muhammadhafeezmalik
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Dograi - The Last Battle of Lahore
In Lahore’s Bibi Pak Daman graveyard, sleeps Maj Ziauddin Uppal of 30 Heavy Regiment. The headstone on officer’s grave tell us that our Artillery Observer had embraced Shahadat on 17 Sep 1965 at Wagah. If we get a bit precise on location it was Dograi. Dograi, dear reader, (contrary to Indian claims) that was recaptured by ‘Qayyum’s valiant men.
Having defended BRBL on 6 Sep, defenders now decided to try their luck on attack. 22 Brigade under a courageous Brigadier Qayyum Sher launched a counter attack on 8 Sep. In the words of Major General Shoukat Riza, “Brigadier Qayyum Sher in his command jeep, moved unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star plate and pennant visible. This was something no troops worth their salt could ignore”
Dograi a village across the BRBL bridge from Batapur that was retaken by Qayyum Sher's valiant men on 8th September It was defended in strength and stayed with Pakistan till the final fight in which 16 Punjab would perish but not before giving a fight in their finest hour
The 15 Indian Division advance towards Lahore from Amritsar was led by 54 Brigade, made up of 3 Jat, 15 Dogra, and 13 Punjab infantry battalions. The advance was slowed by intense Pakistani artillery fire directed by forward observers whose accuracy was assisted by prominent concrete pillars along the border. These had been positioned over the years by survey units for just this eventuality. 3 Jat pushed ahead and crossed the bridge over the BRBD Canal at about 1000 hours on September 6, but were repulsed by 3 Baloch in fierce fighting around the Bata shoe factory and withdrew to the area of Dograi on the east bank. They were followed up by 3 Baloch and about fifty men got trapped on the west of the canal when Pakistani sappers blew up the bridge (and most of the other as well) during the night of September 6/7. Throughout the day the PAF conducted ground attack missions on elements of 15 Division with considerable effect, thus lessening the pressure on 10 Division’s forward localities.
Col Jha recounts that by 2 PM, due to non-arrival of reinforcements, 3 Jat’s situation across the Canal was becoming extremely precarious with every passing moment. The Unit’s vehicles, carrying ammunition for immediate replenishment as well as four out of six anti-tank RCL guns were also damaged due to strafing by PAF F-86 fighter jets and hence not unavailable to the unit. Lack of reinforcements, inadequate air and artillery support plus breakdown in communications further aggravated the situation so Headquarter had to order retreat.
It was during defensive phase at Dograi on night 17/18 that we lost Major Uppal to Indian artillery shelling. A day before Lieutenant Iftikhar of 23 Cavalry had embraced shahadat. A few nights ago on 11/12 September yet another incident happened that was to have grave consequences in coming days for Dograi Defenders.
It was the night of 11/12 September, when 16 Punjab having lost some ground tried to recapture it with tanks. B Squadron of 23 Cavalry, while advancing along the GT Road ran into an anti-tank screen. Major Muhammad Sarwar while in his tank, crossed the road to check on a troop leader that was not moving. It was while re-crossing the road that an anti tank recoilless rifle knocked out his M 48 tank which blew up killing all the crew. B Squadron would remain without a squadron commander, but more on it later in the post.
Indian attack came on night 21/22 Sep. At 2300 hrs in Phase One 13 Punjab and 15 Dogra attacked the front two companies of Pakistani 16 Punjab. 3 Jat would go to the depth companies each of 8 Punjab and 12 Punjab in Phase Two. B Squadron of 23 Cavalry was required to protect the northern flank of 16 Punjab.
Forward companies of 16 Punjab under intense shelling fought bravely. With MG fire and grenades they broke the frontal attacks of Indian 13 Punjab and 15 Dogra. Attacking dead were found within 10-20 yards of forward line. As all of this was happening tanks of 23 Cavalry were nowhere to be found.
Friends, it is a famous saying that luck favors the brave. As the brigade approached the target in the second phase of the attack, Lt Col Desmond Hayde, CO 3 Jat was unaware that the tanks of the defending army were missing from the front and a large gap in the defensive fronts would greet them. This was all they knew by the message from Brigades through wireless that Phase 1 of Brigade Attack on Dograi had failed. This won't deter him an inch, he is credited to have said those iconic words “Zinda ya murda, Dograi mein milna hey”, they only knew that if not now, then never.
Regardless of the outcome, the brave 3-Jat raid presented them with the gift of the Dograi front.
“Up ahead they see Dograi lit up by gunfire as if on a Diwali night.”
Decades later Rachna Bisht Rawat will meet a few who attacked Dograi that night. She would bring us stories, direct from the battlefield.
“It’s 1:40 am when Delta, the first attacking company, hits Dograi, guns blazing.”
Captain Kapil Singh Thapa was in Delta Company. Towards north-eastern edge of Dograi Village he was seen assaulting three trenches single handed. As he sits down to change his magazine, a bullet rips through helmet into his head. He earned Maha Veer Chakra.
Major Asa Ram Tyagi was commanding Alpha Company. Despite bullet wounds he led his troops onto objective. In close quarter combat he is said to have bayoneted a Pakistani officer. Himself shot at close range and badly bayoneted he would later succumb to his injuries on Sep 25
Major Tyagi was awarded Maha Vir Chakra. Indian accounts claim the Pakistani officer meeting his end by the bayonet of Maj Tyagi was Major Nazar of 23 Cav, but in reality he was on the west bank of BRBL. This gallant officer in all probability was Major Mazhar Hussain Shah of 8 Punjab.
Maj Nazar’s A Squadron was ordered to relieve commander-less B Squadron. For some unexplained reasons they would stay west of BRBL reporting they had reached Dograi. With B Squadron already gone Lieutenant Colonel Golwala CO 16 Punjab knew 3 Jats was about to get a walkover.
Major Nazar was ordered to take three tanks from his troop and two from headquarters and take command of the squadron, which had only two tanks left. This army of tanks filled the gap on the left flank of the 16 Punjab defense companies. But due to unknown reasons, Major Nazar tanks were removed from Dograi and moved towards Bhasan village in tha North.
This was the first nail in the coffin of 16 Punjab that Major Nazir threw on the night of the attack. The second nail was struck by Delta Company of 12 Punjab which was defending behind the lines of 16 Punjab. On the night of the attack, when the first phase of attack collapsed and Colonel Golwala knew that tanks were nowhere to be seen.
So at one o'clock in the night, he rushed to the brigade headquarters with a request for tank fire support to Lieutenant Iftikhar and at the same time ordered the 12 Delta Company of Punjab, which was defending in depth behind him, to send a fighting patrol to his left wing so that the enemy could not find a way to attack from there.
The tanks did not come but the Delta Company Commander also did not send a fighting patrol due to unknown reasons. In the second phase of the attack, when the 3 Jats were knocking at the door of the deep defense, there were no tanks, no fighting patrols, but, as per the Punjabi proverb, a Rarra Maidan (empty field).
The two companies behind the 16th Punjab, the Delta Company of the 12th Punjab and the Charlie Company of the 8th Punjab, retreated across the canal with heavy losses. Now General Mehmood says that 3 Jats got a walkover on Dograi, but Monsoon War of Amarinder Singh and General Tejinder Sher Gul gives us the details of 3 Jats attack.
The Indian Attack
At the dawn of September 22, two companies of the 16th Punjab had engaged the enemy on both sides. In front of them were 13 Punjab and 15 Dogra troops and 14 horse tanks and behind them were 3 Jat soldiers. When Captain Nasir Nawaz Janjua of 16 Punjab turned back to get the news from behind, he did not find 8 Punjab nor 12 Punjab soldiers.
Rather, they were countered by 3 Jats. Captain Janjua, along with the drivers and the number of soldiers counted at hand, somehow managed to get across the canal and reported the situation to the brigade headquarters, but by then it was too late.
In the early morning of September 22, 16 Punjab soldiers saw the machine guns of 14 horse tanks coming from the front and 3 Jats behind them firing indiscriminately from the rooftops of Dograi village. Colonel Golwala preferred to fight rather than surrender.
The men of the platoon with rocket launchers came out from the fronts shouting the last slogan in a frenzy. Before they could target the tanks, they were martyred by 14 Horse's machine guns. The rifle-bearers remained in the front until the end, carrying their spears in with passion of pure calmness. At the same time, they came out in front of the attackers and said that if they go, they should take one or two with them and surrender their lives. Those who survived the front shock were brought down by the fire of the rear platoon.
By 0800 hrs the battle was over for 16 Punjab. 56 soldiers including two officers,, Second Lieutenant Akhtar and Captain Sagheer, were martyred on the battlefield. The latter was awarded Sitara e Jurrat. Lieutenant Colonel Golwala badly wounded was among the prisoners. He earned a well deserved Sitara e Jurrat.
Lieutenant Muhammad Akhtar, whose service was just a few days, was among the bodies of fifty-six martyrs scattered on the battlefield. Also, there was Captain Sagheer Ahmed, who was awarded the SJ after his martyrdom. 70 soldiers were taken as prisoner, including forty wounded, Colonel Golwala was also among badly injured.
a popular Haryanvi song commemorates Battle of Dograi
کہے سنے کی بات نہ بولوں، گاؤں دیکھی بھئی
تین جاٹ کی کتھا سناؤں، سن لے میرے بھائی
اکیس ستمبر رات گھنیری، حملہ جاٹوں نے ماری
دشمن میں مچ گئی کھلبلی، کانپ اُٹھی ڈوگرئی
Consequently, on September 22, a hasty counter-attack was launched against the Reserve Division at Dograi in broad daylight. When this counter-attack force which consisted of 1 Baloch Regiment and 23 Cavalry tanks reached the gathering point of Wahgariyan, they received effective fire from artillery and anti-tank weapons.
On September 22, on the day that Dograi was lost, according to the United Nations resolution, the ceasefire was to be implemented at twelve o'clock on the same day but on India's insistence, this period was extended till 3 am on September 23. No one reported this delay in implementation of ceasefire to Pakistan's 10 Division Commander General Sarfraz.
Captain Harinder Kumar Jah of 3 Jats was among those who fought on the Dograi front. He mentions the meeting of his commanding officer, Col. Desmond Head, with the CO of 3 Baloch, Col. Tajumal Malik, which took place on the banks of the BRB canal after the ceasefire.
There was also mention of the constancy of the Jats and the gallant defeat of the 16th Punjab, and at the end of a bravely fought battle, both sides parted hand in hand in good spirits and in good military tradition.
India’s central axis in the Lahore sector was directed north-west towards Lahore and was intended to cross the BRBD Canal near Burki, a hamlet about 400 metres on the eastern side of the canal defended by a company of 17 Punjab, part of the two-company covering force of 13 Infantry Brigade. The company commander, Major Aziz Bhatti, thoroughly deserved the award of the Nishan-i-Haider, and his men also fought bravely. (My father was in that Haideri Battalion).
Whatever the cause, the battles on the line of the canal were savage. 50 Brigade attacked the isolated group of 3 Baluch on 7 and 8 September but failed to dislodge them. The commander of 15 (Indian) Division was replaced (coincidently as later his counterpart in the Pakistan 15 Division was removed from the Sialkot sector), for failure to reinforce success in crossing the canal and for withdrawing under pressure. ‘Under a new GOC,’ says a neutral country’s intelligence report, ‘the Indian forces on this axis probed and counter-attacked continuously up to September 23, but made no headway.’ This is correct as far as it goes, but the battles were see-saw, with both sides’ infantry and armour attacking and counter-attacking under artillery fire and suffering heavy casualties whose evacuation was extremely difficult. Gallantry was not as one-sided as claimed by the historian Gulzar Ahmed. Describing the Batapur-Dograi fighting, he wrote: The Indian commander now calculated the economics of killing Pakistani soldiers in terms of rupees and felt that considering the family pensions and children’s allowances to be paid to the families of the dead it was cheaper to confine to artillery shelling. It was also a safer method of passing the day.
This type of diatribe does not befit a gentleman and is regrettable as it demeans the soldiers of both sides, who fought bravely and with skill. It is true that an Indian writer states, ‘in a series of actions up to 18 September, battalion and brigade commanders in 15 Division sector displayed a conspicuous lack of the killer instinct and a marked disinclination to take risks,’ but attacks were put in against 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch on 12 September and again between the 14 and 16 and on the night of the 21/22 September. All were repulsed, but 3 Jat’s attack of 22 September, just before the cease-fire, got through to Dograi. Risk-taking succeeded in the end; but over five hundred men (about 250 from each side) died for the sake of a few square miles of ground.
India’s central axis in the Lahore sector was directed north-west towards Lahore and was intended to cross the BRBD Canal near Burki, a hamlet about 400 metres on the eastern side of the canal defended by a company of 17 Punjab, part of the two-company covering force of 13 Infantry Brigade. The company commander, Major Aziz Bhatti, thoroughly deserved the award of the Nishan-i-Haider, and his men also fought bravely. Claims that the area of Burki and Nurpur/Hudiara (half-way between the border and the BRBD Canal) was strongly defended appear incorrect. If an examination is made of units available to Pakistan Army on 6–10 September, and where they were in other sectors according to Indian and independent sources, it can be calculated that the Burki-Nurpur area was not well-defended — indeed, to the point of indicating poor planning. There were, however, about a dozen pill-boxes camouflaged to resemble huts, each occupied by three-man heavy machine-gun teams, and the area was mined. Perhaps it should have been obvious that the three main roads leading to Lahore from India would be important to an advance because the bridges crossing the BRBD Canal along these routes would be of a higher load-carrying capability than any others in the area. Militarily, it was not exactly brilliant to choose them as axes because, if an advance is aligned to a straight-line road (thus making it easier for planners and logisticians to calculate the times and places of the attacking troops to facilitate the business of movement, communications and resupply), once it is detected by the opposition it can work to the advantage of the defender rather than the attacker. HQ 1 Corps Pakistan Army did not appear to realize this tactic, although it certainly was gauged correctly by the PAF, whose attacks were devastating.
Gulzar Ahmed observed that “The battle of Burki shall ever remain an epic story of intense heroism, cool courage and dauntless spirit of a handful of men opposing immensely larger forces,” and that summed it up very well.
It appears that the Indian advance towards Lahore via Burki was slowed by Pakistani troops and the Rangers in the Nurpur-Hudiara area and along the axis to the canal at Burki, but that their numbers were not as large as claimed by some commentators, although there was a strong Pakistani artillery presence in the shape of two regiments, one each of field and medium guns, and a battery of 8-inch heavy guns. The Nurpur-Hudiara area could be seen from specially-constructed observation posts in Burki, and artillery observers directed fire on the advance to the rear and flanks. The reason for the advance being slow is probably that forward troops were hesitant about pressing on through or around the opposition, not realizing that the area was very lightly defended. In difficult country with poor observation, as in the flatlands around Burki, it is not possible to assess immediately what size of force might be blocking an advance. A quick platoon attack might flush out an infantry section placed specifically to delay an advance, and after having done so another platoon can press on without the momentum of the advance having been interrupted for any appreciable time — or the intended ‘quick’ platoon attack might run into a battalion, in which case there is always a muddle in trying to extricate the unfortunate platoon whose commander was simply bearing in mind Field Marshal Slim’s dictum that the first duty of an advance guard is to advance. The Indians did not advance quickly and could not take Burki on the run. The Pakistanis failed to reinforce the company at Burki and relied on artillery to break up the attacks, which it did for the initial three days. “Enemy artillery,” says one Indian commentator, “fired more than 2000 shells in 30 minutes,” but at 2000 hours on 10 September the Indians put in a brigade attack (4 Sikh and 16 Punjab) which succeeded in reaching Burki. The bridge across the canal had been blown and, in spite of drawing up to the canal, the Indians could not force a crossing. There was stalemate on the central axis, as on the northern.
India’s advance was blunted and the defenders were able to hold their positions and prevent penetration of the vital ground between Sialkot and Lahore. It appears that the Indian aim was simply to attack where it considered the enemy was weak and to gain as much ground as possible while endeavouring to keep their enemy off balance. Exploitation would come later, were either the Lahore or the Sialkot offensive to be successful. This is a perfectly understandable aim, and one that might just have been achieved had it not been for the stubborn resistance and remarkable gallantry of numerically inferior Pakistani formations.
The war ended on September 23, 1965. Both countries’ economies were badly affected and their defence forces had suffered casualties and losses. There was no victor, in the classic sense of the word, but important military lessons had been learned. Let us hope that, fifty years later, they will not have to be put into practice.
Sources: 1- https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/detail/MTA5OA==.html
2- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dograi
3- http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/battle-of-dograi-reminisces-of-a-war-veteran/
4- https://www.meemainseen.com/2019/09/dograi/
