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Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: The United States
This profile summarizes the major arms control agreements, regimes, initiatives, and practices that the United States subscribes to and those that it does not. It also describes the major weapons programs, policies, and holdings of the United States, as well as its proliferation record. This profile is one of a series focused on the arms control record and status of key states, all of which are available on the Arms Control Association’s Website at Arms Control Association | The authoritative source on arms control since 1971..

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties


Signed
Ratified

Biological Weapons Convention
1972
1975

Chemical Weapons Convention
1993
1997

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
-The Senate rejected the accord Oct. 13, 1999.[1]
1996
- - -

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-Recognized as one of five nuclear-weapon states.
1968
1970

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
-Party to two of the five protocols.[2]
1982
1995

Outer Space Treaty
1967
1967

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
1990
1992

Ottawa Mine Ban Convention
-Stockpiles some 10.4 million antipersonnel landmines.[3]
- - -
- - -



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Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed in 1998, entered into force in 2009.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Co-founder with Russia.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Founder.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: The United States has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.


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Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
In the early 1970s, the United States destroyed its entire stockpile of biological weapons, which had been developed between 1943 and 1969. The United States in recent years has steeply increased funding for biodefense programs, which some independent analysts argue could also lend themselves to offensive weapons research and development.[4]

In 2001, the United States opposed and killed an effort dating back to 1995 to augment the Biological Weapons Convention with a legally binding verification protocol. U.S. officials said the protocol would be too burdensome on legitimate government and private biodefense programs, while not deterring cheaters.

Chemical Weapons:
Behind Russia, the United States declared the second-largest stockpile of chemical agents. As of August 2007, the United States had destroyed about 14,500 metric tons of the initial 27,274 metric tons that it had declared. The U.S. Department of Defense says that it will not complete elimination of the remaining agents until 2023, exceeding the Chemical Weapons Convention deadline by 11 years.

Missiles:

Ballistic Missiles: In September 2005, the United States retired the last of its 50 10-warhead MX intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), leaving the United States with a land-based ICBM force of 500 Minuteman IIIs. The George W. Bush administration is currently pursuing a plan to trim that remaining force by 50 ICBMs.
The other long-range missile system maintained by the United States is the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The U.S. Navy is nearing completion of its replacement of all older Trident I missiles with the newer Trident II D5 missile. Fourteen submarines are outfitted with the Trident SLBM.

Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States is barred from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In October 2007, the United States and Russia called upon other countries to forswear missiles banned by the INF Treaty.



Cruise Missiles: The United States deploys ship-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles. The Harpoon missile is an anti-ship system, while the Tomahawk, which can be armed with a nuclear warhead, is a land-attack missile. The United States is currently in the process of retiring its nuclear-armed AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles and trimming its fleet of AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, which can be armed with conventional or nuclear payloads, to 528 missiles.


Nuclear Weapons:
The U.S. nuclear stockpile consists of approximately 10,000 strategic and tactical warheads. This stockpile includes warheads deployed and those stored in reserve, but it does not include retired warheads that are awaiting dismantlement. In a July 2007 report, the United States claimed that 3,696 strategic warheads were “operationally deployed,” meaning warheads loaded onto ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, as well as some warheads stored at heavy bomber bases. U.S. B-52 and B-2 bombers can deliver nuclear payloads.

The United States reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. It has pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states-parties in good standing under the NPT unless they attack the United States in league with a state possessing nuclear arms. Top U.S. officials, however, have repeatedly hinted that Washington might respond with nuclear arms to a chemical or biological weapons attack, regardless of whether the attacker has nuclear weapons. In its secret September 2002 National Security Presidential Directive-17, the George W. Bush administration stated explicitly that U.S. retaliation options for any type of weapon of mass destruction attack against the United States includes nuclear weapons.

The United States conducted 1,030 total tests, more nuclear tests than any other state. The first test occurred July 16, 1945, and the last test took place Sept. 23, 1992.

The United States is the only country to have used nuclear weapons against another country, dropping in August 1945 two bombs (one apiece) against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The United States has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. The United States halted the production of HEU for weapons in 1964 and ceased plutonium reprocessing for weapons in 1992. Current U.S. fissile stockpiles for weapons total about 47 declared metric tons of plutonium and 250 declared metric tons of HEU.[5] Under an agreement finalized in 2000 with Russia, the United States is committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium, but the project has been delayed.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the world’s preeminent conventional arms seller. A 2007 U.S. Congressional Research Service study reported that over the previous eight years the United States had agreed to $123.5 billion in global arms sales, which is an amount more than double the second highest tally of $54 billion by Russia.[6]


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Proliferation Record

A close relationship exists between the U.S. and British nuclear weapons programs, including U.S. supply of the Trident SLBM to the United Kingdom.

The United States also is the only nuclear-weapon power known to station its nuclear weapons in other countries. Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom all host U.S. tactical nuclear gravity bombs as part of NATO nuclear sharing agreements. These estimated 480 weapons remain under U.S. custody during peacetime, but some could be released to U.S. allies for delivery in times of war.


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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

The United States is currently implementing two nuclear reductions treaties with Russia. Although Moscow and Washington concluded several years ago the nuclear cuts required by the 1991 START accord, the two governments continue to rely on that treaty’s extensive verification regime to exchange information, visit, and monitor each other’s nuclear weapons complexes. These activities help the two countries assess implementation of their latest nuclear arms agreement, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which did not include verification measures. Under SORT, the two countries are supposed to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec. 31, 2012. However, the treaty limit expires that same day, freeing both countries to build up their nuclear forces if they choose to do so. The two countries are in the process of negotiating a follow-on to the START Treaty, which would place further limits on the sides' arsenals.

The United States has led NATO in demanding that Russia withdraw its remaining military forces from Georgia and Moldova as a condition for ratification of the 1999 Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which would replace the original treaty’s bloc and regional arms limits with national weapon ceilings. In addition to the CFE Treaty, the United States is party to another European security instrument, the Open Skies Treaty, which facilitates unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territories of all states-parties.

The United States has signed protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin America and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Washington, however, declared that it would reserve the right to retaliate with all options, implying the possibility of nuclear weapons, to a chemical or biological weapons attack by a member of the African zone. The United States has not signed the protocols for the Central Asian, Southeast Asian, or South Pacific zones.

The United States has been a leading proponent of negotiating a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament. In 2004, however, the United States dropped its support for seeking an “effectively verifiable” cutoff, claiming that a verification regime would be time consuming to negotiate, costly to implement, and ultimately imperfect, potentially impinging on the national security interests of law-abiding states while not deterring determined cheaters. Meanwhile, the United States has staunchly opposed efforts by China and Russia to launch negotiations on a treaty for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Washington contends that there is no arms race in outer space to prevent. These competing priorities have deadlocked the conference which has not negotiated an agreement since concluding the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the United States has joined with many other countries to promote new restrictions on the use of anti-vehicle mines, but that effort has been blocked by China, Pakistan, and Russia. The United States announced in June 2007 that it was dropping its opposition to negotiations by CCW states on restricting cluster munitions. But the United States said it has no position on the potential outcome of the negotiations except that an agreement should “protect civilians while taking into account security requirements.” The United States has declined to join a Norwegian-led effort outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians.”

The United States also has not endorsed a British-led effort to negotiate a United Nations treaty to establish standards for the international arms trade. Washington contends the effort would be too time consuming and produce standards of the lowest common denominator.

Although the United States has elected not to join the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention, the United States is not known to have used antipersonnel landmines since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 2004, the United States announced that it would phase out the use of any type of mine lacking self-destruct or self-deactivation features. Washington also has provided the most funding to global demining.

The United States is participating in the so-called six-party process that is supposed to lead to North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. Washington is also actively working to limit Iran’s nuclear activities, which the United States charges are intended to develop nuclear weapons. The United States has pressed for tougher penalties on Iran.

In July 2005, the United States launched an initiative with India to repeal most U.S. and multilateral civilian nuclear trade restrictions on India. Congress gave its qualified approval to the endeavor in December 2006, but the effort has stalled due to opposition from some Indian lawmakers, who charge the deal will erode India’s ability to make independent foreign policy and impinge on its nuclear weapons program.

The United States led a 2003 invasion of Iraq citing its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. No evidence has been discovered to support these allegations.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.


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ENDNOTES

1. The Senate could vote on the treaty again. Since taking office in 2001, the George W. Bush administration has said repeatedly that it does not support the treaty.

2. The United States has not ratified Protocol III on Incendiary Weapons, Protocol IV on Blinding Lasers, and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It also has not approved an amendment that extends the convention’s application beyond just interstate conflicts to intrastate conflicts.

3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, July 2006, 1,236 pp.

4. Roffey, Roger, Hart, John, and Kuhlau, Frida, “Crucial Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, p. 17.

5. International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report, 2007, October 2007, 164 pp.

6. Grimmett, Richard F., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006, Congressional Research Service, September 26, 2007, 92 pp.

The United Kingdom

Signed
Ratified

Biological Weapons Convention
1972
1975

Chemical Weapons Convention
1993
1996

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
-Has linked its signature to that of India.
1996
1998

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-Has developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty.
1968
1968

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
-Party to four of the five protocols.[1]
1981
1995

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
1990
1991

Outer Space Treaty
1967
1967

Ottawa Mine Ban Convention
-Banned exports of antipersonnel landmines, but retains and deploys them for defensive purposes.
1997
1998



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Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Yes, entered into force in 2004.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: The United Kingdom has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.


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Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The United Kingdom had an active biological warfare program from 1936 to 1956. As part of that program, the United Kingdom weaponized anthrax and researched plague, typhoid fever, and botulinum toxin. Today, the British government operates an extensive and sophisticated defensive program that includes research on potentially offensive pathogens.

Chemical Weapons:
Pakistan did not declare possessing any chemical weapons when it joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Pakistan remains in good standing under the treaty.

Missiles:

Ballistic Missiles: The United Kingdom maintains one type of ballistic missile system in its arsenal for delivering nuclear warheads. That missile is the U.S.-origin Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missile, which has an estimated range of roughly 7,400 kilometers.


Cruise Missiles: The United Kingdom possesses two air-launched land-attack cruise missile systems, the PGM-500 and PGM-2000. The latter can carry a heavier payload.


Nuclear Weapons:
In December 2006, the United Kingdom announced plans to reduce its deployed force of approximately 200 strategic nuclear warheads to less than 160. The government also declared that the reserve stockpile, the size of which is secret, will be trimmed by 20 percent.

British nuclear warheads are only deployed on submarines. Currently, the government maintains four Vanguard-class submarines, which are projected to start reaching the end of their service lives in the early 2020s. The government has initiated a process to develop a new class of submarines to potentially carry British nuclear warheads until about mid-century.

The British government’s standard practice is to have only one submarine on routine patrol at any given time. The government claims the missiles aboard the submarine are not on alert and that launching a missile would take several days of preparation.

In May 2000, the British government reaffirmed a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT subject to certain conditions regarding their behavior and alliances. London refuses to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons, but has stated that it would only employ such arms in self-defense and “even then only in extreme circumstances.”

The United Kingdom has conducted 45 nuclear weapon tests. The first test occurred Oct. 3, 1952, and the last took place Nov. 26, 1991.

In April 1995, the British government declared that it no longer produces fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. The government has declared that its military stockpile consists of 3.2 metric tons of plutonium and 22 metric tons of HEU.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
The United Kingdom is a key arms exporter. In 2007, the British government volunteered to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms that in 2006 the United Kingdom had exported two tanks, 37 armored combat vehicles, eight attack helicopters and one missile system, as well as more than 359,000 small arms and light weapons. In a September 2007 arms trade report, the U.S. Congressional Research Service reported that the United Kingdom had agreed to $3.1 billion in new arms export deals in 2006.[2]

The United Kingdom is spearheading an initiative to negotiate an arms trade treaty to establish standards for global arms exports. The United Nations in 2008 is convening a group of governmental experts to explore the feasibility of such an instrument.


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Proliferation Record

Although a leading supplier of conventional weapons to other states, the United Kingdom is not known to have deliberately or significantly (??? That means they did) contributed to the spread of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons to other states.


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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

The British government has signed protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin American, South Pacific, and African nuclear-weapon-free zones. London has not done so for the Southeast Asian or Central Asian zones.

The United Kingdom is a state-party to the Open Skies Treaty, which enables unarmed reconnaissance flights over all states-parties territories, and has signed the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. London, along with other western capitals, is refusing to ratify the latter agreement until Russia fulfills commitments to withdraw its military forces from Georgia and Moldova.

London further supports the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament. Although the British government previously endorsed an “effectively verifiable” cutoff, it has backed off promoting that objective after the United States in 2004 declared it no longer supported that goal.

The United Kingdom is participating in a Norwegian-led effort to negotiate a treaty to ban cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians,” and it also supports concluding an instrument on cluster munitions through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

The United Kingdom joined the United States in invading Iraq in 2003 citing its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. No evidence has been discovered to support these allegations.

London has engaged in negotiations with Iran over its nuclear activities, which the United Kingdom suspects are intended to develop nuclear weapons. The British government supports ratcheting up sanctions on Iran to persuade it to halt certain activities, particularly uranium enrichment.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

Israel
Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties


Signed
Ratified

Biological Weapons Convention
- - -
- - -

Chemical Weapons Convention
1993
- - -

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
1996
- - -

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-Suspected of developing nuclear arms outside the treaty.
- - -
- - -

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
-Party to three of the five protocols.[1]
- - -
1995

Outer Space Treaty
1967
1977

Ottawa Mine Ban Convention
- - -
- - -



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Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, but Israel has committed to maintaining export controls consistent with the regime.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member. Israel is prohibited from importing key nuclear materials and technologies from the 45 group members because Israel does not subject its entire nuclear enterprise to safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member, but Israel has pledged its “adherence to the principles” of the arrangement.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: No, Israel has not negotiated such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Israel has filed the requested reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.


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Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The Israeli government operates an extensive and sophisticated biodefense program. It has not made public pronouncements on its biological weapons policy nor signed the Biological Weapons Convention, which is widely interpreted as an indication that Israel has some offensive capabilities.

Chemical Weapons:
Israel has signed, but not ratified, the Chemical Weapons Convention. Although the status of its formerly extensive offensive weapons program and stockpile is unknown, there is no doubt that Israel is active in defensive research. Russian intelligence claimed in 1993 that “Israel has a store of chemical weapons of its own manufacture... [and] is capable of producing toxic substances of all types, including nerve-paralyzing, blister-producing and temporarily incapacitating substances and so forth.”[2]

Missiles:

Ballistic Missiles: Israel fields an arsenal of nuclear-capable Jericho missiles, which are based on French technology and road- and rail-mobile. The Jericho-1 was first deployed in the early 1970s and the 1,500 kilometer-range Jericho-2 followed in 1990. Israel’s space-launch capability indicates it could develop a missile with intercontinental reach.


Cruise Missiles: Israel has purchased U.S.-origin Harpoon cruise missiles with a range of 120 kilometers. Reports suggest that Israel has modified the Harpoon system to deliver nuclear payloads.[3] It also is believed to have indigenously developed a submarine-launched cruise missile system with a range of up to 900 kilometers.


Nuclear Weapons:
Israel is suspected of having a nuclear arsenal ranging from 75 to 200 nuclear warheads, although it has never officially acknowledged possessing such arms or demonstrated its capability through a nuclear test. Israel officially maintains that it “will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.” (lolz)

In addition to its Jericho missiles, Israel maintains a fleet of nuclear-capable fighter combat aircraft, including U.S.-origin F-16s and F-15s. Independent analysts also believe Israel’s Dolphin-class submarines have been outfitted to deliver nuclear weapons.

How much plutonium Israel has produced is unknown. One independent analyst calculates the amount as roughly 600 kilograms.[4] It is assumed by some analysts that Israel has a uranium-enrichment program, although there is not enough evidence to support a credible estimate of how much highly enriched uranium Israel might have produced.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Israel has been an important and leading arms client of the United States, but Israel also is stepping up its arms sales abroad. In the process, Israel upset the United States by transferring certain weapons and technologies, including spare parts for unmanned aerial vehicles, to China. Israel and the United States signed a secret memorandum in August 2005 aimed at restricting certain Israeli exports to other countries.[5]

Israel is the one of a few Middle East states that has consistently volunteered its annual arms export and import data to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

In January 2007, the United States made a preliminary finding that Israel might have violated the use terms of imported U.S. arms, specifically cluster munitions. In a summer 2006 conflict with Hezbollah guerillas located in southern Lebanon, Israel employed U.S.-origin cluster munitions, which are reportedly authorized exclusively for use against clear military targets. Allegations were made that Israel used the weapons more indiscriminately. The United States had suspended cluster munitions exports to Israel for several years during the 1980s because of a finding that Israel had misused the weapons.


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Proliferation Record

Israel is not known to have deliberately or significantly contributed to the spread of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons to other states, although the extent of Israel’s involvement in South Africa’s previously secret, now abandoned, nuclear weapons program is uncertain.


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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

On June 7, 1981, Israeli planes bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor, which Israel charged would contribute to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. That attack did not halt the secret Iraqi nuclear weapons program, which was not exposed and dismantled until the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Israel has not threatened to block negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty at the 65-member Conference on Disarmament, but Israeli leaders have voiced reservations about the initiative.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

Russia
Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties


Signed
Ratified

Biological Weapons Convention
1972
1975

Chemical Weapons Convention
1993
1997

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
1996
2000

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-Recognized as one of five nuclear-weapon states.
1968
1970

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
-Party to four of the five protocols.[1]
1981
1984

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
1990
1992

Outer Space Treaty
1967
1967

Ottawa Mine Ban Convention
-Stockpiles some 26.5 million antipersonnel landmines.[2]
- - -
- - -



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Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member, but Russia claims to adhere to the group’s rules and control list.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Member.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Member.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: Signed in 2000, the protocol entered into force on October 16, 2007.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Co-founder with the United States.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Participant.

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: Russia has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and volunteered to provide assistance to other states.


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Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
Despite ratifying the Biological Weapons Convention, the Soviet Union apparently maintained an extensive offensive germ weapons program, including research into plague, anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, glanders, and hemorrhagic fever. In an August 2005 report, the U.S. Department of State asserted that “the United States is concerned that Russia maintains a mature offensive [biological weapons] program.”[3] The report noted, “a substantial amount of dual-use research conducted in recent years has legitimate biodefense applicability, but also could be used to further an offensive program.” Russia has disputed the allegations.

Chemical Weapons:
Upon entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia declared possessing approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the largest amount in the world. As of May 2007, Russia had destroyed 20 percent of this stockpile and is supposed to eliminate the rest by 2012. However, all indications are that Russia will not complete its destruction activities on time.

A dispute lingers over whether Russia has fully declared all of its chemical weapons-related facilities and past production. The United States claims Moscow has not provided a full accounting of its chemical weapons activities, particularly the alleged production of a new generation of nerve agents known as Novichoks.[4]

Missiles:

Ballistic Missiles: Russia has an extensive, albeit aging, force of silo- and mobile-land based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In a July 2007 report, Moscow claimed to have 509 deployed ICBMs, most of which are Soviet-era systems. Many of those missiles are nearing the end of their service lives, and the intended mainstay of Russia’s future ICBM force is the Topol-M or SS-27. As of July 2007, Russia stated it had fielded 47 Topol-Ms, including three mobile launchers. Russia also maintains a few hundred submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) that date back to the Soviet period. Moscow, however, is working to develop a new SLBM, the Bulava. Russian leaders also vaguely say they are developing other missile-related systems, such as a hypersonic glide vehicle, that will be capable of penetrating anti-missile systems, which the United States is developing and deploying.Under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Moscow is barred from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Russia has abided by this prohibition, but the Kremlin also has suggested it might withdraw from the accord because its neighbors are acquiring types of missiles that are forbidden to Russia. In October 2007, the United States and Russia called upon other countries to forswear missiles banned by the INF Treaty.


Cruise Missiles: The Russian military possesses three types of air-launched cruise missiles and two submarine-launched cruise missile systems.


Nuclear Weapons:
Estimates of Russia’s total nuclear forces, including tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, vary greatly. In July 2007, Russia claimed 3,909 total deployed strategic warheads under the terms of the 1991 START nuclear reductions agreement. It is generally estimated that Russia also may have up to 3,000 tactical nuclear warheads in service. In addition, Russia may have as many as 8,000 to 10,000 nuclear warheads in reserve.

In 1993, Russia abandoned the Soviet Union’s previous pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. Moscow has reiterated past pledges not to use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess them, but it also has warned that it might use nuclear weapons if other responses failed to “repulse armed aggression.”

All told, the Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear tests. The first test occurred Aug. 29, 1949, and the last test took place Oct. 24, 1990.

Russia has publicly declared that it no longer produces fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, for weapons purposes. The Kremlin announced a halt to HEU production for weapons in 1989 and the cessation of plutonium production for weapons in 1994. As with Russia’s warhead stockpile, there is a great deal of uncertainty about its holdings of fissile material. One independent 2007 report estimates that Russia possibly has 640 metric tons of HEU, which could vary by as much as 300 metric tons, and 120 to 170 metric tons of plutonium stockpiled for weapons.[5] With the United States, Russia is implementing a program to downblend 500 metric tons of Russian excess HEU into reactor fuel unsuitable for bombs. That project is supposed to be completed in 2013. The two countries, however, have yet to begin disposing of 68 metric tons of excess plutonium (34 tons apiece) under an agreement finalized in 2000.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
Russia trails only the United States in supplying conventional arms abroad. Between 2001 and 2008, Russia committed to selling some $58 billion in weapons to other states.[6] China and India are two long-term and leading purchasers of Russian arms, but Algeria and Venezuela in 2006 sealed multi-billion dollar weapons deals with Russia. Russian arms sales to Venezuela increased further in 2009, after Russia agreed to loan $2.2 billion to Venezuela for the purchase of tanks and advanced anti-aircraft missiles. Western governments have criticized Russia for not being discriminating enough in its arms transactions, citing the dramatic increase in sales to Venezuela, and transfers to Iran and Sudan.


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Proliferation Record

The Russian government and Russian entities have repeatedly been charged by the U.S. government and independent analysts as aiding nuclear and missile programs in states of concern. For instance, Russia is helping construct Iran’s Bushehr reactor and offered to supply fuel for the reactor’s operation. Although these activities are legal, the United States contends Iran may use the project as cover or glean know-how from it for an alleged illicit nuclear weapons program. In addition, Russia provided nuclear reactor fuel to India. These transfers defied a former Nuclear Suppliers Group rule that baned the sale of nuclear fuel or technology to India, as India's nuclear enterprise was not subject to IAEA safeguards. This rule was overturned on September 6, 2008. In the missile realm, the United States asserts Russian entities have helped spread missile technologies to “China, India, Iran, and other countries.”[7]

The vast former Soviet biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons complexes, including their former scientists, are seen as a potential source of arms, materials, and know-how for other regimes or non-state actors. Consequently, the United States and other countries have many programs dedicated to mitigating this potential threat by helping Russia, as well as other former Soviet states, secure or destroy facilities, materials, and weapon systems, and gainfully employ former scientists in non-arms related work.


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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

Russia is currently implementing two nuclear reductions treaties with the United States. Although Moscow and Washington have concluded the nuclear cuts required by the 1991 START accord, the two governments continue to rely on that treaty’s extensive verification regime to exchange information, visit, and monitor each other’s nuclear weapons complexes. These activities help the two countries assess implementation of their latest nuclear arms agreement, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which did not include verification measures. Under SORT, the two countries are supposed to reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by Dec. 31, 2012. However, the treaty limit expires that same day, freeing both countries to build up their nuclear forces if they choose to do so. Furthermore, the START Treaty will expire on December 5, 2009, which will remove the legal basis for formal verification measures between the sides. Both the United States and Russia have recognized the need to reach a new agreement, and are currently negotiating an arms control treaty to replace START.

Russia threatened to suspend implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty on Dec. 12, 2007. The Russian government followed through on this statement by officially suspending its implementation of the CFE Treaty on December 12, 2008. Moscow contends that NATO countries, led by the United States, are unjustifiably delaying ratification of a 1999 revised version of the treaty and, thereby, endangering Russian security. NATO members are conditioning ratification on Russia fulfilling commitments to withdraw its military forces from Georgia and Moldova. The Kremlin says the issues should not be linked. Meanwhile, Russia continues to implement another European security instrument, the Open Skies Treaty, which facilitates unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territories of all states-parties.

The Russian government has signed protocols stating its intent to respect and not threaten the use of nuclear weapons against states-parties to the Latin America and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. It has not signed the protocols for the African, Central Asian, and Southeast Asian zones.

At the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD), Russia has supported negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), but has made negotiation of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space a top priority. Russia and China jointly submitted the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) to the CD on February 12, 2008. Under the Bush administration, the United States opposed any negotiation on an outer space treaty, which prevented the CD from forming a work plan. The Obama administration changed this policy, and has actively pursued the negotiation of a FMCT. These efforts resulted in the adoption of a work plan at the CD on May 28, 2009 which included discussions of an FMCT, and a PPWT. Despite some initial progress, negotiations on these issues broke down and show no immediate prospect of improvement.

Within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Russia has resisted a U.S.-sponsored initiative to negotiate restrictions on the use of anti-vehicle landmines, but reluctantly consented to CCW negotiations on cluster munitions. Moscow has declined to participate in a Norwegian-led effort outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that “cause unacceptable harm to civilians.” Moreover, Russia has showed little enthusiasm for negotiating a United Nations treaty to establish standards for the international arms trade.

Russia supports creation of and has offered to host an international nuclear fuel bank to help persuade countries to forgo development of their own national nuclear fuel production capabilities, which also could be used to produce nuclear-bomb material.

Russia is participating in the so-called six-party process that is supposed to lead to North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. On Iran, Moscow is urging Tehran to be transparent about its nuclear activities, while opposing Western government attempts to toughen sanctions on Iran.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.

India
Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties


Signed
Ratified

Biological Weapons Convention
1973
1974

Chemical Weapons Convention
1993
1996

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
-Only supports the treaty in the context of general nuclear disarmament.[1]
- - -
- - -

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
-Has developed nuclear weapons outside the treaty.
- - -
- - -

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
-Party to all protocols.
1981
1984

Outer Space Treaty
1967
1982

Ottawa Mine Ban Convention
-Employs landmines for border defense.
- - -
- - -



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Export Control Regimes, Nonproliferation Initiatives, and Safeguards

Australia Group: Not a member.

Missile Technology Control Regime: Not a member, but India pledged in July 2005 to adhere to the regime’s guidelines.

Nuclear Suppliers Group: Not a member, but India vowed to “harmonize” its export controls with those advocated by the voluntary 45-member group. India is prohibited from importing key nuclear materials and technologies from group members because New Delhi does not subject its entire nuclear enterprise to safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Wassenaar Arrangement: Not a member.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol: No, but India pledged in July 2005 to negotiate and sign such an agreement.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Not a participant.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: Not a participant.

Proliferation Security Initiative: Not a participant. A senior U.S. official indicated to Arms Control Today that the initiative does not target Indian transfers because it is a U.S. ally.[2]

UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673: India has filed reports on its activities to fulfill the resolutions and offered to host IAEA courses on physical security of nuclear facilities.


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Major Weapons Programs, Policies, and Practices

Biological Weapons:
The Indian biotechnology private sector is highly sophisticated and the government conducts defensive biological weapons research. No evidence points to an offensive weapons program.

Chemical Weapons:
India has destroyed over half of its declared 1,055 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles. India’s destruction deadline is April 2009. Indian industry exports precursor and dual-use chemicals and the armed forces operate an active chemical weapons defense program.

Missiles:

Ballistic Missiles: India has an active and advanced ballistic missile sector, which has produced a nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missile that is in service. Nuclear-capable medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles are also under development and have been flight-tested. The Agni-3, which has an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers, is the longest-range missile successfully flight-tested. Consistent reports exist that India intends to convert a space launch vehicle into an intercontinental-range ballistic missile, the Surya.[3]


Cruise Missiles: India has worked with Russia to produce the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile. The missile, which can be launched from aircraft, ships, or a mobile ground vehicle, has an estimated range of roughly 300 kilometers—the threshold range of missiles that Missile Technology Control Regime members are supposed to exercise restraint in exporting. India and Russia say they plan to market the missile for export.


Nuclear Weapons:
India is estimated as having an arsenal of up to 100 warheads, although it is unclear how many warheads might be fully assembled.[4] India is working to expand its fleet of ground-launched ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and has fighter aircraft that can perform this mission. The Indian government is also developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that can be launched from surface ships and submarines.

Indian officials say the development of their nuclear stockpile is based on maintaining a “credible minimum deterrent.” Although India stated in January 2003 that it would not use nuclear weapons against states that do not possess such arms and declared that nuclear weapons would only be used to retaliate against a nuclear attack, the government reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to biological or chemical weapons attacks.

India has conducted 3 nuclear weapon tests, although it claimed its first test was a “peaceful” nuclear explosion. In addition, one test involved two simultaneous explosions and another involved three synchronized blasts. The first test occurred May 18, 1974, and the last took place May 13, 1998.

India continues to produce fissile material for weapons purposes and refused to cease such production as part of a proposed U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation deal. New Delhi has approximately 500 kilograms of plutonium available for nuclear weapons and up to another 11.5 metric tons of reactor grade plutonium in spent fuel, which could be reprocessed for weapons use.[5] Some analysts estimate that India could increase its production of fissile material for weapons if it succeeds in securing foreign nuclear fuel shipments because such a move would free up more Indian domestic resources currently divided between the military and civilian sector for building bombs.[6] Only four of India’s 22 existing or under construction nuclear reactors are currently under IAEA safeguards.

Conventional Weapons Trade:
India is a leading buyer of conventional arms. Between 1999 and 2006, India totaled $22.4 billion in arms sales agreements, according to a 2007 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service. That total made India first among all developing arms buyers during that period.[7]


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Proliferation Record

India’s first nuclear test was of a device derived partially from Canadian and U.S. exports designated for peaceful purposes. That test spurred the United States and several other countries to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group to more severely restrict global nuclear trade.

The George W. Bush adminstration has sanctioned several Indian entities for transferring technologies and know-how to Iraq and Iran that could contribute to chemical or biological weapons programs. Independent analysts also allege that India’s procurement system for its own nuclear programs could leak or reveal nuclear know-how to other states or non-state actors.[8]


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Other Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities

India has concluded bilateral confidence-building measures with Pakistan. After their tit-for-tat nuclear tests in 1998, the two rivals volunteered to abstain from nuclear testing. They also have established a hotline to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war and agreed to exchange advance notifications of ballistic missile flight tests.

At the 65-member Conference on Disarmament, India favors negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty that is “effectively verifiable,” which is a condition opposed by the United States. At that Geneva forum and elsewhere, India has consistently called for general nuclear disarmament by all states.

In March 2006, India pledged to subject more of its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards as part of a U.S.-Indian initiative to exempt India from current U.S. and multilateral nuclear trade restrictions. India has yet to negotiate the required safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which is a necessary condition for the overall U.S.-Indian effort to advance. The Indian government has not initiated negotiations with the IAEA because of opposition from some Indian lawmakers, who charge the U.S.-Indian deal will erode India’s ability to make independent foreign policy and impinge on its nuclear weapons program.

-Researched and prepared by Alex Bollfrass.
 

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