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1965 War: The Wrong Lessons

Past is past

Let us look at the mistakes to avoid another war...

War means destruction of peoples lives... There is nothing heroic in War...

Let India and Pakistan live in Peace...

Let the Muslims in India live in peace... We are easy targets for Bajrang Dal and Shiv sena holigans

Look what happened in Gujrat...

Let there be peace...
Well said Ferrari! :thumbsup:
Amen to that!
 
VIEW: How Ayub wasted the China card —Ahmad Faruqui

Indira Gandhi dismissed the American threat as irrelevant, saying everyone would be dead if Delhi was nuked. Later, the Americans revealed they never intended to attack Delhi. Their goal was simply to rescue American servicemen trapped in East Pakistan

Slowly and steadily, the 1965
Indo-Pakistan war has shed its mysteries. But it is still unclear why it ended suddenly.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ayub’s foreign minister, insinuated that Pakistan was winning the war when Ayub succumbed to foreign pressure. Bhutto also said that the Tashkent Agreement contained a secret clause that compromised Pakistan’s national security and he threatened to “let the cat out of the bag”.

But he never followed through on this threat, probably because merely talking about the cat gave his budding political career a boost. Toward the end of his life, Ayub told G W Choudhry that there was no such clause and the only secret was Bhutto’s childish behaviour at Tashkent. No secret clause has surfaced thus far.

Another mystery has been China’s role in the conflict. Air Marshal Asghar Khan in his 1979 book, “The First Round”, said that a key reason for the war’s indecisive outcome was Ayub’s failure to avail himself of his newfound friendship with China. Asghar Khan flew to Beijing on September 9th on a secret mission to procure arms and ammunition and met Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai.

Chou was up on the military aspects of the situation and assured him that the Chinese would immediately fly the needed combat aircraft over the Karakorums to Pakistan. But to Chou’s surprise, that was not acceptable to Ayub, who wanted the aircraft crated and shipped to Indonesia and then re-shipped to Karachi to hide the transfer from the Americans.

Asghar Khan also conveyed Ayub’s request that the Chinese move the People’s Liberation Army toward the border with India. This deeply concerned the Chinese, because it would have international ramifications. They invited Ayub to Beijing so that Mao could “look him in the eye” and verify that Ayub intended to see the whole thing through. Alternatively, Chou was prepared to visit Pakistan. In the end, Ayub neither visited China nor did he invite Chou for a visit, knowing that his eyes would have given the show away.

Asghar Khan’s account of how Ayub failed to play the China card has received little attention in the scholarly literature, perhaps because it was based on unsubstantiated evidence. However, a quarter century later, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday have substantiated it. They are the co-authors of a major new biography called “Mao: The Unknown Story”.

This meticulously documented expose portrays the grave harms caused to the Chinese people by a man who was supposedly acting in their interest but who in practice was carrying out a megalomaniacal agenda that took more lives than Stalin’s in the Soviet Union. Regarding the 1965 war, it says that Mao was anxious to score another victory over India, having trounced it conclusively in 1962 in the northeastern portion of the border between Tibet and India.

The authors say that China actually came through on Ayub’s request and moved its troops closer to the border with India. It went a step further and issued two ultimatums to India, demanding that it dismantle alleged outposts on territory claimed by China. India was put on the defensive, but the plan collapsed when Pakistan suddenly accepted a UN call for a ceasefire before China’s deadline had expired.

Ayub told Mao that the costs of continuing the war were too high for Pakistan to bear, both diplomatically and economically. However, Mao pressed Ayub to fight on, saying: “If there is a nuclear war, it is Peking and not Rawalpindi that will be the target.” But Ayub demurred.

This episode of history is rich in lessons. First, Ayub should not have gone into a war without thinking through the consequences of sending his forces into Kashmir. He made a fatal error of generalship when he assumed that India would not retaliate against Lahore. This strategic myopia would be imitated by Yahya and Musharraf.

Second, Ayub failed to avail himself of the new ties that Pakistan had cultivated with China and remained a prisoner of the old ties with the US, even though they had gone stale once the US placed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan just as the war began. The embargo was one-sided since it crippled the Pakistani military, whose equipment then was almost entirely of US origin, without making much of a dent in the Indian ability to make war.

Third, Ayub should have thought through the consequences of going to war with India at a time when Pakistan’s major allies were each other’s sworn enemies. Ironically, when Pakistan desperately needed China’s aid six years later, it would find that the China card had expired.

It had been disabled by the long-term defence pact that India had signed with the Soviet Union in August 1971. The USSR moved several army divisions to its border with China in Manchuria. China was forced to tell Pakistan that the Soviet Union did not fear China, which — translated from the Mandarin — meant that China feared the Soviet Union. It could not put pressure on India.

Ironically, by then China and the US had reconciled their differences. Both had a common interest in saving Pakistan. The US moved the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal but this did not deter Indira Gandhi from moving ahead with her war plans to invade Dhaka. According to an interview given many years later by General Sam Maneckshaw, who was then the Indian army chief, Indira Gandhi dismissed the American threat as irrelevant, saying everyone would be dead if Delhi was nuked. Later, the Americans revealed they never intended to attack Delhi. Their goal was simply to rescue American servicemen trapped in East Pakistan.

In the mean time, GHQ was telling Gen. Niazi that he would be bailed out by yellow from the north (Chinese) and blue from the south (Americans). When paratroopers began to land around his HQ, the feckless general sent his assistant to out to check their colours. He came back with really bad news. They were brown.

The fourth lesson is that it is always a bad idea to pick a fight with an adversary who is several times bigger and who has further armed himself with a cogent diplomatic strategy. And the final lesson is to say you won when you did not.

One would think that Pakistan’s military rulers would have figured out these lessons. Alas, evidence is scant. Georges Clemenceau famously said, “War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men.” He could well have added, “Especially to the men in khaki who are moonlighting in muftis.”

The writer, an economist based in San Francisco, has authored “Rethinking the national security of Pakistan,” Ashgate Publishing, 2003

Incisive article. Very well written.
 
Listen to this original interview of PAF pilots in 1965,

[YOUTUBE]

Can some one translate the urdu bit.
 
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Dear brothers ,
This is my first posting in pdf. had India not agreed for ceasefear the situation of pak could have been very similar to 1971 Pak was left with weapons for only 10 days and was in no mood to continue the war. In India 1965 victory is given more value than 1971.
 
I have visited this place in Punjab

Patton Nagar was the imaginary name given to a stretch of land at the Bhikiwind village in the Khem Karan area in 1965 where more than 60 tanks of the Pakistani Army were displayed after the September Indo-Pak War. The Pakistan Army tanks were captured at the battle of Assal Uttar - Pakistan's Waterloo - by India's 4 Mountain Division and it became a memorial to the Indian Triumph of blunting the Pakistani War Machine in the 1965 War. The tanks were displayed for some time after which they were shipped to various cantonments and army establishments for display as war trophies. Over the years, the tanks from Bhikiwind were joined by more captured tanks from the 1971 Indo-Pak War. The Battle of Basantar, the Defence of Longewala, the Capture of Dacca all resulted in scores of Pakistani tanks falling into our hands.
 
My contention is that propaganda in the aftermath of the war was such a blatant lie that it reinforced the belief in PA that one Pak soldier was equal to 10 Indian slodiers. I remember reading a book by Inayatullah who made it appear that PA had only a handful of tanks and the same were rushed from one sector to another beating the hell out of Indian Armour. Whereas in England I had seen pictures of large numbers of Pattons destroyed or ditched at Khem Karan. We paid dearly for this delusion in 1971. It is always harmful to under estimate the enemy.

For me PA made two major mistakes in 1965 war:

1. Changed the command of 12th Div from Majo Gen Akhtar Malik to Yahya Khan. No one has still explained this strange decision in the middle of an on going attack on Aknur!!

2. Incompetence of GOC of pride of PA, the 1st Armoured Div. Just because Brig Shami was killed by a sniper, 200 Pattons of 1st Armoured Div retreated!!!.

IMO promotions in PA from Brigadier and above ceased to be on merit alone from Ayub Khan's days. My reference is Brig Zafar Alam's book "The way it was". Maj Gen Nasir should have been tried for cowardice in the face of the enemy. According to this book officers who showed gallantry in war were never promoted to high ranks.

We forget that peactime smartly dressed "Yes men" dont make good war time leaders. To be sucessful in the face of the enemy fire requires a rebellious streak in the officer's nature which refuses to accept stupid high command decisions. Whereas PA promoted "tiger" Niazi who was seen telling dirty jokes during a dinner just after the surrender in Dhaka in 1971. Jackal would have been a more appropriate nickname.
 
the following vedio shows loads of equipment and tanks left behind by the retreating indian army.

 
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1965 was a war and every war is made up of several battles. the only battle in which indians had the upper hand was khemkaran. altho i have never seen any photograph of those 60 lined up patton tanks cptured by india.
 
Mostly because pak media is not allowed to tell the truth to the citizens of pakistan under army pressure. 1965 is atragedy in pak history. Now people of pak comes to know the true story from internet and other sources.

let peace always prevail
 
Mostly because pak media is not allowed to tell the truth to the citizens of pakistan under army pressure. 1965 is atragedy in pak history. Now people of pak comes to know the true story from internet and other sources.

let peace always prevail

Stop ranting on about things you have no clue about, it's only you and other Indian's claiming it's a failure. Go read your Indian books, and you think Indian media will tell the truth, while claiming Pakistani doesn't, such thinking will never get you no where. Your true story from Wikipedia doesn't count and stop making these stupid claims of people knowing the truth, etc how would you know have you done a survey? Their are sources that talk about Pakistan's gains and dis-advantages including for India, it's a back breaking research in Indo-Pak wars.

Their have been good/bad battles on both sides, but it ended up in a stalemate (under UN mandate).

P.S.: Have constructive talks cause the last 3 posts from you have been nothing to ponder and discuss about, and stop ruining a good thread with non-sense, let those who know talk.
 
Mostly because pak media is not allowed to tell the truth to the citizens of pakistan under army pressure. 1965 is atragedy in pak history. Now people of pak comes to know the true story from internet and other sources.

let peace always prevail

see guys; this is why truth is harmful; some people can't handle the truth ;)
 
Pak sniper atleast you accept it was a stalemate. but your country celebrates it as a victory day? dont you think it is a trajedy of Pakistan. Yes I personaly agree it was a stalemate, I also agree that their should be no war between us.Your anger will prove something else wise men never abuse, nevr get angry . accept the truth it prevails.
 
Pak sniper atleast you accept it was a stalemate. but your country celebrates it as a victory day? dont you think it is a trajedy of Pakistan. Yes I personaly agree it was a stalemate, I also agree that their should be no war between us.

It was no tragedy for Pakistan and it never will be but in your un-educated eyes it might be. And funny thing if it was a stalemate according to UN and you accuse Pakistan of celebrating then why you celebrating, by making it look like a victory? I don't care if their is war or no war between us, what happens happen, and I certainly wouldn't protest against a war rather support it, for personal reasons. I follow the motto "Peace through Arms".

Your anger will prove something else wise men never abuse, nevr get angry . accept the truth it prevails.

:rofl: Your a bigger joke than I originally thought.
 
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