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Quiet approach



A.K. Antony, Defence Minister, with Toshimi Kitazawa, his Japanese counterpart, before their meeting in New Delhi on April 30.

Quiet diplomacy often forms the substance of international relations. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the recent dialogue between Japanese Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and his Indian counterpart A.K. Antony is a potentially important pointer in the evolving geopolitics of the East Asian region.

Details of the Kitazawa-Antony talks in New Delhi on April 30 were not released by either side at that time. The meeting was not a secret event, of course, and no hidden agenda need, therefore, be read into the failure of the two sides to make any immediate comment. However, the details, as later ascertained by this correspondent in Singapore, do reveal some new trends in the defence-related diplomacy between the two countries.

More importantly, these new trends fit into an emerging pattern of India's incremental dialogue with China's neighbours in East Asia – Japan, South Korea, and member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Such scaled-up dialogue need not necessarily be seen as an effort by India to try and “balance” out China. Nonetheless, it is becoming gradually evident that India is trying to make its presence felt in China's neighbourhood. And, in this, New Delhi has found willing partners.

Such a gradually emerging big picture of India in the larger East Asian geopolitical region can only be gleaned from some of the finer details of India's current dialogue with Japan and with South Korea on parallel tracks. Relevant to this context is the India-Republic of Korea Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue in Seoul on April 9, apart from the Kitazawa-Antony talks.

This particular dialogue between India and Japan is noteworthy on two counts: one, the new move for an “exchange of information on the escorting schedules” of the Japanese and Indian naval vessels engaged in their independent anti-piracy operations along the Gulf of Aden; and two, the manner in which Kitazawa took Antony into his confidence over Japan's views about China's military activities in the area surrounding the Japanese archipelago.

There certainly was nothing amiss about such discussions. However, the key diplomatic point to note is that China has been placed on the agenda of Japan-India dialogue on defence cooperation. This does not, of course, signal any kind of military coordination by Tokyo and New Delhi in their independent interactions with Beijing. What cannot, however, escape notice is the fact that the Japan-India defence ministerial dialogue, a crucial aspect of a relevant Action Plan, has now acquired a new dimension beyond the obvious bilateral one. China has been recognised as a potential factor in the evolving Japan-India engagement.

Interesting indeed is Kitazawa's discourse on China's naval activities in the area surrounding Japan in April and thereabouts. Antony was informed of Tokyo's perceptions on how China's military helicopter(s) carried out “proximate” flights in the vicinity of Japanese escort ships. And, Kitazawa is believed to have pointed out how Japan recognised the importance of “engaging China to take responsible actions as well as to comply with all international laws and regulations”.

Also emphasised was Tokyo's view that Beijing should display greater “transparency” than now on all matters relating to China's military modernisation and defence posture. It is understood that Antony conveyed to his Japanese counterpart some thoughts on India's ongoing interactions with China in the defence sector. This was done with reference to the evolving political framework of India's dialogue with China across a wide spectrum of common and differential interests.

About a week after the Kitazawa-Antony dialogue, but unrelated to it, the Japanese government lodged a protest with China over its perceived military activities in the seas surrounding Japan. Of no direct relevance to the future of the Japan-India defence dialogue were Beijing's thoughts on Tokyo's unusual diplomatic action of this kind.

The emerging China factor apart, Tokyo is clearly seeking to move closer to New Delhi in the defence domain in a manner consistent with Japan's post-imperial military doctrine of pacifism. Military experts say that the latest move for “exchange of information on the [independent] escorting schedules” of the Japanese and Indian naval vessels, now engaged in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden sector, reflects a deepening of trust between these two navies. The Japanese navy, or more precisely the Maritime Self-Defence Force to call it by its pacifist name, is generally seen to be wary of such coordination, except perhaps with Washington, Tokyo's long-standing military ally despite all the current turbulence in their ties.

Antony and Kitazawa have also agreed that India and Japan should hold a naval exercise by 2011. The two countries have already held trilateral naval exercises, of the sophisticated kind, involving the United States as well. At least two such trilateral exercises have taken place off Japan, not far from the Chinese maritime domain. In addition, India and Japan teamed up with the U.S. and Australia, besides Singapore, for a multilateral naval exercise in 2007. Another talking point during the Kitazawa-Antony meeting was the idea of joint training, involving the Japanese and Indian navies, for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and U.N. peacekeeping operations.

These and other aspects of the Japan-India defence ministerial dialogue do not really signify an altogether new political direction in the overall bilateral domain. In fact, a defence-cooperation-related Action Plan was already agreed upon during Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's visit to New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, early in January. Despite this diplomatic caveat, the new reality is that the defence-related Action Plan is being actively implemented, that too with reference to the emerging political dynamics in East Asia. These dynamics can be traced primarily to the relentless rise of China as a potential superpower.

Another aspect of these dynamics is that Hatoyama has so far failed to master the diplomatic equivalent of rocket science in his efforts to deflect Japan off its “geosynchronous” orbital path around the U.S. in global affairs. However, he has not completely given up his efforts to bring about some balance, if not total “equality”, between the U.S. and Japan in their 60-year-old military alliance.

U.S. NAVY/AP

The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force destroyer J.S. Yuudachi leading a formation during Exercise Malabar 2007 in the Bay of Bengal. More than 20,000 naval personnel from the navies of Australia, India, Japan, the Republic of Singapore, and the United States took part in the exercise.

Not to be underestimated in this broader context is the political importance of the new references to China in the Japan-India defence ministerial dialogue. More significantly, India and Japan are engaged in a politically calibrated exercise to tone up the overall dynamics of their bilateral engagement.

Antony and Kitazawa may not have directly dealt with the idea of translating into reality the “2+2 Dialogue” formula, which Hatoyama and Manmohan Singh agreed upon in early January. The idea was, of course, in the air even earlier. The formula, with its arithmetical architecture, is very simple indeed: the Defence and Foreign Ministers of Japan, arrayed on its side as “2”, will hold periodic talks with the Defence and External Affairs Ministers of India, arrayed on its side as the other “2”.

Such a “2+2 Dialogue” between any two countries is considered to be the diplomatic index of a truly special or near-special relationship between them.

2+2 dialogue

Asked about the fate of the Japan-India “2+2 Dialogue” formula, without reference to the recent Kitazawa-Antony meeting, Kazuo Kodama, a top Japanese official, told this correspondent that “the idea is active, not dormant”. The two countries have already agreed to begin such a process at the sub-Cabinet level or at the level of senior officials.

Japan regularly holds “2+2 Dialogue” with the U.S. and Australia. These talks, at the ministerial level in each case, are held on altogether different political tracks. While Japan does not look upon India as being in the same category of partners at this stage, significant in itself is the reality that Tokyo and New Delhi are seeking such a format of dialogue.

In a different but related sphere, India figures alongside Australia in Japan's calculus of security cooperation. Tokyo already has somewhat similar security-related agreements, basically declarations, with both Canberra and New Delhi. These do not, obviously, measure up as the equivalents of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. However, the Kitazawa-Antony dialogue shows that Tokyo and New Delhi are gravitating towards each other almost the same way in which Japan and Australia have. This, surely, is the perception on the Japanese side, while the political spin in the Indian officialdom is not very clear.

In a sense, the political label of a “strategic partnership” between any two countries, with or without the so-called add-on of a global dimension in such a “partnership”, is now in some kind of “inflationary use” (in the words of a north-east Asian diplomat).

However, it is the emptiness of such an “inflationary use” that India and South Korea are now seeking to avoid in their escalating engagement in the diplomatic domain. India's Secretary (East), Latha Reddy, and her South Korean counterparts recently held the first-ever meeting in the upgraded category of foreign policy and security dialogue.

The meeting in Seoul covered issues of trade, with particular reference to the India-South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that came into effect in January, besides the conventional aspects of security-related engagement.

Political ties between New Delhi and Seoul have been warming up in the context of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak's travel to India as its Republic Day guest this year. In particular, Seoul has been evincing considerable interest in promoting ties with India in the civil nuclear sector. And, interestingly, the South Korean Ministry of Education, Science and Technology presented, in April, a citation to a senior Indian diplomat, C. Rajasekhar, for his role in the promotion of cooperation between the two countries in the atomic energy sector.

On yet another political track in the Asia-Pacific region, India figures in the new efforts of ASEAN to create a new forum of ASEAN+8 nations. This will consist of all the 10 ASEAN member-states, plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, the U.S. and Russia. It is in this context that the regular talks between New Delhi and ASEAN, coordinated on the Indian side by Latha Reddy and Ambassador Biren Nanda, among others, acquire a new sense of urgency.

The ASEAN+8 forum, not yet given a formal name, is significant for the inclusion of not only the U.S. but also Russia as key players of the geopolitical East Asian region. In a recent conversation with this correspondent, former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo C. Severino emphasised the new importance of Russia, already a key player in the multilateral talks on Korean denuclearisation, besides the more conventional relevance of the U.S., to East Asia.
 
Sri Lanka dependent on India

(LMD) Sri Lanka’s president Mahinda Rajapaksa visited New Delhi for four days last week for talks with Indian ministers. He returned home with seven bi-lateral agreements with India, and immediately met China’s deputy prime minister in Colombo.

Small nations are bound to have complex relationships with large powerful neighbours. Ireland, for instance, had an ambivalent association with Britain, and the imperial power continued to exert power long after Ireland became independent. Cyprus’s fate will always be intertwined with that of Turkey and Greece. Sri Lanka is a nation about the same size as Ireland with a population of 20 million. Yet just across the Palk Straits there are around 65-70 million Tamils, many of whom were sympathetic to the fight by the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) for a separate Tamil state within the territory of Sri Lanka.

India’s support for Sri Lanka in recent years was a vital factor in the defeat of the LTTE in 2009. Radar equipment was supplied and the Indian secret service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), discreetly provided intelligence and training for pilots. Indian naval support prevented the Tiger leaders from escaping by sea to fight again.

The Indian government is today providing aid for de-mining areas formerly controlled by the LTTE and rebuilding the railways in the north. Some Sri Lankans are ambivalent about India’s agenda in promoting reconciliation through devolution, under the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution. India’s help to the LTTE is seared into the national memory – the mines that India is now helping to remove were originally laid with Indian assistance.

Part of the game plan

Governments from the India state of Tamil Nadu had long provided a haven for Tamil separatist militants from Sri Lanka. The central government under Indira Gandhi connived in this, and tolerated the existence of bases and training camps in other parts of India. According to MR Narayan Swamy, the biographer of the LTTE leader Prabakharan, the RAW trained 1,200 Sri Lankan Tamils in the use of weapons and laying mines between 1983 and 1987. Arms deliveries to various groups began in 1984 and went on almost up to the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement in 1987 (1).

Douglas Devananda, once a separatist militant and now a government minister (he accompanied Rajapaksa on his recent trip to India and was threatened with arrest for murders carried out in Tamil Nadu in 1986), says: “We realised that they were only trying to use us in their game plan.” It was widely rumoured that Indira Gandhi intended to use Sri Lankan Tamil rebels as an advance force in a plan to emulate the Turkish action in North Cyprus in 1974 and actually take over part of Sri Lanka. A retired Sri Lankan intelligence officer writing anonymously in the Sunday Leader (2) claims the RAW was responsible for a bomb blast in Colombo’s Pettah market in 1987 and planned to blow up the city’s sewerage system if the Sri Lankan government did not comply with India’s wishes. That same year India, finding the LTTE intractable, sent in the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The stated intention was to bring a swift end to the conflict by disarming the LTTE, but the Tigers were as ready to fight the Indians as the Sinhalese.

Sri Lankan Tamils were alienated when frustrated Indian soldiers, out of their depth, committed atrocities, such as a massacre of doctors, nurses and patients at a hospital in Jaffna on 21 October 1987. This followed intensive shelling of the city of Jaffna. According to Narayan Swamy: “The Indian army had been welcomed with garlands and prayers…For the mass of Jaffna people, the IPKF offensive was an unbelievable conflagration, a horror movie come true.” And the Sri Lankan government accused India of violating its sovereignty and international law by sending the Indian air force to drop food supplies on Jaffna.

Ranasinghe Premadasa, prime minister of Sri Lanka from 1978-88, had always been opposed to the accord with India. When he succeeded JR Jayawardene as president in December 1988, tensions between Sri Lanka and India increased. Premadasa saw the removal of the IPKF as essential to restore order to the south after the bloody JVP uprising because the Sinhalese nationalist JVP traded on bitter opposition to Indian interference. Premadasa was later assassinated by the LTTE, on May Day 1993.

Withdrawal was completed in March 1990. More than 1,000 Indian soldiers had been killed and over 2,000 wounded. The financial cost to India of its intervention in Sri Lanka was put at around $1.25bn. But the real cost was far higher. Rajiv Gandhi’s mother Indira was the architect of India’s interventionist policy: Rajiv oversaw its intensification and paid the ultimate price – assassination by the LTTE.

Poisoned chalice?

Before Rajapaksa’s visit to India there were street protests in Colombo by leftist elements and high profile lobbying by professional and business people against the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Part of the anxiety about this trade agreement, which has been growing for over two years, is that the government is withholding details, so people fear Sri Lanka could be dominated by cheaper and skilled Indian services at the expense of domestic industry. The fear is that this version of “free trade” with India will be analogous to the way the US uses Nafta to maintain hegemony over weaker trading partners. In The Island newspaper Douglas Jayasekera has related his experience of previous trade negotiations (3).

Deuteronomy tells us that gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Aid can be a poisoned chalice. Indian “aid” has come in the form of interest-bearing loans and development projects have provided few jobs for Sri Lankans. The big Chinese projects have used only Chinese labour. And the Chinese presence building a port at Hambantota has caused India anxiety and may be the reason for the proposed new Deputy High Commission in that city. Many Sri Lankans wonder at the real reason for an Indian diplomatic presence in Jaffna and Hambantota when there are few Indian nationals in either place. The suspicion is that the Jaffna office, which will undoubtedly have RAW personnel on its staff, is to develop closer relations between the Tamil community in Jaffna and Tamil Nadu.

Some Sri Lankans fear being colonised by India. The anonymous intelligence officer links this in with the promotion of the 13th amendment which India imposed on Sri Lanka as a means of devolving power to the north and east, the territory claimed by the LTTE as a Tamil homeland. He claims: “This is a first step towards setting up a client state in the north and east of our country which would ultimately vote to link itself with Tamil Nadu and India”. But Dayan Jayatilleka, Sri Lanka’s UN ambassador in Geneva during the closing stages of the war, sounds a warning note: “If India stops supporting us, not even the Non Aligned Movement will defend us fully, because they take their cue from respected Third World states such as India.

Sri Lanka dependent on India RATATHOTA.com
 
you cant ignore closeness towards china

India has to keep its eyes open

we have to workout on BD ,SL,NEPAL

these 3 countries must be our side in and condition
 
Sri Lanka dependent on India
Many Sri Lankans wonder at the real reason for an Indian diplomatic presence in Jaffna and Hambantota when there are few Indian nationals in either place. The suspicion is that the Jaffna office, which will undoubtedly have RAW personnel on its staff, is to develop closer relations between the Tamil community in Jaffna and Tamil Nadu.

Sri Lanka dependent on India RATATHOTA.com

That was a googly. Lets wait and see.
 
we have to workout on BD ,SL,NEPAL

these 3 countries must be our side in and condition

they don't want to be on any one's side.

The smart people want to play the middle ground , maximise India ,China benefits. with no negatives.

Just like we do with the US , Russia and Europe.
 
China already maintains its Embassy in Colombo (one of the largest); China also maintains it’s Deputy Embassies in Kandy, Hambantota, Anurathapura & Galle.
 
SRI LANKA WANT ECONOMIC SUPPORT & DEFENCE SUPPORT FROM BOTH CHINA AND INDIA.

SRI LANKA WILL MAINTAIN A BALANCE DIPLOMATIC TIE WITH CHINA AND INDIA.

WE WANT CASH, CASH & MORE CASH …………………….
 


india-sri-lanka.jpg
 
SRI LANKA WANT ECONOMIC SUPPORT & DEFENCE SUPPORT FROM BOTH CHINA AND INDIA.

SRI LANKA WILL MAINTAIN A BALANCE DIPLOMATIC TIE WITH CHINA AND INDIA.

WE WANT CASH, CASH & MORE CASH …………………….
you guys are in the same position India was during the early days of the cold war
 
you guys are in the same position India was during the early days of the cold war

I can give u another example: Sri Lanka will be the only country in South Asia that can buy weapons & other Defense Products from China, India, Pakistan, Russia, USA, EU, Brazil, South Korea & Israel.
 
Thats quality makes srilanka jack in the pack. i.e. s.l. is quit favarable 4 every big power due to its stragic location
 
or until the Sethusamudram Ship Channel Project proposing to link the Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar between India and Sri Lanka by creating a shipping channel through
 
It is easy to understand what must be running through MS Dhoni’s mind. He has achieved many accomplishments in the last three years at the helm. Yet, as the World Cup 2011 beckons, the anxiety and despair among fans are similar to when India crashed out of the World Cup in the Caribbean four years ago.
 
What is India in for?

Summer is not only the best season to have a vacation but also time to think over some political events and revise, if necessary, existing political strategies. India is not an exception.

Major issues on the agenda are as follows: what links are there between Delhi's focus on polycentric world order and almost hidden but consistent steps aimed at changing India's position in global politics? Which strategy will be chosen to replace 'Nehru`s course' which is viewed by many as 'outdated' and no longer fitting into modern realia? Will India's altered foreign policy undermine 'unshakable' principles of political and economic sovereignty?

These are not empty questions, not least because these principles of political and economic sovereignty have consolidated the Indian people over the past 60 years. These principles allowed India steadily strengthen its autonomous position on international scene. India has never tried to have close links with only one state (or a few countries) so that not to harm its strategic interests.

Supporters of the idea of sovereignty think that India's independent position has now been put at risk as the country's relations with the U.S were granted a 'special status'.

The U.S. has become more active in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) with Washington trying to lure India into its long-term plans.

I think American strategists are being guided by three major tendencies:
1. Since the APR has become an epicenter of global economy, the U.S. urgently needs allies to protect its national interests in this huge region.
2. Despite relatively weak economic and military potential, the U.S is trying to regain its leadership over global market amid rapid economic growth in China and some other countries in the APR.
3. Washington wants to prevent China's geoeconomic and geopolitical expansion, which is an extremely difficult task since Russia is not going to counterbalance China in the APR and beyond, and because the economies of Japan, South Korea and some other countries of North-Eastern Asia depend on ties with China.

In these circumstances, the Obama administration has to revise what was said and done by their predecessors under George W. Bush, when 'special relations with India were used as means to deter China. A return to Bush's policy was approved by three authoritative circles in India: 1) private corporate sector- its members relying on 'strategic cooperation' with the U.S as the only way to make India 'an economic superpower' by 2030-2035. 2) growing middle class viewing America as an 'external guarantor' of new India's way of life in the face of rising China. 3) Generals and officers, most of them considering the U.S as 'producer and reliable supplier of the latest military technology. These people are said to have access to India's Defense Ministry, and have been insisting on making the US the main supplier of military hardware instead of Russia.
Economically prosperous and politically active Indian community in the U.S (over 3 million people already) adds stability to Washington-Delhi cooperation.

Apart from this, Americans have been persistently imposing their ideas on Indian scholars and students in hope for winning their approval of the US values.

Some Indian intellectuals believe that 'an American project' to shift India's foreign policy standards comes right on time amid favorable political circumstances within the country. The Communists and the Bharatiya Janata Party opposing the National Congress have become weaker due to a change of generations and a need for reforms. Certainly, 'the American project' differs from the US-led color revolutions in former Soviet republics and in some other places worldwide. But it is evident that the U.S has been trying to oust Indian leftist politicians from any of the ruling coalitions.
Finally, here comes the most evident proof that Delhi is included in Washington's geopolitical plans: the U.S has repeatedly demonstrated its interest in 'the union of four democracies' (US, Japan, Australia and India) with a possibility for South Korea to join this 'eastern NATO' (the way this project was dubbed in Beijing) in future.

Some left-wing intellectuals think that the 'project' is supervised by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who is viewed by the leading Indian journalists as 'a politician beyond politics' focusing only on social and economic reforms. In their opinion, it was Mr. Singh who approved 'a nuclear deal' as well as India's withdrawal from the non-proliferation regime. He also negotiated a possibility of buying from the US the latest models of weapons and hardware as well as many other initiatives involving cooperation with the US. They say the 'American project' will be a success when Mr. Singh hands over his duties to Rahul Gandhi, a son of Sonia and Rajiv Gandhi, who represents 'interests of the country's young generation'.

I think this is an exaggeration. I know it for sure: Manmohan Singh appreciates deep understanding of India by such prominent Soviet scholars like Gleriy Shirokov, Lev Reisner, Grigory Kotovsky and others. For both the prime minister and the leader of the Indian National Congress, Sonia Gandhi, strategic meaning of the Indian-Russian relations is obvious. However, in the past 15-20 years new factions have been formed in India, its members reminding Russia of its neglect towards Delhi under Yeltsin and growing geopolitical expansion of China in order to justify their disapproval of Nehru`s course. And right they are. I mean, unlike in previous years, India is not always successful as an arbiter capable to maintain balance in the society. By the way, the country's largest party-the Indian National Congress- enjoys support from only 28% of the voters.

So, India's course towards 'Americanization' is evident. Otherwise, how could we explain delays in delivery of 126 Russian multipurpose jets, India's passive stance on BRIC and RIC, and weak diplomatic activity at the Indian Embassy in Moscow? It is neither accidentally hearing some Indian diplomats describing Nehru's ideas as 'archaic'.

Of course, in the long run India's political course is determined through its people's will. But Moscow cannot turn a blind eye to a possibility of worsening relations with India. In these circumstances the Russian authorities should not wait any longer and get prepared to protect its interests in South Asia.

(Views expressed in this article reflect the author's opinion and do not necessarily reflect those of RIA Novosti news agency. RIA Novosti does not vouch for facts and quotes mentioned in the story)
 
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