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Behind Enemy Lines (Major Munawar Awan and His Ghaznavi Force)

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Major Munawar Awan joined Indian Military Academy Dehradun in 1940, joined British Indian Army and was posted in 1/14th Punjab Regiment (Present 5 Punjab). During WW II 1/14th Punjab Regiment was sent to Burma to defend the City of Rangoon where British forces were facing heavy odds against Japanese. Finally Japanese captured Rangoon and captured most of the British Troops including 1/14th Punjab Regiment. During years of capitivity, the Indian National Army movement was launched by Subhash Chandra Bose who was looking for voulenteers in the Japanese Prision Camps. He delivered enthusasitc lectures to Officers and Men of British Indian Army in captivity, resultantly 80% of 1/14th Including Officers and Men (Less British) joined INA and it was 1/14th that formed the base of INA producing reknown heros of INA like than Captain Shahnawaz Khan, Captain (Later Col) Kiyani, Capt Ram Singh. Munawar was one of them.
Subsequently These men fought against British troops in battles to come and Munawar than young Lieut was promoted to Captain, he assumed commanded the 1st Battalion of 2nd Guerilla Regiment of INA in battle of Imphal when the Commanding officer was hit and injured.
After Japanese retreat from Burma like most of other INA officers and men, Munawar was captured and placed in solitary confinement in Multan Jail waiting for death sentence for his defiance to king.
But meanwhile, the partition occurred and like other INA personal Munawar was released and opted to go to Pakistan and settled with a local buisness.
Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah who had heard of Munawar's INA achievements wrote to him and offered him service with Pakistan Army at the same rank. Munawar joined his own unit the ex 1/14th Punjab now recommissioned as 5 Punjab "Sher Dil Ki Paltan". In 1964 Munawar's services were given to govt of AJ&K and was sent on deputation to Azad Kashmir Regular Force (AKRF) and posted to 21st Battalion of AKRF (later 21 AK).
In July 1965 Operation Gibraltar was planned and 9 Groups were established out of AKRF units with a mix of local Razakars and few SSG personal for explosive ordnance handling.
9 Groups named after famous Muslim Conqurers were established and inflitrated in Indian Occupied Kashmir from Sectors throughout AJ&K.
1=OPERATION GIBRALTAR
Infiltration of these forces started by the end of July 1965 through different sectors. Ghaznavi Force with all its strength and equipment was launched through Kotli, Khoi Rata and Nakial Sectors into Darhal Malkan, Rajouri, Kandi, Budhil,thanamandi,mehndar and sarankot. Major Munawar had chosen Green Plains around sanasar lake as his Force Headquarter. A Para drop site was also established for PAF Aircraft to drop supplies in these plains around this lake. Munawar assigned one company under Capt. Sher Ahmed to warpal malkan and thana mandi, other company under Capt Maqsod Hussain Shah to Budhil and Kundi in the North East of Rajouri. Company each under command Capt. Muhammad Din and Capt. Khursheed were sent to carryout Guerilla actions in Huqa pani,mehndar,pir kali and sarankot. Capt. Mohsin was tasked to carryout Operations in the Bhimbar Sector,Noushera,Sandar bani and Jungles of Kali Dhaar. By 6 August Ghaznavi Force captured Budhil and had formed Revolutionary Councils for Kandi and Budhil headed by Faqeer Muhammad and Sardar Hussain Buxsh respectively. From August to September the force carried out various activities throughout Mehdar,Rajouri,Thana and Budhil areas to block and inflict damage on Indian Army movements, depots,units and headquarters besides urging local Kashmirs to revolt. Some of the recorded actions were:

a- ENCOUNTER AT KSENI HILL:
On 1000hours night 14 August troops of Ghaznavi Force blocked the Indian Army's supply route by blowing up 6 bridges constructed over Tavi river. This was the first major action since arrival into the area. Indian Army reacted by launching a Multi Directional Attack on 8 August on Budhil but Ghaznavi stood its ground. Major Munawar laid a skillful ambush at Kseni Hill, from where Ghaznavi Force struck the crossing columns of Indian Army forcing them to retreat with heavy casualties. By 18 August, Budhil, Kandi and all the adjoining areas were under Ghaznavi's Control and a large number of locals volunteered to join it

b-CLASH AT MOHAR MALAI
On 1 September Munawar sent a company of Ghaznavi Force to capture Riyasi under Lieutenant Khadim Hussain, after crossing Panchi mountain they crossed Tavi,then started moving towards Mohar Malai. On 2 September at 1000hrs Khadim's Company reached Mohar Malai and unexpectedly came into confrontation with resting troops of a company of Indian Army destined for Raj Nagar. A brief firefight took place in which 21 Indians were killed and Khadim lost six of his own men. The rest of the Indian Company retreated towards Raj Nagar.
c-BATTLE OF PALMA (RAJOURI)
By 4 September All the Forces of Operation Gibraltar less Ghaznavi were either trapped, destroyed or had withdrawn back to Pak and the operation had virtually ended. Ghaznavi launched its initial offensive for Rajouri by an assault on Munawar Pass (Named after Major Munawar After the war) a strategically located pass in Pir Panjal Range and captured It after inflicting heavy casualties on Indian troops. On 12 September 1965 0200hrs Ghaznavi Force initiated its attack on Palma from three directions. Palma was the Garrison and Cantonment of Rajouri City housing Headquarters of Indian Army's 25th Infantry Division and a Regiment of Infantry. Palma was attacked by Munawar with a strength of more than thousand individuals mostly the locals. Palma was soon filled with terrifying noise of gunfight between Ghaznavids and Indian Troops. Indian Infantry Battalion was caught off guard. Divisional Headquarters was hastily shifted away from Palma while the Indians lost more than 200 men. Ghaznavi Force losses were 115 killed and more than 150 Injured. Palma was finally Captured together with Rajouri City by 13 September 1965.
4-ENCOUNTER AT RAMBAN BRIDGE
Ghaznavi Force fought its last action at the Battle of Ramban Bridge where Munawar with his Ghaznavi Force skillfully trapped and ambushed Indian 3rd Kamaon Regiment sent under Lt-Col Sinha to recapture Rajouri. It was forced to pursue Ghaznavi Force elements in the Nullah Depth by an ambush and was inflicted with very heavy losses once it moved down the Nullah forcing it to retreat leaving its dead, injured and equipment behind. India ultimately announced head money worth Rs 10,00000 for killing Ghaznavi force Commander Major Munawar.

2-FAILURE OF OPERATION GIBRALTAR A MISCONCEPTION
As the Ghaznavi Force has occupied 500sq Km inside Enemy Territory and was in possession of it even by the time cease fire occurred (can be confirmed from books: IndoPak War 1965 by Lt Gen (r) Mahmod Ahmed, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis. by Col Vivek Chadha of Indian Army and War Dispatches 1965 by Lt Gen (r) Harbakhsh Singh than GOC in C Indian Army Western Command 22 Fateful Days for India by D.R.Mankekar, The untold Story by Gen B.M.Kaul, History of AK Regiment vol-II)
It is very much clear than Operation Gibraltar managed to attain it's Objective partially, It was the Capture of Rajoui region by Munawar that served as the basis of Operation Grandslam to capture Akhnor which was adjacent to Rajouri and capture Akhnor would cut India from Kashmir.
Had the Rajouri not been captured Grandslam would have never taken place as Akhnor even if captured could have been easily sandwiched between Indians from both Punjab and Rajouri.
There is none except Major Munawar Khan SJ, in Indo-Pak Armies who had secured and controlled this much of area in one theatre of war during 1965. Had the paper tiger Gen Yahya Khan not involved himself in the rapidly progressing Operation Grand Slam brilliantly planed by Gen Akhtar Malik, Pakistan Army would have conveniently carried out link up with Rajouri already under the administrative control of Major Munawar Khan SJ. The Map of Kashmir would have changed. A large number of Indian security forces in IOK would have surrendered and India would not have dared to open a front on International Border. But alas……….. Another sad and strange part of the story is that despite the fact Major Munawar Khan controlled and administered 500 sq km area in IOK, he was awarded with just a Sitara-e-Jurat by the govt of Pakistan. According to the memoirs of few senior AK officials and other reliable sources, Gen Akhtar Malik had recommended and discussed Major Munawar’s case with Gen Ayub, Gen Musa and AK president Abdul Hamid Khan for award of both Nishan-e-Haidar and Hilal-e-Kashmir to the officer for his extra ordinary gallantry and miraculous achievements. But Gen Akhtar Malik was told by Gen Ayub that he was proud of Major Munawar Khan and no doubt he was King of Rajouri but Nishan-e-Haidar could only be awarded to a martyred and AK president regretted on the pretext that since the area of Rajouri-Budil Region captured by Major Munawar had been vacated and returned to India after UN mandated Cease Fire, therefore AK legislative assembly was not going to sanction this award (What a logic). Whereas on the other hand Major Ranjeet Singh Dayal captured Haji Pir Pass just 8 km inside AK, without any resistance by the Pakistani Troops and he was awarded Mahavir Chakara. Both the places Rajouri-Budil Region and Haji Pir Pass had strategic importance but are there any comparison between the achievements of both the officers? Control of Rajouri-Budil Region placed Pakistan in a strong bargaining position. Hence it is suggested that we must include the chapters in our books/articles regarding failures of GIBRALTAR Operation as well as the great achievements/successes of GHAZNAVI Force.

3-WITHDRAWL
Ghaznavi Force was the only Force out of all 9 Forces established as part of Operation Gibraltar, that remained intact and firmly held its ground until the end of the conflict, it continued to dominate western and south western jammu till the end of the war and welcomed the UN observers who landed in Rajouri to monitor Ceasefire. It was withdrawan (despite protests by its commander who feared Indian retaliation against local population) back to Pakistan after the ceasefire on 22 September 1965 and was later disbanded

4-AWARD:
Munawar was awarded the Sitara e Jurat for his actions in the Rajouri valley, and was also referred to as the "King of Rajouri" by Field Marshal Ayub Khan. He died a few years later and was buried in his native village Jhatla, District Chakwal.

5-MEMORIAL:
Munawar Pass, a pass in pir panjal mountain range north of Pir ki Gali overlooking the town of Rajouri in Indian Kashmir was named after Major Munawar by the locals.
 

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Major Munawar Awan joined Indian Military Academy Dehradun in 1938, joined British Indian Army and was posted in 1/14th Punjab Regiment (Present 5 Punjab). During WW II 1/14th Punjab Regiment was sent to Burma to defend the City of Rangoon where British forces were facing heavy odds against Japanese. Finally Japanese captured Rangoon and captured most of the British Troops including 1/14th Punjab Regiment. During years of capitivity, the Indian National Army movement was launched by Subhash Chandra Bose who was looking for voulenteers in the Japanese Prision Camps. He delivered enthusasitc lectures to Officers and Men of British Indian Army in captivity, resultantly 80% of 1/14th Including Officers and Men (Less British) joined INA and it was 1/14th that formed the base of INA producing reknown heros of INA like than Captain Shahnawaz Khan, Captain (Later Col) Kiyani, Capt Ram Singh. Munawar was one of them.
Subsequently These men fought against British troops in battles to come and Munawar than young Lieut was promoted to Captain, he assumed commanded the 1st Battalion of 2nd Guerilla Regiment of INA in battle of Imphal when the Commanding officer was hit and injured.
After Japanese retreat from Burma like most of other INA officers and men, Munawar was captured and placed in solitary confinement in Multan Jail waiting for death sentence for his defiance to king.
But meanwhile, the partition occurred and like other INA personal Munawar was released and opted to go to Pakistan and settled with a local buisness.
Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah who had heard of Munawar's INA achievements wrote to him and offered him service with Pakistan Army at the same rank. Munawar joined his own unit the ex 1/14th Punjab now recommissioned as 5 Punjab "Sher Dil Ki Paltan". In 1964 Munawar's services were given to govt of AJ&K and was sent on deputation to Azad Kashmir Regular Force (AKRF) and posted to 21st Battalion of AKRF (later 21 AK).
In July 1965 Operation Gibraltar was planned and 9 Groups were established out of AKRF units with a mix of local Razakars and few SSG personal for explosive ordnance handling.
9 Groups named after famous Muslim Conqurers were established and inflitrated in Indian Occupied Kashmir from Sectors throughout AJ&K.
1=OPERATION GIBRALTAR
Infiltration of these forces started by the end of July 1965 through different sectors. Ghaznavi Force with all its strength and equipment was launched through Kotli, Khoi Rata and Nakial Sectors into Darhal Malkan, Rajouri, Kandi, Budhil,thanamandi,mehndar and sarankot. Major Munawar had chosen Green Plains around sanasar lake as his Force Headquarter. A Para drop site was also established for PAF Aircraft to drop supplies in these plains around this lake. Munawar assigned one company under Capt. Sher Ahmed to warpal malkan and thana mandi, other company under Capt Maqsod Hussain Shah to Budhil and Kundi in the North East of Rajouri. Company each under command Capt. Muhammad Din and Capt. Khursheed were sent to carryout Guerilla actions in Huqa pani,mehndar,pir kali and sarankot. Capt. Mohsin was tasked to carryout Operations in the Bhimbar Sector,Noushera,Sandar bani and Jungles of Kali Dhaar. By 6 August Ghaznavi Force captured Budhil and had formed Revolutionary Councils for Kandi and Budhil headed by Faqeer Muhammad and Sardar Hussain Buxsh respectively. From August to September the force carried out various activities throughout Mehdar,Rajouri,Thana and Budhil areas to block and inflict damage on Indian Army movements, depots,units and headquarters besides urging local Kashmirs to revolt. Some of the recorded actions were:

a- ENCOUNTER AT KSENI HILL:
On 1000hours night 14 August troops of Ghaznavi Force blocked the Indian Army's supply route by blowing up 6 bridges constructed over Tavi river. This was the first major action since arrival into the area. Indian Army reacted by launching a Multi Directional Attack on 8 August on Budhil but Ghaznavi stood its ground. Major Munawar laid a skillful ambush at Kseni Hill, from where Ghaznavi Force struck the crossing columns of Indian Army forcing them to retreat with heavy casualties. By 18 August, Budhil, Kandi and all the adjoining areas were under Ghaznavi's Control and a large number of locals volunteered to join it

b-CLASH AT MOHAR MALAI
On 1 September Munawar sent a company of Ghaznavi Force to capture Riyasi under Lieutenant Khadim Hussain, after crossing Panchi mountain they crossed Tavi,then started moving towards Mohar Malai. On 2 September at 1000hrs Khadim's Company reached Mohar Malai and unexpectedly came into confrontation with resting troops of a company of Indian Army destined for Raj Nagar. A brief firefight took place in which 21 Indians were killed and Khadim lost six of his own men. The rest of the Indian Company retreated towards Raj Nagar.
c-BATTLE OF PALMA (RAJOURI)
By 4 September All the Forces of Operation Gibraltar less Ghaznavi were either trapped, destroyed or had withdrawn back to Pak and the operation had virtually ended. Ghaznavi launched its initial offensive for Rajouri by an assault on Munawar Pass (Named after Major Munawar After the war) a strategically located pass in Pir Panjal Range and captured It after inflicting heavy casualties on Indian troops. On 12 September 1965 0200hrs Ghaznavi Force initiated its attack on Palma from three directions. Palma was the Garrison and Cantonment of Rajouri City housing Headquarters of Indian Army's 25th Infantry Division and a Regiment of Infantry. Palma was attacked by Munawar with a strength of more than thousand individuals mostly the locals. Palma was soon filled with terrifying noise of gunfight between Ghaznavids and Indian Troops. Indian Infantry Battalion was caught off guard. Divisional Headquarters was hastily shifted away from Palma while the Indians lost more than 200 men. Ghaznavi Force losses were 115 killed and more than 150 Injured. Palma was finally Captured together with Rajouri City by 13 September 1965.
4-ENCOUNTER AT RAMBAN BRIDGE
Ghaznavi Force fought its last action at the Battle of Ramban Bridge where Munawar with his Ghaznavi Force skillfully trapped and ambushed Indian 3rd Kamaon Regiment sent under Lt-Col Sinha to recapture Rajouri. It was forced to pursue Ghaznavi Force elements in the Nullah Depth by an ambush and was inflicted with very heavy losses once it moved down the Nullah forcing it to retreat leaving its dead, injured and equipment behind. India ultimately announced head money worth Rs 10,00000 for killing Ghaznavi force Commander Major Munawar.

2-FAILURE OF OPERATION GIBRALTAR A MISCONCEPTION
As the Ghaznavi Force has occupied 500sq Km inside Enemy Territory and was in possession of it even by the time cease fire occurred (can be confirmed from books: IndoPak War 1965 by Lt Gen (r) Mahmod Ahmed, Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis. by Col Vivek Chadha of Indian Army and War Dispatches 1965 by Lt Gen (r) Harbakhsh Singh than GOC in C Indian Army Western Command 22 Fateful Days for India by D.R.Mankekar, The untold Story by Gen B.M.Kaul, History of AK Regiment vol-II)
It is very much clear than Operation Gibraltar managed to attain it's Objective partially, It was the Capture of Rajoui region by Munawar that served as the basis of Operation Grandslam to capture Akhnor which was adjacent to Rajouri and capture Akhnor would cut India from Kashmir.
Had the Rajouri not been captured Grandslam would have never taken place as Akhnor even if captured could have been easily sandwiched between Indians from both Punjab and Rajouri.
There is none except Major Munawar Khan SJ, in Indo-Pak Armies who had secured and controlled this much of area in one theatre of war during 1965. Had the paper tiger Gen Yahya Khan not involved himself in the rapidly progressing Operation Grand Slam brilliantly planed by Gen Akhtar Malik, Pakistan Army would have conveniently carried out link up with Rajouri already under the administrative control of Major Munawar Khan SJ. The Map of Kashmir would have changed. A large number of Indian security forces in IOK would have surrendered and India would not have dared to open a front on International Border. But alas……….. Another sad and strange part of the story is that despite the fact Major Munawar Khan controlled and administered 500 sq km area in IOK, he was awarded with just a Sitara-e-Jurat by the govt of Pakistan. According to the memoirs of few senior AK officials and other reliable sources, Gen Akhtar Malik had recommended and discussed Major Munawar’s case with Gen Ayub, Gen Musa and AK president Abdul Hamid Khan for award of both Nishan-e-Haidar and Hilal-e-Kashmir to the officer for his extra ordinary gallantry and miraculous achievements. But Gen Akhtar Malik was told by Gen Ayub that he was proud of Major Munawar Khan and no doubt he was King of Rajouri but Nishan-e-Haidar could only be awarded to a martyred and AK president regretted on the pretext that since the area of Rajouri-Budil Region captured by Major Munawar had been vacated and returned to India after UN mandated Cease Fire, therefore AK legislative assembly was not going to sanction this award (What a logic). Whereas on the other hand Major Ranjeet Singh Dayal captured Haji Pir Pass just 8 km inside AK, without any resistance by the Pakistani Troops and he was awarded Mahavir Chakara. Both the places Rajouri-Budil Region and Haji Pir Pass had strategic importance but are there any comparison between the achievements of both the officers? Control of Rajouri-Budil Region placed Pakistan in a strong bargaining position. Hence it is suggested that we must include the chapters in our books/articles regarding failures of GIBRALTAR Operation as well as the great achievements/successes of GHAZNAVI Force.

3-WITHDRAWL
Ghaznavi Force was the only Force out of all 9 Forces established as part of Operation Gibraltar, that remained intact and firmly held its ground until the end of the conflict, it continued to dominate western and south western jammu till the end of the war and welcomed the UN observers who landed in Rajouri to monitor Ceasefire. It was withdrawan (despite protests by its commander who feared Indian retaliation against local population) back to Pakistan after the ceasefire on 22 September 1965 and was later disbanded

4-AWARD:
Munawar was awarded the Sitara e Jurat for his actions in the Rajouri valley, and was also referred to as the "King of Rajouri" by Field Marshal Ayub Khan. He died a few years later and was buried in his native village Jhatla, District Chakwal.

5-MEMORIAL:
Munawar Pass, a pass in pir panjal mountain range north of Pir ki Gali overlooking the town of Rajouri in Indian Kashmir was named after Major Munawar by the locals.

 
is that Roh afza in the 3rd picture? just curious...
 
I do not want to contest the narrative ( which is flawed) because this has been shred to death repeatedly in the past with both sides claiming victory.

Quite tiresome really.

The stated aim of the Op was to serve as a catalyst to a mass uprising - none of which happened .
 
I do not want to contest the narrative ( which is flawed) because this has been shred to death repeatedly in the past with both sides claiming victory.

I would not speak or defend it myself as it is a long tiresome argument with both sides driven with pride and patriotism
but just see what your own Indian Army Writers including than GOC in C Western Commad Lt Gen Harbaksh has to say about Ghaznavi Force in Operation Gibraltar.
I have already mentioned these books to authenticate the narrative, ill mention them again.
Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis, War Dispatches 1965 by Lt Gen (r) Harbakhsh Singh than GOC in C Indian Army Western Command 22 Fateful Days for India by D.R.Mankekar and The untold Story by Gen B.M.Kaul.

or maybe you would not agree because you being a FANBOY are supposed;expected and taught to scream victory of your Bharat mata even if it requires crossing all barriers of logic and facts.

 
I would not speak or defend it myself as it is a long tiresome argument with both sides driven with pride and patriotism
but just see what your own Indian Army Writers including than GOC in C Western Commad Lt Gen Harbaksh has to say about Ghaznavi Force in Operation Gibraltar.
I have already mentioned these books to authenticate the narrative, ill mention them again.
Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis, War Dispatches 1965 by Lt Gen (r) Harbakhsh Singh than GOC in C Indian Army Western Command 22 Fateful Days for India by D.R.Mankekar and The untold Story by Gen B.M.Kaul.

or maybe you would not agree because you being a FANBOY are supposed;expected and taught to scream victory of your Bharat mata even if it requires crossing all barriers of logic and facts.

Nothing to do with fanboys, or FANBOYs, if you prefer.

Operation Gibraltar was not about individual derring-do, and brilliant guerrilla warfare mounted by characters out of Boys' Own magazine. It was about providing a rallying point for the supposedly fiery tinder of Kashmiri supporters of Pakistan, who were aching for an opportunity to strike against their forcible occupiers. It was about the totally fabricated fables and fairy tales sold to a credulous leadership by one of the sub-continent's most manipulative and self-seeking politicians, a person who was quite happy to see his own country split when he thought that such a split would increase his own popularity and power. It was about, at the military policy level, another riff on the deep state habit of being unable to distinguish between legitimate use of armed force, and the use of clandestine terrorist operations to achieve what it wanted and could not achieve through either politics or diplomacy.

According to Pakistani sources, nine (9) groups were launched; eight (8) were liquidated almost immediately. To this FANBOY, that comes to a figure of a little over 88% failure. Brilliant military feat this was not.

Coming to Akhtar Malik's brilliant follow-up being posited on the successes of Ghaznavid, that is the most complete nonsense. It is well-known that Malik had planned it right at the outset, prior to operations being launched; that he had in mind a back-up, not a link-up. The silly statement about Rajouri being captured and Operation Grand Slam having been planned to take advantage of that is just that, a silly statement (by a FANBOY).

First, Malik could not have known in advance that eight groups would fail and that the ninth would survive longer, and his plan could not have been based on astrology or reading the tea leaves.

Second, unless he was a thundering idiot, he would not have planned that a mobile strike force manned and equipped for a swift strike across flat terrain should swing left during the course of this strike and link up with irregulars fighting in the ravines and gullies off the road. Such a dissipation of effort, such dilution of concentration is not without precedent in the brainless leadership of military services in south Asia, but it is fair to absolve Malik of such imbecile thinking.
 
Nothing to do with fanboys, or FANBOYs, if you prefer.

Operation Gibraltar was not about individual derring-do, and brilliant guerrilla warfare mounted by characters out of Boys' Own magazine. It was about providing a rallying point for the supposedly fiery tinder of Kashmiri supporters of Pakistan, who were aching for an opportunity to strike against their forcible occupiers. It was about the totally fabricated fables and fairy tales sold to a credulous leadership by one of the sub-continent's most manipulative and self-seeking politicians, a person who was quite happy to see his own country split when he thought that such a split would increase his own popularity and power. It was about, at the military policy level, another riff on the deep state habit of being unable to distinguish between legitimate use of armed force, and the use of clandestine terrorist operations to achieve what it wanted and could not achieve through either politics or diplomacy.

According to Pakistani sources, nine (9) groups were launched; eight (8) were liquidated almost immediately. To this FANBOY, that comes to a figure of a little over 88% failure. Brilliant military feat this was not.

Coming to Akhtar Malik's brilliant follow-up being posited on the successes of Ghaznavid, that is the most complete nonsense. It is well-known that Malik had planned it right at the outset, prior to operations being launched; that he had in mind a back-up, not a link-up. The silly statement about Rajouri being captured and Operation Grand Slam having been planned to take advantage of that is just that, a silly statement (by a FANBOY).

First, Malik could not have known in advance that eight groups would fail and that the ninth would survive longer, and his plan could not have been based on astrology or reading the tea leaves.

Second, unless he was a thundering idiot, he would not have planned that a mobile strike force manned and equipped for a swift strike across flat terrain should swing left during the course of this strike and link up with irregulars fighting in the ravines and gullies off the road. Such a dissipation of effort, such dilution of concentration is not without precedent in the brainless leadership of military services in south Asia, but it is fair to absolve Malik of such imbecile thinking.
So You want us to believe that the country's powerful military leadership was probably blind, deaf and had no tentacle of it's own to make anylasis other then a single politician whom they were forced to believe and the entire powerful military junta was eventually driven by him to launch such an adventure. It's Hilarious or Ridiculous, I leave upon readers to judge.
As for liquidation of 8 and accomplishment of the 9th, this has also been mentioned by the sources from opposite side in parallel to Pakistani sources, and no body never claims it to be a jubilant military feat either, infarct a partial success of a limited scale is what has been mentioned.
probably FANBOY might have just missed the fact or never read enough that the location for Grand slam was never finalized until the very end of Operation Gibraltar. A drive to Akhnoor with the knowledge of Ghaznavid not in control of Rajouri could be the biggest Nonsense one could think of due to obvious geographical linkage Rajouri provides IHK to Indian Punjab.
Defending a salient against a well planned counter attack of Indian Army from the North and South and East might not be the best idea Gen Akhtar would have thought as per your claims.
As for Malik's knowledge you talked about, the reports and estimates were already good about Ghaznavids even by the mid august 15 to 20 days prior so it is not hard to conclude that a plan thoroughly would have included those estimates into it.
As for the mobile strike force push, there was nothing to swing left or right if at all you have concluded a wrong message out of the narrative. It was simply an obvious relief because of a guerrilla infested north which would naturally halt any attempt for a downward push by enemy to south for a link up for a considerable time if not permanently during which further gains would be made and positions be consolidated. And that i think was way natural for any planner to consider.
 
So You want us to believe that the country's powerful military leadership was probably blind, deaf and had no tentacle of it's own to make anylasis other then a single politician whom they were forced to believe and the entire powerful military junta was eventually driven by him to launch such an adventure. It's Hilarious or Ridiculous, I leave upon readers to judge.

It is both hilarious and ridiculous, and the ill effects of the manipulations of that politician on the naive and blundering military leadership, powerful though it was, are clearly visible. Whatever 'tentacles' of its own it had - Mallik himself had his own assessment of the situation, and it was not particularly optimistic, as his planning of Operation Grand Slam clearly shows - these were disregarded.

As for liquidation of 8 and accomplishment of the 9th, this has also been mentioned by the sources from opposite side in parallel to Pakistani sources, and no body never claims it to be a jubilant military feat either, infarct a partial success of a limited scale is what has been mentioned.

Partial success? Limited scale? As far as the PA General Staff were concerned, General Mitha's men were the only game in town, there was no alternative. General Mallik's efforts were tolerated, they were certainly not part of the main plan, or they would have made their thinking about leadership of that second operation clear long before it was needed to fly Yahya Khan down by helicopter to take over the operation about which he knew nothing. It is not for nothing that he spent two whole days finding out which unit was where and doing what; he had no clue about what was going on.

probably FANBOY might have just missed the fact or never read enough that the location for Grand slam was never finalized until the very end of Operation Gibraltar.

Read your own records, including the correspondence of Mallik with his own brother after he was unceremoniously bundled out to Turkey as Ambassador. He had planned Grand Slam long before, and it was frowned on by Musa Khan, who felt that it would never be needed.

A drive to Akhnoor with the knowledge of Ghaznavid not in control of Rajouri could be the biggest Nonsense one could think of due to obvious geographical linkage Rajouri provides IHK to Indian Punjab.

There was no connection. Keeping or not keeping Rajouri would not have affected in any way the breach of communications out of Jammu into J&K.

Defending a salient against a well planned counter attack of Indian Army from the North and South and East might not be the best idea Gen Akhtar would have thought as per your claims.

Since you obviously have no clue, there were no Indian troops worth the candle facing 12th Division's thrust, and Harbaksh had to scramble to put together whatever units came to hand once the direction and purport of the thrust became apparent. Even then, it was a touch and go job. Six years later, the man who led the PA to victory over border police in Kutch in 65 mounted his own thrust towards Chhamb-Jaurian and broke through. This was in the teeth of a determined Indian defence, aware of the previous effort represented by Grand Slam.

It was precisely because there were no troops in the vicinity that Harbaksh counter-attacked across the international border. That should have provided armchair strategists the clue.


As for Malik's knowledge you talked about, the reports and estimates were already good about Ghaznavids even by the mid august 15 to 20 days prior so it is not hard to conclude that a plan thoroughly would have included those estimates into it.

As far as is known, there was NOTHING clear emerging about the detachments of commandos and their fate, except that all the news was bad. How the battlefield results of one out of the nine became apparent is difficult to understand. I suppose Munnawar despatched an owl.

As for the mobile strike force push, there was nothing to swing left or right if at all you have concluded a wrong message out of the narrative. It was simply an obvious relief because of a guerrilla infested north which would naturally halt any attempt for a downward push by enemy to south for a link up for a considerable time if not permanently during which further gains would be made and positions be consolidated. And that i think was way natural for any planner to consider.

What was the mobile column supposed to do, continue on into the hills of Himachal Pradesh until it reached the Spiti-Kulu border with China?

It is highly recommended that all future ruminations on grand strategy be accompanied by a suitable map - an outline map will do, although a topographic map will illuminate far more - and some idea of the order of battle on both sides.

Not all eager and enthusiastic strategists are likely to achieve some - any - synchronisation with what their military planners might have considered natural.
 
Again cheerleaders hailing the BATTLES while being completely ignorant of objective of WAR.

When Indian cricket team use to lose matches, we use to boast of Sachin's century. That's the sorry case for Pakistan.
 
Again cheerleaders hailing the BATTLES while being completely ignorant of objective of WAR.

When Indian cricket team use to lose matches, we use to boast of Sachin's century. That's the sorry case for Pakistan.

And Did You Achieve Your Objective of Drinking Wine In Lahore Gymkhana Or "Liberating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir"?????
 

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