atomic power technology to the energy-hungry country, the Press Trust of India reported on Sunday. French presidential diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte informed U.S. diplomats that Paris was "not sure that the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is secure," particularly given "the frequent movement of nuclear weapons by the Pakistani military," according to a September 3, 2009, U.S. cable made public by the transparency group WikiLeaks.
French Defense Minister Gerard Longuet, speaking in New Delhi last week, voiced his worries about India's nuclear-armed rival: "This part of the world needs some clarification and stability as well. India is an old strategic partner.... Regarding Pakistan we are waiting for clarifications." International concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons were renewed by incidents that called into question the military's competence -- the news that al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was able to escape detection for years in the country and a 17-hour siege on a naval base in Karachi last week by a handful of militants.
There are a number of scenarios in which Pakistani nuclear weapons might be placed at risk for diversion to rogue actors, according to Reuters.
Islamabad generally keeps its nuclear warheads apart from their carriers, but they could be combined and fielded in the event of conflict with India. Authentication codes would still be required to fire weapons such as the Hatf 9, said Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom.
"However, in a fluid battlefield context such codes will likely be released to prevent the weapons being overrun before they can be used," he stated in an e-mail message to Reuters. "In such a 'release delegated' state... it's possible that terrorists could seize a functioning weapon."
There are also concerns about radicalized military officers in positions of authority, who might collaborate with extremists or pass on authorization codes or nuclear systems.
"The expected increase in radicalization, especially within the Pakistani army after the U.S. raid and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad... raises additional concerns," said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
The attack on the naval base highlighted the threat that militants might launch an assault against military nuclear sites.
"I think the attack on PNS Mehran... show
Weapons material from an unarmed nuclear warhead, even a smaller tactical weapon, could still be removed for dispersal through a radiological "dirty bomb," according to Reuters.
"Responsible Pakistani stewards of their nuclear assets have no choice but to reevaluate their security requirements and procedures," said Michael Krepon, director of the South Asia and Space Security programs at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington.
Meanwhile, disgraced former Pakistani nuclear weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in a Sunday interview said his country's nuclear weapons effort had for the past 10 years been "running without any break," Gulf News reported.
"Although I have not been associated with the program for the past 10 years, I know that it has been running without any break and the process of uranium enrichment is in progress," the newspaper Dawn quoted Khan as saying.
Khan confessed in 2004 to operating a black market proliferation ring that sold nuclear technology and information to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. He was released in 2009 from a five-year term of house arrest.
While the Pakistani program was not giving the "final shape to new nuclear weapons," bomb-grade material was being generated and could be used to construct warheads as needed, Khan said.
He insisted the state's nuclear arsenal was safe from any Pakistani Taliban or foreign assault thanks to a "highly secured system which has been improved gradually." At no time were the country's nuclear weapons at risk of being seized, Khan asserted.
Pakistani nuclear weapons were located at multiple sites and only a small number of individuals know their whereabouts. "You can count these people on fingers who exactly know about the location of nuclear arsenals," Khan said.
notorious_eagle
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Good Analysis; but a major flaw in your in thinking is that, it assumes that the opposing side is maintaining status quo.
Okay so your Armoured Formations move in, beat Pakistan's light mechanized/infantry units and capture a chunk of land. Now What? Your Armoured Formations need huge supply lines because they are big and need to be fed. Looking at the capabilities of the Indian Army, its going to be extremely hard for India to create secure supply lines.
What if PA decides that it has had enough and decides to encircle or outflank your Formations, or even worse outflank them and cut off their supply lines. Your Armoured Formations would not be able to hold much longer without the supplies coming in, thus its a very unlikely scenario that IA can hold on to the territory. When your battered, bruised and tired Armoured Formations go up against PA's fresh Armoured Formations head on, chances of a PA victory are higher as compared to IA. No matter how much mobilization India achieves, it can never beat Pakistan's mechanized units to the border.
Excellent, but your analysis fails to take into account that PA has increased the number of its special forces. The number of SSGs have increased in the past decade from 3 battalions to a division, while the Air Force and Navy have their own special forces units. An Airborne drop inside Pakistan off SF forces is very unlikely because its going to be impossible for India to hide the effort as your helis or transport aircrafts would be lit up on Pakistan's radar screens long before. If in case the India manages to drop their SF, PA maintains an air assault brigade ready to be deployed within hours.
Excellent, but in the current scenario Pakistan holds an advantage over India in the artillery field. Pakistan has more SP Artillery as compared to India and our tube artillery is already set up, so pounding the invader is not going to be hard. India had a huge advantage in my opinion in the form of Smerch, the IA could batter PA's forces from stand off ranges without exposing their forces. But the induction of A100 in PA's inventory cancels out IA's advantage, IA would have to expose the Smerch against the A100 in order to use it effectively.
There is no evidence that the 3 Sister Services are talking to each other regarding this doctrine, its mainly an Army lead initiative and i find it hard to believe that the Navy and Air Force would let the Army take the glory. While on the other hand the recent synergy achieved between PA and PAF has been absolutely phenomenal under the current COAS and ACM, not only have they performed several exercises, but both these services have real battle experience of working together.
Your right, i should not have used the word impossible, but i will use the words 'extremely difficult'. There is no evidence to suggest that under a short and intense war, Pakistan will be unable to sustain its operations against India. If you make the claim that in a long term war India will prevail, i would agree with you but in a short term war, the balance of forces is roughly the same. India cannot use its advantages of numbers effectively if its envisioning a short war, contrary to what you say the logic dictates that the Indian Army does not has the capability to pull off something like this. This is why i am yet to see any real reorganization on the battlefield from the Indian side.
We have several alternatives and this is definitely one of them.
Okay so your Armoured Formations move in, beat Pakistan's light mechanized/infantry units and capture a chunk of land. Now What? Your Armoured Formations need huge supply lines because they are big and need to be fed. Looking at the capabilities of the Indian Army, its going to be extremely hard for India to create secure supply lines.
What if PA decides that it has had enough and decides to encircle or outflank your Formations, or even worse outflank them and cut off their supply lines. Your Armoured Formations would not be able to hold much longer without the supplies coming in, thus its a very unlikely scenario that IA can hold on to the territory. When your battered, bruised and tired Armoured Formations go up against PA's fresh Armoured Formations head on, chances of a PA victory are higher as compared to IA. No matter how much mobilization India achieves, it can never beat Pakistan's mechanized units to the border.
Excellent, but your analysis fails to take into account that PA has increased the number of its special forces. The number of SSGs have increased in the past decade from 3 battalions to a division, while the Air Force and Navy have their own special forces units. An Airborne drop inside Pakistan off SF forces is very unlikely because its going to be impossible for India to hide the effort as your helis or transport aircrafts would be lit up on Pakistan's radar screens long before. If in case the India manages to drop their SF, PA maintains an air assault brigade ready to be deployed within hours.
Excellent, but in the current scenario Pakistan holds an advantage over India in the artillery field. Pakistan has more SP Artillery as compared to India and our tube artillery is already set up, so pounding the invader is not going to be hard. India had a huge advantage in my opinion in the form of Smerch, the IA could batter PA's forces from stand off ranges without exposing their forces. But the induction of A100 in PA's inventory cancels out IA's advantage, IA would have to expose the Smerch against the A100 in order to use it effectively.
There is no evidence that the 3 Sister Services are talking to each other regarding this doctrine, its mainly an Army lead initiative and i find it hard to believe that the Navy and Air Force would let the Army take the glory. While on the other hand the recent synergy achieved between PA and PAF has been absolutely phenomenal under the current COAS and ACM, not only have they performed several exercises, but both these services have real battle experience of working together.
Your right, i should not have used the word impossible, but i will use the words 'extremely difficult'. There is no evidence to suggest that under a short and intense war, Pakistan will be unable to sustain its operations against India. If you make the claim that in a long term war India will prevail, i would agree with you but in a short term war, the balance of forces is roughly the same. India cannot use its advantages of numbers effectively if its envisioning a short war, contrary to what you say the logic dictates that the Indian Army does not has the capability to pull off something like this. This is why i am yet to see any real reorganization on the battlefield from the Indian side.
We have several alternatives and this is definitely one of them.
thinkingcap81
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Eagle,
I am not too well versed in military affairs but...
Why should it not be that after the IBGs gain a foothold inside Pakistani territory there will not be adequate support IA support columns to keep PA offensives at bay? Surely IA cannot be just focusing only on thrusts with respect to the IBGs. Even mobilization times for supporting forces would also have been significantly reduced.
The recent Vijayee Bhava exercises confirm that CS is very much a doctrine under implementation and is being continually fine-tuned. Introduction of the Nasr tactical missile also indicates that the assessment of the PA is that something drastic will need to be made to stop IA advances and subsequent hold on territory. Or that even to defeat the IBGs will mean severe depletion of PA firepower which makes it vulnerable to the backup IA support.
Since one of the stated objectives of the doctrine is not extensive penetration into Pakistani territory due to perhaps logistical difficulties, the significantly larger IAF should be able to achieve localized neutralization of PAF offensive capability.
All this till diplomatic intervention forces a stalemate. And even dropping a tactical nuke will cause extreme isolation of Pakistan.
I am not too well versed in military affairs but...
Why should it not be that after the IBGs gain a foothold inside Pakistani territory there will not be adequate support IA support columns to keep PA offensives at bay? Surely IA cannot be just focusing only on thrusts with respect to the IBGs. Even mobilization times for supporting forces would also have been significantly reduced.
The recent Vijayee Bhava exercises confirm that CS is very much a doctrine under implementation and is being continually fine-tuned. Introduction of the Nasr tactical missile also indicates that the assessment of the PA is that something drastic will need to be made to stop IA advances and subsequent hold on territory. Or that even to defeat the IBGs will mean severe depletion of PA firepower which makes it vulnerable to the backup IA support.
Since one of the stated objectives of the doctrine is not extensive penetration into Pakistani territory due to perhaps logistical difficulties, the significantly larger IAF should be able to achieve localized neutralization of PAF offensive capability.
All this till diplomatic intervention forces a stalemate. And even dropping a tactical nuke will cause extreme isolation of Pakistan.
RedBaron
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These are all excellent points...thanks Fatman (am still catching up after a long gap, good to read your postings!)
Regarding actually going to war (using CSD or otherwise) as retaliation for a terrorist strike, a simple Cost-benefit analysis can show that it would be easier and way less expensive to focus on preventing a 26/11 type of attack.
- What needs to be done to protect our Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities which are primary targets? How many boots on the ground should we have - police, NSG, special SWAT teams? What communication and surveillance capabilities should be acquired? What training and equipment needs to be procured?
- What sort of crisis management model should the local administrators follow?
- How do you plan and implement a "If you see something, say something" model that NY and other western cities have?
Let's just say we cover 50 cities in total. If we estimate spending Re. 1,000 crore (roughly USD 225 Million if I have my math right) in investing in preventative systems and infrastructure, total cost would be around Re. 50,000 crore (roughly USD 11 Billion), surely affordable as compared to a war in terms of monetary cost, lives and property, risk to economy, etc. The benefits would be manifold- a citizenry that feels safe and is more trustful of the government, a better funded local law enforcement working closely with defence, etc. etc. Does anyone know whether enough thought has been put into this? Should a second 26/11 happen, we would be partly to blame if we have not learned from the first.
Contrarian
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In a neighbourhood like South Asia, with neighbours like Pakistan and China. You need strong military capabilities to deter the opponent. India's overwhelming conventional superiority against Pakistan is merely on paper. In reality, if you include logistics and all, India cannot field that overwhelming superiority in the battlefield. So to overcome that, doctrines like CS are necessary.
This COUPLED with increased spending on homeland security.
This COUPLED with increased spending on homeland security.
Army of Pakistan
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You will see our Shaheens and Baburs...and they will be have nuclear warheads.
Not suprisingly, you couldn't think hard enough.
majesticpankaj
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be careful of NATO...they may steal them... u know their capabilities..
RedBaron
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Agree that conventional superiority is on paper only and doctrines like CS are needed. Whether they are best response to deter/respond to a 26/11-like attack is arguable.
Contrarian
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There are 3 things which would deter Pakistan.
1. Having extra-ordinarily high battlefield superiority which assures Pakistani GHQ that they would lose & fast.
2. Capability and demonstration of punitive strikes in case of them sponsoring terrorism again. This includes SF, etc.
3. Having great trade linkages with Pakistan. Its almost assured that greater trade with Pakistan would lead to their greater dependency on us and increase their trade deficit with India. Therefore if dependency is high, they lose if Indian economy falls. As it happens, the political elite in Pakistan are also the business elite, and their businesses would suffer with the Indian economy hurting. It also increases the threat of an economic sanction against Pakistan.
India is pursuing all three.
In another 10 years time, India & Indian economy would allow Armed Forces to be on a different plateau compared to Pakistan. The government is already on a modernization and expansion spree of both conventional and special forces. Take a wide eyed view, capabilities are being built up steadily.
India is also pushing really hard for increased trade with Pakistan. With the announcement that Pakistan will grant MFN status soon, this endeavour should bear fruit as well.
Dalai Lama
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Who says peace can't be bought with money.
What about them? There are ways to cross them depending upon whether its a cut section or fill section.
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