Indian strategic thinking and Pakistan.

[Joe Shearer]

This is theatre 3, western Arunachal.

Yes that's what I implied, Namka Chu and Thagla. Short of that they can do precious little.

I am taken aback. What about the Bailley Trail, which opened up Dalvi's position completely to the PLA?

And what happens if they do not follow the grain of the terrain, where the mountains run north-west to south-east, but go across, in a left hook, into Bhutan? (a) the Royal Bhutanese Army's flank is turned; (b) XXXIII Corps flank is turned; (c) the only road link inito the north-east is a day's march away. As far as the likelihood of their crossing hill terrain against the grain is concerned, they did so on numerous occasions in Korea.

 

[MilSpec]

I agree. It would be nice to have a discussion regarding IA's policy on the Western front. I think it would be wise if we talk a bit about the Cold Start Doctrine. It appears that IA is keen to adopt and implement this strategy on the battlefield. What i cannot get my head around is what exactly are going to be IA's objectives? Anything less than destruction of Pakistan's offensive capabilities will keep India's Western flank perpetually vulnerable. The more i read into India's planning, the more i am amazed about China. China has managed to successfully check mate India by propping up Pakistan. Instead of focussing all her might against China, India is forced to allocate the majority of her elite fighting units to deal with Pakistan. This strategy is simply a master piece. This makes sense why China always accepts every demand that is made by either of the three armed services of Pakistan.

The entire border with pakistan has been extensively analysed by both sides, I assume all the permutations and combination for IBG breaking the LOC is extensively studied by Pakistani planners and countermeasures must be deployed.

Another fact that annoys me about IBG's is lack of attack helicopters in the Indian Arsenal. It would be great to have large number of armored attack heli's flying with the IBG's providing maximum air support to ground troops. Next parameter for IBG to suceed is a top notch mechanised infantry. My personal opinion would be there should be three pronged formations for cold start doctrine:
Fast moving formations - Light IBG's with (10-15 APC's, 2 SAM's, 10 Tanks, 5-10 IFV's with anti tank capability + 2 heli 300-500 Inf )
Medium formations - Heavy IBGs (20-25 Tanks, 4 Sam, 15-25 APC/IFV 4 Heli, 500-700 Infantry and Rocket Arty )

Light Supply Groups - (4-5 fuel Tank trucks, 5-6 supply trucks, 5-10 IFV, 5 engg vehicles, 500 infantry )

Heavy Supply Groups - (5-8 fuel Tank trucks, 10-15 supply trucks, 5-10 IFV, 5 engg vehicles, 1000 infantry)

Armored columns - (50-75 tanks, 30-40 Anti tank Vehicles, 20-30 IFV, rocket arty, Squadron of Attack heli, )

Maybe CSD needs some aspect of sundarji doctrine in it too with a heavy armored thrust to overwhelm certain defensive positions.


notorious_eagle made an excellent point about china's strategy, Chinese effort to prop up pakistan against India is an incredible success. They have ensured that india has to focus all its energy on pakistan and inevitable chinese borders will remain ill equipped and thus vulnerable. Even without engaging India, they have ensured they have the ability to pressurize India as they please. But the most amazing aspect is they have maintained a balance, They have never created a cuban missile crisis like situation for India, hence keeping out of the international communities eyes. Chinese policy toward the situations is indeed very mature.

 

[Nassr]

Original Post by By Joe Shearer

The Dong Hill East of Lohit river, Maha Plateau, Ladders West of Lohit river, Dong plateau, Lachman Ridge, Slopes of Dong Hill are the probable thrust points and we have committed the requisite forces in advance, not to mention our established presence in Richu, East Ridge, Kibithoo, and the Ladders areas. So it will at best be an academic discussion on what the PLA can possibly commit and what we already have.

Not to be condescending, but this is a startlingly detailed and knowledgeable summary, with some loss of detail inevitable in a summary.

My comment, supportive in this case, is that while the choice of points to defend is a tactical issue, I would hope to see a well-articulated and WELL-REHEARSED doctrine for defense of these points, their set-up and mutual interdependence to allow aerial support for supplies, and the response to the initial thrusts, it is hoped from a mobile reserve well-placed to move to the point of greatest strategic impact, rapidly, with sufficient force.

Until the doctrine is in place - and there is no sign of it - and until we have enough rotary wing aircraft to ship at least a brigade to the hot spot, it remains, to me, a work in progress.
Original Post By deltacamelately

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...tegic-thinking-pakistan-10.html#ixzz22JViJmwP

Mountain warfare and use of rotary wing in large numbers presents a conundrum of operational nightmare and is contingent on so many factors. A simultaneous brigade lift needs around 110-120 MI17 helicopters or about 70 odd Chinooks. To find landing grounds big enough to accommodate so many helicopters simultaneously is very difficult indeed in mountainous terrain.

Which means that more number of landing grounds would be needed, and landings would have to be sequential, one after the other. These landing grounds would not only be at a distance from each other, but also at a distance from the objective. Slithering operations to drop around 24-2500 troops in quick time may not be possible in all the cases, even if these troops are trained in such an operation. Many of the implications for an offensive operation are different than those of a defensive operation. Time in both the cases is of premium.

In certain cases, if roads are available, it may be prudent to move the force by road rather than through helicopter lift for want of appropriate necessities. However, during peace time, such improvements can be undertaken which would help in transporting large number of troops through helicopters. Which incidentally would also tend to give away the intentions. Without going into the implications of whether the move is undertaken during day light hours or night time, or keeping the air situation in view, these indeed are difficult operations.

 

[Nassr]

I agree. It would be nice to have a discussion regarding IA's policy on the Western front. I think it would be wise if we talk a bit about the Cold Start Doctrine. It appears that IA is keen to adopt and implement this strategy on the battlefield. What i cannot get my head around is what exactly are going to be IA's objectives? Anything less than destruction of Pakistan's offensive capabilities will keep India's Western flank perpetually vulnerable. The more i read into India's planning, the more i am amazed about China. China has managed to successfully check mate India by propping up Pakistan. Instead of focussing all her might against China, India is forced to allocate the majority of her elite fighting units to deal with Pakistan. This strategy is simply a master piece. This makes sense why China always accepts every demand that is made by either of the three armed services of Pakistan.

Tell this to the Chinese and they get very angry about it – and rightly so. In my opinion India is caught between the devil and the deep sea in this case. The Indian strategy has not been devised by the Chinese, it is Indian strategy. Like Joe Shearer says, that India would like to go after the weaker pugilist first. The Chinese, if at all, are trying to make the weaker element stronger – yes their reason may also include their desire that most of Indian troops are tied down by Pakistan and therefore are not available against the Chinese.

At the same time the Indians are trying to woo the Chinese and are trying to improve relations with them. But while doing this, the Indians have mired themselves so much with American and Western interests, no matter how much they would like to present themselves as neutral or non-aligned, that the Chinese would always suspect Indian intent.

In my opinion, in any future India – Pakistan war, due to Chinese presence and movements along India – China border, India would not be able to relocate much of the forces deployed along Chinese border against Pakistan. And also probably the main reasons for selection of shallow objectives, due to the weighing in of nuclear factor, coupled with Chinese threat, the war would be fought with more or less integral theater forces on both fronts.

 

[rockstarIN]

In my opinion, in any future India – Pakistan war, due to Chinese presence and movements along India – China border, India would not be able to relocate much of the forces deployed along Chinese border against Pakistan. And also probably the main reasons for selection of shallow objectives, due to the weighing in of nuclear factor, coupled with Chinese threat, the war would be fought with more or less integral theater forces on both fronts.

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...tegic-thinking-pakistan-11.html#ixzz22JtIwfXW

This is not true IMO. Hoping a Chinese thrust, even a troop movement along the border when an Indo-pak conflict is useless. Apart from deplomacy and arms supply, China will never go beyond that.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The entire border with pakistan has been extensively analysed by both sides, I assume all the permutations and combination for IBG breaking the LOC is extensively studied by Pakistani planners and countermeasures must be deployed.

Another fact that annoys me about IBG's is lack of attack helicopters in the Indian Arsenal. It would be great to have large number of armored attack heli's flying with the IBG's providing maximum air support to ground troops. Next parameter for IBG to suceed is a top notch mechanised infantry. My personal opinion would be there should be three pronged formations for cold start doctrine:

Fast moving formations - Light IBG's with (10-15 APC's, 2 SAM's, 10 Tanks, 5-10 IFV's with anti tank capability + 2 heli 300-500 Inf )

Medium formations - Heavy IBGs (20-25 Tanks, 4 Sam, 15-25 APC/IFV 4 Heli, 500-700 Infantry and Rocket Arty )

Light Supply Groups - (4-5 fuel Tank trucks, 5-6 supply trucks, 5-10 IFV, 5 engg vehicles, 500 infantry )

Heavy Supply Groups - (5-8 fuel Tank trucks, 10-15 supply trucks, 5-10 IFV, 5 engg vehicles, 1000 infantry)

Armored columns - (50-75 tanks, 30-40 Anti tank Vehicles, 20-30 IFV, rocket arty, Squadron of Attack heli, )

Maybe CSD needs some aspect of sundarji doctrine in it too with a heavy armored thrust to overwhelm certain defensive positions.

Perhaps we can pick up the thread for this in a subsequent discussion, since these tactical arrangements really follow from the strategic overview. That is not to deny that strategy must keep iin mind tactical capabilities on the ground.

notorious_eagle made an excellent point about china's strategy, Chinese effort to prop up pakistan against India is an incredible success. They have ensured that india has to focus all its energy on pakistan and inevitable chinese borders will remain ill equipped and thus vulnerable. Even without engaging India, they have ensured they have the ability to pressurize India as they please. But the most amazing aspect is they have maintained a balance, They have never created a cuban missile crisis like situation for India, hence keeping out of the international communities eyes. Chinese policy toward the situations is indeed very mature.

Another reason why we need to work very hard to blunt their strategy by building a peace - there is no other way to describe the deliberation and sustained effort that will be needed for peace to prevail; it is something to be done in the teeth of an increasing radicalisation of the Pakistani population, an unrelenting pressure from the die-hard elements in their deep state, and spectacular acts of terror intended to break our resolve.

 

[MilSpec]

Perhaps we can pick up the thread for this in a subsequent discussion, since these tactical arrangements really follow from the strategic overview. That is not to deny that strategy must keep iin mind tactical capabilities on the ground.




Another reason why we need to work very hard to blunt their strategy by building a peace - there is no other way to describe the deliberation and sustained effort that will be needed for peace to prevail; it is something to be done in the teeth of an increasing radicalisation of the Pakistani population, an unrelenting pressure from the die-hard elements in their deep state, and spectacular acts of terror intended to break our resolve.

OT
Each and every post of your are so well articulated, it's a delight to read them.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Original Post by By Joe Shearer

The Dong Hill East of Lohit river, Maha Plateau, Ladders West of Lohit river, Dong plateau, Lachman Ridge, Slopes of Dong Hill are the probable thrust points and we have committed the requisite forces in advance, not to mention our established presence in Richu, East Ridge, Kibithoo, and the Ladders areas. So it will at best be an academic discussion on what the PLA can possibly commit and what we already have.

Not to be condescending, but this is a startlingly detailed and knowledgeable summary, with some loss of detail inevitable in a summary.

My comment, supportive in this case, is that while the choice of points to defend is a tactical issue, I would hope to see a well-articulated and WELL-REHEARSED doctrine for defense of these points, their set-up and mutual interdependence to allow aerial support for supplies, and the response to the initial thrusts, it is hoped from a mobile reserve well-placed to move to the point of greatest strategic impact, rapidly, with sufficient force.

Until the doctrine is in place - and there is no sign of it - and until we have enough rotary wing aircraft to ship at least a brigade to the hot spot, it remains, to me, a work in progress.
Original Post By deltacamelately

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/strate...tegic-thinking-pakistan-10.html#ixzz22JViJmwP

Mountain warfare and use of rotary wing in large numbers presents a conundrum of operational nightmare and is contingent on so many factors. A simultaneous brigade lift needs around 110-120 MI17 helicopters or about 70 odd Chinooks. To find landing grounds big enough to accommodate so many helicopters simultaneously is very difficult indeed in mountainous terrain.

Which means that more number of landing grounds would be needed, and landings would have to be sequential, one after the other. These landing grounds would not only be at a distance from each other, but also at a distance from the objective. Slithering operations to drop around 24-2500 troops in quick time may not be possible in all the cases, even if these troops are trained in such an operation. Many of the implications for an offensive operation are different than those of a defensive operation. Time in both the cases is of premium.

In certain cases, if roads are available, it may be prudent to move the force by road rather than through helicopter lift for want of appropriate necessities. However, during peace time, such improvements can be undertaken which would help in transporting large number of troops through helicopters. Which incidentally would also tend to give away the intentions. Without going into the implications of whether the move is undertaken during day light hours or night time, or keeping the air situation in view, these indeed are difficult operations.

The most fundamental difference between PLA and Indian Army war-fighting capability lies in the phenomenal logistic superiority of the PLA, and second only to that and flowing directly from that, their superiority in concentrating strength at relatively short notice. As has been pointed out by analysts and observers, or reported by their own publications, they have achieved the capacity to concentrate 25 divisions in three months time. A formidable metric; I had a stronger adjective in mind but toned it down for the sake of sobriety.

It is critical now for India to think deeply and seriously about long-term ameliorative action. For starters, we must begin looking at the logistics infrastructure with a completely different eye. There has been a great deal of despairing purchase of big-ticket aerial capability. That gritted-teeth decision was an abject admission of political failure, a failure of will to keep the management of our airlines system, and, a million times more important, our railways system, out of political management and control and in purely professional and technical hands.

The railways system is still our best bet for moving large volumes of material long distances. For the railways to meet the strategic logistics needs of the military, we need to re-orient its management, devoting facilities to military, naval and aerial base and materiel support, and extending the network enormously in unserviced areas such as the Brahmaputra valley and theaters accessible from it, the terai in UP, even into the hilly terrain of Uttaranchal and Himachal, and most certainly paralleling the LAC in Ladakh.

It is beyond this that the BRO should take over, not as a substitute for this. The paradox of transportation takes over after a point, in a road system: how much fuel is needed to transport a tonne of material, and how much transport capacity should be dedicated to transporting that amount of fuel? The roadways system must be expanded enormously, with dual use capacity in mind and the civilian component kept visible at all times, through the existing NHAI; the incredible change brought about by a minister headed, ironically enough, by a retired major general is a hint of what can be done, and this has to be taken into the hills, right to the identified points of strategic and tactical interest by the BRO.

The final leg of the triad is the need for an extensive system of landing strips and helipads networking the hills. Contrary to the suggestion made by Nassr, such an expansion programme need not necessarily give away any intentions of military nature since it is already a strident demand by the people of the state of Arunachal; building this network can easily be represented with an air of bland, oriental hypocrisy as a concession reluctantly granted to popular demand.

Finally, regarding the capacity required. Considering the needs of a mountain division, while it approximates that of a plain vanilla infantry division, additional capacity will have to be provided at brigade level, because of the need for each brigade fighting in hilly terrain to have its own integral very-light weight artillery component. These are still retained at division level in conventional formations, and that is totally useless in a mountain warfare context, where formations must necessarily be far more self-contained and autonomous, due to terrain. (to be continued).

 

[Joe Shearer]

The most fundamental difference between PLA and Indian Army war-fighting capability lies in the phenomenal logistic superiority of the PLA, and second only to that and flowing directly from that, their superiority in concentrating strength at relatively short notice. As has been pointed out by analysts and observers, or reported by their own publications, they have achieved the capacity to concentrate 25 divisions in three months time. A formidable metric; I had a stronger adjective in mind but toned it down for the sake of sobriety.

It is critical now for India to think deeply and seriously about long-term ameliorative action. For starters, we must begin looking at the logistics infrastructure with a completely different eye. There has been a great deal of despairing purchase of big-ticket aerial capability. That gritted-teeth decision was an abject admission of political failure, a failure of will to keep the management of our airlines system, and, a million times more important, our railways system, out of political management and control and in purely professional and technical hands.

The railways system is still our best bet for moving large volumes of material long distances. For the railways to meet the strategic logistics needs of the military, we need to re-orient its management, devoting facilities to military, naval and aerial base and materiel support, and extending the network enormously in unserviced areas such as the Brahmaputra valley and theaters accessible from it, the terai in UP, even into the hilly terrain of Uttaranchal and Himachal, and most certainly paralleling the LAC in Ladakh.

It is beyond this that the BRO should take over, not as a substitute for this. The paradox of transportation takes over after a point, in a road system: how much fuel is needed to transport a tonne of material, and how much transport capacity should be dedicated to transporting that amount of fuel? The roadways system must be expanded enormously, with dual use capacity in mind and the civilian component kept visible at all times, through the existing NHAI; the incredible change brought about by a minister headed, ironically enough, by a retired major general is a hint of what can be done, and this has to be taken into the hills, right to the identified points of strategic and tactical interest by the BRO.

The final leg of the triad is the need for an extensive system of landing strips and helipads networking the hills. Contrary to the suggestion made by Nassr, such an expansion programme need not necessarily give away any intentions of military nature since it is already a strident demand by the people of the state of Arunachal; building this network can easily be represented with an air of bland, oriental hypocrisy as a concession reluctantly granted to popular demand.

Finally, regarding the capacity required. Considering the needs of a mountain division, while it approximates that of a plain vanilla infantry division, additional capacity will have to be provided at brigade level, because of the need for each brigade fighting in hilly terrain to have its own integral very-light weight artillery component. These are still retained at division level in conventional formations, and that is totally useless in a mountain warfare context, where formations must necessarily be far more self-contained and autonomous, due to terrain. (to be continued).

Based on piecing together some indications from diverse sources, i calculated approximately 2000 MT of capacity would be needed for a division. That gives us 600 MT per brigade, fractionally higher to account for a heavier weight of integral artillery. Considering that two army corps would be assigned to this task, that should lead to twelve brigades on point defence, typically in one- or two-battalion formations, across theaters two and three (east Arunachal and west Arunachal), or about 7200 MT.

The stark reality that faces us is clear if we recall that each Mi17 carries 4 MT of cargo, and that our total strength of this aircraft is approximately 150, with another 100 on order.

 

[notorious_eagle]

Tell this to the Chinese and they get very angry about it – and rightly so. In my opinion India is caught between the devil and the deep sea in this case. The Indian strategy has not been devised by the Chinese, it is Indian strategy. Like Joe Shearer says, that India would like to go after the weaker pugilist first. The Chinese, if at all, are trying to make the weaker element stronger – yes their reason may also include their desire that most of Indian troops are tied down by Pakistan and therefore are not available against the Chinese.

At the same time the Indians are trying to woo the Chinese and are trying to improve relations with them. But while doing this, the Indians have mired themselves so much with American and Western interests, no matter how much they would like to present themselves as neutral or non-aligned, that the Chinese would always suspect Indian intent.

In my opinion, in any future India – Pakistan war, due to Chinese presence and movements along India – China border, India would not be able to relocate much of the forces deployed along Chinese border against Pakistan. And also probably the main reasons for selection of shallow objectives, due to the weighing in of nuclear factor, coupled with Chinese threat, the war would be fought with more or less integral theater forces on both fronts.

This exactly brings me to my point. These objectives are not concrete enough to knock out Pakistan quick and focusing her strength against the Chinese. Since IA is in a time table, she will have to force the PA to come out and slug it out. Anything less than the destruction of PAF's front line fighters and PA's armour would be unacceptable for India to execute her strategy against China. Shallow objectives are not good enough as India's Western flank will always be vulnerable if she is involved in a full on shooting war against China.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This exactly brings me to my point. These objectives are not concrete enough to knock out Pakistan quick and focusing her strength against the Chinese. Since IA is in a time table, she will have to force the PA to come out and slug it out. Anything less than the destruction of PAF's front line fighters and PA's armour would be unacceptable for India to execute her strategy against China. Shallow objectives are not good enough as India's Western flank will always be vulnerable if she is involved in a full on shooting war against China.

Shallow objectives, executed within today's environment of an expected three- to six-week duration of hostilities before global pressures to stop fighting build up, will not succeed.

Only a series of military actions, each achieving a concrete but well-bounded step, each contributing to a cumulative weakening of the military system, each executed swiftly, to a plan, and terminated with protestations of peaceful intentions, will succeed in putting Pakistan into a position where she cannot readily interfere with the resolution of the northern problem.

 

[MilSpec]

^^^@ Joe Shearer, assuming apni bangla bujthe paren, looks like PM's er jonno 10000 post count chai, to jodi paren to ekta email add pathan, IBG'r discussion ta jomano jabe.

 

[Joe Shearer]

^^^@ Joe Shearer, assuming apni bangla bujthe paren, looks like PM's er jonno 10000 post count chai, to jodi paren to ekta email add pathan, IBG'r discussion ta jomano jabe.

 

[Joe Shearer]

To deal briefly with these theaters, nos. 5 and 6, before dealing with a very strange and different set of geo-political problems, the problems of Nepal of the future, of the shoulder of India abutting Nepal, of southern Ladakh and of northern Ladakh. It may also be appropriate to refer in a summary form to Jinx1's critique, and to others.

No Arguments.

4. Bhutan.

It is, I think, safest to repose full trust in the integrity and honourable intentions of a very powerful neighbour, but to prepare to defend oneself against that neighbour in case of unexpected developments. Presumably XXXIII Corps is already charged with this duty. Any failure to guard against 'eventualities' would be criminal. As an observer would have noted, Bhutan is vulnerable to attack not merely directly but from the eastern flank as well.

Ditto. However, the XXXIII are sitting pretty and they have their job cut-out perfectly.

5. Sikkim.

let us hope for the best.

 

[Hello_10]

The actual report indeed makes an interesting reading. However, there are dichotomies, contradictions and clear biases in the script.

Some of the significant points are:

>>>China will remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge for India … as it impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space”. There is nothing blatant in it as the newspaper report suggest.

It is surprising that in 1998, after nuclear tests, PM Vajpayee cited Chinese threat as the primary reason for going nuclear. Many Indian Defence Ministers have also called China as the primary threat to India. This is also being stated to the foreign government visitors.

This report however does not identify China as a threat and treats China as a competitor. Probably, this report inadvertently speaks the truth. China is actually not taken as a threat to India and the bogey is only for the Americans and the West.

This also qualifies the predominant Indian military deployment against Pakistan. Almost 80% of Indian Armed forces are deployed against Pakistan and not against China.

>>>Pakistan contrarily is identified as posing “present and potential threats” to India.

It clearly means that Pakistan is the prime enemy of India and not China. Clearly, the so-called enhancements and additional troop deployments taking place along the Chinese border are a farce and these troops like earlier would be used against Pakistan.

>>>The report indicates that the core strategic challenge in dealing with Pakistan is to simultaneously work towards achieving a degree of normality in our relationship and to cope with present and potential threats posed by Pakistan.

A clear statement that India would never be honest and straight with Pakistan. There will not be any trust between the two.

>>>The report calls upon India to make it clear to Islamabad that “the actual pace of negotiations would be contingent on its behaviour”. It supports application of “negative levers”, including diplomatic pressures, reasserting India’s claims to Azad Kashmir and developing the capacity to mount punitive military operations in response to acts of terrorism.

Therefore, Pakistan should not expect any honest breakthrough from India. Simple - Pakistan can do the same to India. India can not and would not be able to push Pakistan through her so-called negative levers.

The attempts by leaders to restore amenable relationship with India is likely to result in failure. Even the enhancement in trade between the two countries would be negatively exploited by India.

>>>The report states that the nuclearisation of South Asia has ruled out large-scale wars. Therefore the suggested shift from the “paradigm focused on capture of territory to a paradigm based on destructive ability”. This is elaborated by highlighting the “employment of cyber and/or air power in punitive mode”, as well as “shallow thrusts” along the international frontier and the LoC.

Indian can never dismember Pakistan by using its military. Glad the Indians recognize this fact. If Indians can make shallow thrusts – so can we. Big deal.

>>>Also that India should be prepared to “act on strong but less than perfect information”.

Pakistan can respond as effectively because only limited selective Indian strikes can be launched. If they do it, we would do it. If they do it, we would do it. If they do it, we would do it. If they do it, we would do it. How many times would Indians resort to this – equal number of times we would do the same. Where lies the advantage.

>>>The most important suggestion is with regard to shift of military strategy from being continental strategic format to maritime strategic format., meaning that IN should be invested into and converted into the primary fighting service.

Understanding the fact that Indian Armed forces are incapable of making any worthwhile dent in Pakistani and Chinese defences, they conveniently move away to IN for operations in the IOR. Pretty much they are doing now – anti-piracy operations.

They however would not be able to use this advantage on the high seas in the presence of USN and other major maritime powers.

It is a shame, such a big country with large armed forces all dressed up and nowhere to go. The only place these forces can be used is, against their own people who want to secede from Indian Union, and what a union indeed.

first about Nuclear issue, Indian Nuclear Doctrin is as below, a clear demand for a nuclear free world and until then only, India wants to keep nukes. so obviously India doesn't have any ground to oppose nuclear holding of Pakistan also as neither India nor Pakistan are signatory of NPT

rest, emerging economies, BRICS/E7, would only try to fix the problems and go ahead with higher progress but those who are in trouble, like US/UK/EU/Pakistan/Bangladesh and similar countries, they want to create more problems for the emerging countries, there is not much to talk on this issue

INDIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

In essence, the draft doctrine was based on the following assumptions-

• Nuclear weapons are meant for deterrence. The basic thrust was to deter the use of nuclear weapons and not fight a nuclear war.

• Nuclear weapons are to be used only in retaliation of nuclear attack on India. Therefore the doctrine was purely defensive in nature.

• Nuclear weapons would not be used to deter the threat or use of conventional weapons, biological or chemical weapons.

• Emphasis on 'minimum credible deterrence' would avoid any unnecessary arms race

Chanakya Code : SD Pradhan's blog-The Times Of India

As of October 2008, China,[1] India[2] and North Korea[3] have publicly declared their commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_first_use

In accordance with its policy at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 2008, India formally proposed two multilateral agreements and two global conventions in a detailed framework for nuclear disarmament and laid the seven point agenda for:

1. Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.
2. Negotiation of an agreement on no-first use of nuclear weapons among nuclear weapons states.
3. Negotiation of a universal and legally binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.
4. Negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
5. Negotiation of a nuclear convention prohibiting development, stockpiling and production of nuclear weapons, moving towards a global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of these weapons.
6. Unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapons states to reduce risks and dangers arising from the possibility of accidental use of these weapons.
7. Adoption of additional measures by nuclear states to reduce accidental use.

Chanakya Code : SD Pradhan's blog-The Times Of India

In June 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh “restated” India's policy as, “fully committed to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory in nature."

Chanakya Code : SD Pradhan's blog-The Times Of India

and about NPT, India as a nation has a simple understanding about it as below:

Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 condemned the discriminatory nuclear regime, (NPT), in UN by saying:

"We cannot accept the logic (of NPT) that a few nations, (P5s), have the right to pursue their security by threatening the survival of humankind. It is not only those who live by the nuclear sword who, by design or default, shall one day perish by it. All humanity will perish. Nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons (P5s) are freed of all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their production. History is full of such prejudices paraded as iron laws: that men are superior to women; that the white races are superior to the colored; that 'colonialism' is a civilizing mission, that those who possess nuclear weapons are responsible powers and those who do not are not.”

"Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate expression of the philosophy of terrorism: holding humanity hostage to the presumed security needs of a few.”

Rajiv Gandhi Speaks Against Nuclear Weapons