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analysis: Rethinking military power Tanvir Ahmad Khan
It is necessary to identify convergences and divergences of interests between us and our international friends and factor them into policy. This will be possible only if the state recognises the fact that military power by itself has not made Pakistan more secure and will not do so in future
Pakistan has to contend with strange challenges. Governments change all over the world through elections or through a wide range of quasi-democratic or undemocratic processes. It is assumed that regardless of its provenance change of government entails a mandatory review of existing policies. This review spans the entire gamut of national life with the existing economic order and foreign and security policies providing important focal points. When it comes to Pakistan, the defeated forces as well as some outside powers insist on continuity of discredited policies that have been squarely rejected by the electorate.
The momentous outcome of the election of February 18 leaves no option but to carry out a dispassionate review of the state we are in with a view to opening up new and better policy choices.
A year ago the Pakistani regime looked unassailable in its efforts to marginalise dissent and make sure that it would not impact on their self-serving decisions. The working assumption was that a small coterie of decision-makers faced no countervailing force in the body politic. All it needed was a band of publicists who helped it create a world of make-belief particularly about economic development and Pakistans heroic stature in the claimed global battles of good and evil. The hubris that lay behind this wilful rejection of informed opinion in the country received a mighty jolt a year ago and the regime started to unravel.
The election has produced a National Assembly which has already elected a Speaker and a Prime Minister with majorities that have virtually no parallel in Pakistans history. As power shifted under the relentless pressure of a people shaken by the events of November 3, 2007, the catalogue of crises faced by the country grew exponentially. Rightly or wrongly, the popular perception is that the new government is beginning its work in just about the worst possible circumstances.
It will be wrong to be glib about the priorities that the incoming administration should follow. It is even more difficult to sequence the tasks neatly as a number of issues demand a simultaneous commitment of ameliorative effort. By far, the most urgent task is prompt reduction in the economic distress of a large segment of the people left behind by the illusory economic achievements under the stewardship of an international banker, Shaukat Aziz.
Apart from this challenge the new government cannot but urgently address the question of relying exclusively or heavily on the use of military force to resolve conflictual situations in Balochistan and along the western border with Afghanistan.
The two issues have general similarities but are also differentiated by specific and intrinsic factors shaping the two dire contingencies. From time to time there are dark hints of the involvement of quite a few foreign intelligence outfits in the insurgency in Balochistan but the stark reality is that its roots are in the failure of our federal state to understand the fundamental layer of ethno-national aspirations in our politics.
Ethnic nationalism has its origin in valid longings for linguistic and cultural identity. Fully functional federations provide opportunities for this kind of self-determination. Unfortunately in Pakistans case there was reluctance to do so either because of an obsessive view of religion as a monolithic construct or extrapolation of the uniformity of military garrisons into the splendid diversity of ancient peoples coming together in a shared constitutional arrangement of a nation state. Sadly, this neglect of ethno political realities has been greatly exacerbated by utterly unacceptable disparities of income and economic opportunities that alienate the youth in particular.
The new government must not feel bound by the disproportionate faith in the use of force that characterised the policies of the last few years. It has to recognise the flip side of this policy as well. The Baloch dissidents, particularly those who took up arms, also have no trust in negotiating with a federal authority perceived as callous and insensitive to their cultural identity and economic needs. The composition of the new coalition provides Pakistan with an unusual opportunity to embark upon a fresh political initiative. It will need a set of properly conceived confidence building measures that would inevitably include a review of the present military operations.
There is more entrenched opposition to changing the mix of strategies when it comes to Afghanistan-related commitment of military power by Pakistan. Washington remains implacably opposed to any talks with the militants though an increasing number of western analysts now concede that at the end of the day peace in Afghanistan would require talks with the Taliban and other armed resistance groups. Refusal to negotiate is endorsed by some elements in Pakistan partly because their hostility to political Islamists is as dogmatic as that of the adversary towards them and partly because of the past experience when relaxation of military pressure was used by the insurgents to re-equip and re-group and launch audacious acts of terror on both sides of the international border.
Viewed from a certain standpoint the extremists are a seamless whole. And yet there are differences of motivation and objectives between its Afghan and Pakistani components. Resistance to foreign occupation, the Talibans Islamist ideology, ethnic politics, the great greed of foreign contractors which has made Afghanistans reconstruction a hollow project and the failure of the elected parliament of that country to perform any significant role in national policy combine to make for a long period of turmoil. The West is prepared to stick it out as long as casualties remain at the present low level.
The impact on Pakistan, however, is too severe to afford a similar luxury of a conflict lasting decades. It is necessary to identify convergences and divergences of interests between us and our international friends and factor them into policy. This will be possible only if the state recognises the fact that military power by itself has not made Pakistan more secure and will not do so in future.
The writer is a former foreign sectretary. He can be contacted at tanvir.a.khan@gmail.com
It is necessary to identify convergences and divergences of interests between us and our international friends and factor them into policy. This will be possible only if the state recognises the fact that military power by itself has not made Pakistan more secure and will not do so in future
Pakistan has to contend with strange challenges. Governments change all over the world through elections or through a wide range of quasi-democratic or undemocratic processes. It is assumed that regardless of its provenance change of government entails a mandatory review of existing policies. This review spans the entire gamut of national life with the existing economic order and foreign and security policies providing important focal points. When it comes to Pakistan, the defeated forces as well as some outside powers insist on continuity of discredited policies that have been squarely rejected by the electorate.
The momentous outcome of the election of February 18 leaves no option but to carry out a dispassionate review of the state we are in with a view to opening up new and better policy choices.
A year ago the Pakistani regime looked unassailable in its efforts to marginalise dissent and make sure that it would not impact on their self-serving decisions. The working assumption was that a small coterie of decision-makers faced no countervailing force in the body politic. All it needed was a band of publicists who helped it create a world of make-belief particularly about economic development and Pakistans heroic stature in the claimed global battles of good and evil. The hubris that lay behind this wilful rejection of informed opinion in the country received a mighty jolt a year ago and the regime started to unravel.
The election has produced a National Assembly which has already elected a Speaker and a Prime Minister with majorities that have virtually no parallel in Pakistans history. As power shifted under the relentless pressure of a people shaken by the events of November 3, 2007, the catalogue of crises faced by the country grew exponentially. Rightly or wrongly, the popular perception is that the new government is beginning its work in just about the worst possible circumstances.
It will be wrong to be glib about the priorities that the incoming administration should follow. It is even more difficult to sequence the tasks neatly as a number of issues demand a simultaneous commitment of ameliorative effort. By far, the most urgent task is prompt reduction in the economic distress of a large segment of the people left behind by the illusory economic achievements under the stewardship of an international banker, Shaukat Aziz.
Apart from this challenge the new government cannot but urgently address the question of relying exclusively or heavily on the use of military force to resolve conflictual situations in Balochistan and along the western border with Afghanistan.
The two issues have general similarities but are also differentiated by specific and intrinsic factors shaping the two dire contingencies. From time to time there are dark hints of the involvement of quite a few foreign intelligence outfits in the insurgency in Balochistan but the stark reality is that its roots are in the failure of our federal state to understand the fundamental layer of ethno-national aspirations in our politics.
Ethnic nationalism has its origin in valid longings for linguistic and cultural identity. Fully functional federations provide opportunities for this kind of self-determination. Unfortunately in Pakistans case there was reluctance to do so either because of an obsessive view of religion as a monolithic construct or extrapolation of the uniformity of military garrisons into the splendid diversity of ancient peoples coming together in a shared constitutional arrangement of a nation state. Sadly, this neglect of ethno political realities has been greatly exacerbated by utterly unacceptable disparities of income and economic opportunities that alienate the youth in particular.
The new government must not feel bound by the disproportionate faith in the use of force that characterised the policies of the last few years. It has to recognise the flip side of this policy as well. The Baloch dissidents, particularly those who took up arms, also have no trust in negotiating with a federal authority perceived as callous and insensitive to their cultural identity and economic needs. The composition of the new coalition provides Pakistan with an unusual opportunity to embark upon a fresh political initiative. It will need a set of properly conceived confidence building measures that would inevitably include a review of the present military operations.
There is more entrenched opposition to changing the mix of strategies when it comes to Afghanistan-related commitment of military power by Pakistan. Washington remains implacably opposed to any talks with the militants though an increasing number of western analysts now concede that at the end of the day peace in Afghanistan would require talks with the Taliban and other armed resistance groups. Refusal to negotiate is endorsed by some elements in Pakistan partly because their hostility to political Islamists is as dogmatic as that of the adversary towards them and partly because of the past experience when relaxation of military pressure was used by the insurgents to re-equip and re-group and launch audacious acts of terror on both sides of the international border.
Viewed from a certain standpoint the extremists are a seamless whole. And yet there are differences of motivation and objectives between its Afghan and Pakistani components. Resistance to foreign occupation, the Talibans Islamist ideology, ethnic politics, the great greed of foreign contractors which has made Afghanistans reconstruction a hollow project and the failure of the elected parliament of that country to perform any significant role in national policy combine to make for a long period of turmoil. The West is prepared to stick it out as long as casualties remain at the present low level.
The impact on Pakistan, however, is too severe to afford a similar luxury of a conflict lasting decades. It is necessary to identify convergences and divergences of interests between us and our international friends and factor them into policy. This will be possible only if the state recognises the fact that military power by itself has not made Pakistan more secure and will not do so in future.
The writer is a former foreign sectretary. He can be contacted at tanvir.a.khan@gmail.com
