Zarvan
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 28, 2011
- Messages
- 54,470
- Reaction score
- 87
- Country
- Location
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain
In irregular warfare and low intensity conflict, especially of the proxy kind, surprise remains an essential principle. It is achieved by terrorist controllers through choice of time, date and location of terrorist strikes. The nature of strike and the choice of objective also add weight to the surprise factor. It is always done by our adversary with full capability to deny his own hand in the support that he extends. However, once a pattern is established repetition is usually not expected but repetition of the modus operandi it appears is becoming the norm. This happens when it is appreciated by the adversary that our capacity to limit him is restricted and we are unable to launch a counter strategy. Gurdaspur was a manifestation of that. Pakistan has quite obviously done much homework in deciding its strategy, assessing weaknesses and appreciating the impact. The payoffs of the current strategy are apparently yet tactical but have a larger strategic orientation and intent.
In the field of security the best way to counter an adversary’s strategy is to first carry out an intelligence appreciation; this essentially involves getting into the mind of the planners on the other side and examining the intent, the methodology and the intended impact. This essay sets out to do such an analysis from a layman’s angle and commences with a survey of the existing situation and the ground.
It has been repeated ad nauseam that conduct of terrorist operations in the Kashmir Valley is proving difficult (although efforts to infiltrate and add to numbers and quality of terrorist presence are on the increase). To keep the proxy war alive even in the absence of kinetic strikes, Pakistan’s nexus of agencies has adopted symbolic actions which help in messaging; prime among them is the raising of flags of both the Islamic State and of Pakistan. In a net worked world, images of this flash within seconds helping spread the message that there is considerable turbulence in the Valley and that pro-Pakistan and pro-Islamic sentiment has substantially increased/returned. The aim is to project small unconnected events as mass movements multiplied on social media. This is clever thinking enhanced by frequent manipulation of the threat of Islamic State to India. To shroud the threat perception, mislead and manipulate deductions the combination of Pakistani and Islamic State flags is being effectively used. However, such messaging has a timeframe of effectiveness. It needs substantiation of an apparent struggle and images of flags have short term effect unless linked from time to time with higher profile actions. The relevance of actors such as LeT and JeM dilutes if they are seen to be only playing mind games through symbolic acts. An odd kinetic operation has to send home the message of their existence and their importance; after all not for nothing do they collect funds from the public in Pakistan’s Punjab province. These funds must translate into capability otherwise the perception will prevail that India’s security forces have got the better of these radical organizations. The choice of areas to execute such acts is wide but there are limitations too. It is difficult to penetrate the Valley or organize large strikes there. With rapid local recruitment it is not long before such acts could be perpetrated by recently inducted recruits to herald their arrival. However, till then Jammu region offers many advantages. The footprint of terror and militancy in the Valley and LoC sector of Jammu has reduced substantially and symbolically this is conveying India’s moral victory. Thus, ever since 2014 the IB sector has become the first choice due to the well reiterated reasons of easier infiltration, closer objectives and feasibility of exploitation of the highway for greater flexibility and choice of objectives. In the situation that the terrorist groups find themselves it is important to demonstrate capability in the extended region of both divisions, Jammu and Kashmir.
The extension of this zone to a segment of Punjab could be deliberate or incidental; it is as yet not easy to surmise anything after a single act. However, hypothetically the Ravi belt is the type of terrain which offers scope for infiltration despite wire obstacles and ‘nakas’ of the BSF. A terror strike in Punjab helps to build a larger threat perception against India forcing greater caution and higher costs for deployment and intelligence activity; all the ingredients of the ‘war by a thousand cuts’ which has been Pakistan’s pet scheme since the days of Zia ul Haq.
India is worried and it should be because besides the dismay in the public about the ease with which terrorists seem to be infiltrating and conducting terror acts from Jammu to north Punjab, there is the larger spectre of the Islamic State. It is not easy to assess the impact on youth although we have confidence in liberal ideology being the line that Indian youth takes. Mavericks and renegades in society are attracted to ideologies such as that of the Islamic State and it is commonly believed that an age of anti-materialism is upon us, much like the age of ‘hippy culture’ and ‘flower children’ of the Sixties. Those were against violence, the new age movements have depraved ideology believing in extreme violence.
How do we put an end to what is happening in the border belt of Jammu region and threatening to move into northern Punjab and perhaps extending further. The easiest option is to involve the Army; push it to deploy in the second tier of the counter infiltration grid; that has been done innumerable times starting with Operation Woodrose in 1984. I was a part of the second tier during the heyday of the Punjab militancy and was deployed at Bhikiwind and Khalra. The effectiveness was high with excellent coordination with the BSF but this is not the optimum option as an Army in peacetime has many more things to do than counter infiltration. In the LoC belt this task is performed as an incident to the deployment to oversee the sanctity of the LoC itself; as such it is acceptable. There the Rashtriya Rifles has also played a major role in reinforcing the density of deployment.
It has taken the Army almost twenty or more years of experience to deliver effectively at the LoC and make the same near impregnable although there are yet enough loopholes. Can this model be adopted in the Jammu and Punjab belt in conjunction with the experience of the BSF and Punjab Police acquired during the late eighties and early nineties? The LC counter infiltration grid is based upon a few concepts. Firstly, there is the physical presence of troops in the form of bases and ambushes reinforced by electronic surveillance and night vision devices. Secondly, the deployment is tiered with adequate layers to side step if infiltration is detected. Thirdly, reliance is on intelligence which over years has developed into a system with dissemination in almost real time without awaiting results of processing. Fourthly, the involvement of the leadership has ensured accountability; Commanding Officers and Brigade Commanders are wary of the possibility of the LoC Fence being cut in their areas of responsibility which is a sure indication of an undetected infiltration. This has helped in energizing the grid, keeping even staff officers awake at night and changing the body clock of soldiers. It is a 24x365 effort which has to be intelligently played out with changing seasons, inputs and continuously changing modus operandi.
The experience of the LoC needs to be transposed to the IB sector intelligently, adapting the best practices. If there is a need for greater technological footprint all emergent rules and procedures should be invoked to shorten the period of acquisition. I would go to the extent of employing the Army temporarily with time lines for withdrawal. It is an emergent national cause and the Army is the last resort while other resources are gathered.
Diplomatically, the debate will be on whether the Ufa agreement should be executed in letter and spirit or abrogated even before the ink is dry. I do recommend its continuation. The NDA government may like testing the waters of diplomacy with Pakistan and drawing fresh conclusions. Sometimes engagement gives the opportunity to read the mind of your adversary. The NSA and the DGMO meeting their counterparts will only help us understand the dynamics better and the choice to continue or withdraw still remains with us.
Lastly, there is enough intellectual capital in India's strategic community to come up with recommended measures to counter Pakistan’s strategy. It must remain in the loop and use its expertise to also sensitize the media from time to time. This is already being done to some extent but the consultative machinery needs some greater formalisation.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain's Blog : Gurdaspur and its after effects
In irregular warfare and low intensity conflict, especially of the proxy kind, surprise remains an essential principle. It is achieved by terrorist controllers through choice of time, date and location of terrorist strikes. The nature of strike and the choice of objective also add weight to the surprise factor. It is always done by our adversary with full capability to deny his own hand in the support that he extends. However, once a pattern is established repetition is usually not expected but repetition of the modus operandi it appears is becoming the norm. This happens when it is appreciated by the adversary that our capacity to limit him is restricted and we are unable to launch a counter strategy. Gurdaspur was a manifestation of that. Pakistan has quite obviously done much homework in deciding its strategy, assessing weaknesses and appreciating the impact. The payoffs of the current strategy are apparently yet tactical but have a larger strategic orientation and intent.
In the field of security the best way to counter an adversary’s strategy is to first carry out an intelligence appreciation; this essentially involves getting into the mind of the planners on the other side and examining the intent, the methodology and the intended impact. This essay sets out to do such an analysis from a layman’s angle and commences with a survey of the existing situation and the ground.
It has been repeated ad nauseam that conduct of terrorist operations in the Kashmir Valley is proving difficult (although efforts to infiltrate and add to numbers and quality of terrorist presence are on the increase). To keep the proxy war alive even in the absence of kinetic strikes, Pakistan’s nexus of agencies has adopted symbolic actions which help in messaging; prime among them is the raising of flags of both the Islamic State and of Pakistan. In a net worked world, images of this flash within seconds helping spread the message that there is considerable turbulence in the Valley and that pro-Pakistan and pro-Islamic sentiment has substantially increased/returned. The aim is to project small unconnected events as mass movements multiplied on social media. This is clever thinking enhanced by frequent manipulation of the threat of Islamic State to India. To shroud the threat perception, mislead and manipulate deductions the combination of Pakistani and Islamic State flags is being effectively used. However, such messaging has a timeframe of effectiveness. It needs substantiation of an apparent struggle and images of flags have short term effect unless linked from time to time with higher profile actions. The relevance of actors such as LeT and JeM dilutes if they are seen to be only playing mind games through symbolic acts. An odd kinetic operation has to send home the message of their existence and their importance; after all not for nothing do they collect funds from the public in Pakistan’s Punjab province. These funds must translate into capability otherwise the perception will prevail that India’s security forces have got the better of these radical organizations. The choice of areas to execute such acts is wide but there are limitations too. It is difficult to penetrate the Valley or organize large strikes there. With rapid local recruitment it is not long before such acts could be perpetrated by recently inducted recruits to herald their arrival. However, till then Jammu region offers many advantages. The footprint of terror and militancy in the Valley and LoC sector of Jammu has reduced substantially and symbolically this is conveying India’s moral victory. Thus, ever since 2014 the IB sector has become the first choice due to the well reiterated reasons of easier infiltration, closer objectives and feasibility of exploitation of the highway for greater flexibility and choice of objectives. In the situation that the terrorist groups find themselves it is important to demonstrate capability in the extended region of both divisions, Jammu and Kashmir.
The extension of this zone to a segment of Punjab could be deliberate or incidental; it is as yet not easy to surmise anything after a single act. However, hypothetically the Ravi belt is the type of terrain which offers scope for infiltration despite wire obstacles and ‘nakas’ of the BSF. A terror strike in Punjab helps to build a larger threat perception against India forcing greater caution and higher costs for deployment and intelligence activity; all the ingredients of the ‘war by a thousand cuts’ which has been Pakistan’s pet scheme since the days of Zia ul Haq.
India is worried and it should be because besides the dismay in the public about the ease with which terrorists seem to be infiltrating and conducting terror acts from Jammu to north Punjab, there is the larger spectre of the Islamic State. It is not easy to assess the impact on youth although we have confidence in liberal ideology being the line that Indian youth takes. Mavericks and renegades in society are attracted to ideologies such as that of the Islamic State and it is commonly believed that an age of anti-materialism is upon us, much like the age of ‘hippy culture’ and ‘flower children’ of the Sixties. Those were against violence, the new age movements have depraved ideology believing in extreme violence.
How do we put an end to what is happening in the border belt of Jammu region and threatening to move into northern Punjab and perhaps extending further. The easiest option is to involve the Army; push it to deploy in the second tier of the counter infiltration grid; that has been done innumerable times starting with Operation Woodrose in 1984. I was a part of the second tier during the heyday of the Punjab militancy and was deployed at Bhikiwind and Khalra. The effectiveness was high with excellent coordination with the BSF but this is not the optimum option as an Army in peacetime has many more things to do than counter infiltration. In the LoC belt this task is performed as an incident to the deployment to oversee the sanctity of the LoC itself; as such it is acceptable. There the Rashtriya Rifles has also played a major role in reinforcing the density of deployment.
It has taken the Army almost twenty or more years of experience to deliver effectively at the LoC and make the same near impregnable although there are yet enough loopholes. Can this model be adopted in the Jammu and Punjab belt in conjunction with the experience of the BSF and Punjab Police acquired during the late eighties and early nineties? The LC counter infiltration grid is based upon a few concepts. Firstly, there is the physical presence of troops in the form of bases and ambushes reinforced by electronic surveillance and night vision devices. Secondly, the deployment is tiered with adequate layers to side step if infiltration is detected. Thirdly, reliance is on intelligence which over years has developed into a system with dissemination in almost real time without awaiting results of processing. Fourthly, the involvement of the leadership has ensured accountability; Commanding Officers and Brigade Commanders are wary of the possibility of the LoC Fence being cut in their areas of responsibility which is a sure indication of an undetected infiltration. This has helped in energizing the grid, keeping even staff officers awake at night and changing the body clock of soldiers. It is a 24x365 effort which has to be intelligently played out with changing seasons, inputs and continuously changing modus operandi.
The experience of the LoC needs to be transposed to the IB sector intelligently, adapting the best practices. If there is a need for greater technological footprint all emergent rules and procedures should be invoked to shorten the period of acquisition. I would go to the extent of employing the Army temporarily with time lines for withdrawal. It is an emergent national cause and the Army is the last resort while other resources are gathered.
Diplomatically, the debate will be on whether the Ufa agreement should be executed in letter and spirit or abrogated even before the ink is dry. I do recommend its continuation. The NDA government may like testing the waters of diplomacy with Pakistan and drawing fresh conclusions. Sometimes engagement gives the opportunity to read the mind of your adversary. The NSA and the DGMO meeting their counterparts will only help us understand the dynamics better and the choice to continue or withdraw still remains with us.
Lastly, there is enough intellectual capital in India's strategic community to come up with recommended measures to counter Pakistan’s strategy. It must remain in the loop and use its expertise to also sensitize the media from time to time. This is already being done to some extent but the consultative machinery needs some greater formalisation.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain's Blog : Gurdaspur and its after effects
