Saturday, June 13, 2009
By A Siddique
It is stuff of the espionage novels but the stark scenario created by the unexplained disappearance of an Indian nuclear scientist has sent alarm bells ringing in the nuclear watchdog agencies the world over. Nuclear scientist Lokanathan Mahalingam, who worked in the Simulator Training Division of the Kaiga Atomic Power Station, went missing on the morning of June 8 and despite a most exhaustive search by the local police as well as the specialist 40 member team of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), no trace of the missing scientist has been found. After exhausting the possible reasons of the mysterious disappearance that included tiger attack or drowning in local ponds the investigations are getting focused on the possibilities of abduction or a voluntary defection to unknown destinations.
The possibility of Mahalingams defection or abduction has opened up hair-raising scenarios in which a fully trained nuclear scientist has either turned rogue to join a terrorist group or has decided to defect to a country with which it had a long standing clandestine interaction; spurred by fears of losing cover or after having been exposed. In both cases the consequences can be catastrophic. Mahalingam is a top nuclear scientist working in the training section having access to highly sensitive documents on the Kaiga Nuclear Facility in the Karwar District. The facility has three units and uses pressurised heavy water reactor to generate 220 MW of power and forms an important link in the chain of plutonium producing cycle feeding the Indian nuclear weapons programme. In addition the scientist had the experience of working at the Kalpakkam Nuclear Plant. In whatever way one looks at the disappearance it comes across as a major lapse in the nuclear security paradigm in India; fraught with frightening possibilities.
Personnel related safety protocol breaches are not something new to the Indian nuclear proliferation record. Just a few years ago, two top rung Indian nuclear scientists were blacklisted for engaging in proliferation activities aimed at facilitating Iranian nuclear programme. Senior US officials alleged that YSR Prasad and C Surendra both former and successive chiefs of the state-run Nuclear Power Corporation of India had collaborated in providing assistance to Iran in pursuit of her efforts at enrichment of Uranium to weapon grade levels; misdemeanours that earned them the slapping of US sanctions. According to US sources, Washington had informed Delhi as early as 2003 regarding suspicions of nuclear proliferation activities of rogue Indian scientists. Despite hectic Indian efforts to shake off the charges, the US authorities persistently maintained that the two Indian scientists had helped Iran in the pursuit of its nuclear ambitions; asserting that the sanctions were based on credible information. According to the Washington Times, the US administration let it known to the Indians that not only would it maintain sanctions on Indian scientists, but additionally consider imposing curbs on New Delhi in response to other Indian transfers of weapons-related goods to Iran.
Indian claims that the two sanctioned scientists only helped Iran in improving safety at the Iranian nuclear plants failed to impress observers. Henry Sokolsky, director of the Non Proliferation Policy Education Centre, said the US sanctions were triggered by concerns related to these scientists helping Iran in following its weapons programme. Specifically, according to Sokolsky, these Indian scientists were specialists in procedures for extracting Tritium, which is used to boost the explosive power of nuclear bombs. According to US sources, Prasad and Surendar transferred Tritium extraction technology to Iran under the pretext of improving safety for use at the heavy water plant that she planned to build against objections of the IAEA. The Iranian episode was no singular aberration; Indian scientists have been widely reported for helping Libya in the development of its nuclear facilities which were later abandoned under international pressure.
The exposure of Indian scientists engaging in nuclear proliferation activities brings into focus another dimension of Indian contributions toward proliferating weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means; involvement of Indian engineering and chemical producing companies in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means through shady deals involving a nod from the Indian government. Sanctions were imposed on Protech Consultant Private Limited, an Indian entity, for supplying chemical and biological weapons related materials to Iran as well Iraq. Also, another Indian firm NEC Engineering Private Limited shot to notoriety by finding a mention in the British governments Iraq dossier.
The episode of the missing nuclear scientist poignantly brings out the security lapses in the Indian system of command and control; for security of personnel of the nuclear establishment is a part of the overall security matrix of the nuclear assets. US, too, recently reported a security breach of classified information related to its nuclear facilities. The emergence of these incidents and the manner of their being taken in easy stride stands in marked contrast to the prejudice faced by the Pakistans nuclear programme regarding the safety of its nuclear assets. One shudders to imagine the furore at the global level if, God forbid, such an episode had occurred in Pakistan. Isnt it time for Pakistans detractors to acknowledge the safety of nuclear assets in Pakistan and the efficacy of the command and control measures put in place to guard against untoward incidents? As they say, action and the track record speak louder and is more convincing than words.
