BATTLE REPORT #16 Fall Gelb:Blitzkrieg 1940

[AUSTERLITZ]

GERMAN INFANTRY SQUAD TACTICS

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The standard german infantry squad(Gruppe) from 1940-1943 numbered 10 men.It was the basis of german infantry tactics and the main staying power of the wehrmacht.The infantry squad evolved around 1916-1917 during the first world war and matured into its 10 man form after the initial 13 man one was found unwieldy in the polish campaign.In 1943 due to manpower shortage ,one rifleman was reduced and gruppe shortened to 9 men,but in 1940 wehrmacht was reaching its peak and squad numbered 10 men.

GRUPPE COMPOSITION :

Squad leader(Gruppenfuhrer) - Equipped with Sub-machine gun and 6 magazines,hand grenades.Plus field glasses,pocket compass,signal whistle,searchlight and utility.He commands the squad ,his main job is to position and direct the fire of the squad's light machine gun and if possible the riflemen.Responsibility of the Squad Leader was to husband the ammunition resources of the unit,as the instinctive tendency for men in combat to loose off as many rounds as possible, irrespective of whether there is any target to hit.Is expected to be aggressive but composed and lead by example whenever possible.

Machine Gunner I - 1 Mg34 light machine gun and a spare drum magazine of 50 rounds.Plus a pistol.He is usually the best/steadiest shooter in the squad and is responsible for maintaining the weapon.He operates the vital weapon on the field.

Assistant Machine Gunner - Spare barrel,1 ammunition belt usually 250 rds,1 ammunition box of 300 rounds,4 50 round drum magazines.Pistol.Ensures supply of ammunition,positioning of machine gun and change of barrel.Can replace primary gunner if killed.

Ammunition Carrier - Spare barrel,Ammo belt,1 ammunition boxes.Rifle.Carries and inspects ammunition,stays to the rear and keeps a close watch on Machine gun's flanks.Extra man if any of first 2 killed also required to reload fired belts; to search for ammunition left behind during a position change and to act as a close defence rifleman when the situation requires.

6 x Riflemen - Mauser Bolt action rifle,2 ammo pouches,spade,hand grenades.When required explosive charges,machine gun tripod mount,smoke grenades and extra ammunition.Provide steady long range fire with rifles while protecting the light machine gun and using fire and movement.Assault in final phase under LMG coverfire with grenades and bayonet.Most experienced rifleman serves as second-in-command serving as leader in his absence,maintaining liason with platoon and serving as a link while leader concerned himself with tactics.

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GERMAN TACTICAL PHILOSOPHY : ROLE OF THE MACHINE GUN
More or less all major armies had a simple recipe for squad combat..neutralize enemy with fire superiority by squad machine gun and manuever to assault him close up with riflemen.The main difference lay in implementation.

The British doctrine divided the squad nominally into a 3 man gun group with a Bren LMG including Assistant Squad leader and a 7 man rifle group including the Squad leader.The Gun Group provided the base of fire, targeting known or suspected enemy positions. This enabled the Rifle Group to break cover and advance towards the enemy line.After revealing its position Gun grp had to change position often.During this time, the riflemen were not idle. If the distance to the enemy line was too great to cross in a single bound, they would seek a defensible position. Once reached, this would enable the gun team to make their switch. Now it became the turn of the riflemen to provide cover fire, ideally directed against the enemy position of the greatest threat to their now vulnerable gun team. Once the light machine gun had reached its secondary position, the crew could recommence fire, this time from a different angle, thus forcing the return fire to be redirected. The riflemen could now attempt to move forward again, either to a new firing location or to assail the enemy line directly. The gun team was continual seeking new locations which allowed them to lay fire down for as long as possible before the advancing riflemen risked crossing their path. This process could be repeated as many times as was necessary to put the riflemen into a position for them to make the final assault.Often the platoon mortar would fire smoke for initial rifle group movement.
This 'deliberate' methodical repeatable formula was simple and easy to employ.It had some drawbacks however.
1]It required patches of cover along the route of advance to make the switch from position to position .Continous switch on terrain devoid of cover would be very difficult execute.2]Need of gun group to swap fire positions continously may delay the advance,allowing enemy to react and inflict casualities on rifles which in turn will weaken the cover fire for LMG switching.3]If gun group gets pinned down rifles have to advance alone.Alternatively if rifle group comes under fire from unexpected angle and gets stranded,it can't help LMG reposition and itself will have to conduct a costly withdrawal.

The American doctrine held to long established traditions of markmanship and the rifleman as the decider of the firefight.The 12-man squad itself was divided into 3 distinct parts - a 2-man scout team, a 4-man support team including the BAR(Browning automatic rifle), a 5-man assault team, and the squad leader. The system was supposed to work like this: the squad leader advances with the scout team to locate the enemy, then direct the fire of the support team on their positions before joining the assault team in order to lead them in to wipe them out.However the BAR was not a real LMG and incapable of sustained fire.The US doctrine thus depended heavily on the spirit and prowess of the G.I rifleman and his superb semi-automatic M1 garand -the best infantry rifle of the war until the german sturmgewehr44 assault rifle.All men except BAR man carry rifles.However theory didn't often translate to practice.
First problem was loss of unit cohesion -''Here's what often happened to the squad in combat: the squad leader gets pinned down or hit with the scout team; the support team blasts away in the general direction of the origin of enemy fire without any real idea of where their positions really are; the leaderless assault team then makes the attack alone, that is if they didn't need the influence of their NCO to do it under fire in the first place.''
Second problem was that BAR was incapable of achieving fire superiority against an enemy machine gun.
This problem was not exposed in paratrooper,marine and rangers units which had their squad LMGs.UAmerican standard infantry thus often required allotments of HMGs from higher command levels or artillery support to dislocate a german position.

German doctrine was directly opposite of the american one.German military thinkers after experience of WW1 envisioned the machine-gun, not the rifle, as the primary killing weapon on the battlefield. This is one reason that they continued to equip their riflemen with the outdated Mauser bolt-action or the short-ranged machine-pistol late into the war, the machine gun was the weapon that mattered not the rifle.Now just as the americans concentrated on designing the best rifle,the germans focused on the machine gun.Their 2 products the mg34 and mg42 were the best designs of the war.
To add to this unlike the us or british system in german practice,the squad leader stays with the machine gun and directs its fire where he wants it until the last moment.Also the Gunner is picked beforehand to be the steadiest man in the squad and also a good shooter ensuring an accurate continous hail of lead on correct enemy positions even under fire.The squad leader also had a short range SMG useful only for close assault,the philosophy was better lose one man from the fire fight to direct the efforts of the remainder, than have all the Squad engaged in an undisciplined free for all.

German tactics was based not on deliberate advance but on firepower and speed.The Squad was handled as an indivisible unit, with little distinction between rifle and machine gun groups. In the assault, the light machine gun would lead the advance, under the personal direction of the Squad Leader. It was regarded as the primary arbiter of the fire fight. The fire of the individual riflemen was not deployed until the assault stage, when it was thought to prove more effective.Keeping the riflemen back till the late phase allowed co-ordination with machine guns of other squad/platoon to fire over their heads and support the attack.Movement would be covered by smoke grenade/mortar smoke.
These tactics went something like this: the squad leader advances with his whole unit until contact is made; the MG then opens up on the enemy to achieve "fire superiority".The mg34(900 rpm) and 42(1200rpm) usually had 1.5-2 times the rate of fire of allied machine guns which allowed them to dominate a firefight by volume of lead poured out in a short time.Meanwhile the whole squad would leapfrog forward in short rushes(showing later how) until the they get into grenade range. The squad leader in all this was better able to control the actions of his unit since his training decreed that during combat he be in the center of the squad.The machine gun itself can act in suppression mode or join the assault itself firing from the hip on the move.
The concept is based on marching fire.Squad advanced as a single entity. All arms were brought to bear on the enemy during the advance. The key to success lay in overwhelming supporting fire delivered from artillery, mortars, machine guns and ideally accompanying tanks. There was no subtlety involved whatsoever. The advantage was speed.

Red Army tactics were simpler.(until 1943).11 man squads with a 2-man LMG squad,2 SMGs and 7 rifles including leader.Squads would move in a ‘chain’, a single-file column, each man separated from the next nearby by one or two paces (or up to eight paces in open order).For attack the column would manuevre into a skirmish line and then assault as one, with no leapfrogging or fire-and-manuevre tactics, fire support coming from other squads or platoons.Within 40–50 yardsof the enemy positions they shouted the Russian battle cry, a deep drawn out Urra!.They fired on the move and, when within range of enemy positions, threw grenades. They closed in rapidly for close combat with point-blank fire, bayonets, weapon butts, entrenching tools, and fists.
These tactics reflected the red army's composition-mainly peasant conscripts incapable of complex manuevers and officers centrally controlled with only nominal initiative encouraged.While these may have been effective against unsteady opponents who lose their nerve, against veteran german troops early war in most cases the attacks degenarated into massed linear human wave attacks without proper fire support incurring devastating losses from german machine guns.It was from 1943 that red army formations began to use fire and manuever in their own way.Red army focused on sub-machine guns ,perfect weapons at short range and very easy to use for conscripts by 'spray and pray ' technique.If they could get within range under artillery fire support(which soviets provided enmasse) and by using cover they could overwhelm any position by brute volume of firepower.They were also kings of urban firefights .Late war whole soviet platoons were armed solely with sub-machine guns.

USE OF TERRAIN WHILE MOVING :
In order to reduce the impact of enemy fire and to reduce the availability of targets,soldiers should aim to make use of terrain features. This includes terrain and cover, which will serve to protect from aerial observation and/or attack.
Above recommends that when moving along the edge of a wood, soldiers should walk slightly inside the wood, in order to take advantage of the protection provided by shadows.
Likewise, soldiers should avoid the highest point of a ridge or hill, as they will be visible against the sky (‘sky-lining’).

When moving across open areas against a light-coloured background, soldiers will be more visible than if moving against a darker background.

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GERMAN INFANTRY SQUAD FORMATIONS :

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The Reihe - The common formation for movement was the loose file or squad column,the reihe formation.Above we see a reihe formation advancing using terrain cover to protect flanks from sudden enfilade fire.The squad leader with field glasses takes the lead ,followed by machine gunner and his assistants allowing the enemy detected to be brought under fire of the main firepower unit of the squad the LMG as early as possible and under the direction of the squad leader.Riflemen follow.Assistant squad leader is in the rear to prevent any confusion.The formation is easy to control,and suited to navigating narrow tracks or difficult terrain and presents a small target from front.If engaged the machine gun sets up begins the firefight while riflemen are sometimes held back till its deemed appropiate.

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The Schützenkette - The 'skirmish chain' formation is the basic formation to be adopted for a firefight.Above shows how on contact with enemy squad adopts this loose linear(small zig zag)formation for skirmish firefight.Machine gun acts as the firebase around which the squad revolves under direct command of squad leader.Forward half of riflemen moves to the right of the deployed machine gun,the rear half rifles move to its left.The Schützenkette is the most appropriate formation for engaging the enemy, as it provides a broad frontage and enables all of the troops to fire. In addition, the formation.This formation is also to be adopted instead of reihe when moving through an open field without cover(because without terrain cover the reihe column might take enfilade fire from concealed enemy mg from the flank decimating the squad)

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Where terrain/neighbouring unit closed off a flank reihe could extend to one flank as well but this was less common.
Alternatively occasionally a british style deliberate advance could also be adopted by seperating the gun and rifle group.Orders like this -‘Gruppe A: MG Team – Direction single pine tree – 6 paces spacing – Schützenkette!
Rifle troop follows at 50 paces distance!’Such a formation is useful when moving through broken terrain or forests, especially on reconnaissance missions, as the entire Gruppe will not fall victim to an ambush. Instead,
the riflemen can cover the lMG Team or act as a reserve.Or it could be reverse -
‘Gruppe A: Rifle troop – direction bullet tree – 8 paces spacing – link man Müller –Schützenkette! MG Team follows under command of the machinegunner at 50 paces distance!’
Such a formation is useful when advancing through unclear terrain, as it serves to protect the MG Team from an ambush.However the Reihe and Schutzenkette were the 2 dominant formations.

NEXT :OFFENSIVE TACTICS - SCHUTZENKETTE AND FIREFIGHT- ADVANCE UNDER FIRE-ASSAULT ETC.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

GERMAN INFANTRY SQUAD TACTICS - OFFENSIVE

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SQUAD ON THE ATTACK :
A typical attack consists of the following stages:

(I) Entfaltung or Development Stage - The deployment by the Kompanie from its marching formation into its ordered individual platoon formation and the platoons separate into their individual Gruppen in accordance with the platoon commander's orders. This typically occurs at least 800m from the enemy.Any allotted heavy support weapons will set up to the rear.

(II) Entwicklung or Deployment stage -This is a continuation of the previous stage and refers to the adoption of open-order formations(Reihe usually) by the Gruppen in accordance with the situation and terrain. This occurs when the Gruppenführer(squad leader) considers the situation requires it. The recommended formation is the Schützenreihe.
The enemy should not be engaged by the Gruppe when at distances in excess of 800m and expose its position unless strictly necessary. Instead, the Gruppen should rely upon the Kompanie’s supporting weapons to suppress the enemy.

(III) Angriff or the Attack - It consist of the firefight and the advance under fire to close enough distance for the last assault phase to begin.The Gruppe should advance for as long as possible using the cover of the terrain and/or
support weapons. However, when it is no longer possible to advance unseen, the Angriff commences.The gruppe assumes usually the schutzenkette formation for the firefight.It is at this stage that the Gruppe begins to engage the enemy with its own weapons.However, the first opening of fire by the Gruppe should be ordered by the Gruppenführer,except where unavoidable.Typically, the Gruppenführer positions the lMG immediately following him after recon with his field glasses and directs its fire against targets which will most impede the advance of the riflemen.Now lets see the development of the firefight in stages.

While choosing a position to move into before the firefight commences and while conducting fire and movement,though usually whatever cover available was used there were some general principles regarding choice of position.
• The position must be entered and exited out of sight of the enemy;
• The position should provide both cover for the soldier and a clear field of fire;
• Notice must be taken of use of terrain avoiding sky lines and making use of shadows.
• Stones or boulders should be avoided unless required due to splinters.
Moving into position out of sight of the enemy is necessary to catch the enemy by surprise when the Gruppe opens fire – where possible, a position should enable the LMG to fire into the enemy’s flank.

(Squad leader directs LMG fire in urban area)​

Principles of the Firefight -

>In the attack the fire fight is conducted initially by the heavy weapons. The destruction or neutralization of enemy strongpoints is largely the mission of infantry guns,mortars and heavy machine guns. At effective ranges the squad light machine gun is employed. The riflemen participate in the fire fight in the early phases only when good results may be expected,or when they have insufficient cover. But it is not the task of the riflemen to engage in fire fights of long duration in order to gain fire superiority.Leadership on the part of the squad leader consists in bringing his riflemen into contact with the enemy using terrain with fewest losses.
>The light machine gun opens the firefight and at the most threatening enemy target,its fire controlled by the squad leader.
>When a squad is operating under hostile fire, the breadth and depth of its deployed formation often render control of the entire squad by one person very difficult.Therefore, the riflemen assist in the fire fight of the squad by conducting their fire independently, unless the squad leader concentrates the fire of his riflemen upon one target. Volley fire will be employed on occasions(usually to cover LMG redeployment if necessary).
>The selection of the aiming point is left to the rifleman. In the case of small targets, the aim should be at the bottom; in the case of large ones, at the middle. If a target is moving to one side, the rifleman must aim ahead of, or move his sights with, the target.
>Unless the command fire at will has been given, the rifleman will not fire except at targets that suddenly appear at close range.Tactical surprise to be preserved as long as possible.
>Squad leader must supervise ammunition expenditure carefully.
>It is essential for the squad leader to ensure as far as possible that when the whole squad is in action,that every man is participating actively in the firefight.Not merely frozen behind cover unwilling to expose himself to fire(natural instinct) or firing blindly without aiming.Inexperienced troops are most prone to doing this.
>Firefight must be conducted vigorously rather than in a deliberate fashion,and be kept short.Victory comes to the one who fires the largest number of well-aimed shots against his opponent in the shortest time.
>After a fire action of brief duration, or as soon as the purpose of the fire is attained, the light machine-gunners
and the riflemen take cover. If necessary, they move to another position.
>Surprise fire is one of the main ways of gaining fire superiority.The main way to conduct this is to get the LMG in position without enemy detection and open fire at the most threatening target preferably from a flanking angle.

Advance Under Fire -

>The light machine-gun group usually forms the spearhead of the attack within the squad. The longer the riflemen are able to follow the light machine gun in squad column, the longer may rearward, supporting machine guns fire safely past advancing squads through existing gaps.
>Fire and movement must always be closely coordinated. The terrain must be used in a skillful manner.
>If possible, areas covered by enemy artillery fire are avoided or circumvented insofar as the terrain and mission permit; otherwise, quick rushes are made during a pause in the firing.
>If the situation and enemy fire permit, the squad leader takes advantage of the support of adjacent units or heavy infantry weapons in order to permit the entire squad to rush forward simultaneously.
>The normal procedure is - In working forward the men advance as a group or singly, by bounds(run with leaping strides or advance by leaps from crawling position) called Sprung or by crawling whichever is suited.The nature of the advance and the length of the bounds will depend on friendly fire support, the enemy fire action, and the terrain.

When advancing in combat, the German soldier was taught to advance using the Sprung (bound or leap). A Sprung can occur on an individual basis or as a whole Gruppe.Commands would go like - ‘Prepare to change position!
Next bound to the defile! or ‘Make ready to leap to the barbed wire!’.LMG should be firing when a sprung is made to cover it or smoke used from platoon mortar or grenade.Above picture shows an advance by leaps from crawling position,used primarily on terrain devoid of cover making short rushes from cover to cover impractical.

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Above denotes the proper readiness stances for a movement by bounds(short rush to next cover).Soldiers take their rifle in their left hand, support themselves with their right hand and move their right knee as close as possible to their body without raising their upper body. The Schütze 1 holds the LMG by the sling in his right hand and supports himself with his left. The right knee is moved inwards.When the Schütze 1 is ready to move, he shouts . The Schütze 2 and 3 (***.mg gunner & ammo carrier)place their ammunition boxes flat on the ground in front of them.On the command: ‘Auf! Marsch! Marsch!’, the soldiers rise up quickly and rush forwards towards next cover.

The objective of the German soldier is to gain ground as rapidly as possible and to take the enemy’s position. Hence, a Sprung should be made without orders when:•Artillery fire, heavy weapons fire, or fire of neighbouring troops suppresses theenemy • the enemy ceases fire to reload(especially enemy Machine gun) • Friendly tanks/assault guns suppress the enemy • Aircraft or artillery destroy the enemy’s forward positions • smoke blinds the enemy.

Some Examples. a) Hostile artillery fire covers a bridge which must be crossed by squad.
Solution: Long bounds, with the squad closed up, are made during each pause in fire.
(b) High ground which is under hostile observation and which is being strafed by enemy machine-gun fire has been ordered captured.Solution: Advance as close to the hill as possible under cover, and then the entire squad will rush forward in a bound to the next cover.
(c) The effective fire of friendly artillery compels the enemy to take cover.
Solution: The entire squad will advance in long bounds, to utilize fully the support afforded by the artillery.
(d) A squad is fired upon at close range by an enemy located in a strong defensive position. There is little fire
support by other arms.Solution: The riflemen advance individually by bounds or by crawling; short bounds only are possible.

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(IV) Einbruch or Penetration - The final assault phase of a squad attack.Typically occurs 100 m from enemy position.A signal for heavy support weapons to lift their fire will be given.In penetration, the whole group rushes or fires as a unit.The platoon leader employs several squads advancing from various directions against the objective.
In this way the defensive fires of the enemy will be scattered.This form of attack is not carried out by solitary squad, but by the platoon-the squad acting as a vital component of the whole.

The riflemen should prepare for the assault by loading weapons, fixing bayonets and preparing grenades.The hand grenade is the key weapon for the assault.Where possible, the lMG should be positioned so that it is able to fire into the enemy position without risk of hitting the riflemen in order to ensure that the enemy position is suppressed for as long as possible. If this is not possible, the lMG should be prepared for‘firing from the hip’ and will assault the position along with the riflemen.

Neighbouring troops should engage the enemy position with an increased weight of fire to enable the riflemen to move as close as possible to the position. When the riflemen have approached as closely as they are able, the grenade throwers should, on the command of the Gruppenführer (typically, on a whistle), throw their grenades at the enemy. The riflemen should then storm the position under the cover of the detonating grenades. The Gruppenführer should lead the final assault by the riflemen.

Above depicts a penetration assault on a enemy strongpoint trench line from german trench area.
• Friendly mortars bombard the trench immediately behind the enemy position.
• One Gruppe (the “Deckungstrupp”) fires on the enemy position from the front and on the enemy trench (“1.fdl.Graben”).
• Two assault Gruppen (Stoßtrupps 1 & 2) have positioned themselves in advanced positions to either side of the enemy position.
• The LMGs of the assault Gruppen have been positioned to fire on the enemy position.If such positions were not available they would join the assault firing on the move.
• Under the cover provided by the Deckungstrupp and their own LMG the assault Gruppen storm the enemy position.
• Stoßtrupp 1 attacks the enemy position directly.
• Stoßtrupp 2 moves to the rear of the enemy position to cut off reinforcements.

Once the enemy position has been taken, preparations should be made for an enemy counter-attack. The Gruppe should then prepare to either advance further or consolidate the position in accordance with the orders of the Platoon commander(Zugfuhrer).

GENERAL SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES OF ATTACK :​

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1.If at all possible, the squad works forward under cover without actually firing as long as possible, taking advantage of areas where there is little fire and where there is strong fire support by the heavy weapons.Co-ordination with heavier assets is essential.

2.The squad leader is not restricted to any given position. His place is at decisive points in the action,and where there exists the most responsibility. Until the squad has started the fire fight, he always moves out rapidly at the head of his men and reconnoiters personally in order to determine by what routes, formations,and methods he can advance his squad with the greatest possible protection and cover. The squad leader seeks out elevated points from which he can observe the enemy and the terrain. He leaves his squad under cover and directs them by calls and signals.

3.When covered advance is no longer possible, fire by the squad is usually opened first with the light machine
gun optimally as surprise fire.First, the target which most hinders accomplishment of the mission should be engaged.Light machine gun forms the spearhead of attack by the squad, so that if necessary it can immediately support the squad by fire under direct direction of squad leader -if, for example, the squad suddenly comes under fire.

4.In covered terrain, if there is the possibility of a sudden appearance of the enemy, the squad leader has the riflemen move out ahead of the light machine gum, thus providing better protection of the machine gun against surprise.

5.Every forward movement within sight of the enemy should be covered by fire from the rear or adjacent weapons;otherwise, there will be heavy casualties.

6.If the squad suddenly runs into artillery fire, the men at once throw themselves to the ground and take cover from the splinters. Then they rush forward to the nearest cover against fire or observation,or, if necessary, they rush obliquely forward. By running quickly forward they can best escape the enemy artillery fire. The squad must never try to escape such fire by going to the rear. Areas under heavy fire are avoided by promptly turning aside. If this is not possible,then the squad runs through such areas as fast as possible in one long rush.

7.Whether the members of the squad rush forward together or individually depends upon the distance to the
enemy, the effect of enemy weapons, and the terrain (the nearest cover).- At longer distances, the members of the
squad may often make one long bound together. As the distance to the enemy becomes shorter, the bounds must
usually be proportionately decreased. As a general rule,the bounds should be short enough so that the fire aimedat the men rushing forward will arrive too late in other words, so that they will not be hit during the bound.
Thus, at 700 to 800 yards, the bound should be about 40 paces, at 400 to 500 yards, about 15 to 20 paces. The
more the bound is characterized by surprise, the smaller will be the losses. If the opposing enemy is held down by
the fire of heavy weapons, then advantage should be taken of this fire support for longer bounds.

8.Moving the LMG on uncovered terrain and under enemy fire is useless, because the gun would be neutralized while changing position. If there is no cover in the vicinity to which it can be withdrawn temporarily, the gun must endure the enemy fire and defend itself as best it can.

9.Fire discipline and control are vital to winning a firefight.Squad leader must to the extent possible make sure all squad members are engaging in firefight and regulate ammunition usage.

10.For the penetration, the squad leader must take his squad very firmly in hand, because his personal example is of
utmost importance at this critical moment to lead his men forward to a vigorous assault.

NEXT : SQUAD ON THE DEFENSE - ANTI-TANK TACTICS- RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS

 

[Penguin]

In Holland, 1940. they were particularly good at using captured troops as shields. There are more than a few documented accounts.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

In Holland, 1940. they were particularly good at using captured troops as shields. There are more than a few documented accounts.

Those tactics were more by paratroops/brandenburgers.Local improvisations,not standard doctrine.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

GERMAN OFFENSIVE SQUAD TACTICS - SIMULATED EXAMPLE

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PHASE I : DEVELOPMENT (Entfaltung)

The enemy has occupied "A" village and the heights to the north.The 2d Company, reinforced by one heavy mortar
squad, is located in the woods just south of the banks ofthe brook, prepared to attack. The 1st Platoon is on the right, the 2d on the left, and the 3d 200 yards in the rear of the center. The front of each of the leading platoons extends about 200 yards.As soon as the 2d Company reached the edge of the woods, a reconnaissance patrol was sent to reconnoiter the positions in "A" village. The leader of the right platoon receives the order to send a squad(stutz's squad), together with a company antitank rifle, to Hill 133 to protect the company's assembly area.(arrows represent machine guns)

Stutz's Responsibility - Gruppenfuhrer Stutz's Orders - Two rifles, come with me We are going to that hill (133).Second in command follow me at 50 paceswith the rest of the squad until you are under cover on this side of the hill.
Upon arrival at the hill, the squad leader orders the two riflemen to crawl up to the crest of the hill so that they can just see over it to observe the area beyond. He points out places to be particularly observed. He himself, also under cover, reconnoiters for a position for the LMG and the AT rifle. These will be positions from which as large an area to the front as possible can be brought under fire. For the AT rifle, he will seek a position close to the road. He has the rest of the squad take cover on the rear slope of the hill, and there makes the LMG ready for fire. The machine gun is not yet put into the selected firing position: first, because the squad leader and the two observers are able to see the entire area to the front and there does not appear to be any immediate danger; second, because he does not want to disclose to the enemy any movement on the hill.The squad leader himself observes the entire terrain before him with his field glasses. He immediately communicates his observations to his platoon leader.

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Possible Scenarios -
1.The squad leader Stutz sees 3 enemy riflemen emerge from two bushes about 300 yards to the right oblique and
start running back over an open field.He at once has both riflemen open rapid fire,but not disclose the position of his LMG by firing as target is not valuable enough.An enemy rifleman is hit and falls. While the two observers continue to fire vigorously, the squad leader sends two men from the remainder of his squad forward along the brook to the right in order to find out the troop unit to which the fallen enemy belongs.

(2) An enemy patrol about 500 yards to the right front is seen advancing along the brook.
The leader lets the patrol continue to advance.At the same time, he has the light machine gun and riflemen come closer to the crest of the hill, points out what he. has seen, and makes several estimates of ranges in the direction of the patrol. He has the squad take up positions and open fire with the light machine gun and all rifles (surprise fire) only when the patrol has come within close range, or when it appears that the patrol is aware that the hill is occupied, or when his company's preparations for the advance have been made and the company is about to move forward.

(3) A friendly heavy machine-gun platoon goes up the hill to the left of the squad, to protect the assembly area, and later to support the advance.Stutz contacts him at once and communicates all of his observations. Preparations of the company for attack are now completed. The platoon leader orders the squad to withdraw to the right in the vicinity of the brook and to rejoin the platoon, following along as the rear squad during the advance.

PHASE II : DEPLOYMENT AND ATTACK ( Entwicklung & Angriff )

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The enemy has occupied "B" woods and the heights west of "B" woods (distance about 1,000 yards). The 2d Company, advancing north, has contact on both flanks. It has reached Hill 202 and the wooded area east of the
hill, and is preparing for attack.A reconnaissance patrol has been sent forward by the company along the brook,
through the Trumpeter Woods, toward the west edge of "B" woods.

Platoon Commander's Orders - For the attack, the leader of the 1st Platoon gives the following order to the 4 squad leaders who have assembled about him near the crest of Hill 202.
(1)The company will attack the enemy in "B" woods and on the left of the woods, at the point where the birch-lined avenue can be seen. The 2d Platoon on the right, 1st Platoon on the left, 3d Platoon to the rear center.

(2)The Ist Platoon with 3 squads, deployed in front, will initially advance to the rise in the ground, about 300 yards in front of us where you see a hedge and wire fence. Becker's squad will immediately send two scouts out.
(Pointing) Becker's squad, to the right along this brook, as far as the willow bushes on the bank of the brook.
Einhart's Squad to the right around this hill (202), as fa ras the cluster of bushes on the right slope of that rise on the
ground.Mueller's squad, to the left around this hill on which we are lying, initially up to the next rise in the ground.
Schneider's squad follows Einhart's squad at a distance of about 150 yards until the sand pit is reached.
The light mortar detachment will remain with Schneider's squad.

(3) We have a reconnaissance patrol in the area before us.
(4)I shall be with Einhart's squad.
Squad leaders, repeat my orders! (Each leader repeats only the instructions applying to his ovwn squad.)POSTS!
The squad leaders return to their squads, repeat the situation and orders to the men, and proceed to their
posts.

Squad Leader Becker's Orders - 2 riflemen, move out ahead of us as scouts by 200 yards. In the direction of the small woods, some 600 yards in front of us!The squad will follow me in Schutzenreihe.
The orders of the other squad leaders are similar.Under the fire protection of the heavy machine guns(detatched from battalion heavy weapons company and generally allotted 2-4 per infantry company,company then allots these to their forward platoons) on Hill 202 and to the west, the squads now work their way forward to the indicated positions.
As they advance, they keep the platoon leader in sight. Upon arrival at their new forward positions, the squad leaders, noting that there are covered routes to the right and left still available, join the platoon leader. For the purposes of
protection, the squads may avail themselves of suitable cover in the adjoining sector. However, bunching up must be avoided. The important thing about the advance is that the squads should utilize cover. There will often be gaps between the squads through which the machine guns may fire.

Further Advance -
The platoon leader, having made a personal reconnaissance, now decides to move the squads forward up to the next areas.For the advance to this second forward area, he issues appropriate orders, as he did for the first advance. Whenthe men reach the positions shown above it becomes more difficult to advance under cover and out of sight.
Areas, such as that around e, which are exposed to the enemy's observation, must be crossed in double-time.
In any further advance the platoon is now within effective range of the enemy light machine guns (600 to 800 yards).
From this area on, therefore, the squad leader and the other members of the squad must exercise particular caution in order to avoid heavy casualties.As soon as they have drawn enemy fire and are no longer able to advance under cover, the scouts join the squad which has been following behind them.

Becker leading squad B, in the advance from the south side of the Trumpeter Woods on, must under all circumstancesavoid coming again into the line of sight. From the Trumpeter Woods to the next rise in the ground (north of the Trumpeter Woods) it will still be possible to advance under cover. The high ground at f should be reached in one bound.Should the Trumpeter Woods be under artillery fire, so that it is impossible to pause there, the squad should immediately continue on to the elevation at 'f in one bound. If necessary, the squad may move around the woods in advancing to f.
The platoon leader finds very difficult the further advance, at this stage, of Einhart's squad(E) andSchneider's squad(S). He decides that the next objective for E squad should be the steep rise of g. But the intervening area offers no cover.
Enemy fire from the neighborhood of the tree clumps by the birch-lined avenue is certainly to be expected. In order to keep the enemy down, Einhart prepares his light machine gun for action. In addition,the light machine gun of Becker undertakes to protect the advance of Einhart's from the position at f. In its further advance, Einhart's squad is protected
by the fire of the squad at f. Supporting fires of the heavy machine guns, the light infantry cannon, and the artillery will also be utilized to assist the advance.Schneider's squad(S) moves to the area evacuated by B squad.

The distance to the enemy is still too great for the employment of the light mortar detachment. Nevertheless,the platoon leader now brings up this detachment.The squads continue to work their way forward, toward the positions i and h, under the fire protection of all the heavy infantry weapons, and under their own mutual fire support - Fire and manuever now fully underway as the firefight reaches its height,the schutzenkette formation will be used often if necessary. At distances under 500 yards, the platoon leader employs the light mortar to combat particularly stubborn resistances.

PHASE III : PENETRATION (Einbruch)

It is difficult to simulate penetration into an enemy's position so that it conforms to the realities of war.The 1st Platoon, an interior unit, has worked its way forward in the attack under the strong fire support of all the weapons, until it is within assaulting distance (about 200 yards) of the enemy. The squads are disposed as indicated above.(Names now generic A,B,C,D as particular squad leader names not necessary)
The enemy, strongly shaken by heavy artillery preparation and infantry-cannon and heavy machine-gun fire, still holds a few positions on the opposite hill. Enemy artillery is striking immediately behind the platoon.The fire of an enemy heavy machine gun is passing over the squad into the terrain beyond.Friendly artillery fire has been directed at the hill in front of the platoon. Now, as directed by flare, it shifts to the area behind the hill. (This fire may be represented by sound or smoke explosives.)
Squad A's light machine gun is in position near the group of bushes and fires at the enemy opposite the squad.The riflemen have worked their way forward to the banks of the brook and are also firing. The squads to the left and right
have advanced to about the same general line. The platoon's light mortar is also firing on the enemy strongpoint
opposite Squad A.

Storming the Enemy Position -
The squad leader is in the midst of his riflemen. He has them fix bayonets. (If the riflemen are lying under cover, they will all fix bayonets simultaneously.If they are in the line of fire, some will fix bayonets while the others continue to fire.) The enemy opposite is now firing only sporadically (umpire's decision). The light mortar is firing heavily and very effectively upon him. The squad leader decides upon an assault. He gives his light machine gun the prearranged signal (this might be done by repeatedly raising his rifle perpendicularly in the air) to join him as quickly as possible and to go
forward in the assault with the riflemen.The squad leader is the first to spring up for the assault, shouting encouragement.Remaining enemy resistance is broken by close-in fighting- grenades first ,rifles moving in under the explosions. After the assault, the squad leader at once scatters his squad, which had tended to concentrate during the assault. He has them occupy positions on the captured hill. All the riflemen fire vigorously upon the retreating or counterattacking enemy.

PHASE IV :CONSOLIDATION

As the leader of Squad A is giving new orders, one of his men cries out, pointing out that some 10 or 15 riflemen are advancing for counterattack, having just emerged from the clump Of bushes and from behind the high ground to the left oblique some 120 or 150 yards away. Simultaneously, a light machine gun directly opposite opens fire on the squad.
The platoon leader is with the adjacent squad on the left. This squad is now approaching the west end of the
captured hill.

Solution.-The leader of Squad A at once orders:1. ENTIRE SQUAD, 2. POSTS, 3. RIFLEMEN LEFT OBLIQUE,4. FIRE AT WILL. (No sight adjustment is necessary, since the last firing was done with battle sights.) The machine gun and all the riflemen fire upon the advancing enemy riflemen, since the latter present the most immediate danger. The squad leader fires with his machine pistol. The enemy counterattack may lead to the loss of the hill just captured, as well as to heavy casualties in the squad,unless the squad leader immediately and energeticallyemploys his entire squad-his riflemen and machine gun.Even the No. 2 and No. 3 fire on the enemy with pistols or rifles.

Neutralizing Enemy Machine Gun Nest -
We shall now assume that the counterattack was repulsed, and that the enemy had retreated with heavy losses
under the fire of Squad A and Squad B, the latter meanwhile having reached the hill. The rest of the enemy
(about four men) have disappeared into the creek bottom behind the high ground. Two men of Squad A have been
wounded by enemy machine-gun fire. They are still able to take part in the fight. The enemy machinegun has been firing continuously on Squad A, without itself receiving any fire. The squad leader now subjects the enemy light machine gun to the combined fire of his entire squad. The platoon leader orders Squad A to pin down the enemy machine-gun group by fire while he attacks it with the other squads. He orders the light mortar detachment.
to follow the platoon. He fires a green rocket to notify the artillery and the light infantry-cannon platoon that their fire, which is now directed about 150 'yards beyond the platoon, must be raised farther ahead.

The leader of Squad B follows the platoon leader, with his men following him in schutzenreihe. The second-incommand
follows at the rear of the coltumn. Now crouching, now rushing from cover to cover, they advance along the creek bottom. The squad leader succeeds in reaching the clump of bushes without loss. When he starts to advance farther, another enemy machine gun joins the action and begins to fire at his squad He halts the advance, brings his light machine gun at once into position, and opens fire on the new enemy machine gun. The riflemen take cover in the clump of bushes, while the squad leader and one man observe the area to their front. It is now assumed that a heavy machine-gun squad (flag) is with the platoon leader. He at once has it fire upon the enemy light machine gun near the brook, and orders Squad A to surround and attack the machine-gun nest by circling around Hill 127. The platoon leader advances to the attack with the rest of the squads along the creek bottom to the left. He takes the light mortar along with his platoon for use against any objective which might suddenly appear.

NOTE : Above is an idealized exercise scenario,but important in understanding the general methods applied.

NEXT: SQUAD TACTICS - DEFENSIVE - ANTI-TANK -RIVER ASSAULT- OUTPOST DUTY -PATROL DUTY

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GERMAN SQUAD TACTICS -DEFENSIVE

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INTRODUCTION :
Until the russian campaign ,defensive tactics recieved minimal attention in german manuals so coverage here is limited.The germans modernized and reintroduced trench warfare and strongpoint system in the eastern front in the later years but this campaign covers their early war approach which 'detested' trench warfare.When defending, the defender aims to balance his weakness in numbers and/or equipment through his choice of a position and the coordination between his supporting arms. However, the position should be such that the enemy is forced to attack and cannot merely by-pass it and attack somewhere else weaker.The terrain, defensive works, supporting units and observation should all be taken into consideration when selecting a position. Inter-locking and mutually supporting fire (especially from lMG’s) of the Gruppen is of great importance at the platoon level.When looking into squad defensive tactics its important to understand that it operates as a cog in wheel,a part of the whole defensive system based on 4 zonal defence which we have already described from battalion level.The squad is a part of that whole,rather than using independent special tactics.

GENERAL PATTERN :

German squad defensive tactics stressed the importance of integration with larger plans and the principle of posts scattered in depth. The individual Schützengruppe (squad) was expected to dig in on a frontage 30 or 40 meters, this being the maximum that a squad leader could effectively oversee in a defending battle. Major landmarks, such as single trees or crests were best shunned as too attractive to enemy fire. During the digging, one member of the squad was to stand sentry, preventing surprise from ground or air. Gaps between squads might be left, although covered by fire. Key to the defense was the location of the machine gun, which would be given several alternative positions, perhaps 50 or more meters apart, that were identified from the outset. It would cover longer range targets, while the riflemen, who might well be held further back, were concerned mainly with sweeping the terrain at close and very close range.

The usual deployment would see the men of the squad in pairs in foxholes, trenches, or ditches, posted close enough to communicate with their partner. These little sub-section nests would be slightly separated, echeloned, or at different levels, thus decreasing the effect of enemy fire. In the event that the enemy attack did not materialize immediately, the second phase of construction would see the digging of trenches behind the main line in which much of the squad could be kept back under cover until needed. Good camouflage was complemented by the avoidance of any obvious movement to attract enemy observation. The defensive fire fight was initiated by the machine gun at effective range, riflemen remaining concealed until the enemy assault, at which all were to open fire regardless of cover. Hand grenades falling on the position were to be dealt with either by the men diving away into cover, or by picking up the grenade and throwing it back.

In the latter part of World War II, there was particular emphasis on resistance to armor. Ideal defensive positions were therefore on a tank-proof obstacle, equipped with at least one anti-tank weapon, capable of all round defense, and having artillery support directed by a forward observer. Active patrols with anti-tank weapons, as small as a single squad, were to be encouraged to intercept enemy tanks probing a defense.

TYPES OF DEFENSE:

The Zugführer(Platoon Commander), together with the Gruppenführers should, where possible, visit each Gruppe and give the following information in his battle orders:
• The route of the main battle line;
• The depth of friendly positions;
• Indicate overlapping fire sectors;
• The placement of the Gruppe’s foxholes/riflepits (Schützenlöchern) and their field of fire;
• Rules of engagement for opening fire on enemy troops and armoured vehicles.

Defensive operations can be divided into either sustained or delaying actions.

SUSTAINED DEFENCE :

In a sustained defence, the Main Line of Resistance or Hauptkampflinie (HKL) is established and represents the forward point of the advance. Should the position be lost, the defender must re-take it, in order to ensure the integrity of the frontline. Therefore, the position must be defended to the last man. For a sustained defensive position, the defence is staggered(Zig-Zag) and in-depth so that the effect of enemy fire is lessened. Also, should the forward positions be taken, the enemy is engaged by rearwards lying positions as well as by flanking positions. This serves to wear down an enemy assault and to minimise friendly losses.

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The lMG should be placed first and be positioned so that it commands the best field of fire and can support neighbouring Gruppen through flanking fire. The Gruppenführer should then position the riflemen to either one or both sides of the lMG and oversee the camouflage and preparation of the position (otherwise known as a Gruppenest).
Each position should contain 2 or 3 riflemen and should be spaced at irregular intervals 4-8m apart staggered towards the rear. If time allows, the Schützenlöchern should be connected by a shallow trench (Kriechgraben). The Gruppenest should be no wider than 30m.Alternative positions should also be selected and prepared. If time allows, a rear position
should be prepared that will protect the Gruppe from observation and enemy artillery fire.The Gruppenführer should position himself such that he is able to direct and control his Gruppe, especially the MG.

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Once the position has been prepared, camouflage is of utmost importance and note should be taken of the earth from the digging activities. Unnecessary movement should be avoided.
Observation posts (or Vorposten) should be positioned ahead of the main position, in order to observe the enemy or to break up an enemy assault. Typically, Vorposten are composed of 1-2 men with a communication link to the main position. The position should be well camouflaged and offer good possibilities for observation. The occupants should be rotated at regular intervals and be aware of their task, especially whether to engage the enemy or not. It is recommended that a sketch map be drawn and a Meldung, or log of enemy activity be kept and reported to the Gruppenführer. When attacked, the enemy should be primarily engaged by support weapons and the lMG should hold its fire until the last moment, in order that it remains hidden. The Riflemen should avoid firing unless necessary and be held ready for counter-attacks.

DELAYING ACTION :
In a delaying action there is no defined HKL. Instead the Gruppenführer should aim to force the enemy to commit as many resources as possible whilst maintaining the strength of his Gruppe. Unlike a sustained defence, the lMG should engage the enemy as soon as possible along with other supporting weapons.The route(s) for a safe withdrawal should be reconnoitred beforehand, as it is intended that the defensive position is to be abandoned. During the withdrawal, the riflemen should withdraw under the cover of the lMG-Trupp. Once in the next position, the riflemen should cover the withdrawal of the lMG. The Gruppenführer should remain with the lMG.

FIELD FORTIFICATIONS :

1.Schutzenmulde & Schutzenloch -
Where there is little time for preparation of the position, the riflemen would dig a Schützenmulde which essentially consists of a hole about 0.4-0.5m deep for a rifleman to lie down in and offers additional protection for the prone soldier.
This would typically be dug where speed is of the essence or when under fire, as it is possible to dig it whilst lying down.Where more time is available, a rifle-pit or Schützenloch would be dug.Typically, for 2-3 soldiers to either stand or kneel in dependent upon the depth, it offers more protection than the Schützenmulde against artillery and mortar fire. The Schützenloch can be covered by a shelter-quarter for camouflage.Above You can see schutzenloche dug for riflemen

2.Gruppenneste -
For defence on a more permanent basis squad trench networks or strongpoints would be constructed.These Gruppenneste.(Squad nests) were to be a part of the whole platoon and company strongpoints,which in turn would be part of the whole battalion strongpoint.The gruppenneste themselves could include rifle-pits.

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Above depicts a forward line squad trench(Kampfgraben).The Schutzenloch fur 2 schutzen denote 2 man rifle-pits incorporated into the trench system.Stitchgraben is the main body of the slit trench(narrow,shallow).Schutzennischen denote fire steps(So that soldiers in front-line trenches could fire through the parapet, a fire-step was dug into the forward side of the trench. The fire-step was 2 or 3 ft high. It was on this that the sentries stood. It was also used by the whole unit when standing-to (an anticipated enemy attack).M.G Feure Stellung are machine gun firing positions with alternate ones available dependent on angle of enemy advance and fire and for switching.Unterstand is the squad bunker to the rear.It is connected to the main forward trench by the Annaherungsgraben or approach trench by which squad can also withdraw to the rear.

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3.Reinforced Squad Strongpoint -
When faced with the need to defend wide frontages where a continous defensive front was impractical due to manpower limitations like in russia or the african desert germans often built self-contained,scattered,reinforced squad strongpoints.Above is an ideal example.
1 represents 2 man rifle pits or schutzenloch with firing steps.
2 is a light or medium mortar.
3 would either be an Anti-tank gun or a 20mm flak AA gun also useable vs infantry and light vehicles.
4 and 5 denotes light machine gun positions - a strongpoint can have 1 or 2 depending on its strength.If a flak gun is lacking one of the machine guns would be provided with a tripod mount for anti-aircraft duty (it could also then serve as an HMG with greater range).Such a strongpoint is thus capable of limited all-round defense.
6 represents dugouts or small bunkers where squad can take shelter.
7 is a barbed wire fence erected to prevent enemy infantry from closing into grenade range.
8.Anti-armour mines mixed with anti-personnel mines to prevent approach with impunity.
9.Forward observation post connected to main trench by communications trench,used by sentries at night to prevent infiltration.

Such a strongpoint would be sited on high ground with a good field of fire and manned by 16-24 men.When under attack various colour combinations from flare pistols would be used to signal other strongpoints or command posts of its situation.
The construction of such a strongpoints begins when the commander selects 3 nearby positions each with good fields of fire -the central position will hold the AT gun/flak gun the flanking positions the machine guns,they are then connected by communications trenches.The trenches will be covered with boards and stones in order to make them splinter-proof and difficult to recognize from the air.Strongpoint will then be wired and mines laid.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SQUAD DEFENSE :

1.By skillful disposition of forces (organization in depth, security of flanks) and strong organization of the position on suitable ground (camouflage, natural obstacles, artificial barriers, etc., before the front) a force numerically inferior, but equal or superior in morale and equipped with the modern strong defensive power of many automatic weapons may stop, either temporarily or indefinitely, an attacking force which is greatly superior in numbers and weapons.

2.Good observation posts, as well as favorable firing conditions (fields of fire) for the heavy and light machine guns,
are the chief factors in determining the framework of the position, because heavy weapons constitute the backbone
of every defensive position. The machine guns must be located so that they can cover the entire area in front of the position with effective frontal and flanking fire.

3.In the defense the main line of resistance is established in an integrated manner, The forward light machinegun
nests and rifle strongpoints are located in that line. By the combined fire of all arms the enemy attack must be
broken up in front of the main area of resistance.

4.In the sector assigned to him by the platoon commander, the squad leader, after personal reconnaissance, assigns the riflemen their places in the position and supervises the organization and the camouflage.Front of the squad is about 30 to 40 yards. If the squad occupies greater frontage, the squad leader cannot control his squad in combat. The front of the platoon is about 200 to 300 yards. Gaps between the squads must definitely be covered by fire. The position is organized hastily or thoroughly (by foxholes, joining of foxholes, obstacles, etc.) depending on the time available (proximity of the enemy).

(Squad leader directs LMG fire on russian human wave attacks)​

5.The squad leader first finds the most suitable location for the light machine gun within his squad, a position providing the most effective field of fire and also insuring a good opportunity to support adjacent units with flanking fire. Several alternate firing positions are reconnoitered at once and chosen, and they are organized later.Alternate firing positions must not be located too close to other positions. They should be at least 50 yards apart; otherwise the machine gun will not evade the hostile fire. Furthermore, it should always be possible to occupy alternate firing positions well concealed from enemy observation.

6.Next, in compliance with the platoon leader's orders the squad leader posts the riflemen as a reserve or establishes them in the front line. In the latter case the riflemen are located so that the whole forward terrain can be swept with fire, principally at close range and very close range. As a rule, two riflemen are grouped together, usually 'in a small trench or ditch sufficiently close so that they can easily understand each other even in combat. In order to decrease the effectiveness of enemy fire, these separate nests or groups should not be on the same level but should be echeloned. If sufficient time is available after the squad groups (units) have been established, the platoon leader may order the squad members to dig foxholes or trenches somewhat to the rear of their firing positions. The foxholes should be concealed from ground observation and, if,possible, from air observation.The men may remain under such cover until the squad is employed in the fire fight.

7.During the reconnaissance of the position and the construction of the trenches a member of the squad is always designated to observe and warn against the approach of the enemy troops and airplanes.

8.Conspicuous terrain features, such as solitary trees, bushes, the highest point of an elevation, the edge of woodsetc., should be avoided in occupying a position.They offer the enemy a good landmark and quickly draw fire. If there is sufficient time, clear away conspicuous trees, bushes, etc., for they facilitate the fire of the enemy's heavy infantry weapons and artillery.

9.The trench work is almost always betrayed by the fresh excavated earth (either lighter or darker in color), by sharp edges, and by the shadows of the holes which have been dug. Sharp corners and straight lines should therefore be avoided.

(To the right,two riflemen in schutzenloch firing while ammo carrier brings up ammo for LMG)​

10.Do not reveal the position to enemy scout patrols by premature firing. If possible, allow them to come so close that they can be taken prisoners or shot with comparative safety.

11.At long ranges the fire fight is first carried on by artillery and heavy machine guns. In the meantime the squad leader keeps his squad under cover and concealment so that it will not be discovered prematurely.The squad leader opens fire with the light machine gun at effective range only. Light machine-gun fire is directed particularly against targets which cannot be effectively engaged by the artillery and heavy infantry weapons.When the enemy attacks, every rifleman, without regard to cover, must use his rifle. If an enemy hand grenade falls into the position, he springs quickly into cover, or he seizes the hand grenade and throws it out. The squad leader fires the submachine gun only at very close range. Otherwise he directs the fire of his squad, principally that of the light machine gun.

12.In the presence of enemy tanks the squad members take temporary shelter in rifle pits, in holes made specifically for protection against tanks, or, when necessary, by jumping into any available depression. Running away means certain death. Rifle and machine-gun fire has no effect against the armor of the tanks.The most important targets for the squad are the enemy infantrymen following close behind the enemy tank attack. They must be subjected immediately to concentrated fire by all the rifles. If they cannot be seen because of a smoke screen laid down by the tanks, then fire into the smoke.Objective is to seperate the armor from its infantry and then have the anti-tanks weapons in reserve and rear pick them off.

13.If the squad is placed to the rear of the main line of resistance, it entrenches itself just as the other squads do. The orders of the platoon leader determine its action. Often it will join in the fire action and contribute to the volume of fire in front of the MLR by firing through a gap. Surprise fire (though avoid opening fire prematurely) must prevent the enemy from engaging the squad before the latter's fire effect has had time to operate. The squad leader must establish the position so that his men can bring flanking fire upon an enemy who has broken into the position of an adjacent unit. In preparing for the delivery of a counterblow, the leader must reconnoiter in advance to determine the route for such an attack.

14.If the enemy has penetrated the position of an adjacent unit, the squad must hold its position under all circumstances, until rear squads have driven the enemy back. The enemy is stopped by bands of fire. If the situation to the immediate front permits, the enemy who has made a penetration must be hurled back by a quick counterblow conducted by local reserves kept in readiness for that purpose. After the enemy is driven back, the squad again organizes for defense.

NEXT : SQUAD ON PATROL DUTY -SQUAD ON OUTPOST DUTY -RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

GERMAN SQUAD TACTICS -OTHER DUTIES

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GERMAN SQUAD AS COMBAT OUTPOST :

In the defense, combat outposts are usually located in advance of the main line of resistance. They are generally posted close enough so that they can still be seen by the artillery observers and so that they can be supported by the fire of the light artillery located in the main defensive position. They defend themselves, or, if the situation requires, they discontinue the defense and fall back to resume defensive action farther to the rear. When there is a temporary lull in the fighting, the attacker may also provide security for his combat position by means of outposts. Usually such outposts consist of pickets, reconnaissance patrols, and observation or listening posts.
The combat outposts provide close-in security. They have the following missions:
(a) To make the enemy's approach difficult.
(b) To deceive the enemy as to the nature of the defense, as well as the location of the main line of resistance.
(c) To protect the forces in rear by retarding the enemy advance until the rearward forces are ready for combat.
(d) To carry out battle reconnaissance and to maintain contact' with the enemy if and when contact is established.

One or more squads, often reinforced by heavy machine guns and antitank rifles, are employed as outposts in the sector of the platoon or company. In open terrain permitting unrestricted observation, combat outposts are placed under a designated leader from within the company in order to insure coordinated action and control, especially when they are far advanced. In the lattercase, the company commander takes personnel for outposts from platoons in the front line; he will usually reduce correspondingly the forward area of the platoon sectors.
When they are posted, the outposts must know whether they are to defend themselves, or if (and when) they are to withdraw to the position before strong enemy attacks and where they are to take position in line. Furthermore, they must know what friendly reconnaissance patrols or advanced security detachments are before them. The outposts must have orders whether or not they are to withdraw fighting, or whether or not they are to withdraw at one bound. If in the intermediate terrain there are still some sectors that are favorable for defense, they will often occupy these. They must always withdraw in such a way as not to obstruct the fire from the main positions. They must be given information as to passages over streams and marshes, through barbed-wire entanglements, minefields, etc.The outposts are grouped in individual nests, which are echeloned in depth so that the rear nests can later give fire protection for some time in case the forward elements must withdraw. The battle outposts must energetically prevent the enemy scout patrols from getting through their line. By means of patrols, and at times by small advances, they themselves reconnoiter the enemy.

After the organization of their positions, the outposts must prepare dummy positions in order to give the appearance of a stronger force. This deception may be made still more effective by changing positions from time to time. In this way they also make more difficult the enemy's minor thrusts against individual nests of the outposts. Such changes are particularly desirable at night if the enemy has had an earlier opportunity to detect the location of individual nests.

When the outposts of his squad go into position, the squad leader goes quickly out ahead with two men to reconnoiter the position. Through the second-in-command he has had the squad either follow at a certain distance or advance to a designated point. While those accompanying him provide security in the direction of the enemy, the squad leader first looks for the most suitable position for his light machine gun (the best field of fire, the best camouflage, and the best means for going into and leaving the position under cover). With the same considerations in mind, he picks out several
suitable alternate firing positions. By firing the machine gun from different positions, the outposts can simulate a'
stronger force, and their machine guns may also avoid effective enemy fire. After doing this the squad leader locates positions for his riflemen (arranged in nests of two or three men each)so that by observation and fire they can give each other mutual support, as well as aid adjacent units. The squad usually does not extend over 200 yards. All positions must be selected so that it is possible to enter and leave them under cover. Conspicuous .features, such as isolated bushes, are to be avoided. Immediately after his squad arrives at the position, the squad leader provides local security during the organization of the ground by putting the machine gun in a temporary position. He then organizes the position and the dummy works. Next, he establishes communication with the adjacent unit, visually or by sending out several men. As a rule, each squad establishes communication toward the right. If definite signals (flares, flag signals, etc.) for the evacuation of the position have not been specified, before starting out from the main line of resistance the squad leader reaches an agreement with units adjacent to his position in order to insure coordinated withdrawal. He determines distances to various points on the terrain where the enemy is expected to appear first and notes them on a sketch. In preparation for the night, he and his men study the terrain and the avenues of approach available to the enemy and select a suitable position for the night.

SQUAD ON OUTGUARD DUTY :
Troops at rest and exposed to contact with the enemy provide security against attack by means of outguards.The outguards are under the outpost commander. The outposts have much the same mission as the advance guard on the march, namely:
(1) to reconnoiter in the direction of the enemy, so far as is necessary for the security of the troops at rest;
(2) to prevent disturbance by the enemy;
(3) in case of enemy attack, to give the troops in rear time to get ready for march or combat; and
(4)To prevent the enemy from observing the resting troops(strength, organization, or shelter). Preparation must always be made for defense against tanks.

No more troops should be assigned on outpost duty than are absolutely necessary for the security of the troops at rest
(in order to spare the men). Hence, at a considerable distance from the enemy and behind sectors which are easy to defend (narrow passes, etc.), only a weak outpost is necessary. Closer to the enemy, and when there are less favorable defensive positions, a stronger protective force is needed.

First of all, the outposts provide security along the roads and highways leading from the enemy, using stronger units (companies) reinforced by heavy infantry weapons for the main march roads, and often only outguards or advanced sentinels for the byroads. On the most important roads or highways, use antitank barriers, mine barriers, and antitank guns.For security, outguards are posted by the company. Their distance will generally depend on the road net andthe defensive possibilities (bridges, road crossings, hills). Usually they will not be over 1,600 yards away.

Its strength will vary from a squad to a platoon. To outguards of platoon strength, one or two antitank rifles and possibly one or two heavy machine guns should be assigned. They may also be reinforced by antitank guns. Advanced sentinels will often suffice on the less important roads.Stronger outguards in turn provide for their own security by means of advanced sentinels, reconnaissance patrols, and observation or listening posts. In addition, every outguard provides security for itself directly by means of a sentry. The outguard constitutes the reserve of its own sentinels.The harder the intervening terrain is to observe, and the closer the enemy, the more often must visiting and reconnaissance patrols be sent within the chain of sentries.

Outguard on Contact -The outguard allows an enemy patrol to approach as close as possible if it appears that it has not recognized the outguard. It is then either cut off all at once or destroyed by fire at close range (which is important for
determination of the troop unit). After closing the barrier, the outguard takes cover from enemy armored scout cars. The car or tank is engaged by the antitank rifle. Its appearance is reported to the rear by means of signal pistols in order that the company antitank guns can go into action in good time. If a strong enemy force comes up, all the riflemen begin a heavy fire at once, in order, first, to slow up his advance and, second, to notify the company of the attack. Oneman is sent back immediately with the report, on a bicycle if possible. The outguard then withdraws to the company over the route which has already been reconnoitered, without, however, restricting the field of fire of rear elements.

​

SQUAD IN THE ADVANCE GUARD :

As security for the main body, about one-third to one-sixth of the entire infantry force marches at a considerable distance ahead as an advance guard. The advance guard is organized into a support and an advance party. For security the latter sends an infantry point ahead about 500 yards.Because of the continual danger of enemy air attacks, long continuous columns are seldom possible in daytime.The advance guard commander is not bound to any one place. If an encounter with the enemy is possible, then he stays with the advance party. of the advance guard. The main body follows at a distance of 2 to 4 miles.
The advance guard has the following mission:
(1) To insure the unmolested march of the entire force.(It quickly removes potential causes of delay and brushes
aside weak enemy resistance.)
(2) To protect the main body from a surprise attack.
(3) To give the main body time and space for deployment in case of an encounter with a strong enemy force.

The distances between individual parts of the column for example, between the infantry point and the advance party-are sufficient to insure that the next largest unit will not be involved at once by the combat of the smallerformation, and yet such that the smaller formation can receive timely support from the following unit.
Liaison between the various elements in the column is maintained by connecting files (at times also by cyclists, cavalrymen, motorcyclists, and motorists). In daytime the distance between the connecting files is about 100 yards. At night, and in operation over terrain which restricts visibility, distances between elements are reduced.Similar to the organization of the advance guard is that of the rear guard, which protects withdrawing troops against the confusion caused by sudden attack. The rear guard withdraws by stages.

Infantry Point - About 1,000 yards ahead of the infantry point, the mounted point marches by bounds from one observation point to another.
(1) Mission of the infantry point.--The infantry point protects the advance party following behind, and drives
away weaker enemy forces by quick attacks. If strong enemy forces are met, it gives the elements following time
and space for deployment, and at the same time it reconnoiters the enemy positions until the company appears.
By employing heavy fire, it stops the advance of the enemy as long as possible.
The infantry point consists of about one to four squads (usually two squads) under an officer (platoon leader), accompanied usually by one antitank rifle and a cyclist. One light mortar detachment may also be attached.

(2) Formation of the advance - The formation in which the infantry point advances depends on the proximity of the enemy and on the terrain. If there is no danger of an immediate encounter with the enemy, then the infantry point marches along the road, usually one squad in column to the right under the trees, and the other to the left under
the trees. The leader of the infantry point is at the head with the command group. The light mortar detachment
and one or two antitank rifles of the company are at the tail of the column.
Two intelligence men are sent out as scouts about 100 to 200 yards ahead, each equipped with field glasses and
trained as gas detectors. One is equipped with a pistol in order to signal promptly to the rear announcing the approach of enemy tanks.
In the infantry point some men are detailed to observe to the front, others to the right, and others to the left and to the rear (toward the company) or toward the connecting files and air scouts. When approaching a defile, the scouts go around both sides in order to preclude surprise. Hills close to the road are used by the point leader for observation, but he must not delay on them too long.In terrain over which cannot be seen (for example, forests), it is best to have the squad riflemen march in front of the machine gun in order to insure protection of the machine gun from surprises.
When the enemy is near, the point often moves in ditches alongside the road, in extended echelon or in line of skirmishers. Any observation of the enemy should be reported through messengers (cylists) by prearranged signals or by oral transmission through the connecting files. The transmission of long messages from one file to the next is not to be recommended, because by repeated transmission from file to file the message is usually incorrectly stated. In the advance the infantry point does not allow itself to be held up by hostile fliers, but uses the shade of trees or advances in the ditches alongside the road.

(3)In Contact with Enemy -
If the infantry point advances against a village or a woods in which the enemy is thought to be (by report of mounted point or cyclists), then it deploys and goes forward on a broad front(Schutzenkette). On passing through villages, buildings and grounds are quickly searched for enemy troops.
If the infantry point encounters a weak enemy force for example, a few riflemen or a light machine gun (forward
security)-then it immediately brings its light machine gun (or light machine guns) into position and opens fire. The point leader leads the riflemen in attack upon the enemy, taking advantage of cover and usually working quickly around to outflank the enemy, so as not to delay the advance of the troops following. The light mortars are brought into position at once; they are immediately assigned a target (a light machine gun).Quick action is imperative when the enemy holds animportant point: for example, a defile or a commanding height.
Enemy scouts and reconnaissance parties must be fired upon and driven away at once. They must not be allowed to get even a glance at the marching column. If the point encounters a sizable enemy force, one that surpasses it in strength, then it initially takes full cover until friendly, rear heavy machine guns arrive and are put in position, and supporting troops come up from the rear. In the meantime the point leader, using his field glasses, determines the extent of the enemy and the location of his machine-gun positions, and, if a covered,approach is possible, sends out a patrol for close reconnaissance of the enemy positions (to determine frontage, flanks, and composition) and reports to the company.
If the enemy attacks, then the leader at once commences a heavy fire with the machine gun and all rifles, in order to bring the attack to a standstill. If in terrain offering cover to the enemy the infantry point is suddenly fired upon at very close range (somewhere under 100 yards), then there is no time to open fire. With a shout of "Hurrah!" it rushes at the enemy. If at this close range the men should throw themselves to the ground in order to open fire, they would suffer heavy losses before they had time to fire.
By means of prearranged light signals and bugle signals, tanks are immediately reported to the rear so that the defensive weapons there (antitank guns and antitank rifles) may act in due time. When there is a strong wind or fog, or when in covered terrain (for example, woods), the prearranged warning may also be to detonate a hand grenade as a signal of approaching tanks. In the presence of tanks the point takes full cover close to one side of the road, if possible in ditches, because in such a position the men are usually in a dead space, under cover from enemy tank fire.

GENERAL USE OF DECEPTION :

1. Divert the enemy's attention in the opposite direction, so that you can approach him silently from the rear and make your kill, or so that you bypass him unnoticed. Make a noise by throwing stones. Use small parties to attract attention while the main body carries out the envelopment.

2. Draw mines across the road just in front of a hostile vehicle, and kill the crew from ambush as they climb out.

3. Noise-making devices in the vicinity of wire obstacles, as well as the use of dummies, can induce Allied soldiers to open fire. In this way the number and location of hostile weapons can be determined.

4. If it is necessary for you to pretend to be dead, lie down as close as possible to enemy dead until the danger is past or until night has fallen. A helmet pierced by small-arms fire will lend added realism when you are feigning death.

5. Mine deserted trenches.

6.Cut telephone cables at night, and draw one end into an ambush so that hostile linesmen can be killed or captured.

7. By using single rounds from a 20-mm machine gun in an armored car, you can make the enemy think you have a heavy antitank gun.

8.By warming up your vehicle engines, you can imitate the sound of vehicles approaching and departing, and thus can simulate troop movements.

9. Put up boards with "Danger Mines!" and a death's head painted on them. Fence off the area with wire. Make tracks around the resulting dummy minefield, and mine them.

10.Patrols using captured vehicles often can achieve surprise. Captured vehicles also can be useful when you are trying to lure hostile soldiers into an ambush.

11.When your patrols approach populated places, they may find it profitable to stop suddenly, fire a few shots in the direction of the village, turn, and make a getaway. The opposition is likely to disclose itself by firing.

12.Patrols operating behind the enemy's front lines should turn sign posts and notice boards to face the wrong direction or to lead into an ambush.(aka trolling)

13. If a reconnaissance or combat patrol is observed by the enemy and finds it necessary to withdraw, the members of the patrol should hang jackets on the wire or place helmets with the tops showing, to hold the enemy's attention.

14.Cover weapon positions with boards, and camouflage them to resemble the surrounding terrain. The occupant of a position then can push the board up with his helmet, fire at hostile personnel at close range, and duck back into his hidden position again.

15.Place piles of straw or wood around gasoline cans in the vicinity of your positions. If the enemy approaches you at night, fire on these materials and thus illuminate the attackers.

16.In a system of defense based on strongpoints, build a dummy position between the strongpoints. At night fire light signals to give the impression of a continuous line of defense. Put up artificial cover for the enemy in front of such a position and mine it. Or else arrange that the exits lead him into your field of fire.

17. Prepare dummy fuel dumps out of old cans and barrels, so as to lure hostile air attacks. Prepare dummy bivouacs and other concentrations by using tents, wooden crates, and derelict vehicles.

18. At night, leave lights in partly blacked-out houses -- or keep small fires burning -- in areas well away from genuine bivouacs.

19.Deflect bombing attacks by displaying swastika flags prominently on knocked-out vehicles at a safe distance from your own positions.

20.Leave behind hand grenades with the delay fuze removed when withdrawing under enemy attack.When enemy troops attempt to use the captured grenades, pulling the friction wire causes the grenades to explode immediately without the usual 4 to 5 second delay.

NEXT : RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS - THE PANZER DIVISIONS

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

RIVER ASSAULT TACTICS

GENERAL SUMMARY -

The assault crossing of a defended river line was one of the most difficult tactical offensive operations conducted in World War II.All major armies had 3-4 engineer companies at divisional level. Regardless of the scope of the operation – divisional, corps, or army-level – the initial assault crossing was very much a tactical operation. Usually no more than a reinforced battalion or regiment, supported by considerable artillery, was committed to conduct the actual assault and to establish a foothold on the far bank. This initial assault was usually made by means of small manpaddled or powered assault boats. Once this was accomplished, follow-on forces would be shoved across as rapidly as possible to clear and secure a bridgehead; footbridges, ferries, and rafts were used for this phase, while larger pontoon bridges were being hurriedly emplaced for heavier equipment to cross. The troops landed on the far bank had to be prepared to meet immediate heavy counterattacks, and to hold the bridgehead until sufficient breakout forces were in place.The river crossing operations were crucially important in the french campaign.The general tactics followed by the major armies for river crossing operations were largely similar.

One of the most desirable objects for an advancing army is to seize bridges intact over major rivers.This was largely the task of small mobile reconnaissace forces advancing far ahead of the main body,aiming to take the bridge by surprise and speed.If the bridges had been demolished beforehand a river assault had to be conducted.​

(Above - German large inflatable paddle boats capable of carrying 18 men)​

Selecting Crossing Sites -
Crossing sites would have to be selected based on enemy positions,river width .Larger the width of a crossing site,longer the duration of vulnerability to enemy fire.However the narrower the crossing site,the greater the current which would make anchoring and controlling boats difficult.Water depth would also determine the speed of current.Regarding enemy dispositions on the other side,the assault unit’s initial and follow-on objectives, exits from the shore, and access to the road system were critical. The location of the objectives was the foremost factor in the selection of crossing points, and every effort was made to select undefended or lightly defended sectors.
Road access into the assault area was important in order to deliver boats, troops, supplies, and bridging equipment. Dumps were established, and units moved into assembly areas. Closer to the river were the assault positions or forming-up points from which the infantry and engineers would move the boats to launch points.These dumps and areas had to be concealed from ground and air observation, as did the troops’ approach routes to the crossing sites. The steepness of the bank and the ground conditions had to allow infantry carrying boats to reach the water’s edge. Suitable positions for supporting weapons covering the far side were essential. Likewise, the far banks had to be climbable and/or offer exit trails. The exits from the landing sites had to ideally provide firm ground, cover and concealment, and allow access to roads. It would be a real problem for one bank to be at or near water level, and the opposite side higher, since whichever side the higher bank was on required considerable engineering work to provide access/exit points at bridge level. Pre-existing ferry crossing sites were ideal for pontoon bridges since they had existing access and exit roads, and ferry landings on both banks were suitable for supporting bridge ends as they were at the same level.
Current speed had to be considered: if it were too fast, it would carry even powerboats downstream before they could reach the far shore.
Multiple landing sites might be selected to provide for multiple toeholds to be gained, with the most successful of these receiving the follow-on forces.
​

(German powered motor assault boats under smokescreen,these were operated by 250 men special companies and famously employed at sevastopol by von manstein to telling effect)

PHASE IA - RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING
By studying maps and aerial photographs of the selected crossing and bridge sites the division or corps engineer commander could forecast the needs for assault boats and bridging equipment. He would request these from higher echelons in good time, so there would be no delay in their delivery.If possible, rehearsals were conducted on another river, or at least “dry” rehearsals. At the same time the assault boats, ammunition, supplies, bridging equipment and materials were delivered and stockpiled close to the assault positions. Assault units might have been selected from the reserve of the division/regiment that had reached the river Assault positions were selected, and troops issued ammunition, rations, etc. Deception efforts might occur during this phase. Artillery would be registered.

PHASE IB - FIRE PREPARATION ​

Artillery and mortar fire would be placed on known enemy defensive positions, reserves, artillery positions, command posts, etc. Fires would be preplanned to engage deploying reserves and counterattacks. Dive bombers and ground attack aircraft would attack enemy reserves and other positions and facilities. Normally bridges on subsequent streams/rivers on the far side would not be attacked, to retain them for breakout, but selected bridges not used to advance the main attack might be destroyed to protect the flanks. Artillery and mortars would often fire smoke to blind enemy positions and observers.
​

(Ferries -In use since Greek and Roman times)​

PHASE II - ASSAULT CROSSING
The actual crossings were often conducted at first light.River mist and fog might be present, offering a degree of concealment, though also a risk of confusion.Ideally, the assault would occur when the rising or setting sun was shining​

across the river into the defenders’ eyes. The artillery would concentrate on enemy defensive positions, obstacles, and artillery. Smoke generators or smoke pots might be used to screen the assault boats if the wind was blowing from the near side; if it was blowing from the far bank, the artillery would fire smoke on that shore to drift back across the river. On the other hand, while potentially providing lifesaving cover for the assault boats, smoke might hamper the attack, especially in finding the proper landing sites. Rommel, when commanding 7. Panzer-Division in France in spring
1940, used artillery to set fire to a riverside village, and the resulting smoke screened troops crossing by inflatable boats. Supporting direct-fire weapons on the near side would also cover the assault.
At the appointed time the boats were picked up and the troops crossed the line of departure, this usually being the last concealment. From here the boats were carried upright. There would be no increase in covering fire, in order
not to alert the defenders. Clambering down the riverbank and crossing boggy ground and vegetation was difficult. If launching from a steep bank boats could not be pushed into the water bow-first, as they would ship water;they had to be launched sideways. A squad automatic weapon was often placed in the bow. Artillery preparation would only begin a short time before the assault was launched, and for night assaults it might be withheld to ensure surprise, until the assault was discovered and the enemy reacted. Once the boats were committed, then even if they were receiving heavy casualties it was better to keep going rather than turn back still exposed to fire. Moving rapidly to the enemy bank might mask the boats from fire from weapons further back. Troops were told not to return fire from the boats; this was ineffective, and risked hitting men in their own or other boats. Covering weapons on the near bank (AT guns, machine guns, mortars) would open fire. Once they disembarked, boat teams would not halt to organize into platoons, but press inland to their objectives and establish toeholds, no matter how tenuous. Engineers would return the boats, taking wounded with them, and ferry across subsequent waves until rafts and footbridges were in place.

(Heavy bridge carriers of the armies,lowest one is german.Present at divisional engineer detatchement)​

PHASE III - ESTABLISHMENT OF BRIDGEHEAD
If the immediate enemy defences overlooking the crossing had been silenced,the assault force had to establish a viable short-term defense on the first defendable terrain, termed the bridgehead.Enemy forward observers were driven off, defensive fires established, and AT mines laid on avenues of approach, covered by AT guns. The flanks of the bridgehead had to be secured as soon as possible, at least with screening forces. This allowed time for the improved ferries and bridges to be emplaced so that additional forces and logistics could cross and prepare for the breakout. Typically, a substantial force including armor had to be built up inside the bridgehead to ensure the success of the breakout; piecemeal attacks by units as they trickled across the river might not succeed. The sooner the breakout from a bridgehead occurred the better, in order to prevent the defenders from reinforcing the containing force.

(Pontoon bridge allowing reinforcement of bridgehead)​

PHASE IV - CONSOLIDATION AND REINFORCEMENT
Pontoon footbridges would be emplaced first, to rush infantry reinforcements across to make up for the losses among the assault waves. Ferries and barges would carry AT guns, tanks, artillery, and other support. Casualties would beevacuated at the same time.Unless enemy resistance was light and disorganized, or they possessed inadequate mobile reserves, the assault force had to build up strength and resources before it could conduct a breakout. Even if unable to break out, such bridgeheads were often maintained to tie down enemy defenders while breakouts from other bridgeheads were launched. Additional pontoon bridges, ferry services, and boat relays would be established. More infantry and supporting weapons would be delivered, to include the forces designated for the breakout, along with more supplies and ammunition. The bridgehead might be physically enlarged during this phase.

PHASE V - BREAKOUT
Like the assault crossing itself, the breakout would commence with artillery and air support. The breakout would most likely be conducted by fresh troops, while the original assault troops held the bridgehead. Follow-on units and supply transport would be ready to exploit the breakout.

Apart from large river crossings small bands of troops could cross streams or rivers on rope bridges or by ,swimming,wading,fording.But these were for raiding,reconnaisance.As a bridgehead on the other hand couldn't be sustained with heavy reinforcements unable to be carried accross by such means.​

NEXT : GERMAN PANZER DIVISIONS -GERMAN MOTORIZED INFANTRY(SCHUTZEN/PANZERGRENADIERS)

 

[LowPost]

This doesn't seem to be the right topic to post this but I've got a film recommendation for you. I just watched 1944 today with English subs, an Estonian WWII film which came out this year and it deals with Estonians fighting in the Waffen-SS and their compatriots from the Red Army. It is set during the Battle of Tannenberg Line and the Battle of Tehumardi.

It is meant to be understood as an anti-war film because the Estonian people, being part a little country, were portrayed as victims of a conflict fought between two European major powers. At one point Estonians were killing each other and it also deals with the conflicting loyalties and opinions the individuals on whom the movie focuses have. There are Estonians who strongly believe in the Nazi racial ideology and carry out the Hitler salute without question and there are also Estonian Waffen-SS soldiers who apparently hate "the Reds" but they don't hold Hitler in high esteem and they even make fun of him. On the other hand we've got a Red Army officer who is undoubtedly to Stalin and loathes the "fascists", whilst his subordinates are unwilling to kill their Estonian brothers fighting for the other side.

Even with a low budget of €1.9 mln the producers have made the most of it. There are intense fighting scenes and much drama, so this is surely one of the best WWII films I've ever watched.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

THE PANZERWAFFE

​

ORIGINS : DEVELOPMENT OF THE PANZER ARM

INFLUENCE OF VON SEECKT -
Germany, constrained by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, was not allowed to produce tanks of any kind and only a few armoured cars.However from early in the interwar period ,she sought to sidestep these limitations.German theorists had recognized their complete neglect of tanks in world war one as a cause of their defeat.The chief of the Reichsheer,Von Seeckt assessed the reasons for the defeat of the Schlieffen Plan and concluded that it failed for three main reasons: (1) the German failure to interfere with French mobilization; (2) their failure to prevent French redeployment after the initial German victories; and (3) the German failure to recognize the limitations of foot-bound and horse-drawn armies for carrying out encirclement maneuvers. Seeckt concluded that the German experience of the Great War proved that the regular army must meet three demands for the next one. First, it must attain a higher degree of mobility by making maximum use of motor transportation. Second, the logistical system must be strengthened, again by motorization. Finally,dependence on mass conscripted forces must be reduced in favour of a more smaller,professional force capable of rapid mobile operations to serve as a core around which conscription could increase numbers if necessary.According to his blueprint, the air force would give initialpriority to the destruction of the enemy’s air forces by surprise attack, followed by German aerial attacks against major enemy troop concentrations to disrupt the enemy’s mobilization. Then, the disorganized enemy would be attacked by rapidly moving forces, which would break through on narrow frontages and penetrate far into the enemy’s rear, causing further disorganization and,hopefully, a total collapse.

Von Seeckt ​

Seeckt's vision changed the emphasis from mass to mobility (as discussed earlier too),seeking to return the manuever warfare espoused by moltke.The advance of firepower had proven in the first world war that mass attacks of the napoleonic style ,effective in the 19th century were no longer practical.The advantage had decisively turned to the defensive.Nor could germany afford a war of attrition against enemies with greater strategic resources over the long term as had been proven in the great war.Moreover the germany of the interwar period was far weaker than imperial germany.Thus Seeckt's vision reflected the strategic reality for germany where only a return to war of manuever could bring germany success.However there was little consensus on how this would be achieved,(except for the infantry arm which was being retrained wholly in the model of the infiltration tactics of late 1918.)Seeckt,himself a cavalry officer had been greatly influenced by his successes in the eastern front where mobile warfare had prevailed(unlike trench warfare in west) and cavalry had saw use.Thus despite his advanced ideas,even while he encouraged motorization,he firmly believed in the outmoded notion of the place of cavalry in future operations.(Thus in 1932 germany still had 18 cavalry regiments -15 ,000 out of 100,000 reichsheer) and by 1939 still 14.When war broke out they were finally divided amongst the various corps and divisions as recon units .)By the late 1920s the reichswehr was already experimenting with armour in secret.Dummy tanks were used for training at home.A clandestine pact with the soviet union allowed for a tank school at kazan where several german officers visited for observation.Amongst them later wehrmacht luminaries like Model,Blomberg,Von thoma and one Heinz Guderian.

'' In Germany the elements of modern armoured warfare had already crystallized into a doctrine before the war—thanks mainly to the work of General Guderian—and had found practical expression in the organization and training of armoured formations.'' - Rommel's Diary

ROLE OF GUDERIAN :
Heinz Guderian was to become one of the main proponents of the nascent panzer branch and one of its pioneers.Though his reputation as 'The Father of Blitzkrieg' is partly to self-promotion after the war,he played a vital role in the development of the german panzerwaffe.Guderian served as a signals officer in WW1,and joined the motor transportation branch of the reichsheer in 1922.Here he soon became the outstanding advocate for formation of tank units and conversion of the motor transportation branch into an armed force.Outspoken and difficult to work with he made several enemies and faced entrenched opposition from conservative sections in the army,especially the cavalry arm which led to several transfers.Guderian kept track of writings and developments on armor in england and france and also visited the tank school in russia.Between 1930-39 Guderian would spearhead the development of german tank doctrine and organization.Being a signals officer he insisted on each german tank to be equipped with radio sets.His ideas on armoured warfare were fully explained in his work Achtung Panzer!.It reviewed the state of armoured development in the European nations and Soviet Russia, and presented Guderian's theories on the effective use of armoured formations and combined-arms warfare ideas of other general staff officers. The book included the importance of airpower in support of the panzer units for future ground combat.Germany's panzer forces were created largely along the lines laid down by Guderian in Achtung - Panzer!

MECHANIZATION 1929-1935 :
After Blomberg became chief of staff,the pace of mechanization was increased.From late 1929 the formation of the first motorcycle and mechanized reconaissance companies began.The first major step was in 1931 with the creation of the post of Inspector of Motor Troops -with Oswald Lutz as head and Guderian as his chief of staff.This year German General Staff accepted a plan for two types of tank, a medium tank with a 75 mm short barreled gun(Later Panzer 4) and a lighter vehicle with a 37 mm gun(later Panzer III).While german industry would need time and experience to build these machines,the German army used a variety of light tanks based on the British Carden Loyd tankette chassis. The early tanks were code-named Landwirtschaftlicher Schlepper (La S, "agricultural hauler").The Panzerkampfwagen I was the evolution of this light tankette design concealed under designation of tractor and became germany's first post-war tank.It was intended as a stopgap training model with just 2 men as crew,weighing 5.4 tonnes and armed with 2 machine guns and very thin armor.Under Lutz and Guderian the panzer branch was finally making headway,but complete panzer divisions were still some distance off due to heavy opposition to such revolutionary concepts in the army.

The decisive breakthrough came in early 1934 when Guderian was allowed to demonstrate the basic components of the panzer division he envisioned: motorcycle units, an anti-tank platoon, reconnaissance vehicles and a panzer platoon, equipped with experimental tanks.Hitler was won over - ''That is what i want,that is what i''l have''.With Hitler's support in 1935 the post of inspector of panzer troops was created and the first 3 Panzer divisions formed.The Panzerwaffe had been born.

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR INFLUENCES :
The spanish civil war gave the germans the chance to test the panzer in combat.The experience showed the limitations of these light tanks ,especially compared to the soviet supplied republican tanks.However in spain the germans learned to employ their AA gun 8.8 cm in an anti-tank role aggressively,a trend that was to become a staple tactic.Both sides employed tanks in infantry support role.A few times radical attempts at employing the tank in the old 'cavalry charge' style met with disaster.The germans present on the ground recognized this,the british and french didn't.It was in 1936 that Achtung Panzer was published.Spain reinforced in guderian the view that for tanks to be succesful they had to be supported by infantry and supporting arms.Other lessons learnt in spain were -
I.Dive bombing to support mobile operations,and thus the genesis of close support aircraft as 'Flying artillery'.
II.Necessity of radios for command and control in tanks.This was largely accomplished by guderian's insistence,being a former signals officer.This decision was to pay great dividends later.
III.The debate on the manner of use of armor was finally settled in the army manuevers of 1937.Here one army corps defending a sector was to be attacked by 2 ,each with 300 tanks.The tanks made a massed frontal cavalry style assault moving out of range of supporting infantry and artillery and were decimated.

The army chief,Ludwig beck was however concerned with the increased influence of the Panzer arm and had guderian 'promoted' to divisional commander of 2nd panzer division and thus away from his former post.Now the conservative elements each wanted a share of the motorization process,One tank brigade was set aside for Infantry support.3 'Light divisions' were created by converting cavalry divisions with mechanized elements and motorized infantry.The infantry took its share by forming 4 motorized infantry divisions.The artillery arm recieved mechanized anti-tank companies in the divisions.While some of these were sound measures,result was a fragmentation of the motorization effort which was already constrained by severe resource limitations.The fuel,manpower,maintainence cost for a mechanized infantry unit was largely the same as that of an armoured division ,but with lesser combat power.

PANZER ARM 1938 CHANGES:
Definitive changes came in 1938,when in the anschluss of austria though not a single shot was fired - Guderian commanding the 2nd panzer gained personal experience of the capabilities and the shortcomings of these new formations. His division was able to cover some 700km in just two days, but it lost many tanks on the march due to mechanical breakdowns.Scrutinizing this,new measures were adopted for better maintainence and logistical procedures.The bloodless takeover of czechslovakia a few months later proved the sound application of these measures.Czechoslovakia was a real coup for the german panzerwaffe in other ways.The Wehrmacht got its hands on hundreds of Czech built light tanks and the world famous Skoda factories.These tanks-much superior to the Pz I and Pz II were assimilated into german service as the Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t).They served as a enormous boost to the panzerwaffe's numerical strength and would form a full quarter of german panzer strength in the invasion of france Without czech tanks there would have been no 'blitzkrieg' in 1940.

1938 saw 2 other decisive changes.With Beck's resignation,Guderian was in december appointed Inspector of Mobile troops,answerable directly to the army chief and now the definitive influence on development of german panzer tactics and doctrine.
The second was the formation of Motorized Corps Commands - XVI armeekorps (responsible for 3 panzer divisions),XIV armeekorps(responsible for 4 motorized infantry divisions) and XV armeekorps(the 3 light divisions).All 3 corps commands were subordinated to Guderian in his new post.The consolidation of mechanized forces in unified commands ensured they would not be parceled out piecemeal and also they would recieve uniform doctrinal training.

POLAND 1939 to MAY 1940 :
By September 1939,when war began the Panzerwaffe had been expanded from 3 to 6 panzer divisions.Apart from 1-3 existing ones Numbers 4,5,10.Panzer Divisions had been formed.Made possible by ramping up of german tank production and the czech vehicles.1939 saw the beginning of the mass production of the 2 iconic medium tanks of the blitzkrieg years - The Panzer III and The Panzer IV.The Polish campaign didn't see the panzers employed in a concentrated manner,being dispersed under different commands.Panzers didn't form seperate panzerkorps but were paired with infantry divisions in corps and armies,where though intended as support forces they ended up serving as spearheads -exceeding expectations.The Polish campaign led to organizational changes in the structure of the divisions(next post) as well as revealing the ineffectiveness of the 'light divisions' .4 of these were thus converted to panzer divisions.By may 1940 thus the Wehrmacht possesed 10 Panzer divisions and 5 motorized infantry divisions which were to serve as the steel tip of the german lance .

(Panzers in Poland)

''Smash with Fist,Don't feel with Fingers '' - Guderian​

DIFFERENCES WITH ALLIED INTERWAR DEVELOPMENT :
1.Most other armies of the era organized their tanks into "tank brigades" requiring additional infantry and artillery support. Panzer divisions had their own organic infantry and artillery support. This led to a change in operational doctrine: instead of the tanks supporting operations by other arms, the tanks led operations, with other arms supporting them. Since the panzer divisions had the supporting arms included, they could operate independently from other units.

2.French and british were earliest pioneers of armour,but they gradually let their lead dissolve in the 30s.The british experimented with an all-arms mechanised force but disbanded it after entrenched opposition from the higher echeleons of the army.The USA never went beyond 2 small armoured regiments,not even a brigade.The French formed the first unit similar to an armoured division -The Light Mechanized Division in 1934.(DLM)The french produced large quantities of well armed and armoured tanks.They outnumbered the germans in 1940 and were better quality.However the achilles heel was organization and doctrine.The soviets emphasized armour development the most of all armies in the interwar period spending enormous amounts and building up the world's largest tank fleet.Soviets focused on refining methods of mass production and reliable powerful tanks -these would be enormously helpful in their survival in WW2.Doctrinally 'the deep battle' advocated during 1930s was abandoned after the purges and much of the leadership lost.Organization and training however remained weak.

3.The main french problem despite possesing more and better tanks in 1940,was that while germany concentrated all its tanks in 10 panzer divisions with uniform doctrine -French tanks were split up into 3 Light mechanized Divisions,4 Armoured divisions,5 half mechanized cavalry divisions and no less than 38 independent tank battalions for infantry support.Moreover all 4 armoured divisions and 1 DLM were raised in 1940 with little time for training as a panic move after the german success in poland.They would further erode the divisions they actually had by dividing them piecemeal to 4 armies and the reserve.

(Panzer IV)​

4.Finally for the allies there was a problem of doctrine.While the Panzer division was designed for breakthrough and exploitation -independent operations,the Anglo-french armour forces were designed for infantry support to break a 1918 style front.Motorization being an advantage in defence as a strategic reserve.Due to division of the tanks into seperate branches there was no uniformity of doctrine or training.

5.The french tanks also lacked radios in general.Another design flaw was that the commander was also the gunner which reduced combat effectiveness,response time and rate of fire.Lacking recent experience of mobile operations prior to 1940 like the germans,the french armour would also face logistical issues.

In conclusion the 2 armies that focused most on development of the tank force were the 2 that were defeated in world war one - Russia and Germany.Both started from scratch.In both cases dictators imposed their will to decisively speed up the process whereas the victorious anglo-french sat on their laurels and stuck to what had worked.They felt no great incentive for radical changes,nor could the conservative military opinion be overcome by the will of a dictator.Germans were determined not to repeat the trench warfare of 1914 -the tank offered a possible way out.(Though nobody dreamt of the magnitude of success they would achieve at that time)

NEXT: ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF PANZER DIVISIONS 1-10

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

PANZERWAFFE : PART II

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ORGANIZATION OF THE PANZER DIVISION 1940 :

The panzer divisions of 1940 had no uniform organization.Indeed the whole situation was somewhat chaotic.The main reasons behind this were -
1.Hasty raising of multiple divisions in the last 2 years.
2.Experimentation on different types of organization structure.(no consensus yet)
3.Most of all inability of german industry to produce enough tanks to standardize on equipment.

Thus most divisions were a mix of 6 types of tanks,earlier light tankettes such as Panzer I and II,czech light tanks Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t) and the latest german designs Panzer III and Panzer IV.

Above : Symbols for Unit types(For reference)
​

Germany entered the French campaign in 1940 with 10 Panzer divisions.Divisions 1-3 were the original ones raised in 1936.Numbers 4,5,10 were raised during 1938-1940 period.Numbers 6-9 were originally Light divisions,but after the failure of this experimental type in poland were converted to panzer divisions by adding a panzer regiment.These 3 types had seperate organization structures -however the basic layout (components) and lowl level unit organization within the division was consistent in keeping with the german army's einheit principle.

​

Panzer Divisions 1-3 : Above is the Organization of the first 3 panzer divisions.Raised in 1936 these were the senior armoured units of the wehrmacht.The core components are -
>Panzer brigade(of 2 panzer regiments each with 2 battalions)
>Motorized Infantry Brigade(Schutzen later renamed Panzergrenadiers from 1942) with a Krdschutzen(Motorcycle)battalion and a Motorized Infantry regiment(with 3 battalions)
>Motorized Artillery Regiment(with 3 battalions)
>Tank Destroyer(Panzerjager) Battalion.
>Reconaissance Battalion(With armoured cars)
>Motorized Pioneer Battalion( Combat Enginners)
>Supply and Signal services plus Staff.

​

Panzer Divisions 4,5,10 : The organization of the Panzer divisions 4,5 and 10.Identical to earlier organization except that it has 2 motorized infantry regiments each with 2 motorized infantry battalions.Motorcycle battalion removed.This additional infantry made the ratio of panzer battalion: Mot.infantry battalion as 1:1,probably influenced by combat experience.

​

Panzer Divisions 6-9 : These divisions were converted from the light divisions and thus have different organization.Instead of 2 panzer regiments with 2 battlaions each,there is a single panzer regiment with 3 panzer battalions.The motorized component is identical to that of divisions 1 to 3.1 motorized infantry regiment with 3 battalions and motorcycle battalion.The ratio of mot infantry battalions to panzer battalions is kept 1:1.

​

The Command staff was the nerveous system of the Panzer division and co-ordinated its actions with objectives set by high command.The operations officer was the key subordinate to the division commander and acted in many cases as co-commander.The whole staff was mobile on vehicles with a tank escort.Details of german staff system have been discussed earlier. - BATTLE REPORT #16 Fall Gelb:Blitzkrieg 1940 | Page 2

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Working Mechanism of a Panzer Division.The Reconaissance,Combat,Direct fire and indirect fire,support,supply and communications elements clearly depicted along with their relationship with the divisional staff(fuhrungs abteilung).Abteilung word means Battalion or Detatchment.

​

Strength of The Panzer Divisions on the eve of the invasion.The Panzerwaffe fielded 3505 panzers in 10 divisions.Above is breakdown of the strengths of each division.Army Group A under Rundstedt was to carry out the main central thrust into france and was allocated 7 panzer divisions in 3 panzerkorps(Hoth,Guderian,Reinhardt).The feint attack in belgium and netherlands under Army Group B (Von bock)was to be spearheaded by 3 panzer divisions.Army Group C guarding the french opposite the maginot line had no panzer divisions and used in defensive role.Pz .Bef denotes command tanks.
In total ~500 Panzer I, 550+ Panzer II, 400 Panzer III, 300 Panzer IV, 350+ czech tanks plus command vehicles took part in the attack.

NEXT: COMPONENTS OF THE PANZER DIVISION IN DETAIL

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

PANZERWAFFE : PART III

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COMPONENTS OF A PANZER DIVISION :

(A) THE PANZER REGIMENT -
The panzer regiment was basic armoured component of a panzer division.As we have seen last post 2 types of organization existed in 1940.Panzer divisions 1,2,3,4,5 and 10 having 2 Panzer regiments brigaded together.Each of the panzer regiments having 2 panzer battalions. The 2nd type of organization in divisions 6-9(converted from light divisions) saw a single panzer regiment but with 3 panzer battalions.
Above diagram shows a Panzer regiment with 2 panzer battalions(which means it would have belonged to a pz div with 2 such regiments).Main Combat units of the regiment are the 2 Panzer battalions(Abteilung) each with their own staff.The regimental staff has a light panzer zug(platoon) as escort plus there are mobile supply and communications services.Nachr Zug means communications platoon.Le Colonne Transport column and Workstatt Kompanie represents Mobile workshop for maintainence and repair of vehicles.A panzer regiment with 3 battalions would have same basic layout except the increased battalion number.

​

Above diagram is a graphic representation of a 2 battalion panzer regiment.The components described are depicted -equipment may vary in 1940 from regiment to regiment due to scarcity.The basic tactical small-arms unit is the zug or platoon of 5 tanks.Of the 2 panzer battalions each has 3 panzer kompanies.(2 light panzer and 1 medium panzer) plus battalion staff ,staff escort detatchment and a light panzer platoon(zug).Regimental staff have their own command section and escort.The Panzer kompanies themselves are divided into 4 platoons or zugs of 5 tanks each plus 2 tanks of the kompanie troop.Basic regimental and battalion layout remained same from 1939-1943.

(i) The Panzer Abteilung(Battalion) -
The basic tactical unit is the panzer battalion.2 or 3 panzer battalions made up a panzer regiment in 1940.(From late 1941 germans standardized on 3 battalions in one regiment per panzer division,but in 1940 the 2 battalion regiment was majority).The organization of panzer regiment may vary,but organization of panzer battalion is uniform in all divisions.Above depicts the main components -
2 Light Panzer Companies(With a companie troop and 4 platoons or zugs)
1 Medium Panzer companies.(,, ,,)
Battalion Staffel Tank Detatchment
Staff Kompanie with Escort platoon,support elements(motorized pioneers,anti aircraft or flak platoon etc)
Transportation and supply Services.(Under Light Colonne)

​

The main difference between light and medium panzer companies is light companies are armed with Panzer I,II,III and czech tanks.Medium companies have 1 platoon of light tanks(Panzer II) and 3 platoons of medium tanks (Panzer 4).

​

Representation of a panzer abteilung.The medium company zugs often had 4 tanks.German basic panzer battalion organization throughout the earlywar years(1939-1942)remained at 2 light companies and 1 medium companies each of 4 zugs.From 1943 with light tanks obsolete ,standard 4 medium companies were employed ,each with 3 zugs.(Panzer 4 and Panther).Heavy tanks like Tiger were deployed in seperate Heavy Tank battalions allocated at army level to priority theatres from the GHQ pool.

(B)THE SCHUTZEN/MOTORIZED INFANTRY REGIMENT :
The Schutzen Regiment(Later renamed Panzergrenadiers) formed the infantry component of the panzer divisions.As seen earlier 2 basic types of organizational structure existed -
1 motorized Infantry regiment with 3 battalions plus a Kradschutzen(Motorcycle) battalion brigaded together in Panzer divisions 1,2,3,6,7,8,9.
Alternatively,In Pz divisions 4,5,10 there were 2 Schutzen regiments each with 2 battalions each brigaded together.Moorcycle battalion in this type was dropped.
Above diagram depicts a 2-battalion schutzen regiment .The basic support elements are an Infantry gun company(75mm or 150mm guns),a anti-tank or PAK kompanie(pak36 guns with mechanized tractors),a motorcycle platoon.The core element are 2 schutzen battalions.Normally each schutzen battalion would have 3 infantry(mot) companies each -here however in second battalion 1 companie seems to have been replaced by a motorcycle company.This is a ad-hoc measure unique to this regiment and not standrad organization which is 3 schutzen companies each battalion.The battalions also have a Machine gun company(Heavy machine guns and mortars for fire support).
Motorized infantry were carried in trucks and lorries,in 1940 a few motorized infantry regiments had converted 1 company in their battalions to halftracks making them true mechanized infantry,but due to lack of halftracks this would still be a distant process before barbarossa in 1941.

​

Above is a Schutzen regiment with 3 battalions.Each battalion has 3 schutzen companies,an anti tank platoon(PAK),a machine gun company and a motorized pioneer platoon(motorized assault engineers).The regimental support is largely similar except the anti-tank company has been broken up and assigned to each of the battalions in 2nd type.There is also no motorcycle component because kradschutzen in this type were concentrated in a seperate kradschutzen battalion with which this 3-battalion regiment would be brigaded to form the Panzer division's schutzen brigade.

The organization of the motorised infantry companies were identical to that of the normal infantry companies.A Schützenkompanie contained a command element (one officer, 12 men) and three Schützenzuge (rifle platoons).A Schützenzug (one officer, 48 men), led by a Leutnant with a Feldwebel as his second in command, was made up of four ten-man Schützengruppen and a three-man section manning a 5cm GrW 36 mortar.However the firepower of a motorised infantry battalion was much superior to a foot infantry one.It had normally 1.5 to 2 times the amounts of machine guns and mortars allocated to a foot infantry battalion and was thus much more capable in both offensive and defensive action.In all a schutzen regiment mustered around ~2400 (2 battalions) or ~3400(3 battalion) men.
The wehrmacht eventually switched over to the 3-battalion model for its motorized infantry regiments from 1941 as it was more nimble.

(b)Kradschutzen Battalion -
The Schutzen brigades with 3-battalion single schutzen regiments also had a motorcycle battalion of around 800-1000 men.As we have seen these schutzen regiments didn't have smaler motorcycle companies or platoons in them(which is the case for 2 -battalion model with no kradschutzen battalion) and all motorcycle components were amlgamated into this kradschutzen battalion.The speed and quick redeployment capability made it the natural spearhead of the Schutzen Brigade, and it was often used in offensive reconnaissance missions.
Above depicts a kradschutzen battalion organization in 1939 and changes in 1940 with motorcycle companie reduced.It had a machine gun and schwere(heavy) weapons company.The unit was mobile and very well armed.
22 light and 14 heavy MGs, 7 light (50mm) and 6 heavy (81mm) mortars, three 37mm PAK 35/36 AT and 2 light InfanterieGeschutz 75mm guns for 1940 organization.
Kradschutzen battalions didn't exist in Pz divisions 4,5,10.

NEXT : CONTINUED COMPONENTS - pz div artillery and support

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

PANZERWAFFE : PART IV

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COMPONENTS OF A PANZER DIVISION (CONTINUED) -

(C)AUFKLARUNGS ABTEILUNG: RECONAISSANCE BATTALION)
This divisional level support element was of uniform organization and present in all 10 panzer divisions.It represented the 'eyes and ears' of a panzer division,often operating 24 hrs ahead of the main body.The Aufklarungs Abteilung's overall strength layat 753 (26 officers, 4 Beamte, 116 NCOs and 607 other ranks) and its weaponsinventory comprised 427 rifles, 16 light and 2 heavy MGs, 3 light mortars, three 37mm AT guns and two 75 mm light Infanterie Geschiitz.
The mortars,HMG,Anti-tank and Infantry guns were part of the Schwere Company(Heavy weapons Co.).There was the motorcycle battalion.But the main core of the force was in the 2 Panzerspah(Armoured car) Companies.
Each of these had a a section of command cars,1 zug of heavy armoured cars and 2 zugs of light armoured cars.
Overall Aufklarungs Abteilung was equipped with 60 armoured cars, 119 motorcycles, 34 staff cars and 68 lorries.

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(D)DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY REGIMENT :
The artillery regiment formed the crucial fire support element of the division.The regiment had originally 2 battalions.
Every battalion had its own staff and a calibration detachment, as well as three four-gun batteries, giving a total of
24 guns per regiment.(105 mm leFH18)However after the Polish campaign,a 3rd heavy artillery battalion was added to all divisions with identical organization to the light artillery battalions(12 guns in 3 batteries).It employed usually 150 mm sFH18 guns.Thus regiment in total mustered 36 guns.

These guns were towed pieces on motorized tractors for mobility.They were not self-propeled artillery pieces on tracked chassis.In 1940 germany deployed its first Self-propelled artillery piece(Sturmpanzer I Bison) mounting the 150 mm infantry gun barrell on a panzer I chassis.36 were available for the campaign in france.Six of the Panzer divisions recieved one company of six guns each from the GHQ pool sperate from their divisional artillery component.​

(E)PANZERJAEGER ABTEILUNG: ANTI-TANK BATTALION)
The divisional anti-tank component.3 companies each with 12 pak 36 guns(with motorized tractors) plus a mg company for defence.The Pak 36 was to prove insufficient in france and then russia.The wehrmacht did possess about a 100 tracked self-propelled tank destroyers(47 mm czech gun mounted on panzer I chassis)but they served in independent tank destroyers battalions allocatted by GHQ pool.Only from 1942 would the panzerjager abteilung of the panzer divisions get true tracked tank destroyers like marder and jagdpanzers.

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(F)ARMOURED PIONEER BATTALION :
The divisional Pioneer battalion was a vital component -containing both sappers and assault engineers.Strength was ~800.By May 1940 all the Panzer Divisions' Panzer Pionier Bataillon had their usual three companies, one of which was now fully armoured and equipped with six MTW SdKfz 251/5 (a modified version of the SdKfz 251 which carried only eight men instead of ten, the extra space being used to carry engineer equipment), five PzKpfw I'Ladungsleger' (demolition charge layers) modified to carry demolition charges, and four 'Bruckenleger' (bridge layers), which comprised PzKpfw II or IV tanks with their turrets removed and their hulls equipped as bridge layers. All the Panzer Pionier Bataillone also had a Bruko B column.

(Sturmpioneers with flamethrower)​

NEXT : EQUIPMENT OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS -THE TANKS,ARMOURED CARS,GUNS ETC.

 

[AUSTERLITZ]

THE EQUIPMENT OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS ​

Panzerkampfwagen I :
Originally designed as a stopgap training tank,this light tankette entered production in 1934 and production had already ceased in 1937.By 1940 it was clearly obsolete,but due to numbers as manyas 500 participated in Fall Gelb.Many were used in barbarossa as well.They saw heavy service in the spanish civil war and poland where their armour proved insufficient against any determined resistance.Total 1493 were produced from 1934-37.
It weighed just 5.4 tonnes and was armed with 2 machine guns.Armor was a mere 7-13 mm.Only enough to withstand small arms fire.It was vulnerable to 20 mm cannons,anti-tank rifles,anti-tank guns and even 12.7 mm HMG(from rear).
Its advantages were very simple production and maintainence,high speed(50kmph) and great range(200 km).
These panzers were increasingly used as reconaissance and escort tanks.The chassis was also used to mount improvised anti-tank guns and artillery in earlier self-propelled pieces(Panzerjager I & Sturmpanzer I)

Panzerkampfwagen II :
Another stopgap vehicle,built as an upgrade to the Panzer I after the experience of the spanish war showed need for shell proof armour.It had 14 mm fontal armour(later reinforced with spaced armour in many cases) -still largely helpless against anti-tank guns.Weighed 9 tonnes with a 3 man-crew.Armament was a machine gun and a 20 mm autocannon allowing it to engage lightly armoured targets.Like its predecessor had excellent mobility(40kmph) and range(200 km).Over 500 took part in the invasion of france by which time it was already obsolescent ,making it the most numerous german tank.Variants continued to serve until 1943 when production had ceased.From late 1941 it was employed as a reconaissance tank.Panzer IIs served in the liechte kompanies,the escort platoons as well as light platoons of medium companies in a panzer battalion.Nearly 1900 were built over the course of the war,the chassis serving as platform for self-propelled variants like Marder II Tank destroyer & Wespe SPG once the tank itself became obsolete.

Panzerkampfwagen 35(t) :
Originally czech built light tanks from the famous skoda factories.The wehrmacht acquired 244 of these in the takeover of czechslovakia and pressed it into service.They added radios and increased the crew to 4 from 3(reducing load on commander who had to previously load and fire as well as command).These 10.5 tonne machines were capable vehicles in 1940 with 25 mm riveted armour ,good speed(34 kmph) and satisfactory range(120km).The main bonus except the added armour was in armament-
A 37 mm cannon - Penetration of plate inclined at 30° from the vertical 37 millimetres (1.5 in) thick at 100 metres (110 yd), 31 millimetres (1.2 in) thick at 500 metres (550 yd), 26 millimetres (1.0 in) thick at 1,000 metres (1,100 yd), and 22 millimetres (0.87 in) thick at 1,500 metres (1,600 yd)
And 2 x 7.92 mm machine guns.

The vehicle served well in france and in the early stages of barbarossa.By 1942 however most had been transfered to the axis allies such as romania,slovakia,hungary.

Panzerkampfwagen 38(t) :
Another Czech light tank design,this was a superior design to the 35(t).Originally developed by a emigre russian engineer in czechslovakia for the shah of persia it gained export successes and was after the takeover of czechslovakia introduced to german service.It had riveted armour of upto 25 mm(later after french campaign further bolt-on ramour added for 40-50mm protection).Weighing around 10 tonnes it had excellent speed(42kmph) and range(250km).The germans added radios to the 4-man crew.
Armament was 2 x7.92 mm machine guns and a czech 37 mm cannon.The cannon had superior performance to the wehrmacht's pak36 anti tank gun.-40 mm at 100 yds,35 mm at 500 yds,29 mm at 1000 yds and 24 mm at 1500 yds.

While this was an improvement over the earlier designs,the tank still depended largely on its mobility.
The pz 38t performed well in 1940 where notably it formed the bulk of Rommel's 7th Panzer 'Ghost' division.Production continued in czech factories until 1942.After that remaining vehicles were transfered to axis allies or relegated to training and anti-partisan duty.The chassis was popular as platform for assault guns and tank destroyers like the Hetzer Tank Destroyer and the Flakpanzer 38.

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Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf E/F :
The wehrmacht envisaged 2 types of tanks as the core of the panzer arm - One for direct combat against other tanks and other armoured vehicles, requiring the tank to fire armour piercing (AP) shells.The second use was protecting other tanks against anti-tank guns and infantry, firing high explosive shells at such soft targets.The Panzer III was built to be the main tank of the first type ,while the short barrelled Panzer 4 was to be the infantry support tank.They were to be paired together in the panzer divisions(ideally 2 light companies of Panzer IIIs and 1 medium company of Panzer IV per battalion).Designed By Daimler-Benz during 1935-37 the tank entered production in 1939 and continued till 1943.Around 400 were available for the battle of france -with Ausf E and Ausf F being the main production variants. 5800 Panzer IIIs were produced throughout the war.
A distinct feature of the Panzer III, influenced byBritish Vickers tanks (1924), was the three-man turret. This meant that the commander was not distracted with another role in the tank (e.g. as gunner or loader) and could fully concentrate on maintaining awareness of the situation and directing the tank. Most tanks of the time did not have this capability, providing the Panzer III with a combat advantage versus such tanks.Not only all the further German tank designs inherited it, but also, later into the war, most Allied tank designs either quickly switched to the three-man turret.
Weight : 20 Tonnes Speed :40kmph Range :165 kms. Armour : 30 mm
Armament: 37 mm Cannon plus 3x 7.92mm MG34 machine guns.

The armour was later increased to 50 mm from Model Ausf J (1941 onwards) and finally to 70mm by addition of applique armour in Ausf M(1942).However these were not available in 1940.

The main gun of Ausf F was the same as in the Pak36 Anti-tank gun with penetration -34mm at 100 yds,29mm at 500 yds,22mm at 1000 yds and 20mm at 1500 yds.Sufficient for light tanks this proved incapable of piercing heavy french somua and Char-B.

Even at the beginning of the french campaign,new late model ausf F were being fitted with a new 50 mm L/42 cannon.(though almost none took part in france).Hitler instructed after the french campaign the installation of a high-velocity 50mm L/60 cannon,though this was not present in quantity during barbarossa leading to a crisis versus the soviet armour.From Ausf J the L/60 was fitted as standard and early models upgunned which restored some balance in the east,while in the north african desert gave Rommel's Afrika Korps a short lived period of edge in armament over british tanks .While the mainstay of the panzer divisions during 1940-42 its turret ring couldn't accomodate heavier anti-tank guns above 50mm calibre needed to defeat newer enemy tanks,but the panzer 4 could.Thus the panzer 4 was upgunned and became the main medium tanks and panzer III rendered to support with production ending in 1943.After the heavy losses in stalingrad and kursk surviving tanks were relegated to support role from late 1943.The most famous variant was the infantry support/tank destroyer turretless Sturmgeschutz StuG III assault gun- the most succesful self-propelled piece of the war built on its chassis.The Panzer III remains a quintiessential tank of the Blitzkrieg.

Panzerkampfwagen IV -
The sturdy workhorse of the panzer divisions,and the only panzer to remain in constant production throughout the war the Panzer 4 is THE Panzer of World War II.Designed by Krupp,between 1937 - 1945 nearly 8600 tanks were built making it the most mass-produced tank of the wehrmacht.Remarkably versatile and reliable it evolved from an infantry support tank with short barrel gun to the main medium tank of the wehrmacht with a high velocity cannon.In 1940 the Infantry support variant was present.~300 Panzer IVs of this type were available for the french campaign-all concentrated in the Medium companies of the Panzer abteilungs(battalion).The main production variants in france were Ausf C and Ausf D.The specifications are given in above diagram.Armor in these early models was only 30 mm.The HE 75 mm cannon was not meant for anti-tank duty but was nonetheless capable of penetrating 43 mm armor at 700 yds when firing anti-armour ammunition.It had a 5 man crew.

The shock of the soviet t-34 led to crash programmes,leading to upgunning Of the Panzer IV Ausf F2 with a high velocity 75 mm gun from 1942 and on all later versions.This reversed its roles vis a vis the Panzer III.From 1943 Up-gunned Panzer IV and Panther became the 2 main medium tanks.It served till the end of the war and remained in production.Its armour was gradually increased from 30mm to 50mm and finally to 80mm with spaced armour and side Skirts.Measured over the entire war it comprised 30% of the Wehrmacht's total tank strength.The chassis was used for some notable variants like the Wirbelwind Flakpanzer,Brumbarr ,JagdpanzerIV Tank destroyer and the Sturmgeshcutz IV (StugIV) assault gun.

NEXT: OTHER EQUIPMENT - PANZER TACTICS

 

[Blue Marlin]

THE EQUIPMENT OF THE PANZER DIVISIONS ​

Panzerkampfwagen I :
Originally designed as a stopgap training tank,this light tankette entered production in 1934 and production had already ceased in 1937.By 1940 it was clearly obsolete,but due to numbers as manyas 500 participated in Fall Gelb.Many were used in barbarossa as well.They saw heavy service in the spanish civil war and poland where their armour proved insufficient against any determined resistance.Total 1493 were produced from 1934-37.
It weighed just 5.4 tonnes and was armed with 2 machine guns.Armor was a mere 7-13 mm.Only enough to withstand small arms fire.It was vulnerable to 20 mm cannons,anti-tank rifles,anti-tank guns and even 12.7 mm HMG(from rear).
Its advantages were very simple production and maintainence,high speed(50kmph) and great range(200 km).
These panzers were increasingly used as reconaissance and escort tanks.The chassis was also used to mount improvised anti-tank guns and artillery in earlier self-propelled pieces(Panzerjager I & Sturmpanzer I)

Panzerkampfwagen II :
Another stopgap vehicle,built as an upgrade to the Panzer I after the experience of the spanish war showed need for shell proof armour.It had 14 mm fontal armour(later reinforced with spaced armour in many cases) -still largely helpless against anti-tank guns.Weighed 9 tonnes with a 3 man-crew.Armament was a machine gun and a 20 mm autocannon allowing it to engage lightly armoured targets.Like its predecessor had excellent mobility(40kmph) and range(200 km).Over 500 took part in the invasion of france by which time it was already obsolescent ,making it the most numerous german tank.Variants continued to serve until 1943 when production had ceased.From late 1941 it was employed as a reconaissance tank.Panzer IIs served in the liechte kompanies,the escort platoons as well as light platoons of medium companies in a panzer battalion.Nearly 1900 were built over the course of the war,the chassis serving as platform for self-propelled variants like Marder II Tank destroyer & Wespe SPG once the tank itself became obsolete.

Panzerkampfwagen 35(t) :
Originally czech built light tanks from the famous skoda factories.The wehrmacht acquired 244 of these in the takeover of czechslovakia and pressed it into service.They added radios and increased the crew to 4 from 3(reducing load on commander who had to previously load and fire as well as command).These 10.5 tonne machines were capable vehicles in 1940 with 25 mm riveted armour ,good speed(34 kmph) and satisfactory range(120km).The main bonus except the added armour was in armament-
A 37 mm cannon - Penetration of plate inclined at 30° from the vertical 37 millimetres (1.5 in) thick at 100 metres (110 yd), 31 millimetres (1.2 in) thick at 500 metres (550 yd), 26 millimetres (1.0 in) thick at 1,000 metres (1,100 yd), and 22 millimetres (0.87 in) thick at 1,500 metres (1,600 yd)
And 2 x 7.92 mm machine guns.

The vehicle served well in france and in the early stages of barbarossa.By 1942 however most had been transfered to the axis allies such as romania,slovakia,hungary.

Panzerkampfwagen 38(t) :
Another Czech light tank design,this was a superior design to the 35(t).Originally developed by a emigre russian engineer in czechslovakia for the shah of persia it gained export successes and was after the takeover of czechslovakia introduced to german service.It had riveted armour of upto 25 mm(later after french campaign further bolt-on ramour added for 40-50mm protection).Weighing around 10 tonnes it had excellent speed(42kmph) and range(250km).The germans added radios to the 4-man crew.
Armament was 2 x7.92 mm machine guns and a czech 37 mm cannon.The cannon had superior performance to the wehrmacht's pak36 anti tank gun.-40 mm at 100 yds,35 mm at 500 yds,29 mm at 1000 yds and 24 mm at 1500 yds.

While this was an improvement over the earlier designs,the tank still depended largely on its mobility.
The pz 38t performed well in 1940 where notably it formed the bulk of Rommel's 7th Panzer 'Ghost' division.Production continued in czech factories until 1942.After that remaining vehicles were transfered to axis allies or relegated to training and anti-partisan duty.The chassis was popular as platform for assault guns and tank destroyers like the Hetzer Tank Destroyer and the Flakpanzer 38.

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Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf E/F :
The wehrmacht envisaged 2 types of tanks as the core of the panzer arm - One for direct combat against other tanks and other armoured vehicles, requiring the tank to fire armour piercing (AP) shells.The second use was protecting other tanks against anti-tank guns and infantry, firing high explosive shells at such soft targets.The Panzer III was built to be the main tank of the first type ,while the short barrelled Panzer 4 was to be the infantry support tank.They were to be paired together in the panzer divisions(ideally 2 light companies of Panzer IIIs and 1 medium company of Panzer IV per battalion).Designed By Daimler-Benz during 1935-37 the tank entered production in 1939 and continued till 1943.Around 400 were available for the battle of france -with Ausf E and Ausf F being the main production variants. 5800 Panzer IIIs were produced throughout the war.
A distinct feature of the Panzer III, influenced byBritish Vickers tanks (1924), was the three-man turret. This meant that the commander was not distracted with another role in the tank (e.g. as gunner or loader) and could fully concentrate on maintaining awareness of the situation and directing the tank. Most tanks of the time did not have this capability, providing the Panzer III with a combat advantage versus such tanks.Not only all the further German tank designs inherited it, but also, later into the war, most Allied tank designs either quickly switched to the three-man turret.
Weight : 20 Tonnes Speed :40kmph Range :165 kms. Armour : 30 mm
Armament: 37 mm Cannon plus 3x 7.92mm MG34 machine guns.

The armour was later increased to 50 mm from Model Ausf J (1941 onwards) and finally to 70mm by addition of applique armour in Ausf M(1942).However these were not available in 1940.

The main gun of Ausf F was the same as in the Pak36 Anti-tank gun with penetration -34mm at 100 yds,29mm at 500 yds,22mm at 1000 yds and 20mm at 1500 yds.Sufficient for light tanks this proved incapable of piercing heavy french somua and Char-B.

Even at the beginning of the french campaign,new late model ausf F were being fitted with a new 50 mm L/42 cannon.(though almost none took part in france).Hitler instructed after the french campaign the installation of a high-velocity 50mm L/60 cannon,though this was not present in quantity during barbarossa leading to a crisis versus the soviet armour.From Ausf J the L/60 was fitted as standard and early models upgunned which restored some balance in the east,while in the north african desert gave Rommel's Afrika Korps a short lived period of edge in armament over british tanks .While the mainstay of the panzer divisions during 1940-42 its turret ring couldn't accomodate heavier anti-tank guns above 50mm calibre needed to defeat newer enemy tanks,but the panzer 4 could.Thus the panzer 4 was upgunned and became the main medium tanks and panzer III rendered to support with production ending in 1943.After the heavy losses in stalingrad and kursk surviving tanks were relegated to support role from late 1943.The most famous variant was the infantry support/tank destroyer turretless Sturmgeschutz StuG III assault gun- the most succesful self-propelled piece of the war built on its chassis.The Panzer III remains a quintiessential tank of the Blitzkrieg.

Panzerkampfwagen IV -
The sturdy workhorse of the panzer divisions,and the only panzer to remain in constant production throughout the war the Panzer 4 is THE Panzer of World War II.Designed by Krupp,between 1937 - 1945 nearly 8600 tanks were built making it the most mass-produced tank of the wehrmacht.Remarkably versatile and reliable it evolved from an infantry support tank with short barrel gun to the main medium tank of the wehrmacht with a high velocity cannon.In 1940 the Infantry support variant was present.~300 Panzer IVs of this type were available for the french campaign-all concentrated in the Medium companies of the Panzer abteilungs(battalion).The main production variants in france were Ausf C and Ausf D.The specifications are given in above diagram.Armor in these early models was only 30 mm.The HE 75 mm cannon was not meant for anti-tank duty but was nonetheless capable of penetrating 43 mm armor at 700 yds when firing anti-armour ammunition.It had a 5 man crew.

The shock of the soviet t-34 led to crash programmes,leading to upgunning Of the Panzer IV Ausf F2 with a high velocity 75 mm gun from 1942 and on all later versions.This reversed its roles vis a vis the Panzer III.From 1943 Up-gunned Panzer IV and Panther became the 2 main medium tanks.It served till the end of the war and remained in production.Its armour was gradually increased from 30mm to 50mm and finally to 80mm with spaced armour and side Skirts.Measured over the entire war it comprised 30% of the Wehrmacht's total tank strength.The chassis was used for some notable variants like the Wirbelwind Flakpanzer,Brumbarr ,JagdpanzerIV Tank destroyer and the Sturmgeshcutz IV (StugIV) assault gun.

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hi did you write all this, or are you getting this from journals?