jhungary
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Hi, i am back, well, sort of, running on half capacity and the past 3 months have me running around trying to get my qualification up and now i am not that busy anymore so i can start dissecting battle again.
Presenting today battle is a 1 of 5 Vietnam War Battle Series i would like to discuss, in the coming month, i will publish a series of 5 battle that change the course of Vietnam war as part of the sequence, better do a themed round then jumping up and down in timeline right?
So, today's battle is Battle of Ong Thanh
Background of the battle :
The year was 1967, the third years of official US direct involvement on Battlefields in Vietnam, the average troop level at that period is about 170,000-180,000 peaked, so it was before the serious troop surge that happened between 1968 to 1970.
While US have been confined into small scale fighting over the jungle in SE Asia, the Vietcong (or VC) were reluctuant to come out and fight a set piece battle after suffer several lost in Ia Drang Valley, and operation Cedar Fall and Junction City, the US employ a large spherehead of smaller unit (Most likely Compnay level) to locate and draw out the VC and followed on by a larger organised attack involve usually a battalion. Said strategy were labelled "Hammer and Anvil" is part of US Army Search and Destroy doctrine.
On June 12, the element from 1 Infantry Division launched Operation Billings to search for the elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division, which had built-up strength around northern Phuoc Vinh area. 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 1st infantry division were tasked to pacifify position in Binh Doung Province near the Highway 13.
Numerous engagment saw 271 Regiment of VC regiment dogging the 28th Regiment and with previous engagement almost always ended in the VC melting back into the dense jungle after several attemp on several Special Force bases around the area. The 28th moved into Offence.
On 16 October, while conducting a search around the Ong Thanh Stream after some probing action were done in enarby area, LTC Allen found what believed to be a large scale bunker and tunnel network, after some drag and shoot, the US Forces pulled out in favor of air strike and artillery strike. While soften up the VC position. LTC Allen pull out all the US Ground force in the area and return to their NDP (Night Defensive Perimeter). The reason behind this is, by then the time is getting late and night started to set in, allen favor a fight which can maximize their supportive asset (Air Strike and Ground Support) and fighting at night will seriously deplete those ability. In stead of drag on the fighting, they pull out and infavor a recon-in-force early next morning.
Deposition of Forces :
The US fighting force in the area consist of 2/28, a battlaion of about 400 men with HQ C&C
However, most of the 2/28 were left at the NDP shown above to protect the NDP, the battle of Ong Tranh will see action of A/2 and D/2 minus the heavy weapon platoon, plus battalion command team. which is in all slightly more than a standard complement of a fully staffed company (144 men)
Both A and D company left their NDP at 0800 October 17 and travelling southward toward the enemy bunker system, With Alpha Leading and then Battalion Command, and finally D Company act as rear guard. Reaching battle area at 0956.
VC stength is about 1200-1500 men, with 2 regiments (271st and 272nd) in and around the area of battle. Both Regiment were on R&R and resupply run when the battle occur and for major regonisation for an operation to an unspecified objective in latter day.
The VC forces were around the bunker complex, upon the action on OCtober 16, both regiments were setting up around the bunker in 3 size for rear guard and incase the American return. Which they did.
Start of Battle :
With the A Company moving downward under preceding artillery barrage, the lead element of A Company sighted the VC activities ahead and were in process of setting up an ambush themselves, by the time the company Machinegun team were ready, the VC sighting has disappeared into the wood and moment later, a large force was felt decending thru the wood and enter the A Company AO.
The CO of A Company ordered to reinforce the ambush position, then came under intense fire from three side by machinegun inside hidden bunker. 1st platoon were pinned down and the initial barrage of fire have taken toll of the command level of A company as a whole, where the CO, FO of A company were wounder, Platoon leader of 1/A and 2/A were both killed. And about 30 minutes after that, A Company declared combat ineffective (More dead/wounded than able body) and withdraw thru the assembly point on the east.
At this time, Both Delta Company and Battalion command group which were trailing behind Alpha, started receiving fire as Alpha withdraw and regrouped with the rest. Notbeknown to Allen himself, that Alpha have taken a easterly apporach to rejoin, after hearing M60 fire directly in front of their column, mistakely identified the remain of Alpha is coming straight back to them, Allen order a hold of fire for Delta company. Which is a fatal mistake, whcih we will discuss later in this post.
At about 1 hour later, the 271st have now surrounding the newly formed Delta company on three sides. And taking advantage over the cease fire order Allen gave earlier, the VC now creeped up within Hand-to-Hand range and now render all support impossible, Allen assessed the situation, decided to call Bravo company ahead to cover both Alpha and Delta withdraw, and was himself wounded and KIA in subsequent withdrawal.
Fight lasted for 2 hours (from ~1000 to 1220) where the majority of America are now dead or wounded, commander of 271 assume the American force were either destroyed completely or become combat ineffective (Which is correctly assumed) not wanting reprise attack by US Air strike, withdraw back inside the tunnel complex.
Battle is thus concluded with Battalion CO Terry Allen KIA, along with all his entire command staff, Platoon leader of 1/A and 2/A also KIA along with 60 of the US Soldier, With every other man wounded. Of the original 140-150 strength, less than 10 able body emerge out of the jungle.
Importance of the battle
This is one of those few occasion how VC soundly defeated American before 1968, where it gave strength to the VC 271 and 272 regiment for further attack along the highway 13. The whole area were abandoned altogether until 1970.
For the US, the battle signified the end of US superiority over the Vietcong and that it's one of the earliest occasion to demostrate that VC have ability to co-ordinate a large scale attack and ambushes (Prelude of the 1968 tet offensive). The scale of this ambush is easy to see, 95% casualty rate achieved in less than 3 hours window (Although it was an accidenetal engagement). It should be studied by the Military Planner, maybe what happened in tet 1968 would never had happen, but was shelved because of the battle result.
What Went Wrong??
Basically, whatever it can went wrong and whatever wrong it listed in any military textbook happened in this battle. Let's set aside the Fatal error the CO 2/28 have made (The cease fire order), the time and place of battle is wrong, as well as the unit strength and the very purpsoe of this battle happened on the wrong line.
The original battleplan was to conduct a recon-in-force to see if the bunker complex is or still is occupied, however, with recon in force in mind, Allen did only left with a small portion of his own battalion. More importantly, without Heavy weaponry.......
The vision of 140 mem get in a complex bunker and tunnel system without the area being secure by a larger force is absurd at best, insane perhaps. Unlike a static fight, where the enemy march on to you in some distances, you will have time (and space) to call in whatever support elemet you wish to soften up the incoming troop and disrupt their leadership and defeat them in detail.
However, with a running engagement where you as an offender, such superiority of support is not available to you as this time, it is you and your troop that march into the enemy's position.
The only reason military planner and historian think Allen would made such decision is either he overestimated the effect of air and ground stirke on the day of Octobver 16, or seriously underestimate the enemy troop strength and ability. With POW captured on 16 say they are from 271 regiment, suffer 56 kill with earlier engagement. That mean they are facing not just company, or battalion but rather a full regiments of 1200- to upward 1500 or some cases 2000 men.
Poor planning is also blamed for this diasterous battle. Have Allen and command structure previously planned a withdraw position, they would have know the Alpha were withdrawing from East not directly south of their position. That in turn gave way to the fatal order Terry Allen gave
Poor excution is also a factor on this battle. When a unit tantum to another unit in column, like the case here now, the favor withdrawal method is a leap-frog, where the company behind set up Defence perimeter and allow the withdrawing unit to enter heads on and when the withdrawing unit put to safety, they will then form another DP to cover the withdraw from former DP, and so on. That way, there are soldier facing enemy position everytime a unit is withdraw and not just turn around and run. But turn around and run is actually the way they did it on that battle. While Allen expecting Alpha to come thru back their line and hold fire.
Finally is the cease fire order Allen gave, which is a grave error. The guard (Delta) are supposed to face the enemy and fire on them covering with withdraw. Allen waited too long for the Alpha to return, not knowing they are coming in from their SE. That amount of time allow enemy to get close. Without fire superiority solution for pinning down incoming troop, you lose time on letting the enemy get in your position.
Now the order of cease fire are supposed to be for the frontal elememt but nonetheness the whole company did not fire to cover and fend off the attack, with 1 hour passes, allen inadvertenly allow the enemy came so close that render friend close support impossible.
Facing an overhelming attack in number, 2 understrenght company of lightly armed infantry would of course cut to piece, without any ground or air support. This is the natural outcome of the battle. And this is what exactly happened on that day.
That conclude the battle report for today. Hope you enjoy this
Discussion is welcome
Presenting today battle is a 1 of 5 Vietnam War Battle Series i would like to discuss, in the coming month, i will publish a series of 5 battle that change the course of Vietnam war as part of the sequence, better do a themed round then jumping up and down in timeline right?
So, today's battle is Battle of Ong Thanh
Background of the battle :
The year was 1967, the third years of official US direct involvement on Battlefields in Vietnam, the average troop level at that period is about 170,000-180,000 peaked, so it was before the serious troop surge that happened between 1968 to 1970.
While US have been confined into small scale fighting over the jungle in SE Asia, the Vietcong (or VC) were reluctuant to come out and fight a set piece battle after suffer several lost in Ia Drang Valley, and operation Cedar Fall and Junction City, the US employ a large spherehead of smaller unit (Most likely Compnay level) to locate and draw out the VC and followed on by a larger organised attack involve usually a battalion. Said strategy were labelled "Hammer and Anvil" is part of US Army Search and Destroy doctrine.
On June 12, the element from 1 Infantry Division launched Operation Billings to search for the elements of the Viet Cong 9th Division, which had built-up strength around northern Phuoc Vinh area. 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 1st infantry division were tasked to pacifify position in Binh Doung Province near the Highway 13.
Numerous engagment saw 271 Regiment of VC regiment dogging the 28th Regiment and with previous engagement almost always ended in the VC melting back into the dense jungle after several attemp on several Special Force bases around the area. The 28th moved into Offence.
On 16 October, while conducting a search around the Ong Thanh Stream after some probing action were done in enarby area, LTC Allen found what believed to be a large scale bunker and tunnel network, after some drag and shoot, the US Forces pulled out in favor of air strike and artillery strike. While soften up the VC position. LTC Allen pull out all the US Ground force in the area and return to their NDP (Night Defensive Perimeter). The reason behind this is, by then the time is getting late and night started to set in, allen favor a fight which can maximize their supportive asset (Air Strike and Ground Support) and fighting at night will seriously deplete those ability. In stead of drag on the fighting, they pull out and infavor a recon-in-force early next morning.
Deposition of Forces :
However, most of the 2/28 were left at the NDP shown above to protect the NDP, the battle of Ong Tranh will see action of A/2 and D/2 minus the heavy weapon platoon, plus battalion command team. which is in all slightly more than a standard complement of a fully staffed company (144 men)
Both A and D company left their NDP at 0800 October 17 and travelling southward toward the enemy bunker system, With Alpha Leading and then Battalion Command, and finally D Company act as rear guard. Reaching battle area at 0956.
VC stength is about 1200-1500 men, with 2 regiments (271st and 272nd) in and around the area of battle. Both Regiment were on R&R and resupply run when the battle occur and for major regonisation for an operation to an unspecified objective in latter day.
The VC forces were around the bunker complex, upon the action on OCtober 16, both regiments were setting up around the bunker in 3 size for rear guard and incase the American return. Which they did.
Start of Battle :
With the A Company moving downward under preceding artillery barrage, the lead element of A Company sighted the VC activities ahead and were in process of setting up an ambush themselves, by the time the company Machinegun team were ready, the VC sighting has disappeared into the wood and moment later, a large force was felt decending thru the wood and enter the A Company AO.
The CO of A Company ordered to reinforce the ambush position, then came under intense fire from three side by machinegun inside hidden bunker. 1st platoon were pinned down and the initial barrage of fire have taken toll of the command level of A company as a whole, where the CO, FO of A company were wounder, Platoon leader of 1/A and 2/A were both killed. And about 30 minutes after that, A Company declared combat ineffective (More dead/wounded than able body) and withdraw thru the assembly point on the east.
At this time, Both Delta Company and Battalion command group which were trailing behind Alpha, started receiving fire as Alpha withdraw and regrouped with the rest. Notbeknown to Allen himself, that Alpha have taken a easterly apporach to rejoin, after hearing M60 fire directly in front of their column, mistakely identified the remain of Alpha is coming straight back to them, Allen order a hold of fire for Delta company. Which is a fatal mistake, whcih we will discuss later in this post.
At about 1 hour later, the 271st have now surrounding the newly formed Delta company on three sides. And taking advantage over the cease fire order Allen gave earlier, the VC now creeped up within Hand-to-Hand range and now render all support impossible, Allen assessed the situation, decided to call Bravo company ahead to cover both Alpha and Delta withdraw, and was himself wounded and KIA in subsequent withdrawal.
Fight lasted for 2 hours (from ~1000 to 1220) where the majority of America are now dead or wounded, commander of 271 assume the American force were either destroyed completely or become combat ineffective (Which is correctly assumed) not wanting reprise attack by US Air strike, withdraw back inside the tunnel complex.
Battle is thus concluded with Battalion CO Terry Allen KIA, along with all his entire command staff, Platoon leader of 1/A and 2/A also KIA along with 60 of the US Soldier, With every other man wounded. Of the original 140-150 strength, less than 10 able body emerge out of the jungle.
Importance of the battle
This is one of those few occasion how VC soundly defeated American before 1968, where it gave strength to the VC 271 and 272 regiment for further attack along the highway 13. The whole area were abandoned altogether until 1970.
For the US, the battle signified the end of US superiority over the Vietcong and that it's one of the earliest occasion to demostrate that VC have ability to co-ordinate a large scale attack and ambushes (Prelude of the 1968 tet offensive). The scale of this ambush is easy to see, 95% casualty rate achieved in less than 3 hours window (Although it was an accidenetal engagement). It should be studied by the Military Planner, maybe what happened in tet 1968 would never had happen, but was shelved because of the battle result.
What Went Wrong??
Basically, whatever it can went wrong and whatever wrong it listed in any military textbook happened in this battle. Let's set aside the Fatal error the CO 2/28 have made (The cease fire order), the time and place of battle is wrong, as well as the unit strength and the very purpsoe of this battle happened on the wrong line.
The original battleplan was to conduct a recon-in-force to see if the bunker complex is or still is occupied, however, with recon in force in mind, Allen did only left with a small portion of his own battalion. More importantly, without Heavy weaponry.......
The vision of 140 mem get in a complex bunker and tunnel system without the area being secure by a larger force is absurd at best, insane perhaps. Unlike a static fight, where the enemy march on to you in some distances, you will have time (and space) to call in whatever support elemet you wish to soften up the incoming troop and disrupt their leadership and defeat them in detail.
However, with a running engagement where you as an offender, such superiority of support is not available to you as this time, it is you and your troop that march into the enemy's position.
The only reason military planner and historian think Allen would made such decision is either he overestimated the effect of air and ground stirke on the day of Octobver 16, or seriously underestimate the enemy troop strength and ability. With POW captured on 16 say they are from 271 regiment, suffer 56 kill with earlier engagement. That mean they are facing not just company, or battalion but rather a full regiments of 1200- to upward 1500 or some cases 2000 men.
Poor planning is also blamed for this diasterous battle. Have Allen and command structure previously planned a withdraw position, they would have know the Alpha were withdrawing from East not directly south of their position. That in turn gave way to the fatal order Terry Allen gave
Poor excution is also a factor on this battle. When a unit tantum to another unit in column, like the case here now, the favor withdrawal method is a leap-frog, where the company behind set up Defence perimeter and allow the withdrawing unit to enter heads on and when the withdrawing unit put to safety, they will then form another DP to cover the withdraw from former DP, and so on. That way, there are soldier facing enemy position everytime a unit is withdraw and not just turn around and run. But turn around and run is actually the way they did it on that battle. While Allen expecting Alpha to come thru back their line and hold fire.
Finally is the cease fire order Allen gave, which is a grave error. The guard (Delta) are supposed to face the enemy and fire on them covering with withdraw. Allen waited too long for the Alpha to return, not knowing they are coming in from their SE. That amount of time allow enemy to get close. Without fire superiority solution for pinning down incoming troop, you lose time on letting the enemy get in your position.
Now the order of cease fire are supposed to be for the frontal elememt but nonetheness the whole company did not fire to cover and fend off the attack, with 1 hour passes, allen inadvertenly allow the enemy came so close that render friend close support impossible.
Facing an overhelming attack in number, 2 understrenght company of lightly armed infantry would of course cut to piece, without any ground or air support. This is the natural outcome of the battle. And this is what exactly happened on that day.
That conclude the battle report for today. Hope you enjoy this
Discussion is welcome
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