Major Shaitan Singh
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Dec 7, 2010
- Messages
- 3,550
- Reaction score
- 43
- Country
- Location
Note: this piece is intended as a follow-up to my earlier, preliminary analysis of the unidentified munitions claimed to have been used to deliver chemical agents in Syria. It will repeat a little of the material covered in the earlier piece as it is intended to be translated and made available in Arabic. It should be stressed that this is still a preliminary analysis of the limited photographic and videographic material available. It is still not clear whether these munitions carried a CW payload, nor are their origins yet known.
In an earlier post, I conducted a preliminary analysis of the unidentified munitions alleged to have been used in suspected chemical weapons (CW) attacks in Syria, particularly the attack in Eastern Ghouta. The video below shows the delivery, loading, and launching of one of these unidentified munitions, apparently by regime forces. The video, which was announced on the Darya Revolution Facebook page, claims to show the launch of a rocket with a CW payload from Mezzeh Military Airport, on the Western edge of Damascus, towards Eastern Ghouta. The rocket in the video is a strong match for the type of munitions documented in Daraya, Khaladiya, Yabroud, Adra, Eastern Ghouta, and Zamalka (see complete list at the end of this piece).
The video shows several men around the launch site wearing red berets, which is apparently typical of the uniform worn by the Syrian Republican Guard. This is consistent with reports from Israeli sources that rockets containing chemical agents were fired by the 155th Brigade, 4th Armoured Division, which is closely aligned with the Republican Guard. Both units are commanded by Syrian President Bashar al-Assads brother, Maher al-Assad. The 155th Brigades base is believed to be close to Mezzeh airport. Eliot Higgins has calculated the precise impact location of one of the unidentified munitions, with findings that may indicate similar launch sites. It is interesting to note that the figures loading and firing the weapon appear to be in civilian attire, rather than the military uniforms seen on others in the video.
The launcher seen in the video appears to be an Iranian Falaq-2 model, or a similar derivative or copy. These are seen in one, two, three, and four-tube configurations, and have been seen fitted to both military and civilian type trucks and semi-trailers. These may have been acquired from Iran, or may be a copy of the Iranian design. Falaq-2 type launchers are known to be in use with government forces in Syria already, having been reported towards the end of last year. Typically, the Falaq-2 launcher is used in conjunction with a 333mm FL2-A rocket of 1820mm in length, carrying a high explosive (HE) warhead considerably shorter than the unidentified munition in question, which appears to be at the very least 2800mm (and possibly upwards of 3000mm) in length. The video below, Published in December 2012, shows a two-tube Falaq-2 type launcher being fired from Mezzeh Military Airport, allegedly towards Daraya. This is consistent with the claims accompanying the video above.
The munitions themselves are non-standard surface-to-surface rockets of at least 2800mm in length. The long motor body is likely designed to increase the static margin of the rocket, which would improve stability in flight. It is possible that these munitions are produced in differing lengths. Given they are fired from a Falaq-2 type launcher, the diameter of the munitions is likely close to 333mm. It is possible there is a larger diameter variant produced. It is unclear whether the rockets are manufactured in Iran they do bear some similarities to other munitions thought to be produced there or whether they were produced in Syria to suit the Iranian launch system. The tail of the munitions (pictured below) features a straight fin assembly with a ring aerofoil, and a single large exhaust nozzle for the rocket motor. The payload section of the weapon is notably larger than the body section and approximately the same diameter as the fin assembly (possibly slightly larger). It appears to be thin walled, which would indicate the requirement for a high fill-to-weight ratio. However, this would be decreased by the large central body section. One suggestion which was made to me is that the munition is a slip-fit modification of an existing rocket. The bolt seen in the tail image below may have been threaded into the outer material as a pressure hold, typical of a sleeve fit mechanism.
Given their build quality and uniformity of appearance, these munitions are unlikely to be improvised devices.
It is possible that these munitions are not CW delivery devices at all, and are designed to carry a fuel-air explosive (FAE) or HE payload. FAE rockets of similar construction can be seen in the US Surface-Launched Unit, Fuel-Air Explosive (SLUFAE) and Israeli CARPET rockets. It is also a possibility that the munitions were produced in several variants, including a CW variant, or that certain rockets were converted to carry a CW payload at some point after manufacture. FAE or HE weapons could, with varying degrees of difficulty, be converted to deliver a liquid CW payload by replacing the payload of the munition with a chemical agent. A yellow band, seen on one of the munitions (image below), may indicate a different fill type. The warhead in question appears to contain a powdered substance which is more likely to be a HE fill.
The fuze or type of fuze used with these munitions remains unknown. Whilst a Soviet ATK-EB mechanical time (MT) fuze (pictured below) was found near one of these munitions in Eastern Ghouta, it is unclear whether this was from the rocket itself, or from another munition (perhaps related to the airstrikes that followed the alleged CW attack). A MT fuze, whilst a viable option for rockets of this type, would not be the ideal choice. It is also worth noting that the majority of the munitions recorded appear to have functioned as intended. If a MT fuze was used, this may indicate that the operating party was familiar with the weapon system and capable of effectively calculating and setting the MT fuzes to their appropriate delays.
The earliest video of this type of munition appears to be from an attack in Daraya in January of this year; however, there were no claims of a CW attack at this time [Update: an image of a Falaq-2 launcher with the tail fin assembly of a loaded rocket visible has been added below. This image was taken on the 17th November, 2012 by Alzahraa Alep News, and appears consistent with the unidentified munitions]. Indeed, it appears that at least one of these munitions has been observed with what is more likely a HE payload. Videos such as the one below appear to indicate that any CW agent that may be present is either non-persistent, or that some or all of the munitions carried an alternative payload, as discussed above.
1.) It is likely a non-standard munition produced in Iran or Syria, not widely used or manufactured, but likely not an improvised munition;
2.) It is a tube-launched munition, fired from an Iranian Falaq-2 launcher or derivative or copy;
3.) It appears to have a diameter of approximately 333mm or thereabouts at its widest points (warhead base plate and tail fin assembly), and a total length of at least 2800mm;
4.) The nature of the design means they are unlikely to be particularly long-range, nor particularly accurate.
Last edited by a moderator:
